The Experts below are selected from a list of 35442 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Matthew G. Bunn - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Nuclear Security in Russia: can progress be sustained?
The Nonproliferation Review, 2017Co-Authors: Matthew G. Bunn, Dmitry KovcheginAbstract:ABSTRACTNuclear Security in Russia has continued to evolve since the suspension of nearly all US–Russian Nuclear-Security cooperation in 2014, but the United States and the rest of the world now know much less about the directions of this evolution. This article assesses the current state of Nuclear Security in Russia based on an examination of key drivers of Russia’s Nuclear-Security system, from allocation of resources to regulatory oversight. It then outlines four scenarios for the future of evolution of Nuclear Security in Russia, describing potential causes, implications, and observable indicators for each scenario. It closes with recommendations designed to maximize the chance of moving onto a path of continuous improvement of Nuclear Security.
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Threat Perceptions and Drivers of Change in Nuclear Security Around the World: Results of a Survey
2014Co-Authors: Matthew G. Bunn, Eben HarrellAbstract:Leaders at the 2010 Nuclear Security summit agreed on the goal of securing all vulnerable Nuclear material in four years. This goal implied that many countries would change their Nuclear Security policies. But the factors that drive changes in Nuclear Security policies, and that constrain those changes, are not well understood. We conducted a survey of selected Nuclear Security experts in countries with Nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU), or separated plutonium, to explore this issue. The survey included: (a) perceptions of which threats are credible; (b) approaches to Nuclear Security based on a design basis threat (DBT); (c) changes in Nuclear Security policy in the last 15 years; (d) factors causing and constraining changes in Nuclear Security policy; and (e) policy on how much information to release about Nuclear Security. This paper describes the survey, its results, and implications for next steps to strengthen global Nuclear Security.
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Threat Perceptions and Drivers of Change in Nuclear Security Around the World: Results of a Survey
2014Co-Authors: Matthew G. Bunn, Eben HarrellAbstract:and Introduction 1 Methodology 2 Results 4 Figure 1: Credibility of Different Types of Adversaries and Objectives 5 Figure 2: Size of Adversary Groups 6 Figure 3: Causes of Nuclear Security Changes 9 Figure 4: Constraints on Nuclear Security Changes 10 Figure 5: What Nuclear Security Measures Changed 11 Analysis 13 Conclusions 16 Appendix A: Complete Survey Results 21 A. Security Requirements and Threat Assessments 22 B. Recent Changes and Main Causes of Changes 27 C. Consolidation 31 D. Public and International Information 32 E. Cooperation and Assistance Programs 33 Appendix B: Analysis of Russian and US Respondents 34
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Strengthening Global Approaches to Nuclear Security
2013Co-Authors: Matthew G. BunnAbstract:Despite substantial progress in improving Nuclear Security in recent years, there is more to be done. The threats of Nuclear theft and terrorism remain very real. This paper recommends learning from the much stronger national and international efforts in Nuclear safety, and in particular taking steps to build international understanding of the threat; establish effective performance objectives; assure performance; train and certify needed personnel; build Security culture and exchange best practices; reduce the number of sites that need to be protected; and strengthen the international framework and continue the dialogue once leaders are no longer meeting regularly at the summit level.
Bonggeun Jun - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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IFANS and the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit: The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security
Think Tanks Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers, 2018Co-Authors: Bonggeun JunAbstract:The 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul was an excellent opportunity for South Korea to contribute to world peace and it symbolized to the world South Korea’s growth as an “emerging power.” As a foreign policy research think tank in South Korea, the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) focuses on global affairs, such as Nuclear and non-proliferation issues, especially related to North Korea. IFANS, a government-affiliated think tank, played an important role and made a significant contribution to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit through its policy research and recommendations, like its interdisciplinary Nuclear policy program.
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road to the 2012 seoul Nuclear Security summit
2012Co-Authors: Bonggeun JunAbstract:Jun, Bong-Geun.February, 2012.Road to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security summit,Reports,[Washington, D.C.]Johns Hopkins University at SAIS(US-Korea Institute),USKI Working Paper Series,22
Sharon Squassoni - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Inching forward at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit
2012Co-Authors: Sharon SquassoniAbstract:A few days before Seoul hosted the official Nuclear Security Summit in late March, experts met to discuss progress on Nuclear Security. The keynote speaker, Dr. Graham Allison from Harvard University, suggested a strategy of three “No’s” to reduce future Nuclear risks: no loose Nuclear weapons or materials; no new national enrichment or reprocessing facilities; and no new Nuclear weapon states. This strategy links traditional “Nuclear Security”—physical protection of Nuclear material—with Nuclear nonproliferation and fuel cycle management. Yet at the summit a few days later, the 52 heads of state, along with leaders of four international organizations on Nuclear terrorism, focused on doing exactly the opposite: separating out Nuclear Security from nonproliferation, and putting as much distance between the growth of Nuclear power and Nuclear risks as possible. The result: underwhelming progress and no surprises.
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How can countries ensure that the Nuclear Security Summit does not lose momentum and become just another gathering
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2012Co-Authors: Sharon SquassoniAbstract:In 2009, President Barack Obama announced from Prague’s Hradcany square that “the most immediate and extreme threat to global Security” was Nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, and world leaders listened. A year later, 47 of these leaders responded to Obama’s call “to secure all vulnerable Nuclear material around the world within four years” when they gathered in Washington, DC, for the first Nuclear Security Summit. Since then, nearly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) have been removed from 10 countries. And both Russia and the United States have worked hard on HEU destruction efforts—48 metric tons and 7 metric tons, respectively. In March, 50 nations are taking part in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. But how can these countries ensure that the momentum toward a global Nuclear Security culture isn’t lost, and the Seoul summit does not devolve into just another gathering? Three authors explore this question: from the United States, Sharon Squassoni; from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu (...
Rajiv Nayan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Nuclear Security Summit Process: An Indian Perspective
Strategic Analysis, 2014Co-Authors: Rajiv NayanAbstract:AbstractThe third Nuclear Security Summit will be held in The Hague, Netherlands in March 2014. This visionary Nuclear diplomacy will be facing both old and new questions at its third meeting. The basic question relates to the future of the summit process, which has made a significant contribution to international Security in a very short span of time. The summit process, however, may serve it better, and the strengthening of the regime must be continued through the next two summits. However, with or without the summit process, the Nuclear Security regime has to be strengthened. Efforts for Nuclear Security must continue through proper institutionalisation, keeping the International Atomic Energy Agency at the centre.
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The Emerging Nuclear Security Regime: Challenges Ahead
Strategic Analysis, 2012Co-Authors: Rajiv NayanAbstract:Abstract Several measures are being initiated by the international community to secure sensitive materials. Al Qaeda's open interest in acquiring Nuclear weapons and the rise of terrorist activity in Nuclear-armed Pakistan have triggered a global interest in the need to secure Nuclear weapons and materials. In April 2010 President Obama invited some key countries and international organisations in Washington to frame a new regime for Nuclear Security. The emerging regime includes some older initiatives as well as some new mechanisms, and it must address a number of issues. These range from defining Nuclear Security threats to finding the right kind of institution promoting Nuclear Security. The enthusiasm for the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit will depend on how the participating countries and the international community deal with these challenges.
William H Tobey - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Peering down from the Summit: The Path to Nuclear Security 2010–2016 and beyond
Global Summitry, 2016Co-Authors: William H TobeyAbstract:This article reviews the motivations, strengths, and weaknesses of the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS), both procedurally and substantively. Nearly fifty world leaders met at the various NSS—2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. The circumstances that provoked these meetings were unusual, if not unique, but innovations undertaken at the meetings in global summitry and global governance will likely endure. The meetings advanced Nuclear Security in important ways, but the Nuclear Security problem cannot be resolved. It will require ultimately a commitment by states, international organizations, and nonstate actors to continuous improvement. It may ultimately require leaders to return to the summit.
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peering down from the summit the path to Nuclear Security 2010 2016 and beyond
Global Summitry, 2016Co-Authors: William H TobeyAbstract:This article reviews the motivations, strengths, and weaknesses of the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS), both procedurally and substantively. Nearly fifty world leaders met at the various NSS—2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. The circumstances that provoked these meetings were unusual, if not unique, but innovations undertaken at the meetings in global summitry and global governance will likely endure. The meetings advanced Nuclear Security in important ways, but the Nuclear Security problem cannot be resolved. It will require ultimately a commitment by states, international organizations, and nonstate actors to continuous improvement. It may ultimately require leaders to return to the summit.
