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Francois Recanati - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • precis of oratio obliqua oratio recta an essay on Metarepresentation
    Dialectica, 2003
    Co-Authors: Francois Recanati
    Abstract:

    A summary of my book *Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta*, published by MIT Press in 2000 ('Representation and Mind' series).

  • oratio obliqua oratio recta an essay on Metarepresentation
    The Philosophical Review, 2002
    Co-Authors: Francois Recanati
    Abstract:

    Among the entities that can be mentally or linguistically represented are mental and linguistic representations themselves. That is, we can think and talk about speech and thought. This phenomenon is known as Metarepresentation. An example is "Authors believe that people read books." In this book Francois Recanati discusses the structure of Metarepresentation from a variety of perspectives. According to him, Metarepresentations have a dual structure: their content includes the content of the object-representation (people reading books) as well as the "meta" part (the authors' belief). Rejecting the view that the object representation is mentioned rather than used, Recanati claims that since Metarepresentations carry the content of the object representation, they must be about whatever the object representation is about. Metarepresentations are fundamentally transparent because they work by simulating the representation they are about. Topics covered in this wide-ranging work include the analysis of belief reports and talk about fiction, world shifting, opacity and substitutivity, quotation, the relation between direct and indirect discourse, context shifting, semantic pretense, and deference in language and thought.

Barbara Macmahon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Joelle Proust - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Rationality and metacognition in non-human animals
    2020
    Co-Authors: Joelle Proust
    Abstract:

    The project of understanding rationality in non-human animals faces a number of conceptual and methodological difficulties. The present chapter defends the view that it is counterproductive to rely on the human folk psychological idiom in animal cognition studies. Instead, it approaches the subject on the basis of dynamic- evolutionary considerations. Concepts from control theory can be used to frame the problem in the most general terms. The specific selective pressures exerted on agents endowed with information-processing capacities are analysed. It is hypothesized that metacognition offers an evolutionary stable response to the various demands of the internal and external flows of information in a competitive environment. Metacognition provides a form of process-reflexivity that can, but does not have to be redeployed through Metarepresentations. Finally the claim that rationality so conceived involves normativity is discussed.

  • metacognition and Metarepresentation is a self directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition
    Synthese, 2007
    Co-Authors: Joelle Proust
    Abstract:

    Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one's own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has Metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in Metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in Metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although Metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive contents, metacognition and Metarepresentation are functionally distinct.

  • metacognition and Metarepresentation
    Synthese, 2007
    Co-Authors: Joelle Proust
    Abstract:

    Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one's own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has Metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in Metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in Metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although Metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive contents, metacognition and Metarepresentation are functionally distinct.

  • does metacognition necessarily involve Metarepresentation
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2003
    Co-Authors: Joelle Proust
    Abstract:

    Against the view that metacognition is a capacity that parallels theory of mind, it is argued that metacognition need not involve Metarepresentation, nor semantic forms of reflexivity, but only process-reflexivity, through which a task-specific system monitors its own internal feedback by using quantitative cues. Metacognitive activities, however, may be redescribed in Metarepresentational, mentalistic terms in species endowed with a theory of mind.

  • smith j d hields w e and washburn d a the comparative psychology of uncertainty monitoring and metacognition does metacognition necessarily involve Metarepresentation
    2003
    Co-Authors: Joelle Proust
    Abstract:

    Against the view that metacognition is a capacity that parallels theory of mind, it is argued that metacognition need not involve Metarepresentation, nor semantic forms of reflexivity, but only process-reflexivity, through which a task-specific system monitors its own internal feedback by using quantitative cues. Metacognitive activities, however, may be redescribed in Metarepresentational, mentalistic terms in species endowed with a theory of mind. An important conceptual issue raised by the target article consists in the sense of « selfknowledge » engaged in confidence judgments that monkeys and dolphins seem to be able to form, in contrast with other species such as rats and pigeons. The authors tend to consider that the same notion of « self-reflexivity » applies in the realms of higher mental-states attribution and of metacognitive monitoring of the system’s epistemic states. While they accept the view that cognitive self-awareness may be different from self-recognition, they suggest that metacognition is a capacity that parallels theory of mind : the latter asks « whether animals know and monitor the other’s mental states and states of knowing », the former « whether animals know and monitor their own mental states and states of knowing » ( Section 3). This parallel may be misleading, however, in important ways. Given monkeys’ lack of theory of mind and absence of self-recognition (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990, Anderson & Gallup, 1997), it is highly implausible that they have any mentalistic understanding of their ability to evaluate their own epistemic dispositions. But maybe Smith et al. rather suggest that metacognitive abilities constitute a precursor for the mentalistic abilities as found in humans. In this case, however, a clear distinction between mentalizing and metacognitive capacities is still needed. Whereas by definition an animal endowed with a « theory of mind » capacity is able to

Lisa Hopkins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Jen Scott Curwood - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • using the design framework as a Metarepresentation to facilitate teacher researcher collaboration
    International Conference of Learning Sciences, 2010
    Co-Authors: Dana Gnesdilow, Jen Scott Curwood
    Abstract:

    Often, when one educational design fails, the response is to try another design rather than closely inspect the potential disconnects between the designers' intended features and users' perceived affordances. A design-based perspective on classroom curricular interventions may inform subsequent iterations of the design, which can benefit teachers, researchers, and students alike. Our theoretical work draws from the field of participatory design research to highlight the need for the utilization of the design framework as a Metarepresentation to foster collaboration between teachers and researchers. Furthermore, it highlights six ways in which the design framework can be applied throughout the process of planning educational innovations to minimize disconnects that may occur between design, implementation, and iteration.

  • ICLS - Using the design framework as a Metarepresentation to facilitate teacher-researcher collaboration
    2010
    Co-Authors: Dana Gnesdilow, Jen Scott Curwood
    Abstract:

    Often, when one educational design fails, the response is to try another design rather than closely inspect the potential disconnects between the designers' intended features and users' perceived affordances. A design-based perspective on classroom curricular interventions may inform subsequent iterations of the design, which can benefit teachers, researchers, and students alike. Our theoretical work draws from the field of participatory design research to highlight the need for the utilization of the design framework as a Metarepresentation to foster collaboration between teachers and researchers. Furthermore, it highlights six ways in which the design framework can be applied throughout the process of planning educational innovations to minimize disconnects that may occur between design, implementation, and iteration.