Liability Insurance

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Allen N Berger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the coexistence of multiple distribution systems for financial services the case of property Liability Insurance
    Social Science Research Network, 1998
    Co-Authors: David J Cummins, Allen N Berger, Mary A Weiss
    Abstract:

    Property-Liability Insurance is distributed by independent agents, who represent several insurers, and exclusive agents, who represent only one insurer. The independent agency system is known to have higher costs than the exclusive agency system. The market imperfections hypothesis attributes the coexistence of the two systems to impediments to competition, while the product quality hypothesis holds that independent agents provide higher quality services. We measure both profit efficiency and cost efficiency for a sample of property-Liability insurers and find strong support for the product quality hypothesis. The data are consistent with a higher quality of output for independent agency insurers that is rewarded with additional revenues.

  • the coexistence of multiple distribution systems for financial services the case of property Liability Insurance
    The Journal of Business, 1997
    Co-Authors: David J Cummins, Allen N Berger, Mary A Weiss
    Abstract:

    Property-Liability Insurance is distributed through a direct-writer system, where agents represent one insurer, and an independent-agency system, where agents represent several insurers. Independent-agency insurers have higher costs than direct writers. The market-imperfections hypothesis attributes the coexistence of the two types of insurers to impediments to competition, while the product-quality hypothesis holds that independent-agency insurers provide higher-quality services. The authors measure cost efficiency and profit efficiency for property-Liability insurers and find strong support for the product-quality hypothesis, implying that independent-agency insurers produce higher-quality outputs and are compensated by higher revenues. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

David J Cummins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • market value relevance of frontier efficiency evidence from u s property Liability Insurance acquisitions and divestitures
    Social Science Research Network, 2008
    Co-Authors: David J Cummins, Xiaoying Xie
    Abstract:

    This paper examines the relationship between firm efficiency and stock market reaction to acquisitions and divestitures in the US property-Liability Insurance industry during the period 1997-2003. We use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate firm cost and revenue efficiency. Abnormal returns are measured using the standard market model event study methodology. We then conduct multiple regression analysis with cumulative abnormal returns as dependent variables and efficiency and control variables as regressors. The results show that efficient acquirers and targets have higher cumulative abnormal returns but inefficient divesting firms have higher cumulative abnormal returns. The findings are consistent with Insurance acquisitions and divestitures being driven primarily by value-maximizing motivations and also show that frontier efficiency provides relevant information for value-maximizing managers.

  • regulatory solvency prediction in property Liability Insurance risk based capital audit ratios and cash flow simulation
    Journal of Risk and Insurance, 1998
    Co-Authors: David J Cummins, Martin F Grace, Richard D Phillips
    Abstract:

    This paper analyzes the accuracy of the principal models used by U.S. Insurance regulators to predict insolvencies in the property-Liability Insurance industry and compares these models with a relatively new solvency testing approach--cash flow simulation. Specifically, we compare the risk-based capital (RBC) system introduced by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in 1994, the FAST (Financial Analysis and Surveillance Tracking) audit ratio system used by the NAIC, and a cash flow simulation model developed by the authors. Both the RBC and FAST systems are static, ratio-based approaches to solvency testing, whereas the cash flow simulation model implements dynamic financial analysis. Logistic regression analysis is used to test the models for a large sample of solvent and insolvent property-Liability insurers, using data from the years 1990-1992 to predict insolvencies over three-year prediction horizons. We find that the FAST system dominates RBC as a static method for predicting insurer insolvencies. Further, we find the cash flow simulation variables add significant explanatory power to the regressions and lead to more accurate solvency prediction than the ratio-based models taken alone.

  • the coexistence of multiple distribution systems for financial services the case of property Liability Insurance
    Social Science Research Network, 1998
    Co-Authors: David J Cummins, Allen N Berger, Mary A Weiss
    Abstract:

    Property-Liability Insurance is distributed by independent agents, who represent several insurers, and exclusive agents, who represent only one insurer. The independent agency system is known to have higher costs than the exclusive agency system. The market imperfections hypothesis attributes the coexistence of the two systems to impediments to competition, while the product quality hypothesis holds that independent agents provide higher quality services. We measure both profit efficiency and cost efficiency for a sample of property-Liability insurers and find strong support for the product quality hypothesis. The data are consistent with a higher quality of output for independent agency insurers that is rewarded with additional revenues.

  • the coexistence of multiple distribution systems for financial services the case of property Liability Insurance
    The Journal of Business, 1997
    Co-Authors: David J Cummins, Allen N Berger, Mary A Weiss
    Abstract:

    Property-Liability Insurance is distributed through a direct-writer system, where agents represent one insurer, and an independent-agency system, where agents represent several insurers. Independent-agency insurers have higher costs than direct writers. The market-imperfections hypothesis attributes the coexistence of the two types of insurers to impediments to competition, while the product-quality hypothesis holds that independent-agency insurers provide higher-quality services. The authors measure cost efficiency and profit efficiency for property-Liability insurers and find strong support for the product-quality hypothesis, implying that independent-agency insurers produce higher-quality outputs and are compensated by higher revenues. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

Mary A Weiss - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the coexistence of multiple distribution systems for financial services the case of property Liability Insurance
    Social Science Research Network, 1998
    Co-Authors: David J Cummins, Allen N Berger, Mary A Weiss
    Abstract:

    Property-Liability Insurance is distributed by independent agents, who represent several insurers, and exclusive agents, who represent only one insurer. The independent agency system is known to have higher costs than the exclusive agency system. The market imperfections hypothesis attributes the coexistence of the two systems to impediments to competition, while the product quality hypothesis holds that independent agents provide higher quality services. We measure both profit efficiency and cost efficiency for a sample of property-Liability insurers and find strong support for the product quality hypothesis. The data are consistent with a higher quality of output for independent agency insurers that is rewarded with additional revenues.

  • the coexistence of multiple distribution systems for financial services the case of property Liability Insurance
    The Journal of Business, 1997
    Co-Authors: David J Cummins, Allen N Berger, Mary A Weiss
    Abstract:

    Property-Liability Insurance is distributed through a direct-writer system, where agents represent one insurer, and an independent-agency system, where agents represent several insurers. Independent-agency insurers have higher costs than direct writers. The market-imperfections hypothesis attributes the coexistence of the two types of insurers to impediments to competition, while the product-quality hypothesis holds that independent-agency insurers provide higher-quality services. The authors measure cost efficiency and profit efficiency for property-Liability insurers and find strong support for the product-quality hypothesis, implying that independent-agency insurers produce higher-quality outputs and are compensated by higher revenues. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

Yan Feng - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • environmental pollution Liability Insurance in china in need of strong government backing
    AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment, 2014
    Co-Authors: Yan Feng, Arthur P J Mol, C S A Van Koppen
    Abstract:

    Environmental pollution Liability Insurance was officially introduced in China only in 2006, as part of new market-based approaches for managing environmental risks. By 2012, trial applications of pollution Insurance had been launched in 14 provinces and cities. More than ten Insurance companies have entered the pollution Insurance market with their own products and contracts. Companies in environmentally sensitive sectors and high-risk industries bought pollution Insurance, and a few successful compensation cases have been reported. Still, pollution Insurance faces a number of challenges in China. The absence of a national law weakens the legal basis of pollution Insurance, and poor technical support stagnates further implementation. Moreover, current pollution Insurance products have limited risk coverage, high premium rates, and low loss ratios, which make them fairly unattractive to polluters. Meanwhile, low awareness of environmental and social liabilities leads to limited demand for pollution Insurance products by industrial companies. Hence, the pollution Insurance market is not yet flourishing in China. To improve this situation, this economic instrument needs stronger backing by the Chinese state.

  • environmental pollution Liability Insurance in china compulsory or voluntary
    Journal of Cleaner Production, 2014
    Co-Authors: Yan Feng, Arthur P J Mol, C S A Van Koppen
    Abstract:

    China started the trial application of Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance in 2008, as part of a wider development of using market actors and market mechanisms in mitigating environmental pollution. Around the world and in China two main patterns of local pollution Insurance practices can be identified: voluntary and compulsory pollution Insurance promotion. In order to assess experiences from local pollution Insurance practices in China and to contribute to the construction of a national pollution Insurance policy in 2015, comparative case studies were carried out on voluntary (Chongqing) and compulsory (Wuxi, Jiangsu province) pollution Insurance. Based on the analysis of pollution Insurance products, differences in local policies, involved governance structures, and stakeholder attitudes, differences in pollution Insurance market development between Chongqing and Wuxi are illustrated. The results show that in contemporary China, compulsory pollution Insurance promotion helps local governments to quickly build a relatively mature system of pollution Insurance. But it is too early to draw conclusions on the contribution of pollution Insurance to environmental risk mitigation and pollution victim compensation. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Betsy Kelley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • medical professional Liability Insurance and its relation to medical error and healthcare risk management for the practicing physician
    American Journal of Ophthalmology, 2005
    Co-Authors: Richard L Abbott, Paul A Weber, Betsy Kelley
    Abstract:

    Purpose To review the history and current issues surrounding medical professional Liability Insurance and its relationship to medical error and healthcare risk management. Design Focused literature review and authors' experience. Methods Medical professional Liability Insurance issues are reviewed in association with the occurrence of medical error and the role of healthcare risk management. Results The rising frequency and severity of claims and lawsuits incurred by physicians, as well as escalating defense costs, have dramatically increased over the past several years and have resulted in accelerated efforts to reduce medical errors and control practice risk for physicians. Medical error reduction and improved patient outcomes are closely linked to the goals of the medical risk manager by reducing exposure to adverse medical events. Management of professional Liability risk by the physician-led malpractice Insurance company not only protects the economic viability of physicians, but also addresses patient safety concerns. Conclusions Physician-owned malpractice Liability Insurance companies will continue to be the dominant providers of Insurance for practicing physicians and will serve as the primary source for loss prevention and risk management services. To succeed in the marketplace, the emergence and importance of the risk manager and incorporation of risk management principles throughout the professional Liability company has become crucial to the financial stability and success of the Insurance company. The risk manager provides the necessary advice and support requested by physicians to minimize medical Liability risk in their daily practice.