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Bruno Amable - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of employment protection and product Market Regulation on labour Market performance substitution or complementarity
Applied Economics, 2011Co-Authors: Bruno Amable, Lilas Demmou, Donatella GattiAbstract:This article provides new evidence on the linkages between various forms of Market Regulation and joblessness and its components, unemployment and inactivity. One crucial contribution of this article is the analysis of the interdependence across Product Market Regulation (PMR) and labour Markets Regulation (Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)). With the help of a dynamic fixed effect model with an interaction term, we estimate the marginal impact of EPL and PMR at different levels of the other interacted variable. To cope with problems related to the inclusion of time-invariant institutional variables in fixed effect models, we present results of regressions based on a new procedure, specifically designed to treat slowly changing variables. We build time-series data to account for the annual evolution of EPL, and use new data for unemployment insurance net replacement rates. Among other results, we find evidence of a positive (negative) effect of EPL (PMR) on employment performance as well as of substitution, rather than complementarity, between the two forms of Regulation.
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the effect of employment protection and product Market Regulation on labour Market performance substitution or complementarity
Applied Economics, 2011Co-Authors: Bruno Amable, Lilas Demmou, Donatella GattiAbstract:This article provides new evidence on the linkages between various forms of Market Regulation and joblessness and its components, unemployment and inactivity. One crucial contribution of this article is the analysis of the interdependence across Product Market Regulation (PMR) and labour Markets Regulation (Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)). With the help of a dynamic fixed effect model with an interaction term, we estimate the marginal impact of EPL and PMR at different levels of the other interacted variable. To cope with problems related to the inclusion of time-invariant institutional variables in fixed effect models, we present results of regressions based on a new procedure, specifically designed to treat slowly changing variables. We build time-series data to account for the annual evolution of EPL, and use new data for unemployment insurance net replacement rates. Among other results, we find evidence of a positive (negative) effect of EPL (PMR) on employment performance as well as of subst...
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the effect of employment protection and product Market Regulation on labour Market performance substitution or complementarity
Post-Print, 2011Co-Authors: Bruno Amable, Lilas Demmou, Donatella GattiAbstract:This article provides new evidence on the linkages between various forms of Market Regulation and joblessness and its components, unemployment and inactivity. One crucial contribution of this article is the analysis of the interdependence across Product Market Regulation (PMR) and labour Markets Regulation (Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)). With the help of a dynamic fixed effect model with an interaction term, we estimate the marginal impact of EPL and PMR at different levels of the other interacted variable. To cope with problems related to the inclusion of time-invariant institutional variables in fixed effect models, we present results of regressions based on a new procedure, specifically designed to treat slowly changing variables. We build time-series data to account for the annual evolution of EPL, and use new data for unemployment insurance net replacement rates. Among other results, we find evidence of a positive (negative) effect of EPL (PMR) on employment performance as well as of substitution, rather than complementarity, between the two forms of Regulation. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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product Market Regulation innovation and distance to frontier
Social Science Research Network, 2010Co-Authors: Bruno Amable, Lilas Demmou, Ivan LedezmaAbstract:This article contributes to the literature on competition and innovation. It tests the impact of Market Regulation on innovation conditional to the closeness to the technological frontier with a panel of 15 industries for 17 OECD countries over the period 1979–2003. One of the main conclusions of this literature is that of a negative impact of Regulation growing in intensity with the proximity to the frontier. A simple model of innovation and growth shows that one should not necessarily expect this result. Empirical tests on a variety of specifications show that the impact of Regulation can be positive when industries are close to the technological frontier. We argue that this result is in fact line with previous evidence.
Nicholas Dorn - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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democracy and diversity in financial Market Regulation
2014Co-Authors: Nicholas DornAbstract:__Abstract__ Financial Markets have become acknowledged as a source of crisis, and discussion of them has shifted from economics, through legal and regulatory studies, to politics. Events from 2008 onwards raise important, cross-disciplinary questions: must financial Markets drive states into political and existential crisis, must public finances take over private losses, must citizens endure austerity? This book argues that there is an alternative. If the financial system were less 'connected', contagion within the Market would be reduced and crises would become more localised and intermittent, less global and pervasive. The question then becomes how to reduce connectedness within financial Markets. This book argues that the democratic direction of financial Market policies can deliver this. Politicising financial Market policies – taking discussion of these issues out of the sphere of the 'technical' and putting it into the same democratically contested space as, for example, health and welfare policies – would encourage differing policies to emerge in different countries. Diversity of regulatory regimes would result in some business models being attracted to some jurisdictions, others to others. The resulting heterogeneity, when viewed from a global perspective, would be a reversal of recent and current tendencies towards one single/global 'level playing field', within which all financial firms and sectors have become closely connected and across which contagion inevitably reigns.
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render unto caesar eu financial Market Regulation meets political accountability
Journal of European Integration, 2012Co-Authors: Nicholas DornAbstract:Abstract This paper posits three phases in EU financial Market Regulation. First, for the 1990s, established scholarship suggests leadership by public actors in the context of development of the single Market and relations with the USA. We adopt this analysis, characterising it as ‘public–private’ Regulation. Second, in the new millennium Regulation shifted towards ‘private–public’, with regulators paying more attention to the demands of large financial firms. This tendency is explored through a critical study of ‘technical’ decision‐making by EU regulators, focusing upon the Committee of European Securities Regulators and rating credit agencies. Third, as from 2010 EU policy‐makers react to the spillover of the financial crisis from Markets to member states, some limits to private–public governance have been underlined. The paper concludes with a discussion of positions taken by the European Parliament, moderating claims made for ‘technical’ rule‐making and opening up the possibility of wider intellectua...
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policy stances in financial Market Regulation Market rapture club rules or democracy
2011Co-Authors: Nicholas DornAbstract:This chapter calls for democratic accountability and steering of financial Market Regulation, supporting national/regional diversity in regulatory institutions, frameworks and rules. It argues that the form taken by the systemic Market crisis of 2006 onwards – contagion between Market sectors and financial centres – was (is) in part a result of the process of regulatory convergence. Convergence arises from international regulatory networking between those possessing technical expertise, separated off from moral questions, public politics, democratic accountability or any other countervailing power. In a longer-range historical perspective, the paper utilises and develops Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas about ‘cultural capital’ (related here to ideas about ‘club’ or gentlemanly Regulation) and ‘economic capital’ (Market models and other forms of knowledge developed by private interests). Regulatory networking and convergence signify a shift, from a balance between these two forms of knowledge, to the unchallenged ascendance of the second, and so to a one-dimensional knowledge base for financial Market Regulation. From 2009 onwards, as the economic crisis reconstructs political difference (and hence reintroduces possibilities for real policy choice), there is a tussle between three forces: (a) the damaged but still very strong rapture crowd, favouring a continuation and indeed deepening of international, technocratic networking and governance; (b) nostalgic voices calling for a return to ‘club’ Regulation though institutions independent of both the Market and democracy (proposals for centrals banks or other new ‘independent’ institutions to become systemic risk regulators fall into this category); and (c) cosmopolitan forces seeking the broader public good of systemic stability through democratic accountability of financial Market regulators.
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ponzi finance and state capture the crisis of financial Market Regulation
2010Co-Authors: Nicholas DornAbstract:It is widely agreed that failures of financial Market Regulation contributed to systemic instability and the credit crunch of 2007-9. However the reasons for such failures are matters of debate. Three levels of analysis are explored here: descriptive, explanatory and historical. First, and at a descriptive level, consideration of ‘Ponzi finance’ raises provocative questions about continuities between criminal frauds and the broader context of licit but unstable financial Markets. Second, ‘capture’ provides an explanation of policy makers’ and regulators’ acceptance, indeed encouragement, of the rise of a global Ponzi-like financial Market: policy and Regulation were shaped by the Market. Finally, the historical conditions that facilitated capture are explored, using Bourdieu’s work on forms of knowledge related to ‘cultural capital’ and ‘economic capital’. As economic capital became predominant, not only in Markets but also amongst policy makers and regulators, so the social basis for intellectual challenge and emotional caution was lost and groupthink and ‘herding’ occurred. In conclusion, the prospects for change are briefly and somewhat sceptically addressed, in terms of democratic oversight of regulators and/or shifts in global power. This abstract does not appear in the book. Two short extracts are downloadable.
Kai P Purnhagen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the behavioural law and economics of the precautionary principle in the eu and its impact on internal Market Regulation
Journal of Consumer Policy, 2014Co-Authors: Kai P PurnhagenAbstract:The precautionary principle contributes to “the social” of internal Market Regulation as it counterbalances the loss aversion and availability bias of regulators who may too hastily endorse measures based to further the fundamental freedoms instead of fundamental rights and environmental protection. The precautionary principle also enhances the regulatory power of the European Union. By way of regulating via the precautionary principle, EU institutions pretend to have answers to citizen’s fears. These fears result from a crisis of causality, as society is trying to find a meaning to what sometimes appears as a series of patternless events. The EU legal order takes advantage of these effects. It creates an image of being able to cope with these fears, although it is rather questionable whether they really can live up to these expectations.
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homo economicus behavioural sciences and economic Regulation on the concept of man in internal Market Regulation and its normative basis
Law and Economics: Foudations and Applications Economics Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship 1, 2014Co-Authors: Jensuwe Franck, Kai P PurnhagenAbstract:We investigate how EU law conceptualizes the individual to whom internal Market Regulation is addressed. Our analytical point of departure is a stylized information paradigm , whereby for reasons of internal Market benefits, Market players have to bear the burden of perceiving and processing information that is relevant in respect of an intended transaction, as well as disadvantages should they be ill-equipped to cope with this assignment. Although the ECJ implemented the normative concept of a well-informed, observant and circumspect consumer, it never adopted such a stylized information paradigm . The EU legislature assists Market players in perceiving and processing information, and even seeks to steer their decision-making process. We reconsider whether or to what extent this should be understood as an advancement of an information paradigm or rather as a “behavioural turn”. Only a differentiated approach that balances the internal Market rationale with potentially conflicting rights meets the exigencies of EU law.
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homo economicus behavioural sciences and economic Regulation on the concept of man in internal Market Regulation and its normative basis
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Jensuwe Franck, Kai P PurnhagenAbstract:In the following paper we investigate how EU law conceptualizes the individual to whom internal Market Regulation is addressed. To this end, we take as an analytical point of departure a stylized information paradigm, whereby for reasons of internal Market benefits, Market players have to bear the burden of perceiving and processing information that is relevant in respect of an intended transaction, as well as disadvantages should they be ill-equipped to cope with this assignment. We will show that although it implemented the normative concept of a well-informed, observant and circumspect consumer, the ECJ never adopted such a stylized information paradigm. Moreover, we illustrate through various examples how the EU legislature assists Market players in perceiving and processing information, and even seeks to steer their decision-making process. We reconsider whether or to what extent this should be understood as an advancement of an information paradigm or rather as a “behavioural turn.” We argue that only a differentiated approach that balances the internal Market rationale with potentially conflicting rights meets the exigencies of EU law.
Niamh Moloney - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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eu financial Market Regulation after the global financial crisis more europe or more risks
Common Market Law Review, 2010Co-Authors: Niamh MoloneyAbstract:This article charts the EU's regulatory response to the global financial crisis, and explores what the response suggests about the new regulatory landscape and its risks. It explores how the current reform programme, in contrast to earlier reform periods, has been dominated by a concern to manage the pathology of the internal Market through intensive EU "rules on the books" (law-making) but also, and for the first time in EU financial Market Regulation, through more radical "rules in action" (supervision and enforcement). The defining feature of the post-crisis reform movement seems to be the array of influences, chief among the new institutional structures, which are driving the financial Markets regime toward greater centralization. The article examines this decisive move towards "More Europe" and assesses its ramifications. It argues that, while radical reform is certainly needed, the extent to which the EU now governs financial Market Regulation does generate risks, particularly with respect to the extent to which Member State flexibility and discretion is being squeezed from the regime.
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iii financial Market Regulation in the post financial services action plan era
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2006Co-Authors: Niamh MoloneyAbstract:After a hectic period of law reform, which has also provoked major governance reforms in the form of significantly increased levels of transparency and Market consultation and major institutional innovations (with allied accountability and governance risks), the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)1 has now been completed. It has radically transformed the regulatory landscape for financial services in the EC, and set a seal on the recharacterization of EC financial services law from a minimum harmonization-based Market construction regime to a highly interventionist and increasingly sophisti-cated Market Regulation system. In particular, the coincidence of legislative reform under the FSAP with the development of a new institutional process for law-making, which has rapidly become embedded in the financial Market architecture (the Lamfalussy process),2 produced a reform agenda of immense depth and range. The FSAP period has also seen the use and development of a wide range of regulatory tools in EC financial services policy in line with the growing sophistication of the regulatory regime. While disclosure has long been a key policy tool of EC financial services law, the FSAP saw a closer focus on conflict of interest management across the financial sector, on more interventionist controls such as transparency, suitability, and best execution requirements, and on calibrating Regulation to different investor profiles and different Market risks. This article considers a selection of key recent developments.
Julien Prat - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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product Market Regulation firm selection and unemployment
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2011Co-Authors: Gabriel Felbermayr, Julien PratAbstract:This paper analyzes the effect of product Market Regulation (PMR) on unemployment in a search model with heterogeneous multiple-worker firms. In our setup, PMR modifies the distribution of firm productivities, thereby affecting the equilibrium rate of unemployment. We distinguish between PMR related to entry costs and PMR that generates recurrent fixed costs. We find that: (i) higher entry costs raise the rate of unemployment mainly through our novel selection effect, (ii) higher fixed costs decrease unemployment through the selection effect and increase it through the competition effect analyzed in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 879-907). Firm heterogeneity magnifies the impact of both types of regulatory costs. We propose econometric evidence consistent with the unemployment effects of sunk versus recurring costs.
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Product Market Regulation, Firm Selection and Unemployment
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2011Co-Authors: Gabriel Felbermayr, Julien PratAbstract:This paper analyzes the effect of Product Market Regulation (PMR) on unemployment in a search model with heterogeneous multiple-worker firms. In our setup, PMR modifies the distribution of firm productivities, thereby affecting the equilibrium rate of unemployment. We distinguish between PMR related to entry costs and PMR that generates recurrent fixed costs. We find that: (i) higher entry costs raise the rate of unemployment mainly through our novel selection effect, (ii) higher fixed costs lower unemployment through the selection effect and increase it through the competition effect analyzed in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). We propose econometric evidence consistent with the unemployment effects of sunk versus recurring costs.
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employment protection product Market Regulation and firm selection
The Economic Journal, 2007Co-Authors: Winfried Koeniger, Julien PratAbstract:This paper analyzes the effect of labor and product Market Regulation in a dynamic stochastic equilibrium with search frictions. Modeling multiple-worker firms allows us to distinguish between the exit-and-entry (extensive) margin, and the hiring-and-firing (intensive) margin. We characterize analytically how both margins depend on Regulation before we calibrate the model to the US economy. We find that firing costs matter most for the intensive margin. Fixed or set-up costs in the product Market instead alter primarily the behavior of firms at the extensive margin. Moreover, we find important interactions between the policies through firm selection. Finally, the opposite effect of product and labor Market Regulation on job turnover rationalizes the empirically observed similarity of turnover rates across countries.
