The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Ronald R Krebs - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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how dominant narratives rise and fall Military Conflict politics and the cold war consensus
International Organization, 2015Co-Authors: Ronald R KrebsAbstract:Contemporaries and historians often blame the errors and tragedies of US policy during the Cold War on a dominant narrative of national security: the “Cold War consensus.” Its usual periodization, according to which it came together in the late 1940s and persisted until the late 1960s when it unraveled amidst the trauma of the Vietnam War, fits well with a common theory of change in ideas and discourse. That theory expects stasis until a substantial unexpected failure (in this domain, Military defeat) discredits dominant ideas and unsettles dominant coalitions. However, systematic data reveal the standard history of this important case to be wrong. Based on a large-scale content analysis of newspaper editorials on foreign affairs, this article shows that the Cold War narrative was narrower than conventional accounts suggest, that it did not coalesce until well into the 1950s, and that it began to erode even before the Vietnam War's Americanization in 1965. To make sense of this puzzle, I develop an alternative theory of the rise and fall of the narratives that underpin and structure debate over national security. Rooted in the dynamics of public narrative and the domestic politics of the battlefield, the theory argues that Military failure impedes change in the narrative in whose terms government officials had legitimated the mission, whereas victory creates the opportunity for departures from the dominant narrative. Process-tracing reveals causal dynamics consistent with the theory: failure in the Korean War, which might have undermined Cold War globalism, instead facilitated the Cold War narrative's rise to dominance (or consensus); and the triumph of the Cuban Missile Crisis made possible that dominant narrative's breakdown before the upheaval of Vietnam. This hard and important case suggests the need to rethink the relationship between success, failure, and change in dominant narratives of national security—and perhaps in other policy domains as well.
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Military Conflict and the politics of narrative explaining the rise and fall of the cold war consensus
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Ronald R KrebsAbstract:Contemporaries and historians have often blamed the errors and tragedies of US policy during the Cold War on the “Cold War consensus.” Its usual periodization, according to which it came together by around 1948 and persisted until the late 1960s when it unraveled amidst the trauma of the Vietnam War, fits well with a common theory of change in ideas and discourse. That theory expects stasis until a substantial unexpected failure (in this domain, Military defeat) discredits dominant ideas and unsettles dominant coalitions. But the Cold War consensus has never been systematically studied. This article does so for the first time via a large-scale content analysis of foreign affairs editorials. By this measure, the consensus did not coalesce until well into the 1950s and began to erode even before the Americanization of the Vietnam War in 1965. To make sense of this puzzle, I argue that the theoretical conventional wisdom is inadequate when it comes to the dominant public narratives that underpin and structure debate over national security. I argue that the politics of protracted Military failure impede change in these dominant narratives, while victory generates political space for unorthodox ideas to penetrate. Process-tracing reveals causal dynamics consistent with my theory highlighting the domestic politics of the Military and diplomatic battlefield: failure in the Korean War, which might have undermined Cold War globalism, instead facilitated the Cold War narrative’s rise to dominance (or consensus); and the triumph of the Cuban Missile Crisis made possible that dominant narrative’s breakdown before the upheaval of Vietnam. This hard and important case suggests the need to rethink the relationship between success, failure, and change in dominant narratives of national security—and perhaps in other policy domains as well.
Scott L Kastner - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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is the taiwan strait still a flash point rethinking the prospects for armed Conflict between china and taiwan
International Security, 2016Co-Authors: Scott L KastnerAbstract:After decades of tension, relations between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan have improved dramatically in recent years. How durable is this detente? To what degree is armed Conflict in the Taiwan Strait a continued possibility? Answering these questions requires grappling with the impact of several different trends in cross–Taiwan Strait relations, including a rapidly shifting balance of Military power, deepening China-Taiwan economic integration, and changing Taiwanese views on sovereignty and identity issues. Taken together, these trends help to stabilize the cross-strait relationship. Nevertheless, this relationship has not been fundamentally transformed, and future trends could evolve in a way that again increases the danger of Military Conflict. In particular, a changing balance of Military power in the Taiwan Strait has the potential to be highly destabilizing if it overtakes other trends such as economic integration.
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does economic integration across the taiwan strait make Military Conflict less likely
Journal of East Asian Studies, 2006Co-Authors: Scott L KastnerAbstract:Deepening economic ties across the Taiwan Strait are widely believed by analysts and scholars to be a stabilizing force in cross-Strait political relations. Yet within the broader international relations literature, the relationship between economic interdependence and Military Conflict continues to be controversial. This article examines the impact of growing cross-Strait economic links on the likelihood of cross-Strait Military Conflict within the context of this broader literature. A description of three separate causal mechanisms—identified in the existing literature—through which economic ties could promote peace is followed by a discussion of how broadly these processes are operating in the Taiwan Strait case. Although the article does not rule out the possibility that economic integration across the Strait makes a Military confrontation less likely, it shows that the evidence in support of such a proposition is ambiguous.
Adam J Berinsky - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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assuming the costs of war events elites and american public support for Military Conflict
The Journal of Politics, 2007Co-Authors: Adam J BerinskyAbstract:Many political scientists and policymakers argue that unmediated events—the successes and failures on the battlefield—determine whether the mass public will support Military excursions. The public supports war, the story goes, if the benefits of action outweigh the costs of Conflict. Other scholars contend that the balance of elite discourse influences public support for war. I draw upon survey evidence from World War II and the current war in Iraq to come to a common conclusion regarding public support for international interventions. I find little evidence that citizens make complex cost/benefit calculations when evaluating Military action. Instead, I find that patterns of elite Conflict shape opinion concerning war. When political elites disagree as to the wisdom of intervention, the public divides as well. But when elites come to a common interpretation of a political reality, the public gives them great latitude to wage war.
Iuliia Buniak - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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information wars eastern ukraine Military Conflict coverage in the russian ukrainian and u s newscasts
International Communication Gazette, 2017Co-Authors: Nataliya Roman, Wayne Wanta, Iuliia BuniakAbstract:The war in Eastern Ukraine is happening on the battlefield as well as in the informational realm. The two sides of this Military Conflict, Russia and Ukraine, are trying to shape public opinion in their own countries as well as abroad. Depending on the leaning of a media outlet, its audiences see very different pictures of this crisis. This study examined a year’s worth of coverage dealing with the Eastern Ukraine Military Conflict in major Russian, Ukrainian, and American newscasts. The analysis revealed significant differences in the choice of on-camera sources, reporting of civilian and Military fatalities, and framing of the different sides of this Conflict in these media.
Katharine M Floros - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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alliances internal information and Military Conflict among member states
International Organization, 2006Co-Authors: David H Bearce, Kristen M Flanagan, Katharine M FlorosAbstract:We offer a theory explaining how alliances as international security regimes reduce Military Conflict between member-states through their internal provision of information concerning national Military capabilities. Bargaining models of war have shown that a lack of information about relative Military capabilities functions as an important cause of war. We argue that alliances provide such information to internal participants, and greater knowledge within the alliance about member-state Military capabilities reduces certain informational problems that could potentially lead to war. This internal information effect, however, is a conditional one. We posit that the information provided within the alliance matters most for dyads at or near power parity: the cases where states are most uncertain about who would prevail if a Military Conflict did emerge. In power preponderant dyads where the outcome of a potential Military Conflict is relatively certain, the internal information provided by Military alliances becomes less important. Our statistical results provide strong support for these theoretical arguments.Our greatest thanks go to Ashley Leeds, who made available an advance copy of the ATOP 3.0 data set. This article also benefited from presentations at the University of Wisconsin and at ISA-South in Columbia, S.C. Finally, we thank Lisa Martin, two anonymous reviewers, Scott Gehlbach, Chuck Gochman, Zaryab Iqbal, George Krause, Pat McDonald, Jon Pevehouse, Bill Reed, Kevin Sweeney, and Harrison Wagner for their detailed comments and/or suggestions.