The Experts below are selected from a list of 204 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Anna V. Fisher - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Development of Inductive Generalization
Child Development Perspectives, 2015Co-Authors: Anna V. FisherAbstract:Inductive generalization (i.e., making generalizations from instances) is ubiquitous in human cognition. In the developmental literature, researchers have proposed two theoretical accounts of this important process: a Naive Theory account and a similarity-based account. However, neither of these theoretical accounts explains marked developmental changes in inductive generalization with familiar categories that have been documented in prior research. In this article, I describe briefly a revised version of the similarity-based account of inductive generalization that can explain individual variability as well as developmental change in inductive generalization with familiar categories. I also highlight several unresolved issues in the study of development of inductive generalization.
-
inductive generalization with familiar categories developmental changes in children s reliance on perceptual similarity and kind information
Frontiers in Psychology, 2015Co-Authors: Karrie E Godwin, Anna V. FisherAbstract:Inductive generalization is ubiquitous in human cognition; however, the factors underpinning this ability early in development remain contested. The present study was designed to (1) test the predictions of the Naive Theory and a similarity-based account and (2) examine the mechanism by which labels promote induction. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-old children made inferences about highly familiar categories. The results were not fully consistent with either theoretical account. In contrast to the predictions of the Naive Theory approach, the youngest children in the study did not ignore perceptually compelling lures in favor of category-match items; in contrast to the predictions of the similarity-based account, no group of participants favored perceptually compelling lures in the presence of dissimilar-looking category-match items. In Experiment 2 we investigated the mechanisms by which labels promote induction by examining the influence of different label types, namely category labels (e.g., the target and category-match both labeled as bird) and descriptor labels (e.g., the target and the perceptual lure both labeled as brown) on induction performance. In contrast to the predictions of the Naive Theory approach, descriptor labels but not category labels affected induction in 3-year-old children. Consistent with the predictions of the similarity-based account, descriptor labels affected the performance of children in all age groups included in the study. The implications of these findings for the developmental account of induction are discussed.
-
Inductive generalization with familiar categories: developmental changes in children's reliance on perceptual similarity and kind information.
Frontiers in psychology, 2015Co-Authors: Karrie E Godwin, Anna V. FisherAbstract:Inductive generalization is ubiquitous in human cognition; however, the factors underpinning this ability early in development remain contested. The present study was designed to (1) test the predictions of the Naive Theory and a similarity-based account and (2) examine the mechanism by which labels promote induction. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-old children made inferences about highly familiar categories. The results were not fully consistent with either theoretical account. In contrast to the predictions of the Naive Theory approach, the youngest children in the study did not ignore perceptually compelling lures in favor of category-match items; in contrast to the predictions of the similarity-based account, no group of participants favored perceptually compelling lures in the presence of dissimilar-looking category-match items. In Experiment 2 we investigated the mechanisms by which labels promote induction by examining the influence of different label types, namely category labels (e.g., the target and category-match both labeled as bird) and descriptor labels (e.g., the target and the perceptual lure both labeled as brown) on induction performance. In contrast to the predictions of the Naive Theory approach, descriptor labels but not category labels affected induction in 3-year-old children. Consistent with the predictions of the similarity-based account, descriptor labels affected the performance of children in all age groups included in the study. The implications of these findings for the developmental account of induction are discussed.
-
CogSci - Inductive Generalization in Early Childhood: The Contribution of Perceptual and Representational Similarity
Cognitive Science, 2014Co-Authors: Karrie E Godwin, Anna V. FisherAbstract:Inductive Generalization in Early Childhood: The Contribution of Perceptual and Representational Similarity Karrie E. Godwin (kegodwin@andrew.cmu.edu) Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Psychology, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA Anna V. Fisher (fisher49@andrew.cmu.edu) Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Psychology, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA Abstract Inductive generalization is ubiquitous in human cognition; however, the factors underpinning this ability early in development remain contested. Two alternative perspectives have been proposed for how children make inductive inferences: a Naive Theory account (Gelman & Markman, 1986; Markman, 1990) and a similarity-based account (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; 2012). Although both theories claim considerable empirical support, the debate is ongoing and results of extant studies are often deemed inconclusive. We report an experiment designed to evaluate the predictions of each account. In this study, 2- to 5-year-old children were asked to make inferences about highly familiar object categories. The reported findings are not fully consistent with either the Naive Theory or the similarity-based approach. Therefore, we propose a revised version of the similarity- based account, which can account for the reported findings. Keywords: inductive reasoning; categories; representations; cognitive development. Introduction The ability to generalize from the known to the unknown is a critical component of human cognition. For example, by 10 months of age infants are able to generalize observable object properties (e.g., Baldwin, Markman & Melartin, 1993), by 24 months of age children can generalize labels to novel objects (e.g., Booth & Waxman, 2002; Jones & Smith, 1998; Smith, Jones, & Landau, 1996), and during the preschool years children begin to make inductive inferences about unobservable properties (e.g., Fisher, Matlen, & Godwin, 2011; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004). Despite general agreement regarding the importance of inductive generalization for human cognition, there is little agreement regarding the developmental origins of this ability. Two alternative perspectives have been proposed for how children make inductive inferences: a Naive Theory account (Gelman & Markman, 1986; Markman, 1990) and a similarity-based account (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; 2012). According to the Naive Theory approach, from very early in development people first identify category membership of items under consideration and then generalize a known property to items of the same kind: “by 2 ½ years, children expect categories to promote rich inductive inferences… and they can overlook conflicting perceptual appearances in doing so” (Gelman & Coley, 1990, p. 802). Furthermore, it has been suggested that the ability to make category-based inferences is not a product of development and learning. Instead, children are “initially biased” to recognize that labels denote categories and make inferences on the basis of shared category membership (Gelman & Markman, 1986, p. 207), an idea that has been highly influential in the literature (e.g., Booth & Waxman, 2002; Gelman & Coley, 1990; Jaswal & Markman, 2007; Kalish, 2006; Keil, 1989). In contrast to the two-step account of inductive inference suggested by the Naive Theory approach, Sloutsky and Fisher (2004) proposed a one-step similarity-based account called SINC (Similarity, Induction, Naming, and Categorization). According to SINC, children make inferences on the basis of the overall similarity of presented entities computed over all perceived object features. Within this approach, labels are considered to be object features (rather than category markers) that contribute to the overall perceptual similarity. Therefore, according to SINC an inference can be label- based without necessarily being category-based. Several findings suggest that children rely primarily on perceptual features of objects (but not category membership information) to make inferences well beyond the preschool years, possibly until 7 to 9 years of age (e.g., Badger & Shapiro, 2012; Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005; Sloutsky, Kloos, & Fisher, 2007). Evidence in support of the Naive Theory of inductive generalization stems from the seminal study by Gelman and Markman (1986). In this study researchers asked preschool- age children and college students to make inferences about natural kinds when perceptual information was ambiguous or conflicted with category membership (cf. Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004). Labels were used to communicate category information; for instance, participants were asked whether a rock shared a non-obvious property with a stone or chalk. The overall rate of category match choices was above chance, both in preschool children and college students. These findings were taken as evidence that even young children hold a belief (or a Naive Theory) that natural kind objects share a number of unobservable properties if they belong to the same category, and make inductive inferences on the basis of this belief. Subsequent studies reported similar findings in younger children and infants (e.g., Gelman & Coley, 1990; Graham, Kilbreath, & Welder, The similarity-based approach explains these findings through the contribution of the similarity of auditory features (i.e., linguistic labels in this case) to inductive
Karrie E Godwin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
inductive generalization with familiar categories developmental changes in children s reliance on perceptual similarity and kind information
Frontiers in Psychology, 2015Co-Authors: Karrie E Godwin, Anna V. FisherAbstract:Inductive generalization is ubiquitous in human cognition; however, the factors underpinning this ability early in development remain contested. The present study was designed to (1) test the predictions of the Naive Theory and a similarity-based account and (2) examine the mechanism by which labels promote induction. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-old children made inferences about highly familiar categories. The results were not fully consistent with either theoretical account. In contrast to the predictions of the Naive Theory approach, the youngest children in the study did not ignore perceptually compelling lures in favor of category-match items; in contrast to the predictions of the similarity-based account, no group of participants favored perceptually compelling lures in the presence of dissimilar-looking category-match items. In Experiment 2 we investigated the mechanisms by which labels promote induction by examining the influence of different label types, namely category labels (e.g., the target and category-match both labeled as bird) and descriptor labels (e.g., the target and the perceptual lure both labeled as brown) on induction performance. In contrast to the predictions of the Naive Theory approach, descriptor labels but not category labels affected induction in 3-year-old children. Consistent with the predictions of the similarity-based account, descriptor labels affected the performance of children in all age groups included in the study. The implications of these findings for the developmental account of induction are discussed.
-
Inductive generalization with familiar categories: developmental changes in children's reliance on perceptual similarity and kind information.
Frontiers in psychology, 2015Co-Authors: Karrie E Godwin, Anna V. FisherAbstract:Inductive generalization is ubiquitous in human cognition; however, the factors underpinning this ability early in development remain contested. The present study was designed to (1) test the predictions of the Naive Theory and a similarity-based account and (2) examine the mechanism by which labels promote induction. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-old children made inferences about highly familiar categories. The results were not fully consistent with either theoretical account. In contrast to the predictions of the Naive Theory approach, the youngest children in the study did not ignore perceptually compelling lures in favor of category-match items; in contrast to the predictions of the similarity-based account, no group of participants favored perceptually compelling lures in the presence of dissimilar-looking category-match items. In Experiment 2 we investigated the mechanisms by which labels promote induction by examining the influence of different label types, namely category labels (e.g., the target and category-match both labeled as bird) and descriptor labels (e.g., the target and the perceptual lure both labeled as brown) on induction performance. In contrast to the predictions of the Naive Theory approach, descriptor labels but not category labels affected induction in 3-year-old children. Consistent with the predictions of the similarity-based account, descriptor labels affected the performance of children in all age groups included in the study. The implications of these findings for the developmental account of induction are discussed.
-
CogSci - Inductive Generalization in Early Childhood: The Contribution of Perceptual and Representational Similarity
Cognitive Science, 2014Co-Authors: Karrie E Godwin, Anna V. FisherAbstract:Inductive Generalization in Early Childhood: The Contribution of Perceptual and Representational Similarity Karrie E. Godwin (kegodwin@andrew.cmu.edu) Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Psychology, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA Anna V. Fisher (fisher49@andrew.cmu.edu) Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Psychology, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA Abstract Inductive generalization is ubiquitous in human cognition; however, the factors underpinning this ability early in development remain contested. Two alternative perspectives have been proposed for how children make inductive inferences: a Naive Theory account (Gelman & Markman, 1986; Markman, 1990) and a similarity-based account (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; 2012). Although both theories claim considerable empirical support, the debate is ongoing and results of extant studies are often deemed inconclusive. We report an experiment designed to evaluate the predictions of each account. In this study, 2- to 5-year-old children were asked to make inferences about highly familiar object categories. The reported findings are not fully consistent with either the Naive Theory or the similarity-based approach. Therefore, we propose a revised version of the similarity- based account, which can account for the reported findings. Keywords: inductive reasoning; categories; representations; cognitive development. Introduction The ability to generalize from the known to the unknown is a critical component of human cognition. For example, by 10 months of age infants are able to generalize observable object properties (e.g., Baldwin, Markman & Melartin, 1993), by 24 months of age children can generalize labels to novel objects (e.g., Booth & Waxman, 2002; Jones & Smith, 1998; Smith, Jones, & Landau, 1996), and during the preschool years children begin to make inductive inferences about unobservable properties (e.g., Fisher, Matlen, & Godwin, 2011; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004). Despite general agreement regarding the importance of inductive generalization for human cognition, there is little agreement regarding the developmental origins of this ability. Two alternative perspectives have been proposed for how children make inductive inferences: a Naive Theory account (Gelman & Markman, 1986; Markman, 1990) and a similarity-based account (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; 2012). According to the Naive Theory approach, from very early in development people first identify category membership of items under consideration and then generalize a known property to items of the same kind: “by 2 ½ years, children expect categories to promote rich inductive inferences… and they can overlook conflicting perceptual appearances in doing so” (Gelman & Coley, 1990, p. 802). Furthermore, it has been suggested that the ability to make category-based inferences is not a product of development and learning. Instead, children are “initially biased” to recognize that labels denote categories and make inferences on the basis of shared category membership (Gelman & Markman, 1986, p. 207), an idea that has been highly influential in the literature (e.g., Booth & Waxman, 2002; Gelman & Coley, 1990; Jaswal & Markman, 2007; Kalish, 2006; Keil, 1989). In contrast to the two-step account of inductive inference suggested by the Naive Theory approach, Sloutsky and Fisher (2004) proposed a one-step similarity-based account called SINC (Similarity, Induction, Naming, and Categorization). According to SINC, children make inferences on the basis of the overall similarity of presented entities computed over all perceived object features. Within this approach, labels are considered to be object features (rather than category markers) that contribute to the overall perceptual similarity. Therefore, according to SINC an inference can be label- based without necessarily being category-based. Several findings suggest that children rely primarily on perceptual features of objects (but not category membership information) to make inferences well beyond the preschool years, possibly until 7 to 9 years of age (e.g., Badger & Shapiro, 2012; Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005; Sloutsky, Kloos, & Fisher, 2007). Evidence in support of the Naive Theory of inductive generalization stems from the seminal study by Gelman and Markman (1986). In this study researchers asked preschool- age children and college students to make inferences about natural kinds when perceptual information was ambiguous or conflicted with category membership (cf. Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004). Labels were used to communicate category information; for instance, participants were asked whether a rock shared a non-obvious property with a stone or chalk. The overall rate of category match choices was above chance, both in preschool children and college students. These findings were taken as evidence that even young children hold a belief (or a Naive Theory) that natural kind objects share a number of unobservable properties if they belong to the same category, and make inductive inferences on the basis of this belief. Subsequent studies reported similar findings in younger children and infants (e.g., Gelman & Coley, 1990; Graham, Kilbreath, & Welder, The similarity-based approach explains these findings through the contribution of the similarity of auditory features (i.e., linguistic labels in this case) to inductive
Susan A. Gelman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Ownership Matters: People Possess a Naïve Theory of Ownership
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2018Co-Authors: Shaylene E. Nancekivell, Ori Friedman, Susan A. GelmanAbstract:Ownership is at the heart of people’s daily activities and has been throughout history. People consider ownership when acting on objects, engaging in financial matters, and assessing the acceptability of actions. We propose that people’s understanding of ownership depends on an early-emerging, causally powerful, Naive Theory of ownership. We draw on research from multiple disciplines to suggest that, from childhood, a Naive Theory of ownership includes ontological commitments, causal-explanatory reasoning, and unobservable constructs. These components are unlikely to stem from other core theories or from noncausal representations. We also address why people might have a Naive Theory of ownership, how it develops across the lifespan, and whether aspects of this Theory may be universal despite variation across cultures and history.
-
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science - Naive Theories, Development of
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, 2006Co-Authors: Susan A. GelmanAbstract:A Naive Theory (also referred to as commonsense Theory or folk Theory) is a coherent set of knowledge and beliefs about a specific content domain (such as physics or psychology), which entails ontological commitments, attention to domain-specific causal principles, and appeal to unobservable entities. Keywords: knowledge; ontology; causation; domain-specificity; Theory of mind; Naive physics; Naive biology
Gergely Csibra - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
teleological reasoning in infancy the Naive Theory of rational action
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2003Co-Authors: György Gergely, Gergely CsibraAbstract:Converging evidence demonstrates that one-year-olds interpret and draw inferences about other’s goaldirected actions. We contrast alternative theories about how this early competence relates to our ability to attribute mental states to others. We propose that one-year-olds apply a non-mentalistic interpretational system, the ’teleological stance’ to represent actions by relating relevant aspects of reality (action, goal-state and situational constraints) through the principle of rational action, which assumes that actions function to realize goal-states by the most efficient means available. We argue that this early inferential principle is identical to the rationality principle of the mentalistic stance ‐ a representational system that develops later to guide inferences about mental states.
-
Teleological reasoning in infancy: the infant's Naive Theory of rational action. A reply to Premack and Premack.
Cognition, 1997Co-Authors: György Gergely, Gergely CsibraAbstract:We argue that Premack and Premack's criticism of our demonstration (Gergely et al., 1995) of interpreting goal-directed action in one year-olds in terms of the principle of rationality are ill-founded, and their suggested alternative test for goal-attribution is open to lower level interpretations. We show that the alterative model they propose for our data in terms of 'appropriate' change of means action is but a somewhat imprecise restatement of our account of the infant's Naive Theory of rational action. Finally, we elaborate and clarify our model of the teleological stance in infancy which we suggest is an as yet nonmentalistic precursor of the young child's later emerging causal Theory of mind.
Hartry Field - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Prospects for a Naive Theory of Classes
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 2017Co-Authors: Hartry Field, Harvey Lederman, Tore Fjetland ØgaardAbstract:The Naive Theory of properties states that for every condition there is a property instantiated by exactly the things which satisfy that condition. The Naive Theory of properties is inconsistent in classical logic, but there are many ways to obtain consistent Naive theories of properties in nonclassical logics. The Naive Theory of classes adds to the Naive Theory of properties an extensionality rule or axiom, which states roughly that if two classes have exactly the same members, they are identical. In this paper we examine the prospects for obtaining a satisfactory Naive Theory of classes. We start from a result by Ross Brady, which demonstrates the consistency of something resembling a Naive Theory of classes. We generalize Brady’s result somewhat and extend it to a recent system developed by Andrew Bacon. All of the theories we prove consistent contain an extensionality rule or axiom. But we argue that given the background logics, the relevant extensionality principles are too weak. For example, in some of these theories, there are universal classes which are not declared coextensive. We elucidate some very modest demands on extensionality, designed to rule out this kind of pathology. But we close by proving that even these modest demands cannot be jointly satisfied. In light of this new impossibility result, the prospects for a Naive Theory of classes are bleak
-
The Consistency of the Naive(?) Theory of Properties
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2004Co-Authors: Hartry FieldAbstract:If properties are to play a useful role in semantics, it is hard to avoid assuming the Naive Theory of properties: for any predicate Θ(x), there is a property such that an object o has it if and only if Θ(o). Yet this appears to lead to various paradoxes. I show that no paradoxes arise as long as the logic is weakened appropriately; the main difficulty is finding a semantics that can handle a conditional obeying reasonable laws without engendering paradox. I employ a semantics which is infinite-valued, with the values only partially ordered. Can the solution be adapted to Naive set Theory? Probably not, but limiting Naive comprehension in set Theory is perfectly satisfactory, whereas this is not so in a property Theory used for semantics.
-
the consistency of the Naive Theory of properties
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2004Co-Authors: Hartry FieldAbstract:If properties are to play a useful role in semantics, it is hard to avoid assuming the Naive Theory of properties: for any predicate Θ(x), there is a property such that an object o has it if and only if Θ(o). Yet this appears to lead to various paradoxes. I show that no paradoxes arise as long as the logic is weakened appropriately; the main difficulty is finding a semantics that can handle a conditional obeying reasonable laws without engendering paradox. I employ a semantics which is infinite-valued, with the values only partially ordered. Can the solution be adapted to Naive set Theory? Probably not, but limiting Naive comprehension in set Theory is perfectly satisfactory, whereas this is not so in a property Theory used for semantics.
