The Experts below are selected from a list of 24099 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Jean Decety - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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weaving the fabric of social interaction articulating developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience in the domain of Motor Cognition
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2006Co-Authors: Jessica A Sommerville, Jean DecetyAbstract:In this article, we bring together recent findings from developmental science and cognitive neuroscience to argue that perception-action coupling constitutes the fundamental mechanism of Motor Cognition. A variety of empirical evidence suggests that observed and executed actions are coded in a common cognitive and neural framework, enabling individuals to construct shared representations of self and other actions. We review work to suggest that such shared representations support action anticipation, organization, and imitation. These processes, along with additional computational mechanisms for determining a sense of agency and behavioral regulation, form the fabric of social interaction. In addition, humans possess the capacity to move beyond these basic aspects of action analysis to interpret behavior at a deeper level, an ability that may be outside the scope of the mirror system. Understanding the nature of shared representations from the vantage point of developmental and cognitive science and neuroscience has the potential to inform a range of Motor and social processes. This perspective also elucidates intriguing new directions and research questions and generates specific hypotheses regarding the impact of early disorders (e.g., developmental movement disorders) on subsequent action processing.
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THEORETICAL AND REVIEW ARTICLES Weaving the fabric of social interaction: Articulating developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience in the domain of Motor Cognition
2006Co-Authors: Jessica A Sommerville, Jean DecetyAbstract:In this article, we bring together recent findings from developmental science and cognitive neuroscience to argue that perception–action coupling constitutes the fundamental mechanism of Motor Cognition. A variety of empirical evidence suggests that observed and executed actions are coded in a common cognitive and neural framework, enabling individuals to construct shared representations of self and other actions. We review work to suggest that such shared representations support action anticipation, organization, and imitation. These processes, along with additional computational mechanisms for determining a sense of agency and behavioral regulation, form the fabric of social interaction. In addition, humans possess the capacity to move beyond these basic aspects of action analysis to interpret behavior at a deeper level, an ability that may be outside the scope of the mirror system. Understanding the nature of shared representations from the vantage point of developmental and cognitive science and neuroscience has the potential to inform a range of Motor and social processes. This perspective also elucidates intriguing new directions and research questions and generates specific hypotheses regarding the impact of early disorders (e.g., developmental movement disorders) on subsequent action processing.
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Motor Cognition: a new paradigm to study self-other interactions
Current opinion in neurobiology, 2004Co-Authors: Philip L. Jackson, Jean DecetyAbstract:Abstract Accumulative empirical evidence has been reviewed in support of the notion that the production and perception of action as well as the interpretation of others’ actions are functionally connected, and indeed, rely on common distributed neural systems in the preMotor and parietal cortices. We suggest that these neural systems sustain shared representations between self and other that are crucial in social interactions. The inferior parietal cortex plays a special role in the sense of agency, which is a fundamental aspect to navigate within this neural network. The role of other brain areas that implement and regulate these shared representations remains to be specified.
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What you believe versus what you think they believe: a neuroimaging study of conceptual perspective-taking
The European journal of neuroscience, 2003Co-Authors: Perrine Ruby, Jean DecetyAbstract:Social communication requires shared representations as well as a cognitive flexibility for successful interactions between self and other. What neural mechanisms underlie the ability to distinguish between our own perspective vs. the perspective of others at a conceptual level? In this PET study subjects who were medical students were asked according to the experimental conditions to respond to a list of health-related questions, taking either their own perspective or the perspective of a 'lay person'. Third-person perspective as compared to first-person perspective was associated with activation in the medial part of the superior frontal gyrus, in the left superior temporal sulcus, in the left temporal pole and in the right inferior parietal lobe. The reverse comparison revealed a specific activation in the postcentral gyrus for the first-person conceptual perspective. This study provides congruent results at the conceptual level with previous studies investigating the neural correlates of self/other distinction at the Motor level, and opens a new area of research in which conceptual Cognition can be viewed in the continuity of Motor Cognition.
Véronique Boulenger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Motor Cognition-Motor semantics: Action perception theory of Cognition and communication
Neuropsychologia, 2014Co-Authors: Friedemann Pulvermüller, Zubaida Shebani, N Egorova, Rachel L. Moseley, Véronique BoulengerAbstract:A new perspective on Cognition views cortical cell assemblies linking together knowledge about actions and perceptions not only as the vehicles of integrated action and perception processing but, furthermore, as a brain basis for a wide range of higher cortical functions, including attention, meaning and concepts, sequences, goals and intentions, and even communicative social interaction. This article explains mechanisms relevant to mechanistic action perception theory, points to concrete neuronal circuits in brains along with artificial neuronal network simulations, and summarizes recent brain imaging and other experimental data documenting the role of action perception circuits in Cognition, language and communication. © 2013.
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Motor Cognition–Motor semantics: Action perception theory of Cognition and communication
Neuropsychologia, 2013Co-Authors: Friedemann Pulvermüller, Zubaida Shebani, N Egorova, Rachel L. Moseley, Véronique BoulengerAbstract:A new perspective on Cognition views cortical cell assemblies linking together knowledge about actions and perceptions not only as the vehicles of integrated action and perception processing but, furthermore, as a brain basis for a wide range of higher cortical functions, including attention, meaning and concepts, sequences, goals and intentions, and even communicative social interaction. This article explains mechanisms relevant to mechanistic action perception theory, points to concrete neuronal circuits in brains along with artificial neuronal network simulations, and summarizes recent brain imaging and other experimental data documenting the role of action perception circuits in Cognition, language and communication.
Friedemann Pulvermüller - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Motor Cognition-Motor semantics: Action perception theory of Cognition and communication
Neuropsychologia, 2014Co-Authors: Friedemann Pulvermüller, Zubaida Shebani, N Egorova, Rachel L. Moseley, Véronique BoulengerAbstract:A new perspective on Cognition views cortical cell assemblies linking together knowledge about actions and perceptions not only as the vehicles of integrated action and perception processing but, furthermore, as a brain basis for a wide range of higher cortical functions, including attention, meaning and concepts, sequences, goals and intentions, and even communicative social interaction. This article explains mechanisms relevant to mechanistic action perception theory, points to concrete neuronal circuits in brains along with artificial neuronal network simulations, and summarizes recent brain imaging and other experimental data documenting the role of action perception circuits in Cognition, language and communication. © 2013.
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Motor Cognition–Motor semantics: Action perception theory of Cognition and communication
Neuropsychologia, 2013Co-Authors: Friedemann Pulvermüller, Zubaida Shebani, N Egorova, Rachel L. Moseley, Véronique BoulengerAbstract:A new perspective on Cognition views cortical cell assemblies linking together knowledge about actions and perceptions not only as the vehicles of integrated action and perception processing but, furthermore, as a brain basis for a wide range of higher cortical functions, including attention, meaning and concepts, sequences, goals and intentions, and even communicative social interaction. This article explains mechanisms relevant to mechanistic action perception theory, points to concrete neuronal circuits in brains along with artificial neuronal network simulations, and summarizes recent brain imaging and other experimental data documenting the role of action perception circuits in Cognition, language and communication.
Reto W. Kressig - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Simultaneously measuring gait and cognitive performance in cognitively healthy and cognitively impaired older adults: the Basel Motor-Cognition dual-task paradigm.
Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 2011Co-Authors: Nathan Theill, Mike Martin, Vera Schumacher, Stephanie A. Bridenbaugh, Reto W. KressigAbstract:OBJECTIVES: To investigate dual-task performance of gait and Cognition in cognitively healthy and cognitively impaired older adults using a Motor–Cognition dual-task paradigm. DESIGN: Cross-sectional retrospective study. SETTING: The Basel Memory Clinic and the Basel Study on the Elderly (Project BASEL). PARTICIPANTS: Seven hundred eleven older adults (mean age 77.2 ± 6.2, 350 (49.2%) female and 361 (50.8%) male). MEASUREMENTS: Gait velocity and cognitive task performance using a working memory (counting backward from 50 by 2s) and a semantic memory (enumerating animal names) task were measured during single- and dual-task conditions. Gait was assessed using the GAITRite electronic walkway system. Cognitive impairment was defined as a score less than 25 on the Mini-Mental State Examination. RESULTS: During dual tasks, participants reduced gait velocity (P .10). Cognitively impaired individuals had lower baseline gait velocity and a greater reduction in gait velocity but not cognitive performance during dual tasks than cognitively healthy participants (P
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simultaneously measuring gait and cognitive performance in cognitively healthy and cognitively impaired older adults the basel Motor Cognition dual task paradigm
Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 2011Co-Authors: Nathan Theill, Mike Martin, Vera Schumacher, Stephanie A. Bridenbaugh, Reto W. KressigAbstract:OBJECTIVES: To investigate dual-task performance of gait and Cognition in cognitively healthy and cognitively impaired older adults using a Motor–Cognition dual-task paradigm. DESIGN: Cross-sectional retrospective study. SETTING: The Basel Memory Clinic and the Basel Study on the Elderly (Project BASEL). PARTICIPANTS: Seven hundred eleven older adults (mean age 77.2 ± 6.2, 350 (49.2%) female and 361 (50.8%) male). MEASUREMENTS: Gait velocity and cognitive task performance using a working memory (counting backward from 50 by 2s) and a semantic memory (enumerating animal names) task were measured during single- and dual-task conditions. Gait was assessed using the GAITRite electronic walkway system. Cognitive impairment was defined as a score less than 25 on the Mini-Mental State Examination. RESULTS: During dual tasks, participants reduced gait velocity (P .10). Cognitively impaired individuals had lower baseline gait velocity and a greater reduction in gait velocity but not cognitive performance during dual tasks than cognitively healthy participants (P<.01). CONCLUSION: Gait velocity was lower during both dual tasks, whereas decrease in cognitive performance depended on the cognitive ability needed in the dual-task condition. Cognitively impaired individuals generally have poorer baseline performance and greater dual task–related gait velocity reduction than those who are cognitively healthy. Future research should include different conditions for gait to determine adaptive potentials of older adults.
Marc Jeannerod - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Motor Cognition: What Actions Tell the Self
2006Co-Authors: Marc JeannerodAbstract:1. Representations for actions 1.1 Definitions 1.2 Neural models of action representations 1.3 Functional models of action representation 2. Imagined actions as a prototypical form of action representation 2.1 The kinematic content of Motor images 2.2 Dynamic changes in physiological parameters during Motor imagery 2.3 The functional anatomy of Motor images 2.4 The consequences of the embodiment of action representations 3. Consciousness of self-produced actions and intentions 3.1 Consciousness of actions 3.2 Consciousness of intentions 4. The sense of agency and the self/other distinction 4.1 Sense of ownership and sense of agency in self-identification 4.2 The nature of the mechanism for self-identification 4.3 The problem of the self/other distinction 4.4 Failure of self-reCognition/attribution mechanisms in pathological states 5. How do we perceive and understand the actions of others 5.1 The perception of faces and bodies 5.2 The perception of biological motion 5.3 The understanding of others' actions 5.4 Functional implications of the mirror system in Motor Cognition 5.5 The role of the mirror system in action imitation 6. The simulation hypothesis of Motor Cognition 6.1 Motor simulation: a hypothesis for explaining action representations 6.2 Motor Cognition and social Cognition 6.3 Motor simulation and language understanding Conclusion
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The Motor theory of social Cognition: A critique
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2005Co-Authors: Pierre Jacob, Marc JeannerodAbstract:Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human Motor Cognition. In particular, the activity of the mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-human primates, provides an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the Motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospects of a Motor theory of social Cognition. In humans, social Cognition includes the ability to mindread, and many Motor theorists of social Cognition try to bridge the gap between Motor Cognition and mindreading by endorsing a simulation account of mindreading. Here, we question the Motor theory of social Cognition and give reasons for our skepticism.
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The Motor theory of social Cognition: a critique
2005Co-Authors: Pierre Jacob, Marc JeannerodAbstract:Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human Motor Cognition. In particular, the activity of mirror neurons first discovered in the preMotor cortex of macaque monkeys seems to provide an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the Motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospect of a Motor theory of human social Cognition. In humans, however, social Cognition encompasses the ability to mindread. Many Motor theorists of social Cognition try to bridge the gap between Motor Cognition and mindreading by endorsing a simulation account of mindreading. Here, we argue that Motor simulation is neither sufficient nor necessary for third-person mindreading.
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neural simulation of action a unifying mechanism for Motor Cognition
NeuroImage, 2001Co-Authors: Marc JeannerodAbstract:Paradigms drawn from cognitive psychology have provided new insight into covert stages of action. These states include not only intending actions that will eventually be executed, but also imagining actions, recognizing tools, learning by observation, or even understanding the behavior of other people. Studies using techniques for mapping brain activity, probing cortical excitability, or measuring the activity of peripheral effectors in normal human subjects and in patients all provide evidence of a subliminal activation of the Motor system during these cognitive states. The hypothesis that the Motor system is part of a simulation network that is activated under a variety of conditions in relation to action, either self-intended or observed from other individuals, will be developed. The function of this process of simulation would be not only to shape the Motor system in anticipation to execution, but also to provide the self with information on the feasibility and the meaning of potential actions.