The Experts below are selected from a list of 135 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Michael G Pollitt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Which smart electricity service contracts will consumers accept? The demand for compensation in a Platform Market
    Energy Economics, 2018
    Co-Authors: Laura-lucia Richter, Michael G Pollitt
    Abstract:

    This paper considers the heterogeneity of household consumer preferences for electricity service contracts in a smart grid context. The analysis is based on original data from a discrete choice experiment on smart electricity service contracts that was designed and conducted in collaboration with Accent and 1,892 UK electricity consumers in 2015. The results suggest that while customers are willing to pay for technical support services, they are likely to demand significant compensation to share their usage and personally identifying data and to participate in automated demand response programs. Based on these findings potential Platform pricing strategies that could incentivise consumers to participate in a smart electricity Platform Market are discussed. By combining appropriate participation payments with sharing of bill savings, service providers could attract the number of customers required to provide the optimal level of demand response. We also examine the significant heterogeneity among customers to suggest how, by targeting customers with specific characteristics, smart electricity service providers could significantly reduce their customer acquisition costs.

  • Which smart electricity service contracts will consumers accept? The demand for compensation in a Platform Market
    Energy Economics, 2018
    Co-Authors: Laura-lucia Richter, Michael G Pollitt
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper analyses the heterogeneity of household consumer preferences for electricity service contracts in a smart grid context. Platform pricing strategies that could incentivise consumers to participate in a two-sided electricity Platform Market are discussed. The research is based on original data from a discrete choice experiment on electricity service contracts that was conducted with 1,892 electricity consumers in Great Britain in 2015. We estimate a flexible mixed logit model in willingness to pay space and exploit the results in posterior analysis. The findings suggest that while consumers are willing to pay for technical support services, they are likely to demand significant compensation to share their usage and personally identifying data and to participate in automated demand response programs involving remote monitoring and control of electricity usage. Cross-subsidisation of consumers combining appropriate participation payments with sharing of bill savings could incentivise participation of the number of consumers required to provide the optimal level of demand response. We also examine the preference heterogeneity to suggest how, by targeting customers with specific characteristics, smart electricity service providers could significantly reduce their customer acquisition costs.

  • Smart Grid Handbook - Platform Markets and Energy Services
    Smart Grid Handbook, 2016
    Co-Authors: Claire Weiller, Michael G Pollitt
    Abstract:

    A structural shift from transaction-based, marginal cost pricing to fee-based service business models often accompanies We emergence of “Platform” Markets, i.e. multi-sided Markets where an intermediary captures the value of the interaction between user groups. The many examples include telecommunications, data storage, cinema, music and media, and the automobile industry. Why not electricity? In this paper, we explore how the electricity supply industry can be conceived of as a Platform-mediated, two-sided Market and the consequences for pricing. Through two cases, a balancing services provider for smart home energy management systems and an electric vehicle charge manager, we show where a Platform entrant could position itself in the retail electricity Markets between supply companies and end-users. The drivers of such a transition include increased volatility due to renewable generation, the new complexity of roles for end-users, and the introduction of information and communication technologies. Conceiving of electricity as a Platform Market where new entrants provide an energy optimisation and management service may stimulate a competitive ecosystem and innovation. We suggest that fee-based pricing would enable the objectives of time-varying pricing to be achieved without adversely affecting the most vulnerable customers.

Laura-lucia Richter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Which smart electricity service contracts will consumers accept? The demand for compensation in a Platform Market
    Energy Economics, 2018
    Co-Authors: Laura-lucia Richter, Michael G Pollitt
    Abstract:

    This paper considers the heterogeneity of household consumer preferences for electricity service contracts in a smart grid context. The analysis is based on original data from a discrete choice experiment on smart electricity service contracts that was designed and conducted in collaboration with Accent and 1,892 UK electricity consumers in 2015. The results suggest that while customers are willing to pay for technical support services, they are likely to demand significant compensation to share their usage and personally identifying data and to participate in automated demand response programs. Based on these findings potential Platform pricing strategies that could incentivise consumers to participate in a smart electricity Platform Market are discussed. By combining appropriate participation payments with sharing of bill savings, service providers could attract the number of customers required to provide the optimal level of demand response. We also examine the significant heterogeneity among customers to suggest how, by targeting customers with specific characteristics, smart electricity service providers could significantly reduce their customer acquisition costs.

  • Which smart electricity service contracts will consumers accept? The demand for compensation in a Platform Market
    Energy Economics, 2018
    Co-Authors: Laura-lucia Richter, Michael G Pollitt
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper analyses the heterogeneity of household consumer preferences for electricity service contracts in a smart grid context. Platform pricing strategies that could incentivise consumers to participate in a two-sided electricity Platform Market are discussed. The research is based on original data from a discrete choice experiment on electricity service contracts that was conducted with 1,892 electricity consumers in Great Britain in 2015. We estimate a flexible mixed logit model in willingness to pay space and exploit the results in posterior analysis. The findings suggest that while consumers are willing to pay for technical support services, they are likely to demand significant compensation to share their usage and personally identifying data and to participate in automated demand response programs involving remote monitoring and control of electricity usage. Cross-subsidisation of consumers combining appropriate participation payments with sharing of bill savings could incentivise participation of the number of consumers required to provide the optimal level of demand response. We also examine the preference heterogeneity to suggest how, by targeting customers with specific characteristics, smart electricity service providers could significantly reduce their customer acquisition costs.

Eija Koskivaara - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Open-Source Software Implications in the Competitive Mobile Platforms Market
    2011
    Co-Authors: Salman Mian, Jose Teixeira, Eija Koskivaara
    Abstract:

    The era of the PC Platform left a legacy of competitive strategies for the future technologies to follow. However, this notion became more complicated, once the future grew out to be a present with huge bundle of innovative technologies, Internet capabilities, communication possibilities, and ease in life. A major step of moving from a product phone to a smart phone, eventually to a mobile device has created a new industry with humongous potential for further developments. The current mobile Platform Market is witnessing a Platforms-war with big players such as Apple, Google, Nokia and Microsoft in a major role. An important aspect of today’s mobile Platform Market is the contributions made through open source initiatives which promote innovation. This paper gives an insight into the open-source software strategies of the leading players and its implications on the Market. It first gives a precise overview of the past leading to the current mobile Platform Market share state. Then it briefs about the open-source software components used and released by Apple, Google and Nokia Platforms, leading to their mobile Platform strategies with regard to open source. Finally, the paper assesses the situation from the point of view of communities of software developers complementing each Platform. The authors identified relevant implications of the open-source phenomenon in the mobile-industry.

  • I3E - Open-Source Software Implications in the Competitive Mobile Platforms Market
    IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, 2011
    Co-Authors: Salman Qayyum Mian, José A. Teixeira, Eija Koskivaara
    Abstract:

    The era of the PC Platform left a legacy of competitive strategies for the future technologies to follow. However, this notion became more complicated, once the future grew out to be a present with huge bundle of innovative technologies, Internet capabilities, communication possibilities, and ease in life. A major step of moving from a product phone to a smart phone, eventually to a mobile device has created a new industry with humongous potential for further developments. The current mobile Platform Market is witnessing a Platforms-war with big players such as Apple, Google, Nokia and Microsoft in a major role. An important aspect of today’s mobile Platform Market is the contributions made through open source initiatives which promote innovation. This paper gives an insight into the open-source software strategies of the leading players and its implications on the Market. It first gives a precise overview of the past leading to the current mobile Platform Market share state. Then it briefs about the open-source software components used and released by Apple, Google and Nokia Platforms, leading to their mobile Platform strategies with regard to open source. Finally, the paper assesses the situation from the point of view of communities of software developers complementing each Platform. The authors identified relevant implications of the open-source phenomenon in the mobile-industry.

Dengfeng Zhang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Competition in the multi-sided Platform Market channel
    International Journal of Production Economics, 2017
    Co-Authors: Renato De Matta, Timothy J. Lowe, Dengfeng Zhang
    Abstract:

    Abstract We model the decisions in two simple, structurally different, fixed price online channel settings comprised of Marketplaces (retailers) where two sellers of substitutable products transact with buyers (consumers) of those products. The first setting is a common retailer setting (CRS) with one Marketplace, while the other is an exclusive retailer setting (ERS) where each seller is selling in an exclusive Marketplace. We study how price competition and cost sharing in those settings influence the key factors that attract the seller and buyer to a Marketplace, i.e. the seller's revenue share and price respectively. We formulate analytic and optimization models of the retailer revenue sharing decision and the suppliers pricing decision under CRS and ERS. Applying these models to Market environments with different consumer demand patterns, cost structures, and levels of competition yielded a fairly consistent behavior in supplier price and retailer revenue share for each channel setting. The CRS retailer is better off (i.e. higher profits) than the ERS retailers, whereas the ERS suppliers are better off than the CRS suppliers. Finally, the buyer in ERS is better off because the seller in ERS charges a lower price.

Yusuke Zennyo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Platform Market competition with endogenous side decisions
    Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2019
    Co-Authors: Jay Pil Choi, Yusuke Zennyo
    Abstract:

    This paper develops a framework to analyze Platform competition in two‐sided Markets in which agents endogenously decide on which side of a Platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium pricing structure and perform a comparative statics analysis on how the distribution of agents’ preferences affects the Platforms’ profits. We also show that the Market equilibrium under profit‐maximizing Platforms leads to the first best social surplus, which illustrates the importance of the price mechanism to induce more balanced participation across the two sides. This framework can be applied to analyze Market competition for “rental” or “sharing” Platforms. In addition, we extend our analysis to consider an initial investment stage, which makes participants the owner of some durable goods to rent out.