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Don Marquis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the Moral Principle objection to human embryonic stem cell research
Metaphilosophy, 2007Co-Authors: Don MarquisAbstract:Abstract: Opponents of human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research claim that such research is incompatible with the Moral Principle that it is always wrong intentionally to end a human life. In this essay, I discuss how that Principle might be revised so that it is subject to as few difficulties as possible. I then argue that even the most defensible version of the Principle is compatible with the Moral permissibility of hESC research.
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THE Moral‐Principle OBJECTION TO HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH
Metaphilosophy, 2007Co-Authors: Don MarquisAbstract:Abstract: Opponents of human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research claim that such research is incompatible with the Moral Principle that it is always wrong intentionally to end a human life. In this essay, I discuss how that Principle might be revised so that it is subject to as few difficulties as possible. I then argue that even the most defensible version of the Principle is compatible with the Moral permissibility of hESC research.
Kathleen Bawn - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Self Interest, Moral Principle, and Social Context: A Rational Choice Analysis of the Abolitionist Movement
2000Co-Authors: Kathleen BawnAbstract:Author(s): Bawn, Kathleen | Abstract: Is it possible to explain all political behavior in terms of self-interest? If we interpret self-interest as narrow, direct and short-term, the answer is obviously no. Things that we might call culture, ideology, ideas and Moral Principles clearly affect individual choices, and, thereby, political outcomes. But inquiries into the the logic behind these other forces often bring us back to interest. Much behavior that appears at odds with self-interest can be “rationalized” by considering long time horizons and the complexities of social interaction. In acting against my short-term self-interest, I may be building a useful reputation, winning and maintaining allies, making credible commitments, or establishing a focal point. Recent game theoretic work has shown how patterns of behavior that we might attribute to culture (Kreps 1990, Fearon and Laitin, 1996), partisanship (Aldrich 1995), ideology (Bawn 1999) or ideas (Garret and Weingast 1993, Weingast 1995, Bates, de Figueiredo and Weingast 1998) can arise endogenously in models with no causal force other than self-interest. The seemingly non-interest based behavior arises as the result of long time horizons, uncertainty and complex social interaction.The success of the rational choice paradigm in explaining seemingly non-interest-based behavior motivates my initial question. What are the limits of self-interest explanations? While this paper cannot offer a comprehensive answer, it explores a particular alternative to interest, Moral Principle. I will focus here on a case in which the role played by interest seems to be quite small, and the role played by Moral Principle seems quite large – the abolitionist movement in the United States. The seemingly straightforward claim that the abolitionist movement was motivated by Principle begs many questions. Under what circumstances are people motivated by Principle? When does Principle override interest? Why is a given Principle important to one person and not another? Does the “success” of a Principle in motivating behavior depend on the logical force of its content, or simply on the social context in which it is invoked?The argument developed here is that social context matters a lot. Specifically, in some social contexts, some individuals can benefit by taking modestly costly action in defense of a Principle that has no direct link to their self-interest. They benefit because by defending the Principle, they give a credible signal of their own trustworthiness. The idea that behavior contrary to one’s short-term self interest can act as an effective signal is not new to game theoretic political science. Nor is it novel to claim that abolitionism sprang from a particular vision of social order held by evangelical communities in the early-to-mid 19th century. This paper’s contribution is to show that this vision of social order created an unusual need for individuals to be able signal good intentions to their fellow community members.
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Self Interest, Moral Principle, and Social Context: A Rational Choice Analysis of the Abolitionist Movement - eScholarship
2000Co-Authors: Kathleen BawnAbstract:Is it possible to explain all political behavior in terms of self-interest? If we interpret self-interest as narrow, direct and short-term, the answer is obviously no. Things that we might call culture, ideology, ideas and Moral Principles clearly affect individual choices, and, thereby, political outcomes. But inquiries into the the logic behind these other forces often bring us back to interest. Much behavior that appears at odds with self-interest can be “rationalized” by considering long time horizons and the complexities of social interaction. In acting against my short-term self-interest, I may be building a useful reputation, winning and maintaining allies, making credible commitments, or establishing a focal point. Recent game theoretic work has shown how patterns of behavior that we might attribute to culture (Kreps 1990, Fearon and Laitin, 1996), partisanship (Aldrich 1995), ideology (Bawn 1999) or ideas (Garret and Weingast 1993, Weingast 1995, Bates, de Figueiredo and Weingast 1998) can arise endogenously in models with no causal force other than self-interest. The seemingly non-interest based behavior arises as the result of long time horizons, uncertainty and complex social interaction. The success of the rational choice paradigm in explaining seemingly non-interest-based behavior motivates my initial question. What are the limits of self-interest explanations? While this paper cannot offer a comprehensive answer, it explores a particular alternative to interest, Moral Principle. I will focus here on a case in which the role played by interest seems to be quite small, and the role played by Moral Principle seems quite large – the abolitionist movement in the United States. The seemingly straightforward claim that the abolitionist movement was motivated by Principle begs many questions. Under what circumstances are people motivated by Principle? When does Principle override interest? Why is a given Principle important to one person and not another? Does the “success” of a Principle in motivating behavior depend on the logical force of its content, or simply on the social context in which it is invoked? The argument developed here is that social context matters a lot. Specifically, in some social contexts, some individuals can benefit by taking modestly costly action in defense of a Principle that has no direct link to their self-interest. They benefit because by defending the Principle, they give a credible signal of their own trustworthiness. The idea that behavior contrary to one’s short-term self interest can act as an effective signal is not new to game theoretic political science. Nor is it novel to claim that abolitionism sprang from a particular vision of social order held by evangelical communities in the early-to-mid 19th century. This paper’s contribution is to show that this vision of social order created an unusual need for individuals to be able signal good intentions to their fellow community members.
Adil Ahmad Haque - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Torture, Terror, and the Inversion of Moral Principle
New Criminal Law Review, 2007Co-Authors: Adil Ahmad HaqueAbstract:Extremists on both sides of the War on Terror increasingly argue that torture and the deliberate killing of noncombatants are not merely Morally permitted but frequently Morally required. Both factions have found unlikely allies in leading scholars whose recent work provides intellectual support for the proposed upheaval of Moral thought. This article provides new interpretations of the doctrines of noncombatant immunity and double effect which escape traditional criticisms, withstand contemporary challenges, and provide Moral bases for rejecting torture and terrorism with equal force. The article also shows that refusal to torture does not make one complicit in the acts one could have thereby prevented, that deontological constraints retain their conceptual coherence and Moral relevance when applied to states, and that threshold deontology does not support institutionalized torture.
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Torture, Terror, and the Inversion of Moral Principle
New Criminal Law Review, 2007Co-Authors: Adil Ahmad HaqueAbstract:Extremists on either side of the War on Terror increasingly argue that torture and the deliberate killing of noncombatants are not merely Morally permitted but frequently Morally required. Both factions have found unlikely allies in leading scholars whose recent work provides intellectual support for the proposed upheaval of Moral thought. This article provides new interpretations of the doctrines of double effect and noncombatant immunity which escape traditional criticisms, withstand contemporary challenges, and provide Moral bases for rejecting torture and terrorism with equal force. The article also shows that refusal to torture does not make one complicit in the acts one could have thereby prevented, that deontological constraints retain their conceptual coherence and Moral relevance when applied to states, and that threshold deontology does not support institutionalized torture.
Fred Feldman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence by Peter Unger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) pp. xii + 186.
Nous, 1998Co-Authors: Fred FeldmanAbstract:Peter Singer’s ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ appeared in Philosophy and Public Affairs in 1972. It is a thoughtful and direct essay. Singer claims that a certain Moral Principle is true. He claims that it implies that affluent people such as ourselves ought to give very substantial assistance to the poverty-stricken victims of natural disaster in East Bengal. He goes further; he claims that ‘the way of life that has come to be taken for granted in our society’ needs to be altered. He anticipates various objections to his argument, and states his replies. He closes with a short discussion of the extent to which professional philosophers ought to try to influence public policy. The paper has been widely reprinted, and has become a sort of modern classic. I think it deserves this status. The Moral Principle to which Singer appeals is roughly this:
J. Attanucci - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Moral Principle of Care
Introducing Psychological Research, 1996Co-Authors: C. Gilligan, J. AttanucciAbstract:Before reading this summary you should read the preceding summary of Kohlberg’s paper on Moral development.