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Rebecca Saxe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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replications of implicit Theory of Mind tasks with varying representational demands
Cognitive Development, 2017Co-Authors: Lindsey J Powell, Kathryn Hobbs, Alexandros Bardis, Susan Carey, Rebecca SaxeAbstract:Abstract We attempted to reproduce three tests of Theory of Mind in infants using implicit tasks that have been previously reported in the literature. These efforts were intended as initial steps in larger projects aimed at building on past research to better understand infants’ Theory of Mind capacities and their relationship to preschoolers’ explicit Theory of Mind. One task fully replicated evidence of 2-year-old children’s sensitivity to others’ ignorance. The results of another task testing for similar capacities in 18-month-old infants also elicited behavior similar to the original findings, although in that case we only conducted one of two conditions critical for demonstrating that performance depended upon Theory of Mind capacities. In contrast, our violation of expectation tasks failed to reproduce evidence that, by 18 months of age, infants form specific expectations about the actions an agent will engage in on the basis of false beliefs. Instead, looking times were consistent with infants having no clear prediction about the agent's actions under conditions of false belief. We discuss factors that might account for our failure to reproduce the previously reported violation of expectation results on which we were attempting to build. However, we also discuss the consistency of our data with other findings and hypotheses regarding early-developing Theory of Mind, and consider the possibility that they reflect the veridical abilities of 18-month-old infants, who may track others’ knowledge and ignorance but may not consistently represent the contents of others’ beliefs.
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Theory of Mind a neural prediction problem
Neuron, 2013Co-Authors: Jorie Kosterhale, Rebecca SaxeAbstract:Predictive coding posits that neural systems make forward-looking predictions about incoming information. Neural signals contain information not about the currently perceived stimulus, but about the difference between the observed and the predicted stimulus. We propose to extend the predictive coding framework from high-level sensory processing to the more abstract domain of Theory of Mind; that is, to inferences about others' goals, thoughts, and personalities. We review evidence that, across brain regions, neural responses to depictions of human behavior, from biological motion to trait descriptions, exhibit a key signature of predictive coding: reduced activity to predictable stimuli. We discuss how future experiments could distinguish predictive coding from alternative explanations of this response profile. This framework may provide an important new window on the neural computations underlying Theory of Mind.
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Theory of Mind performance in children correlates with functional specialization of a brain region for thinking about thoughts
Child Development, 2012Co-Authors: Hyowon Gweon, David Dodellfeder, Marina Bedny, Rebecca SaxeAbstract:Thinking about other people’s thoughts recruits a specific group of brain regions, including the temporo-parietal junctions (TPJ), precuneus (PC), and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). The same brain regions were recruited when children (N = 20, 5–11 years) and adults (N = 8) listened to descriptions of characters’ mental states, compared to descriptions of physical events. Between ages 5 and 11 years, responses in the bilateral TPJ became increasingly specific to stories describing mental states as opposed to people’s appearance and social relationships. Functional activity in the right TPJ was related to children’s performance on a high level Theory of Mind task. These findings provide insights into the origin of neural mechanisms of Theory of Mind, and how behavioral and neural changes can be related in development. As human adults, we spend much of our time thinking about the actions and thoughts of others: We predict and explain others’ actions, interpret their speech and gestures, make moral and legal decisions about their actions, and more. What underlies all of these impressive and distinctively human behaviors is the capacity to infer and reason about unobservable mental states, a ‘‘Theory of Mind’’ (ToM). With the recent advent of noninvasive methods to study the neural basis of human cognitive functions, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have discovered a set of brain regions that are selectively recruited for ToM tasks (Frith & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), including the bilateral temporo-parietal junctions (TPJ), precuneus (PC), and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC).
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distinct regions of right temporo parietal junction are selective for Theory of Mind and exogenous attention
PLOS ONE, 2009Co-Authors: Jonatha Scholz, Christina Triantafyllou, Susa Whitfieldgabrieli, Rebecca SaxeAbstract:In functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, a cortical region in the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) is recruited when participants read stories about people's thoughts (‘Theory of Mind’). Both fMRI and lesion studies suggest that a region near the RTPJ is associated with attentional reorienting in response to an unexpected stimulus. Do Theory of Mind and attentional reorienting recruit a single population of neurons, or are there two neighboring but distinct neural populations in the RTPJ? One recent study compared these activations, and found evidence consistent with a single common region. However, the apparent overlap may have been due to the low resolution of the previous technique. We tested this hypothesis using a high-resolution protocol, within-subjects analyses, and more powerful statistical methods. Strict conjunction analyses revealed that the area of overlap was small and on the periphery of each activation. In addition, a bootstrap analysis identified a reliable 6–10 mm spatial displacement between the peak activations of the two tasks; the same magnitude and direction of displacement was observed in within-subjects comparisons. In all, these results suggest that there are neighboring but distinct regions within the RTPJ implicated in Theory of Mind and orienting attention.
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people thinking about thinking people the role of the temporo parietal junction in Theory of Mind
NeuroImage, 2003Co-Authors: Rebecca Saxe, Nancy KanwisheAbstract:Abstract Humans powerfully and flexibly interpret the behaviour of other people based on an understanding of their Minds: that is, we use a “Theory of Mind.” In this study we distinguish Theory of Mind, which represents another person’s mental states, from a representation of the simple presence of another person per se. The studies reported here establish for the first time that a region in the human temporo-parietal junction (here called the TPJ-M) is involved specifically in reasoning about the contents of another person’s Mind. First, the TPJ-M was doubly dissociated from the nearby extrastriate body area (EBA; Downing et al., 2001). Second, the TPJ-M does not respond to false representations in non-social control stories. Third, the BOLD response in the TPJ-M bilaterally was higher when subjects read stories about a character’s mental states, compared with stories that described people in physical detail, which did not differ from stories about nonhuman objects. Thus, the role of the TPJ-M in understanding other people appears to be specific to reasoning about the content of mental states.
Francesca Happé - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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reading the Mind in cartoons and stories an fmri study of Theory of Mind in verbal and nonverbal tasks
Neuropsychologia, 2000Co-Authors: Hele L Gallaghe, Uta Frith, Francesca Happé, Nicola Unswick, Paul C Fletche, Chris D FrithAbstract:Previous functional imaging studies have explored the brain regions activated by tasks requiring ‘Theory of Mind’—the attribution of mental states. Tasks used have been primarily verbal, and it has been unclear to what extent different results have reflected different tasks, scanning techniques, or genuinely distinct regions of activation. Here we report results from a functional magnetic resonance imaging study (fMRI) involving two rather different tasks both designed to tap Theory of Mind. Brain activation during the Theory of Mind condition of a story task and a cartoon task showed considerable overlap, specifically in the medial prefrontal cortex (paracingulate cortex). These results are discussed in relation to the cognitive mechanisms underpinning our everyday ability to ‘Mind-read’.
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acquired Theory of Mind impairments following stroke
Cognition, 1999Co-Authors: Francesca Happé, Hiram Ownell, Elle WinneAbstract:The ability to attribute thoughts and feelings to self and others ('Theory of Mind') has been hypothesised to have an innate neural basis and a dedicated cognitive mechanism. Evidence in favour of this proposal has come from autism; a brain-based developmental disorder which appears to be characterised by impaired Theory of Mind, despite sometimes good general reasoning skills/IQ. To date no case of specific acquired Theory of Mind impairment has been reported. The present study examined Theory of Mind in adults who had suffered right hemisphere stroke, a group known to show pragmatic and social difficulties. In one study using story materials and two using cartoons, patients' understanding of materials requiring attribution of mental states (e.g. ignorance, false belief) was significantly worse than their understanding of non-mental control materials. Data from healthy elderly subjects, and a small group of left hemisphere patients (who received the tasks in modified form), suggest that this impairment on mental state tasks is not a function of task difficulty. The findings support the notion of a dedicated cognitive system for Theory of Mind, and suggest a role for the healthy right hemisphere in the attribution of mental states.
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Theory of Mind in the brain evidence from a pet scan study of asperger syndrome
Neuroreport, 1996Co-Authors: Francesca Happé, Uta Frith, Paul C Fletche, Stefa Ehlers, Maria E Johansso, Christophe Gillberg, Raymond J Dola, Richard S J Frackowiak, Chris D FrithAbstract:THE ability to attribute mental states to others ('Theory of Mind') pervades normal social interaction and is impaired in autistic individuals. In a previous positron emission tomography scan study of normal volunteers, performing a 'Theory of Mind' task was associated with activity in left medial prefrontal cortex. We used the same paradigm in five patients with Asperger syndrome, a mild variant of autism with normal intellectual functioning. No task-related activity was found in this region, but normal activity was observed in immediately adjacent areas. This result suggests that a highly circumscribed region of left medial prefrontal cortex is a crucial component of the brain system that underlies the normal understanding of other Minds.
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the role of age and verbal ability in the Theory of Mind task performance of subjects with autism
Child Development, 1995Co-Authors: Francesca HappéAbstract:A number of studies have reported that most children with autism fail Theory of Mind tasks. It is unclear why certain children with autism pass such tests and what might be different about these subjects. In the present study, the role of age and verbal ability in Theory of Mind task performance was explored. Data were pooled from 70 autistic, 34 mentally handicapped, and 70 normal young subjects, previously tested for a number of different studies. The analysis suggested that children with autism required far higher verbal mental age to pass false belief tasks than did other subjects. While normally developing children had a 50% probability of passing both tasks at the verbal mental age of 4 years, autistic subjects took more than twice as long to reach this probability of success (at the advanced verbal mental age of 9-2). Possible causal relations between verbal ability and the ability to represent mental states are discussed.
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Autism: beyond "Theory of Mind"
Cognition, 1994Co-Authors: Uta Frith, Francesca HappéAbstract:The Theory of Mind account of autism has been remarkably successful in making specific predictions about the impairments in socialization, imagination and communication shown by people with autism. It cannot, however, explain either the non-triad features of autism, or earlier experimental findings of abnormal assets and deficits on non-social tasks. These unexplained aspects of autism, and the existence of autistic individuals who consistently pass false belief tasks, suggest that it may be necessary to postulate an additional cognitive abnormality. One possible abnormality - weak central coherence - is discussed, and preliminary evidence for this Theory is presented. © 1994.
Nancy Kanwishe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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people thinking about thinking people the role of the temporo parietal junction in Theory of Mind
NeuroImage, 2003Co-Authors: Rebecca Saxe, Nancy KanwisheAbstract:Abstract Humans powerfully and flexibly interpret the behaviour of other people based on an understanding of their Minds: that is, we use a “Theory of Mind.” In this study we distinguish Theory of Mind, which represents another person’s mental states, from a representation of the simple presence of another person per se. The studies reported here establish for the first time that a region in the human temporo-parietal junction (here called the TPJ-M) is involved specifically in reasoning about the contents of another person’s Mind. First, the TPJ-M was doubly dissociated from the nearby extrastriate body area (EBA; Downing et al., 2001). Second, the TPJ-M does not respond to false representations in non-social control stories. Third, the BOLD response in the TPJ-M bilaterally was higher when subjects read stories about a character’s mental states, compared with stories that described people in physical detail, which did not differ from stories about nonhuman objects. Thus, the role of the TPJ-M in understanding other people appears to be specific to reasoning about the content of mental states.
Chris D Frith - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Theory of Mind
Current Biology, 2005Co-Authors: Chris D Frith, Uta FrithAbstract:What is ‘Theory of Mind’? Maxi eats half his chocolate bar and puts the rest away in the kitchen cupboard. Then he goes out to play in the sun. Meanwhile Maxi’s mother comes into the kitchen, opens the cupboard and sees the chocolate bar. She puts it in the fridge. When Maxi comes back into the kitchen, where will he look for his chocolate bar? The answer to this question will seem obvious. First, Maxi doesn’t know that his mother has moved the chocolate. Second, Maxi still believes, falsely, that his chocolate is in the cupboard. That is why he looks in the cupboard. If this is how you answered the question then you have a ‘Theory of Mind’. We naturally explain people’s behavior on the basis of their Minds: their knowledge, their beliefs and their desires, and we know that when there is a conflict between belief and reality it is the persons’ belief, not the reality that will determine their behavior. Explaining behavior in this way is called ‘having a Theory of Mind’ or ‘having an intentional stance.’Where will Maxi look for his chocolate? (From the collection of Uta Frith.)View Large Image | View Hi-Res Image | Download PowerPoint SlideWhat is the advantage of having a Theory of Mind? Through having a Theory of Mind we can recognize that another person’s knowledge is different from our own. I know what’s behind the rock, but he doesn’t, because, from where he is, he cannot see that there is a scorpion. Having a Theory of Mind allows us to manipulate other people’s behavior by manipulating their beliefs. If he is my friend I can warn him about the scorpion. If he is my enemy I can tell him it is safe. This latter is called tactical deception or Machiavellianism. Human interactions predominantly involve the dissemination of true or false knowledge for good or for ill.Who has a Theory of Mind? Up to the age of about five years, a child told the story of Maxi and his mother will say confidently that Maxi will look for his chocolate in the fridge. It is as if they assumed that what they know to be true everyone else knows too. Nevertheless, even three-year-olds look first at the cupboard when the question is asked, and even 15-month-olds can be shown to have an inkling of what is going on; their eye gaze pattern shows that they are surprised if Maxi looks in the fridge. But only from age five or so do children show full understanding of the situation and become able to explain exactly why Maxi has a false belief.Children with autism have a specific problem with Theory of Mind tasks. They expect Maxi to look for his chocolate in the fridge. They reach a mental age of about 10 years before they achieve an understanding of the Maxi task. More complex problems that involve white lies or double bluff take them even longer to learn, and they may never grasp them fully. Theory of Mind difficulties can also be acquired through brain damage in frontal cortex or in the region of the temporo-parietal junction.From field studies there are accounts of a range of animals using tactical deception. But there is still argument over whether even chimpanzees show evidence of this in controlled experiments. The current view is that chimpanzees may have a rudimentary Theory of Mind, but monkeys (and other animals) probably do not.What is so important about deception and false belief in the study of Theory of Mind? Having a Theory of Mind enables many important human interactions other than deception, in particular teaching. But deception is important in the study of Theory of Mind because of its association with false beliefs. If Maxi’s belief about his chocolate were true — it was still in the cupboard — then you can correctly report where Maxi will look either by basing this prediction on what Maxi believes (because you have a Theory of Mind) or by basing this prediction on where the chocolate really is (not requiring having a Theory of Mind). Thus, when successfully solving false belief tasks, where there is a conflict between the false belief and the true state of affairs, we can deduce that Theory of Mind is engaged.How is Theory of Mind possible? In order to explain people’s behavior on the basis of their Minds, we need to have some idea of what is in their Minds. The ability to acquire knowledge about other peoples’ beliefs and desires is called ‘mentalizing’ or ‘Mind reading’. Our understanding of the mechanisms underlying this ability remains rudimentary. In everyday speech we frequently explain behavior in terms of mental states. Maxi will look in the cupboard because that’s where he believes his chocolate is and because he wants to eat it. Maxi doesn’t know the chocolate is in the fridge. These everyday explanations of behavior in terms of mental states are referred to as folk psychology. Perhaps our ability to mentalize depends upon representations within the brain of the propositions that make up this Theory of behavior (referred to as Theory Theory). On the other hand, perhaps the ability to mentalize is related to our capacity to empathize with other people: to put ourselves into their shoes (this is referred to as simulation Theory).An influential view is that mentalizing crucially depends on the ability to form meta-representations, that is, representations that are decoupled from reality. Thus the truth of the statement, ‘Maxi believes his chocolate is in the cupboard’ does not depend upon where the chocolate is in reality. A possible starting point for developing a mechanistic account of mentalizing comes from the problem of perspective taking. The computation of what another person sees from a different point of view than yours involves translation between egocentric and allocentric spatial co-ordinates. This translation is also fundamental in spatial navigation. It is perhaps no coincidence that in young children the ability to solve spatial viewpoint problems emerges at about the same age as the ability to solve false belief tasks.What is the neural basis of Mind reading? There is currently much interest in identifying a social brain: a circumscribed network of brain regions specialized for the social domain. Mentalizing is one of a number of problems confronting this social brain. When brain activity is measured during the performance of a wide range of tasks engaging Theory of Mind, two regions have been consistently identified: a medial prefrontal region (paracingulate cortex) and the temporo-parietal junction in the superior temporal sulcus.The medial frontal region is also engaged when subjects reflect upon their own mental states, as well as those of others with the more inferior orbital region responding especially to emotional states. The temporo-parietal junction, on the other hand, seems to have a special role in using perceptual cues to recognize the actions and intentions of biological agents. Identification of the precise role of these regions awaits the development of a mechanistic account of our remarkable ability to make inferences about the Minds of others.
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schizophrenia and Theory of Mind
Psychological Medicine, 2004Co-Authors: Chris D FrithAbstract:We suspect that people have an everyday Theory of Mind because they explain and frequently talk about the behaviour of others and themselves in terms of beliefs and desires. Having a Theory of Mind means that we believe that other people have Minds like ours and that we understand the behaviour of these others in terms of the contents of their Minds: their knowledge, beliefs and desires. But how can we demonstrate experimentally that people are using their Theory of Mind to predict the behaviour of others. This problem is particularly acute in the case of animals or young human children when they do not have language. Dennett (1978) discussing Premack & Woodruff's (1978) seminal paper ‘Does the chimpanzee have a Theory of Mind?’, suggested that the use of false beliefs to explain behaviour would provide convincing evidence. When their belief is true (i.e. corresponds to the actual state of the world) we can explain peoples' behaviour on the basis of the state of the world without needing to know about their beliefs. This ambiguity does not arise when the belief is false. The first experiment to use this approach was published by Wimmer & Perner (1983). They showed that at around 4 years of age a child knows that Maxi will look for his chocolates where Maxi believes them to be, even though the child knows that this belief is false because he has seen Maxi's mother moving the chocolates. In the English-speaking world the task involving Maxi and the chocolates has become the Sally-Anne task (see this issue, Lee et al . 2004).
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functional imaging of Theory of Mind
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2003Co-Authors: Hele L Gallaghe, Chris D FrithAbstract:Our ability to explain and predict other people's behaviour by attributing to them independent mental states, such as beliefs and desires, is known as having a 'Theory of Mind'. Interest in this very human ability has engendered a growing body of evidence concerning its evolution and development and the biological basis of the mechanisms underpinning it. Functional imaging has played a key role in seeking to isolate brain regions specific to this ability. Three areas are consistently activated in association with Theory of Mind. These are the anterior paracingulate cortex, the superior temporal sulci and the temporal poles bilaterally. This review discusses the functional significance of each of these areas within a social cognitive network.
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reading the Mind in cartoons and stories an fmri study of Theory of Mind in verbal and nonverbal tasks
Neuropsychologia, 2000Co-Authors: Hele L Gallaghe, Uta Frith, Francesca Happé, Nicola Unswick, Paul C Fletche, Chris D FrithAbstract:Previous functional imaging studies have explored the brain regions activated by tasks requiring ‘Theory of Mind’—the attribution of mental states. Tasks used have been primarily verbal, and it has been unclear to what extent different results have reflected different tasks, scanning techniques, or genuinely distinct regions of activation. Here we report results from a functional magnetic resonance imaging study (fMRI) involving two rather different tasks both designed to tap Theory of Mind. Brain activation during the Theory of Mind condition of a story task and a cartoon task showed considerable overlap, specifically in the medial prefrontal cortex (paracingulate cortex). These results are discussed in relation to the cognitive mechanisms underpinning our everyday ability to ‘Mind-read’.
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Theory of Mind in the brain evidence from a pet scan study of asperger syndrome
Neuroreport, 1996Co-Authors: Francesca Happé, Uta Frith, Paul C Fletche, Stefa Ehlers, Maria E Johansso, Christophe Gillberg, Raymond J Dola, Richard S J Frackowiak, Chris D FrithAbstract:THE ability to attribute mental states to others ('Theory of Mind') pervades normal social interaction and is impaired in autistic individuals. In a previous positron emission tomography scan study of normal volunteers, performing a 'Theory of Mind' task was associated with activity in left medial prefrontal cortex. We used the same paradigm in five patients with Asperger syndrome, a mild variant of autism with normal intellectual functioning. No task-related activity was found in this region, but normal activity was observed in immediately adjacent areas. This result suggests that a highly circumscribed region of left medial prefrontal cortex is a crucial component of the brain system that underlies the normal understanding of other Minds.
Uta Frith - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Theory of Mind
Current Biology, 2005Co-Authors: Chris D Frith, Uta FrithAbstract:What is ‘Theory of Mind’? Maxi eats half his chocolate bar and puts the rest away in the kitchen cupboard. Then he goes out to play in the sun. Meanwhile Maxi’s mother comes into the kitchen, opens the cupboard and sees the chocolate bar. She puts it in the fridge. When Maxi comes back into the kitchen, where will he look for his chocolate bar? The answer to this question will seem obvious. First, Maxi doesn’t know that his mother has moved the chocolate. Second, Maxi still believes, falsely, that his chocolate is in the cupboard. That is why he looks in the cupboard. If this is how you answered the question then you have a ‘Theory of Mind’. We naturally explain people’s behavior on the basis of their Minds: their knowledge, their beliefs and their desires, and we know that when there is a conflict between belief and reality it is the persons’ belief, not the reality that will determine their behavior. Explaining behavior in this way is called ‘having a Theory of Mind’ or ‘having an intentional stance.’Where will Maxi look for his chocolate? (From the collection of Uta Frith.)View Large Image | View Hi-Res Image | Download PowerPoint SlideWhat is the advantage of having a Theory of Mind? Through having a Theory of Mind we can recognize that another person’s knowledge is different from our own. I know what’s behind the rock, but he doesn’t, because, from where he is, he cannot see that there is a scorpion. Having a Theory of Mind allows us to manipulate other people’s behavior by manipulating their beliefs. If he is my friend I can warn him about the scorpion. If he is my enemy I can tell him it is safe. This latter is called tactical deception or Machiavellianism. Human interactions predominantly involve the dissemination of true or false knowledge for good or for ill.Who has a Theory of Mind? Up to the age of about five years, a child told the story of Maxi and his mother will say confidently that Maxi will look for his chocolate in the fridge. It is as if they assumed that what they know to be true everyone else knows too. Nevertheless, even three-year-olds look first at the cupboard when the question is asked, and even 15-month-olds can be shown to have an inkling of what is going on; their eye gaze pattern shows that they are surprised if Maxi looks in the fridge. But only from age five or so do children show full understanding of the situation and become able to explain exactly why Maxi has a false belief.Children with autism have a specific problem with Theory of Mind tasks. They expect Maxi to look for his chocolate in the fridge. They reach a mental age of about 10 years before they achieve an understanding of the Maxi task. More complex problems that involve white lies or double bluff take them even longer to learn, and they may never grasp them fully. Theory of Mind difficulties can also be acquired through brain damage in frontal cortex or in the region of the temporo-parietal junction.From field studies there are accounts of a range of animals using tactical deception. But there is still argument over whether even chimpanzees show evidence of this in controlled experiments. The current view is that chimpanzees may have a rudimentary Theory of Mind, but monkeys (and other animals) probably do not.What is so important about deception and false belief in the study of Theory of Mind? Having a Theory of Mind enables many important human interactions other than deception, in particular teaching. But deception is important in the study of Theory of Mind because of its association with false beliefs. If Maxi’s belief about his chocolate were true — it was still in the cupboard — then you can correctly report where Maxi will look either by basing this prediction on what Maxi believes (because you have a Theory of Mind) or by basing this prediction on where the chocolate really is (not requiring having a Theory of Mind). Thus, when successfully solving false belief tasks, where there is a conflict between the false belief and the true state of affairs, we can deduce that Theory of Mind is engaged.How is Theory of Mind possible? In order to explain people’s behavior on the basis of their Minds, we need to have some idea of what is in their Minds. The ability to acquire knowledge about other peoples’ beliefs and desires is called ‘mentalizing’ or ‘Mind reading’. Our understanding of the mechanisms underlying this ability remains rudimentary. In everyday speech we frequently explain behavior in terms of mental states. Maxi will look in the cupboard because that’s where he believes his chocolate is and because he wants to eat it. Maxi doesn’t know the chocolate is in the fridge. These everyday explanations of behavior in terms of mental states are referred to as folk psychology. Perhaps our ability to mentalize depends upon representations within the brain of the propositions that make up this Theory of behavior (referred to as Theory Theory). On the other hand, perhaps the ability to mentalize is related to our capacity to empathize with other people: to put ourselves into their shoes (this is referred to as simulation Theory).An influential view is that mentalizing crucially depends on the ability to form meta-representations, that is, representations that are decoupled from reality. Thus the truth of the statement, ‘Maxi believes his chocolate is in the cupboard’ does not depend upon where the chocolate is in reality. A possible starting point for developing a mechanistic account of mentalizing comes from the problem of perspective taking. The computation of what another person sees from a different point of view than yours involves translation between egocentric and allocentric spatial co-ordinates. This translation is also fundamental in spatial navigation. It is perhaps no coincidence that in young children the ability to solve spatial viewpoint problems emerges at about the same age as the ability to solve false belief tasks.What is the neural basis of Mind reading? There is currently much interest in identifying a social brain: a circumscribed network of brain regions specialized for the social domain. Mentalizing is one of a number of problems confronting this social brain. When brain activity is measured during the performance of a wide range of tasks engaging Theory of Mind, two regions have been consistently identified: a medial prefrontal region (paracingulate cortex) and the temporo-parietal junction in the superior temporal sulcus.The medial frontal region is also engaged when subjects reflect upon their own mental states, as well as those of others with the more inferior orbital region responding especially to emotional states. The temporo-parietal junction, on the other hand, seems to have a special role in using perceptual cues to recognize the actions and intentions of biological agents. Identification of the precise role of these regions awaits the development of a mechanistic account of our remarkable ability to make inferences about the Minds of others.
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the impact of extensive medial frontal lobe damage on Theory of Mind and cognition
Brain, 2004Co-Authors: Chris M Bird, Uta Frith, Fulvia Castelli, Omar Malik, Masud HusainAbstract:The ability of humans to predict and explain other people's behaviour by attributing to them independent mental states, such as desires and beliefs, is considered to be due to our ability to construct a 'Theory of Mind'. Recently, several neuroimaging studies have implicated the medial frontal lobes as playing a critical role in a dedicated 'mentalizing' or 'Theory of Mind' network in human brains. Here, we report a patient, G.T., who suffered an exceptionally rare form of stroke-bilateral anterior cerebral artery infarction, without rupture or the complications associated with anterior communicating artery aneurysms. Detailed high-resolution neuroanatomical investigations revealed extensive damage to the medial frontal lobes bilaterally, including regions identified to be critical for 'Theory of Mind' by functional neuroimaging of healthy human subjects. For the first time in such a patient, we carried out a thorough assessment of her cognitive profile including, critically, an experimental investigation of her performance on a range of tests of 'Theory of Mind'. G.T. had a dysexecutive syndrome characterized by impairments in planning and memory, as well as a tendency to confabulate. Importantly, however, she did not have any significant impairment on tasks probing her ability to construct a 'Theory of Mind', demonstrating that the extensive medial frontal regions destroyed by her stroke are not necessary for this function. These findings have important implications for the functional anatomy of 'Theory of Mind', as well as our understanding of medial frontal function. Possible reasons for the discrepancies between our results and neuroimaging studies are discussed. We conclude that our findings urge caution against using functional imaging as the sole method of establishing cognitive neuroanatomy.
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reading the Mind in cartoons and stories an fmri study of Theory of Mind in verbal and nonverbal tasks
Neuropsychologia, 2000Co-Authors: Hele L Gallaghe, Uta Frith, Francesca Happé, Nicola Unswick, Paul C Fletche, Chris D FrithAbstract:Previous functional imaging studies have explored the brain regions activated by tasks requiring ‘Theory of Mind’—the attribution of mental states. Tasks used have been primarily verbal, and it has been unclear to what extent different results have reflected different tasks, scanning techniques, or genuinely distinct regions of activation. Here we report results from a functional magnetic resonance imaging study (fMRI) involving two rather different tasks both designed to tap Theory of Mind. Brain activation during the Theory of Mind condition of a story task and a cartoon task showed considerable overlap, specifically in the medial prefrontal cortex (paracingulate cortex). These results are discussed in relation to the cognitive mechanisms underpinning our everyday ability to ‘Mind-read’.
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Theory of Mind in the brain evidence from a pet scan study of asperger syndrome
Neuroreport, 1996Co-Authors: Francesca Happé, Uta Frith, Paul C Fletche, Stefa Ehlers, Maria E Johansso, Christophe Gillberg, Raymond J Dola, Richard S J Frackowiak, Chris D FrithAbstract:THE ability to attribute mental states to others ('Theory of Mind') pervades normal social interaction and is impaired in autistic individuals. In a previous positron emission tomography scan study of normal volunteers, performing a 'Theory of Mind' task was associated with activity in left medial prefrontal cortex. We used the same paradigm in five patients with Asperger syndrome, a mild variant of autism with normal intellectual functioning. No task-related activity was found in this region, but normal activity was observed in immediately adjacent areas. This result suggests that a highly circumscribed region of left medial prefrontal cortex is a crucial component of the brain system that underlies the normal understanding of other Minds.
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Autism: beyond "Theory of Mind"
Cognition, 1994Co-Authors: Uta Frith, Francesca HappéAbstract:The Theory of Mind account of autism has been remarkably successful in making specific predictions about the impairments in socialization, imagination and communication shown by people with autism. It cannot, however, explain either the non-triad features of autism, or earlier experimental findings of abnormal assets and deficits on non-social tasks. These unexplained aspects of autism, and the existence of autistic individuals who consistently pass false belief tasks, suggest that it may be necessary to postulate an additional cognitive abnormality. One possible abnormality - weak central coherence - is discussed, and preliminary evidence for this Theory is presented. © 1994.
