The Experts below are selected from a list of 291 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Markku Keinanen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
the ontological form of tropes refuting douglas ehring s main argument against standard trope nominalism
Philosophia, 2017Co-Authors: Jani Hakkarainen, Markku KeinanenAbstract:According to standard trope nominalism, there are simple tropes that do not have parts or multiply distinct aspects. Douglas Ehring’s Reductio Ad Absurdum against this standard view concludes that there are no simple tropes. In this paper, we provide a response to Ehring defending the standard view. Ehring’s argument may be refuted by (1) distinguishing the ontological form of tropes from their contribution to the ontological content of the world, and (2) construing tropes as having primitive identity. At the same time, standard trope nominalism is elaborated on by distinguishing between ontological form and content, for which there are also independent reasons.
-
The Ontological Form of Tropes - Refuting Douglas Ehring’s Main Argument against Standard Trope Nominalism
Philosophia, 2017Co-Authors: Jani Hakkarainen, Markku KeinanenAbstract:According to standard trope nominalism, there are simple tropes that do not have parts or multiply distinct aspects. Douglas Ehring’s Reductio Ad Absurdum against this standard view concludes that there are no simple tropes. In this paper, we provide a response to Ehring defending the standard view. Ehring’s argument may be refuted by (1) distinguishing the ontological form of tropes from their contribution to the ontological content of the world, and (2) construing tropes as having primitive identity. At the same time, standard trope nominalism is elaborated on by distinguishing between ontological form and content, for which there are also independent reasons.
Robert P. Farrell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Feyerabend’s Reductio Ad Absurdum of ‘Rationalist’ Philosophies
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2003Co-Authors: Robert P. FarrellAbstract:Paul Feyerabend begins his notorious book Against Method (1975) in the following manner: The following essay is written in the conviction that anarchism, while perhaps not the most attractive political philosophy, is certainly excellent medicine for epistemology, and for the philosophy of science. The reason is not difficult to find. ‘History generally, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more many-sided, more lively and subtle than even’ the best historians and the best methodologist can imagine. History is full of ‘accidents and conjunctures and curious juxtapositions of events’ and it demonstrates to us the ‘complexity of human change and the unpredictable character of the ultimate consequences of any given act or decision of men’. Are we really to believe that the naive and simple-minded rules which methodologists take as their guide are capable of accounting for such a ‘maze of interactions’? And is it not clear that successful participation in a process of this kind is possible only for the ruthless opportunist who is not tied to any particular philosophy and who Adopts whatever procedure seems to fit the occasion? (1975, pp. 17–18)
-
feyerabend s Reductio Ad Absurdum of rationalist philosophies
2003Co-Authors: Robert P. FarrellAbstract:Paul Feyerabend begins his notorious book Against Method (1975) in the following manner: The following essay is written in the conviction that anarchism, while perhaps not the most attractive political philosophy, is certainly excellent medicine for epistemology, and for the philosophy of science. The reason is not difficult to find. ‘History generally, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more many-sided, more lively and subtle than even’ the best historians and the best methodologist can imagine. History is full of ‘accidents and conjunctures and curious juxtapositions of events’ and it demonstrates to us the ‘complexity of human change and the unpredictable character of the ultimate consequences of any given act or decision of men’. Are we really to believe that the naive and simple-minded rules which methodologists take as their guide are capable of accounting for such a ‘maze of interactions’? And is it not clear that successful participation in a process of this kind is possible only for the ruthless opportunist who is not tied to any particular philosophy and who Adopts whatever procedure seems to fit the occasion? (1975, pp. 17–18)
Jani Hakkarainen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
the ontological form of tropes refuting douglas ehring s main argument against standard trope nominalism
Philosophia, 2017Co-Authors: Jani Hakkarainen, Markku KeinanenAbstract:According to standard trope nominalism, there are simple tropes that do not have parts or multiply distinct aspects. Douglas Ehring’s Reductio Ad Absurdum against this standard view concludes that there are no simple tropes. In this paper, we provide a response to Ehring defending the standard view. Ehring’s argument may be refuted by (1) distinguishing the ontological form of tropes from their contribution to the ontological content of the world, and (2) construing tropes as having primitive identity. At the same time, standard trope nominalism is elaborated on by distinguishing between ontological form and content, for which there are also independent reasons.
-
The Ontological Form of Tropes - Refuting Douglas Ehring’s Main Argument against Standard Trope Nominalism
Philosophia, 2017Co-Authors: Jani Hakkarainen, Markku KeinanenAbstract:According to standard trope nominalism, there are simple tropes that do not have parts or multiply distinct aspects. Douglas Ehring’s Reductio Ad Absurdum against this standard view concludes that there are no simple tropes. In this paper, we provide a response to Ehring defending the standard view. Ehring’s argument may be refuted by (1) distinguishing the ontological form of tropes from their contribution to the ontological content of the world, and (2) construing tropes as having primitive identity. At the same time, standard trope nominalism is elaborated on by distinguishing between ontological form and content, for which there are also independent reasons.
Eugene S Kryachko - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
on the proof by Reductio Ad Absurdum of the hohenberg kohn theorem for ensembles of fractionally occupied states of coulomb systems
arXiv: Quantum Physics, 2006Co-Authors: Eugene S KryachkoAbstract:It is demonstrated that the original Reductio Ad Absurdum proof of the generalization of the Hohenberg-Kohn theorem for ensembles of fractionally occupied states for isolated many-electron Coulomb systems with Coulomb-type external potentials by Gross et al. [Phys. Rev. A 37, 2809 (1988)] is self-contrAdictory since the to-be-refuted assumption (negation) regarding the ensemble one-electron densities and the assumption about the external potentials are logically incompatible to each other due to the Kato electron-nuclear cusp theorem. It is however proved that the Kato theorem itself provides a satisfactory proof of this theorem.
-
On the proof by Reductio Ad Absurdum of the Hohenberg–Kohn theorem for ensembles of fractionally occupied states of Coulomb systems
International Journal of Quantum Chemistry, 2006Co-Authors: Eugene S KryachkoAbstract:It is demonstrated that the original Reductio Ad Absurdum proof of the generalization of the Hohenberg-Kohn theorem for ensembles of fractionally occupied states for isolated many-electron Coulomb systems with Coulomb-type external potentials by Gross et al. [Phys. Rev. A 37, 2809 (1988)] is self-contrAdictory since the to-be-refuted assumption (negation) regarding the ensemble one-electron densities and the assumption about the external potentials are logically incompatible to each other due to the Kato electron-nuclear cusp theorem. It is however proved that the Kato theorem itself provides a satisfactory proof of this theorem.
-
on the proof by Reductio Ad Absurdum of the hohenberg kohn theorem for ensembles of fractionally occupied states of coulomb systems
International Journal of Quantum Chemistry, 2006Co-Authors: Eugene S KryachkoAbstract:It is demonstrated that the original Reductio Ad Absurdum proof of the generalization of the Hohenberg–Kohn theorem for ensembles of fractionally occupied states for isolated many-electron Coulomb systems with Coulomb-type external potentials by Gross and colleagues is self-contrAdictory, since the to-be-refuted assumption (negation) regarding the ensemble one-electron densities and the assumption regarding the external potentials are logically incompatible to each other due to the Kato electron-nuclear cusp theorem. It is proved, however, that the Kato theorem itself provides a satisfactory proof of this theorem. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Int J Quantum Chem, 2006
-
on the original proof by Reductio Ad Absurdum of the hohenberg kohn theorem for many electron coulomb systems
arXiv: Quantum Physics, 2005Co-Authors: Eugene S KryachkoAbstract:It is shown that, for isolated many-electron Coulomb systems with Coulombic external potentials, the usual Reductio Ad Absurdum proof of the Hohenberg-Kohn theorem is unsatisfactory since the to-be-refuted assumption mAde about the one-electron densities and the assumption about the external potentials are not compatible with the Kato cusp condition. The theorem is, however, provable by more sophisticated means and it is shown here that the Kato cusp condition actually leAds to a satisfactory proof.
-
On the Original Proof by Reductio Ad Absurdum of the Hohenberg-Kohn Theorem for Many-Electron Coulomb Systems
International Journal of Quantum Chemistry, 2005Co-Authors: Eugene S KryachkoAbstract:It is shown that, for isolated many-electron Coulomb systems with Coulombic external potentials, the usual Reductio Ad Absurdum proof of the Hohenberg-Kohn theorem is unsatisfactory since the to-be-refuted assumption mAde about the one-electron densities and the assumption about the external potentials are not compatible with the Kato cusp condition. The theorem is, however, provable by more sophisticated means and it is shown here that the Kato cusp condition actually leAds to a satisfactory proof.Comment: 14 pages. Int. J. Quantum Chem. to appea
Peter T. Saunders - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Reductio Ad Absurdum
Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 2007Co-Authors: Peter T. SaundersAbstract:Most contemporary biologists believe that biological processes are essentially physical. Despite this, most of us do not accept that explanations in biology can be truly satisfactory only if they can be formulated in terms of the laws of physics. In Darwinian Reductionism, Alex Rosenberg dismisses this as illogical. He insists ‘that there is a full and complete explanation of every biological fact, state, event, process, trend or generalization, and that this explanation will cite only interactions of macromolecules to provide this explanation.’ If this were merely a statement of what is possible in principle, there would be no real disagreement with the majority view.