The Experts below are selected from a list of 169260 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Siri Terjesen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Corporate Governance deviance
2017Co-Authors: Ruth V Aguilera, William Q Judge, Siri TerjesenAbstract:We develop the concept of Corporate Governance deviance and seek to understand why, when, and how a firm adopts Governance practices that do not conform to the dominant Governance logic. Drawing on institutional theory, coupled with the entrepreneurship and Corporate Governance literatures, we advance a middle range theory of the antecedents of Corporate Governance deviance that considers both the institutional context and firm-level agency. Specifically, we highlight the centrality of a firm’s entrepreneurial identity as it interacts with the national Governance logic to jointly create Corporate Governance discretion (i.e., the latitude of accessible Governance practices) within the firm. We argue that as a firm’s Governance discretion increases, it will be more likely to adopt over- or under-conforming Governance practices that deviate from established norms and practices. Moreover, we propose that adopting a deviant Corporate Governance practice is contingent on the Governance regulatory environment and a firm’s Corporate Governance capacity. We conclude by advancing a new typology of Corporate Governance deviance based on a firm’s over- or under-conformity with the dominant national logic, as well as its entrepreneurial identity motives. This globally-relevant study refines and extends comparative Corporate Governance research and enriches our current understanding of the institutional logics perspective.
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Corporate Governance deviance
Academy of Management Review, 2016Co-Authors: Ruth V Aguilera, William Q Judge, Siri TerjesenAbstract:We develop the concept of Corporate Governance deviance and seek to understand why, when, and how a firm adopts Governance practices that do not conform to the dominant Governance logic. Drawing on institutional theory, coupled with both the entrepreneurship and Corporate Governance literature, we advance a middle-range theory of the antecedents of Corporate Governance deviance that considers both the institutional context and firm-level agency. Specifically, we highlight the centrality of a firm’s entrepreneurial identity as it interacts with the national Governance logic to jointly create Corporate Governance discretion (i.e., the latitude of accessible Governance practices) within the firm. We argue that as a firm’s Governance discretion increases, it will be more likely to adopt overconforming or underconforming Governance practices that deviate from established norms and practices. Moreover, we propose that adopting a deviant Corporate Governance practice is contingent on the Governance regulatory en...
Matti Suominen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Corporate Governance finance and the real sector
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2012Co-Authors: Paolo Fulghieri, Matti SuominenAbstract:We present a theory of the linkages between Corporate Governance, Corporate finance, and the real sector of an economy. Using a structural model of industry equilibrium with endogenous entry, we show that poor Corporate Governance leads to low levels of competition, and to firms with high insider ownership and leverage. In contrast, good Corporate Governance promotes the adoption of more efficient technologies and development of sectors more exposed to moral hazard. We use our model to study equity market liberalization, and we show that liberalizations facilitate entry and adoption of more productive technologies, especially in countries with good Corporate Governance.
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Corporate Governance finance and the real sector
Social Science Research Network, 2010Co-Authors: Paolo Fulghieri, Matti SuominenAbstract:This paper presents a theory of the linkages between Corporate Governance, Corporate finance and the real sector of an economy. We examine a model of industry equilibrium with endogenous entry. We show that poor Corporate Governance and low investor protection generates less competitive economies, populated by firms with more insider ownership and greater leverage. The quality of the Corporate Governance system can also affect an economy's industrial structure: better Corporate Governance promotes the development of sectors more exposed to moral hazard, such as the high-technology industry. We also show that entrepreneurs may have a preference for "extreme" Corporate Governance systems, where the quality of Corporate Governance and the level of investor protection are either very high or very low. This suggests that entrepreneurs operating in economies endowed with a Corporate Governance system of low-quality may have little or no incentive to seek (or to lobby for) an improvement of the Governance system of their economy. Finally we show that financial liberalizations facilitate firm entry and the adoption of more productive technologies, promoting economic growth. Our stylized model generates predictions that are consistent with several observed empirical regularities.
Ruth V Aguilera - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Corporate Governance deviance
2017Co-Authors: Ruth V Aguilera, William Q Judge, Siri TerjesenAbstract:We develop the concept of Corporate Governance deviance and seek to understand why, when, and how a firm adopts Governance practices that do not conform to the dominant Governance logic. Drawing on institutional theory, coupled with the entrepreneurship and Corporate Governance literatures, we advance a middle range theory of the antecedents of Corporate Governance deviance that considers both the institutional context and firm-level agency. Specifically, we highlight the centrality of a firm’s entrepreneurial identity as it interacts with the national Governance logic to jointly create Corporate Governance discretion (i.e., the latitude of accessible Governance practices) within the firm. We argue that as a firm’s Governance discretion increases, it will be more likely to adopt over- or under-conforming Governance practices that deviate from established norms and practices. Moreover, we propose that adopting a deviant Corporate Governance practice is contingent on the Governance regulatory environment and a firm’s Corporate Governance capacity. We conclude by advancing a new typology of Corporate Governance deviance based on a firm’s over- or under-conformity with the dominant national logic, as well as its entrepreneurial identity motives. This globally-relevant study refines and extends comparative Corporate Governance research and enriches our current understanding of the institutional logics perspective.
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Corporate Governance deviance
Academy of Management Review, 2016Co-Authors: Ruth V Aguilera, William Q Judge, Siri TerjesenAbstract:We develop the concept of Corporate Governance deviance and seek to understand why, when, and how a firm adopts Governance practices that do not conform to the dominant Governance logic. Drawing on institutional theory, coupled with both the entrepreneurship and Corporate Governance literature, we advance a middle-range theory of the antecedents of Corporate Governance deviance that considers both the institutional context and firm-level agency. Specifically, we highlight the centrality of a firm’s entrepreneurial identity as it interacts with the national Governance logic to jointly create Corporate Governance discretion (i.e., the latitude of accessible Governance practices) within the firm. We argue that as a firm’s Governance discretion increases, it will be more likely to adopt overconforming or underconforming Governance practices that deviate from established norms and practices. Moreover, we propose that adopting a deviant Corporate Governance practice is contingent on the Governance regulatory en...
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an organizational approach to comparative Corporate Governance costs contingencies and complementarities
2007Co-Authors: Ruth V Aguilera, Igor Filatotchev, Howard Gospel, Gregory JacksonAbstract:This paper develops an organizational approach to Corporate Governance and assesses the effectiveness of Corporate Governance and implications for policy. Most Corporate Governance research focuses on a universal link between Corporate Governance practices (e.g. shareholder activism, board independence) and performance outcomes, but neglects how interdependences between the organization and diverse environments lead to variations in the effectiveness of different Corporate Governance practices. In contrast to such 'closed systems' approaches, we propose a framework based on 'open systems' approaches to organizations which examines these organizational interdependencies in terms of the costs, contingencies and complementarities of different Corporate Governance practices. These three sets of organizational factors are useful in analyzing the effectiveness of Corporate Governance in diverse organizational environments. We also explore how costs, contingencies and complementarities impact approaches to policy such as 'soft-law' or 'hard law', and their effectiveness in different contexts.
Harry Huizinga - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Corporate Governance and bank insolvency risk international evidence
Research Papers in Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Deniz Anginer, Asli Demirguckunt, Harry HuizingaAbstract:This paper finds that shareholder-friendly Corporate Governance is positively associated with bank insolvency risk, as proxied by the Z-score and the Merton's distance to default measure, for an international sample of banks over the 2004-08 period. Banks are special in that"good"Corporate Governance increases bank insolvency risk relatively more for banks that are large and located in countries with sound public finances, as banks aim to exploit the financial safety net. Good Corporate Governance is specifically associated with higher asset volatility, more nonperforming loans, and a lower tangible capital ratio. Furthermore, good Corporate Governance is associated with more bank risk-taking at times of rapid economic expansion. Consistent with increased risk-taking, good Corporate Governance is associated with a higher valuation of the implicit insurance provided by the financial safety net, especially in the case of large banks. These results underline the importance of the financial safety net and too-big-to-fail policies in encouraging excessive risk-taking by banks.
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Corporate Governance and bank insolvency risk international evidence
Other publications TiSEM, 2014Co-Authors: Deniz Anginer, Asli Demirguckunt, Harry HuizingaAbstract:This paper finds that shareholder-friendly Corporate Governance is positively associated with bank insolvency risk, as proxied by the Z-score and the Merton's distance to default measure, for an international sample of banks over the 2004-08 period. Banks are special in that"good"Corporate Governance increases bank insolvency risk relatively more for banks that are large and located in countries with sound public finances, as banks aim to exploit the financial safety net. Good Corporate Governance is specifically associated with higher asset volatility, more nonperforming loans, and a lower tangible capital ratio. Furthermore, good Corporate Governance is associated with more bank risk-taking at times of rapid economic expansion. Consistent with increased risk-taking, good Corporate Governance is associated with a higher valuation of the implicit insurance provided by the financial safety net, especially in the case of large banks. These results underline the importance of the financial safety net and too-big-to-fail policies in encouraging excessive risk-taking by banks. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Robert W Vishny - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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investor protection and Corporate Governance
Social Science Research Network, 1999Co-Authors: Andrei Shleifer, Robert W Vishny, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez De SilanesAbstract:Recent research on Corporate Governance has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of financial markets, and in the access of firms to external finance. We suggest that there is a common element to the explanations of these differences, namely how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, summarize the consequences of these differences, and suggest potential strategies of reform of Corporate Governance. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand Corporate Governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.
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a survey of Corporate Governance
Journal of Finance, 1997Co-Authors: Andrei Shleifer, Robert W VishnyAbstract:This article surveys research on Corporate Governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in Corporate Governance systems around the world. Corporate Governance DEALS WITH the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers? At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the suppliers of capital get anything back. After all, they part with their money, and have little to contribute to the enterprise afterward. The professional managers or entrepreneurs who run the firms might as well abscond with the money. Although they sometimes do, usually they do not. Most advanced market economies have solved the problem of Corporate Governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance. But this does not imply that they have solved the Corporate Governance problem perfectly, or that the Corporate Governance mechanisms cannot be improved. In fact, the subject of Corporate Governance is of enormous practical impor
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a survey of Corporate Governance
Social Science Research Network, 1996Co-Authors: Andrei Shleifer, Robert W VishnyAbstract:This paper surveys research on Corporate Governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in Corporate Governance systems around the world.
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a survey of Corporate Governance
Research Papers in Economics, 1995Co-Authors: Andrei Shleifer, Robert W VishnyAbstract:This paper surveys research on Corporate Governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in Corporate Governance systems around the world. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
