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John Tawa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Does Social Constructionist Curricula Both Decrease Essentialist and Increase Nominalist Beliefs About Race?
Science & Education, 2020Co-Authors: John TawaAbstract:Increasingly, educators in the biological and social sciences teach about the concept of race from a social constructionist perspective. Scholarship on race pedagogy suggests that to fully appreciate the complexity of race, students must be able to both deconstruct multiple false beliefs about the fixed nature of race (i.e., racial essentialism) and be able to articulate the sociopolitical development of race (i.e., racial Nominalism). In this study, a “knowledge in pieces” theory provides a framework for examining students’ learning about multiple beliefs about race. Participants ( N = 116) were recruited online and were randomly assigned to watch either a video about the social construction of race or a video about stereotypes. Participants completed multidimensional measures of racial essentialism and racial Nominalism before and after watching the videos. As predicted, participants in the social construction video condition showed significantly greater decreases in genotypic and behavioral racial essentialism but surprisingly showed moderate increases in phenotypic essentialism, relative to changes among participants in the stereotype video condition. Moderation analyses explored how changes in racial essentialism were concurrent with changes in racial Nominalism, and whether these concurrences depended on which video participants were exposed to; for example, in the social construction video condition only, decreases in genotypic and behavioral essentialism concurred with increases in sociopolitical Nominalism. Findings are discussed in light of pedagogical and curricular strategies for teaching the social construction of race.
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dimensions of racial essentialism and racial Nominalism a mixed methods study of beliefs about race
Race and Social Problems, 2018Co-Authors: John TawaAbstract:The researcher used a mixed-methods approach to examine the breadth and prevalence of people’s understandings of race. Open-ended qualitative interviews with undergraduate students at a private university (N = 28) were used to inductively develop a multidimensional model of beliefs about race; eight beliefs about race were subsumed under two broader categories including racial essentialism (i.e., belief in race as naturally occurring entities) and racial Nominalism (i.e., belief in race as a social idea). In the quantitative stage, a broader community sample (N = 575) completed an online survey comprised of questions generated from qualitative interviewees’ descriptions of their beliefs. Analyses of survey responses offer estimates of the prevalence of the eight beliefs about race as well as point to demographic variation in endorsement of these beliefs. Essentialist beliefs tended to more frequently be endorsed by males, people of color, immigrants, and non-college students; nominalist beliefs tended to be endorsed by females and college students. Findings are discussed in relation to the conceptualization of beliefs about race and the potential impact of this model for the study of inter-group behavior.
David Liggins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Weaseling and the Content of Science
Mind, 2012Co-Authors: David LigginsAbstract:I defend Joseph Melia's nominalist account of mathematics from an objection raised by Mark Colyvan in his 'There is no easy road to Nominalism' (Mind 119. 474, April 2010, 285?306).
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anti Nominalism reconsidered
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2007Co-Authors: David LigginsAbstract:Many philosophers of mathematics are attracted by Nominalism, the doctrine that there are no sets, numbers, functions or other mathematical objects. John Burgess and Gideon Rosen have put forward an intriguing argument against Nominalism, based on the thought that philosophy cannot overrule internal mathematical and scientific standards of acceptability. I argue that Burgess and Rosen's argument fails because it relies on a mistaken view of what the standards of mathematics require.
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Is there a good epistemological argument against platonism
Analysis, 2006Co-Authors: David LigginsAbstract:One important disagreement within the philosophy of mathematics is over the existence of mathematical objects such as numbers. Platonists assert that mathematical objects exist, whereas nominalists deny their existence. According to platonists, mathematical objects are abstract: in other words, platonists think of mathematical objects as neither causally active nor spatially located. Nominalists tend to agree that if there were mathematical objects, then they would be abstract. But they claim that there are no mathematical objects. Nominalists have various ways of arguing against platonism. For instance, they can try to provide nominalist accounts of mathematics which provide better explanations of the phenomena than the platonist competition. Nominalists also argue against platonism more directly. Of recent direct attacks on platonism, Hartry Field?s (1988, 1989) is perhaps the strongest, and has certainly been the most-discussed. 1 As we shall see, it is ? broadly speaking ? epistemological in character. In their recent article ?Nominalism reconsidered? (2005: 520?23), John Burgess and Gideon Rosen contend that there is no good epistemological argument against platonism. They propose a dilemma, claiming that epistemological arguments against platonism either (i) rely on a dubious epistemology, or (ii) resemble a dubious sceptical argument concerning perceptual knowledge. I take it that impalement on either horn of the dilemma would seriously weaken Field?s argument. In what follows, I will defend Field?s argument by showing that it escapes both horns. I begin by reviewing Field?s argument; then I take on (i) and (ii) in turn.
Gonzalo Rodriguezpereyra - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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resemblance Nominalism and abstract nouns
Analysis, 2015Co-Authors: Gonzalo RodriguezpereyraAbstract:This is a reply to Byeong-Uk Yi who argued that my Resemblance Nominalism fails to account for sentences featuring abstract nouns like (1) Carmine resembles vermillion more than it resembles French Blue and (2) Scarlet is a colour. I accept his criticism of what I said in my book on Resemblance Nominalism about (1), but then I go on to show how (1) can be accounted for. I reject his criticism of what I said in my book about (2). I also show how Resemblance Nominalism can account for other sentences featuring abstract nouns.
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Nominalism about properties new essays
2015Co-Authors: Ghislain Guigon, Gonzalo RodriguezpereyraAbstract:1. Introduction Ghislain Guigon and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra Part I: The Historical Development of the Problem of Universals and Nominalism 2. Aristotle's Definitions of Universals and Individuals in de Interpretatione 7 Paolo Crivelli 3. Abelard's Theory of Universals John Marenbon 4. Ockham's Ontology Claude Panaccio 5. Hume on Spatial Properties Jani Hakkarainen Part II: Systematic Discussion 6. Six Similarity Theories of Properties A. C. Paseau 7. The Trope Coextension Problem Douglas Ehring 8. Coextension and Identity Ghislain Guigon 9. A Trope Nominalist Theory of Natural Kinds Markku Keinanen 10. Nominalism, Naturalism and Natural Properties Joseph Melia 11. Avoiding ad hoc Ontology Nicholas Mantegani
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resemblance Nominalism a solution to the problem of universals
2002Co-Authors: Gonzalo RodriguezpereyraAbstract:Introduction 1. The Problem of Universals: A Problem about Truthmakers 2. The Explananda of the Problems of Universals 3. The Many over One 4. Resemblance Nominalism 5. The Coextension Difficulty 6. Russell's Regress 7. The Resemblance Structure of Property Classes 8. Goodman's Difficulties 9. The Imperfect Community Difficulty 10. The Companionship Difficulty 11. The Mere Intersections Difficulty 12. The Superiority of Resemblance Nominalism Appendix: On Imperfect Communities and the Non-communities they Entail References, Index
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resemblance Nominalism and russell s regress
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2001Co-Authors: Gonzalo RodriguezpereyraAbstract:(2001). Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 79, No. 3, pp. 395-408.
Jani Hakkarainen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the ontological form of tropes refuting douglas ehring s main argument against standard trope Nominalism
Philosophia, 2017Co-Authors: Jani Hakkarainen, Markku KeinanenAbstract:According to standard trope Nominalism, there are simple tropes that do not have parts or multiply distinct aspects. Douglas Ehring’s reductio ad absurdum against this standard view concludes that there are no simple tropes. In this paper, we provide a response to Ehring defending the standard view. Ehring’s argument may be refuted by (1) distinguishing the ontological form of tropes from their contribution to the ontological content of the world, and (2) construing tropes as having primitive identity. At the same time, standard trope Nominalism is elaborated on by distinguishing between ontological form and content, for which there are also independent reasons.
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Hume as a Trope Nominalist
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2012Co-Authors: Jani HakkarainenAbstract:In this paper, I argue that Hume's solution to a problem that contemporary metaphysicians call “the problem of universals” would be rather trope-theoretical than some other type of Nominalism. The basic idea in different trope theories is that particular properties, i.e., tropes are postulated to account for the fact that there are particular beings resembling each other. I show that Hume's simple sensible perceptions are tropes: simple qualities. Accordingly, their similarities are explained by these tropes themselves and their resemblance. Reading Hume as a trope nominalist sheds light on his account of general ideas, perceptions, relations and Nominalism.
Rafal Urbaniak - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Numbers and Propositions Versus Nominalists: Yellow Cards for Salmon & Soames
Erkenntnis, 2012Co-Authors: Rafal UrbaniakAbstract:Salmon and Soames argue against Nominalism about numbers and sentence types. They employ (respectively) higher-order and first-order logic to model certain natural language inferences and claim that the natural language conclusions carry commitment to abstract objects, partially because their renderings in those formal systems seem to do that. I argue that this strategy fails because the nominalist can accept those natural language consequences, provide them with plausible and non-committing truth conditions and account for the inferences made without committing themselves to abstract objects. I sketch a modal account of higher-order quantification, on which instead of ranging over sets, higher order quantifiers are used to make (logical) possibility claims about which predicate tokens can be introduced. This approach provides an alternative account of truth conditions for natural language sentences which seem to employ higher-order quantification, thus allowing the nominalist to evade Salmon's argument. I also show how the nominalist can account for the occurrence of apparently singular abstract terms in certain true statements. I argue that the nominalist can achieve this by, first, dividing singular terms into real singular terms (referring to concrete objects) and only apparent singular terms (called onomatoids), introduced for the sake of brevity and simplicity, and then providing an account of nominalistically acceptable truth conditions of sentences containing onomatoids. I develop such an account in terms of modally interpreted abstraction principles and argue that applying this strategy to Soames's argument allows the nominalists to defend themselves.
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Neologicist Nominalism
Studia Logica, 2010Co-Authors: Rafal UrbaniakAbstract:The goal is to sketch a nominalist approach to mathematics which just like neologicism employs abstraction principles, but unlike neologicism is not committed to the idea that mathematical objects exist and does not insist that abstraction principles establish the reference of abstract terms. It is well-known that neologicism runs into certain philosophical problems and faces the technical difficulty of finding appropriate acceptability criteria for abstraction principles. I will argue that a modal and iterative nominalist approach to abstraction principles circumvents those difficulties while still being able to put abstraction principles to a foundational use.