The Experts below are selected from a list of 14799 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Jenifer Wood - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
peer and cyber aggression in secondary school students the role of Moral disengagement hostile attribution bias and outcome expectancies
Aggressive Behavior, 2010Co-Authors: Chrisa D Pornari, Jenifer WoodAbstract:This study investigated the relationship between cognitive mechanisms, applied by people to rationalize and justify harmful acts, and engagement in traditional peer and cyber aggression among school children. We examined the contribution of Moral disengagement (MD), hostile attribution bias, and outcome expectancies, and we further explored the individual contribution of each MD mechanism. Our aim was to identify shared and unique cognitive factors of the two forms of aggression. Three hundred and thirty-nine secondary school children completed self-report measures that assessed MD, hostile attribution bias, outcome expectancies, and their roles and involvement in traditional and cyber aggression. We found that the MD total score positively related to both forms of peer-directed aggression. Furthermore, traditional peer aggression positively related to children's Moral Justification, euphemistic language, displacement of responsibility and outcome expectancies, and negatively associated with hostile attribution bias. Moral Justification also related positively to cyber aggression. Cyber aggression and cyber victimization were associated with high levels of traditional peer aggression and victimization, respectively. The results suggest that MD is a common feature of both traditional and cyber peer aggression, but it seems that traditional forms of aggression demand a higher level of rationalization or Justification. Moreover, the data suggest that the expectation of positive outcomes from harmful behavior facilitates engagement in traditional peer aggression. The differential contribution of specific cognitive mechanisms indicates the need for future research to elaborate on the current findings, in order to advance theory and inform existing and future school interventions tackling aggression and bullying.
-
peer and cyber aggression in secondary school students the role of Moral disengagement hostile attribution bias and outcome expectancies
Aggressive Behavior, 2010Co-Authors: Chrisa D Pornari, Jenifer WoodAbstract:This study investigated the relationship between cognitive mechanisms, applied by people to rationalize and justify harmful acts, and engagement in traditional peer and cyber aggression among school children. We examined the contribution of Moral disengagement (MD), hostile attribution bias, and outcome expectancies, and we further explored the individual contribution of each MD mechanism. Our aim was to identify shared and unique cognitive factors of the two forms of aggression. Three hundred and thirty-nine secondary school children completed self-report measures that assessed MD, hostile attribution bias, outcome expectancies, and their roles and involvement in traditional and cyber aggression. We found that the MD total score positively related to both forms of peer-directed aggression. Furthermore, traditional peer aggression positively related to children's Moral Justification, euphemistic language, displacement of responsibility and outcome expectancies, and negatively associated with hostile attribution bias. Moral Justification also related positively to cyber aggression. Cyber aggression and cyber victimization were associated with high levels of traditional peer aggression and victimization, respectively. The results suggest that MD is a common feature of both traditional and cyber peer aggression, but it seems that traditional forms of aggression demand a higher level of rationalization or Justification. Moreover, the data suggest that the expectation of positive outcomes from harmful behavior facilitates engagement in traditional peer aggression. The differential contribution of specific cognitive mechanisms indicates the need for future research to elaborate on the current findings, in order to advance theory and inform existing and future school interventions tackling aggression and bullying. Aggr. Behav. 35:1-14, 2009. (c) 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc. Language: en
Chrisa D Pornari - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
peer and cyber aggression in secondary school students the role of Moral disengagement hostile attribution bias and outcome expectancies
Aggressive Behavior, 2010Co-Authors: Chrisa D Pornari, Jenifer WoodAbstract:This study investigated the relationship between cognitive mechanisms, applied by people to rationalize and justify harmful acts, and engagement in traditional peer and cyber aggression among school children. We examined the contribution of Moral disengagement (MD), hostile attribution bias, and outcome expectancies, and we further explored the individual contribution of each MD mechanism. Our aim was to identify shared and unique cognitive factors of the two forms of aggression. Three hundred and thirty-nine secondary school children completed self-report measures that assessed MD, hostile attribution bias, outcome expectancies, and their roles and involvement in traditional and cyber aggression. We found that the MD total score positively related to both forms of peer-directed aggression. Furthermore, traditional peer aggression positively related to children's Moral Justification, euphemistic language, displacement of responsibility and outcome expectancies, and negatively associated with hostile attribution bias. Moral Justification also related positively to cyber aggression. Cyber aggression and cyber victimization were associated with high levels of traditional peer aggression and victimization, respectively. The results suggest that MD is a common feature of both traditional and cyber peer aggression, but it seems that traditional forms of aggression demand a higher level of rationalization or Justification. Moreover, the data suggest that the expectation of positive outcomes from harmful behavior facilitates engagement in traditional peer aggression. The differential contribution of specific cognitive mechanisms indicates the need for future research to elaborate on the current findings, in order to advance theory and inform existing and future school interventions tackling aggression and bullying.
-
peer and cyber aggression in secondary school students the role of Moral disengagement hostile attribution bias and outcome expectancies
Aggressive Behavior, 2010Co-Authors: Chrisa D Pornari, Jenifer WoodAbstract:This study investigated the relationship between cognitive mechanisms, applied by people to rationalize and justify harmful acts, and engagement in traditional peer and cyber aggression among school children. We examined the contribution of Moral disengagement (MD), hostile attribution bias, and outcome expectancies, and we further explored the individual contribution of each MD mechanism. Our aim was to identify shared and unique cognitive factors of the two forms of aggression. Three hundred and thirty-nine secondary school children completed self-report measures that assessed MD, hostile attribution bias, outcome expectancies, and their roles and involvement in traditional and cyber aggression. We found that the MD total score positively related to both forms of peer-directed aggression. Furthermore, traditional peer aggression positively related to children's Moral Justification, euphemistic language, displacement of responsibility and outcome expectancies, and negatively associated with hostile attribution bias. Moral Justification also related positively to cyber aggression. Cyber aggression and cyber victimization were associated with high levels of traditional peer aggression and victimization, respectively. The results suggest that MD is a common feature of both traditional and cyber peer aggression, but it seems that traditional forms of aggression demand a higher level of rationalization or Justification. Moreover, the data suggest that the expectation of positive outcomes from harmful behavior facilitates engagement in traditional peer aggression. The differential contribution of specific cognitive mechanisms indicates the need for future research to elaborate on the current findings, in order to advance theory and inform existing and future school interventions tackling aggression and bullying. Aggr. Behav. 35:1-14, 2009. (c) 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc. Language: en
Katrina Wyman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
is there a Moral Justification for redressing historical injustices
Vanderbilt Law Review, 2008Co-Authors: Katrina WymanAbstract:In recent years, there have been lively popular and academic debates in the United States and elsewhere about whether to redress injustices committed decades and sometime centuries ago. This Article examines whether there is a Moral Justification for repairing historical injustices. My theme is the difficulty of devising a compelling Moral argument for redressing such injustices, notwithstanding the Moral arguments often invoked by the proponents of redress. I begin by briefly introducing the claims that have been advanced in the United States for redressing historical injustices. In particular, I analyze the characteristics of the wrongs for which redress has been claimed, the ways that claims have been advanced, and the remedies requested. Then I specify three Moral arguments often made in support of redressing historical injustices and underscore the difficulties of making a case for redress using these arguments. To emphasize the Moral complexity of claims for redress, I also offer an original case study of a recent claim: the claim against the Swiss banks for profiting from the Holocaust that resulted in a $1.25 billion settlement in 1998. This case study underscores the difficulty of justifying redress for historical injustices by examining whether the program being implemented to address the banks' wrongs is Morally justifiable. I conclude by suggesting that the difficulty of justifying claims for redressing historical injustices counsels in favor of focusing more on recent, as opposed to historical, injustices. INTRODUCTION In recent years, there have been lively popular and academic debates in the United States and elsewhere about whether injustices committed decades or even centuries ago should be redressed through official apologies, commissions of inquiry, reparations, and restitution.1 In the American context, the historical injustices for which redress has been pursued, and in some cases granted, include the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, the Holocaust, and the mistreatment of Native Americans.2 Recently, the most prominent debate in the United States has been about whether federal and state governments and corporations should pay reparations to African Americans for slavery and subsequent discrimination.3 Indeed, in the past few years, several major books have been published advocating reparations for African Americans, numerous law reviews have held symposia on the idea, and many stories have appeared on the subject in print and television media.4 This Article examines whether there is a Moral Justification for redressing historical injustices, focusing on debates in the American context. Perhaps because the legal case for redressing historical injustices is often weak, many supporters of redress advance Moral arguments. For example, proponents argue that redressing historical injustices is necessary to deter future wrongdoing or to promote a more just distribution of societal resources.5 More frequently, they emphasize the injustice of the original wrong6 and argue that there is a continuing obligation to correct it.7 I argue that notwithstanding the prominent role that Moral arguments play in these claims, it is difficult to justify redress for historical injustices in Moral terms. This does not mean that redress never is Morally warranted. But the difficulty of making a strong Moral argument for redressing historical injustices is instructive. In particular, it helps to explain why redress has not been implemented in many instances notwithstanding extensive public debate and why, when redress has been implemented, it often has been on a relatively limited scale.8 In addition, the Moral complexity of claims for redressing historical injustices raises a fundamental question about the value of the time and resources that have been devoted to debating the redress of historical wrongs. This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides some background for analyzing the Moral justifiability of redressing historical injustices. …
Theresa Weynand Tobin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
NATURALIZING Moral Justification: RETHINKING THE METHOD OF Moral EPISTEMOLOGY
Metaphilosophy, 2013Co-Authors: Theresa Weynand Tobin, Alison M. JaggarAbstract:The companion piece to this article, "Situating Moral Justification," challenges the idea that Moral epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all-purpose reasoning strategy for Moral Justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative Moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of Moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying Moral claims in different types of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real-world Moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this method through a case study.
-
Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral Epistemology
Metaphilosophy, 2013Co-Authors: Alison M. Jaggar, Theresa Weynand TobinAbstract:This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how Moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to Moral Justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of Moral Justification lend themselves to rationalizing the Moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve Moral Justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of Moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of Moral epistemology.
-
The Relevance of Trust for Moral Justification
Social Theory and Practice, 2011Co-Authors: Theresa Weynand TobinAbstract:Philosophers working on Moral Justification tend to focus on what forms of reasoning could justify a substantive Moral claim. For example, Kan tians emphasize reasoning that is universalizable;1 discourse ethicists propose conditions for intersubjective dialogue that confer Justification;2 utilitarians recommend reasoning impartially like a benevolent judge or spectator.3 In focusing on what constitutes sound Moral reasoning, philo sophers have paid less attention to the subjects who are doing the reason ing, and in particular to the Moral relationships among people that may either enable or undermine Moral Justification. In this paper, I argue that relationships of trust are often necessary for Moral Justification. Even if a Moral claim is likely to be true, it may not be adequately justified, and thus may not have normative force, unless those who are supposed to accept the claim have good reason to believe that the one entering the claim is a trustworthy Moral interlocutor. Moral Justification often in volves the giving of good reasons by a trustworthy person. My argument is inspired by recent work on the epistemic role of trust in science. Philosophers have made a compelling case that trust is neces sary in order to justify scientific claims because of the epistemic distance that exists between people. By "epistemic distance" I mean that some people have access to evidence or reasons to which others do not have direct access. Epistemic distance creates relations of epistemic depen dence, which gives rise to the need to trust.4 In science, epistemic depen dence results from the complexity of the phenomena scientists study and the technical, highly specialized training that scientific reasoning re quires. For example, John Hardwig argues that because scientists often have to use research by other scientists whose work they cannot inde
Alison M. Jaggar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral Epistemology
Metaphilosophy, 2013Co-Authors: Alison M. Jaggar, Theresa Weynand TobinAbstract:This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how Moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to Moral Justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of Moral Justification lend themselves to rationalizing the Moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve Moral Justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of Moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of Moral epistemology.
-
NATURALIZING Moral Justification: RETHINKING THE METHOD OF Moral EPISTEMOLOGY
Metaphilosophy, 2013Co-Authors: Theresa Weynand Tobin, Alison M. JaggarAbstract:The companion piece to this article, "Situating Moral Justification," challenges the idea that Moral epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all-purpose reasoning strategy for Moral Justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative Moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of Moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying Moral claims in different types of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real-world Moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this method through a case study.