The Experts below are selected from a list of 252 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Gabriele Eckstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Voters' party preferences in Multiparty Systems and their coalitional and spatial implications: Germany after unification
    Public Choice, 1998
    Co-Authors: Franz Urban Pappi, Gabriele Eckstein
    Abstract:

    How should party preferences of voters in a Multiparty System be measured, compared and aggregated? The authors use city block metric of distances between the pairwise comparisons of the five German parties (1995 survey data for West and East Germany). Neither in West nor in East Germany, a party gains the absolute majority of voters' preferences. They derive coalition preferences from the party rankings; the governing coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP is not the winner, compared with other feasible coalitions of the German party System. But the party rankings of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition leaners are more homogeneous than other groups of coalition leaners. In the second part of the article, the authors analyze the common structure of all consistent party rankings. Do voters apply the same criteria to evaluate the political parties? Although only a slight majority of individual rankings fit the often used ideological left-right scale, there does not exist a competing one-dimensional order of the parties that would capture more voters. The joint scale of individual party rankings is interpreted as the collective order which facilitates political orientation of voters. This collective order is more pronounced in West than in East Germany where individuals are almost as consistent in their party rankings but where the rankings fit the collective order less well than in West Germany. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

  • Voters' party preferences in Multiparty Systems and their coalitional and spatial implications: Germany after unification
    Public Choice, 1998
    Co-Authors: Franz Urban Pappi, Gabriele Eckstein
    Abstract:

    How should party preferences of voters in a Multiparty System be measured, compared and aggregated? We use city block metric of distances between the pairwise comparisons of the five German parties (1995 survey data for West and East Germany). Neither in West nor in East Germany, a party gains the absolute majority of voters' preferences. We derive coalition preferences from the party rankings; the governing coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP is not the winner, compared with other feasible coalitions of the German party System. But the party rankings of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition leaners are more homogeneous than other groups of coalition leaners. In the second part of the article, we analyze the common structure of all consistent party rankings. Do voters apply the same criteria to evaluate the political parties? Although only a slight majority of individual rankings fit the often used ideological left-right scale, there does not exist a competing one-dimensional order of the parties that would capture more voters. The joint scale of individual party rankings is interpreted as the collective order which facilitates political orientation of voters. This collective order is more pronounced in West than in East Germany where individuals are almost as consistent in their party rankings but where the rankings fit the collective order less well than in West Germany.

Franz Urban Pappi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Voters' party preferences in Multiparty Systems and their coalitional and spatial implications: Germany after unification
    Public Choice, 1998
    Co-Authors: Franz Urban Pappi, Gabriele Eckstein
    Abstract:

    How should party preferences of voters in a Multiparty System be measured, compared and aggregated? The authors use city block metric of distances between the pairwise comparisons of the five German parties (1995 survey data for West and East Germany). Neither in West nor in East Germany, a party gains the absolute majority of voters' preferences. They derive coalition preferences from the party rankings; the governing coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP is not the winner, compared with other feasible coalitions of the German party System. But the party rankings of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition leaners are more homogeneous than other groups of coalition leaners. In the second part of the article, the authors analyze the common structure of all consistent party rankings. Do voters apply the same criteria to evaluate the political parties? Although only a slight majority of individual rankings fit the often used ideological left-right scale, there does not exist a competing one-dimensional order of the parties that would capture more voters. The joint scale of individual party rankings is interpreted as the collective order which facilitates political orientation of voters. This collective order is more pronounced in West than in East Germany where individuals are almost as consistent in their party rankings but where the rankings fit the collective order less well than in West Germany. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

  • Voters' party preferences in Multiparty Systems and their coalitional and spatial implications: Germany after unification
    Public Choice, 1998
    Co-Authors: Franz Urban Pappi, Gabriele Eckstein
    Abstract:

    How should party preferences of voters in a Multiparty System be measured, compared and aggregated? We use city block metric of distances between the pairwise comparisons of the five German parties (1995 survey data for West and East Germany). Neither in West nor in East Germany, a party gains the absolute majority of voters' preferences. We derive coalition preferences from the party rankings; the governing coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP is not the winner, compared with other feasible coalitions of the German party System. But the party rankings of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition leaners are more homogeneous than other groups of coalition leaners. In the second part of the article, we analyze the common structure of all consistent party rankings. Do voters apply the same criteria to evaluate the political parties? Although only a slight majority of individual rankings fit the often used ideological left-right scale, there does not exist a competing one-dimensional order of the parties that would capture more voters. The joint scale of individual party rankings is interpreted as the collective order which facilitates political orientation of voters. This collective order is more pronounced in West than in East Germany where individuals are almost as consistent in their party rankings but where the rankings fit the collective order less well than in West Germany.

Christoph Arndt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • an empirical model of issue evolution and partisan realignment in a Multiparty System
    Political Research Quarterly, 2018
    Co-Authors: Christoph Arndt
    Abstract:

    Since Carmines and Stimson’s seminal work, the concept of issue evolution has become a common theoretical toolkit to examine and explain polarization around cultural issues and partisan realignment...

  • issue evolution and partisan polarization in a european Multiparty System elite and mass repositioning in denmark 1968 2011
    European Union Politics, 2016
    Co-Authors: Christoph Arndt
    Abstract:

    Issue evolution is a well-established theoretical perspective in the analysis of long-term party competition and partisanship in the US. However, this perspective has rarely been used to analyze political elite effects on partisan polarization in European Multiparty Systems. Consequently, I apply the issue evolution perspective to polarization in a European Multiparty System. I find an emergence of cultural issues in Denmark, where mass level polarization on cultural issues followed elite level polarization. Unlike two-party Systems, niche parties drive issue evolution on the elite level, which is then followed by niche partisan polarization and, finally, mainstream party adaption. The findings illustrate the mechanisms of issue evolution in a European-style Multiparty System and the role of niche parties.

  • Issue evolution and partisan polarization in a European Multiparty System: Elite and mass repositioning in Denmark 1968–2011
    European Union Politics, 2016
    Co-Authors: Christoph Arndt
    Abstract:

    Issue evolution is a well-established theoretical perspective in the analysis of long-term party competition and partisanship in the US. However, this perspective has rarely been used to analyze political elite effects on partisan polarization in European Multiparty Systems. Consequently, I apply the issue evolution perspective to polarization in a European Multiparty System. I find an emergence of cultural issues in Denmark, where mass level polarization on cultural issues followed elite level polarization. Unlike two-party Systems, niche parties drive issue evolution on the elite level, which is then followed by niche partisan polarization and, finally, mainstream party adaption. The findings illustrate the mechanisms of issue evolution in a European-style Multiparty System and the role of niche parties.

Ragnhild L Muriaas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Reintroducing a Local‐Level Multiparty System in Uganda: Why Be in Opposition?
    Government and Opposition, 2013
    Co-Authors: Ragnhild L Muriaas
    Abstract:

    In a referendum in July 2005 the people of Uganda voted overwhelmingly in support of reintroducing the Multiparty System. As a result, one expected an increase in candidates running on party tickets other than the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) in the local elections in March 2006. However, the findings in this article reveal that politicians challenging the incumbent preferred to be non-partisan candidates rather than members of the opposition parties. Based on semi-structured interviews with 198 local leaders, this article connects local perspectives on the reintroduction of the Multiparty System with well-known explanations of weak opposition in Africa, and discloses how formal institutions and people's notions of representation limit the prospects of the opposition at the local level.

  • reintroducing a local level Multiparty System in uganda why be in opposition
    Government and Opposition, 2009
    Co-Authors: Ragnhild L Muriaas
    Abstract:

    In a referendum in July 2005 the people of Uganda voted overwhelmingly in support of reintroducing the Multiparty System. As a result, one expected an increase in candidates running on party tickets other than the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) in the local elections in March 2006. However, the findings in this article reveal that politicians challenging the incumbent preferred to be non-partisan candidates rather than members of the opposition parties. Based on semi-structured interviews with 198 local leaders, this article connects local perspectives on the reintroduction of the Multiparty System with well-known explanations of weak opposition in Africa, and discloses how formal institutions and people's notions of representation limit the prospects of the opposition at the local level.

Mildred Schlesinger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the reaffirmation of a Multiparty System in france
    American Political Science Review, 1990
    Co-Authors: Joseph A Schlesinger, Mildred Schlesinger
    Abstract:

    In accord with the office-seeking theory of parties, we explore the impact of the structure of electoral competition on French parties. We speculated that the Fifth Republic's electoral structure—dual-ballot elections in single-member districts—would produce a Multiparty System consisting of parties tailored to the two-ballot mode of winning. To test our proposition we devised two measures of winning for the members of the national assembly's partisan groups: the percentage of members who won the absolute majority that was needed to win on the first ballot and the average shift in the electoral margin of the groups' remaining members from the first to the second ballot. The two measures revealed four distinct ways of winning, each of which fostered a prototypical party.