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Steven Shavell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the uneasy case for Product Liability
Harvard Law Review, 2013Co-Authors: Mitchell A Polinsky, Steven ShavellAbstract:TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 1438 II. THE SAFETY BENEFIT OF Product Liability 1443 A. Incentives To Reduce Product Risk Generated by Market 1443 Forces B. Regulation of Product Risk 1450 C. Risk Reduction Accomplished by Product Liability 1453 III. THE PRICE-SIGNALING BENEFIT OF Product Liability 1459 A. Price-Signaling and Consumer Information 1459 B. Price-Signaling and First-Party Insurance 1461 IV. THE COMPENSATION BENEFIT OF Product Liability 1462 A. Compensation Accomplished by Insurance 1462 B. Compensation Accomplished by Product Liability 1463 C. The Social Desirability of the Compensation Accomplished by Product Liability 1465 V. THE COSTS OF Product Liability 1469 A. Legal Expenses 1469 B. Price Distortions 1470 VI. IS Product Liability SOCIALLY WORTHWHILE GIVEN ITS BENEFITS AND COSTS? 1472 A. Product Liability for Widely Sold Products 1472 B. Product Liability for Products That Are Not Widely 1476 Sold VII. THE PREVAILING SOCIAL ENDORSEMENT OF Product Liability 1476 A. Judicial Opinions 1476 B. Academic Writing 1483 C. Public Commentary 1487 VIII. THE CONTRAST BETWEEN Product Liability AND Liability TO STRANGERS 1490 IX. CONCLUSION 1491 I. INTRODUCTION The Liability of manufacturers of Products for harms caused to their customers--Product Liability (1)--has great prominence in the United States. Tens of thousands of Product Liability cases are filed annually in state and federal courts, including some as class or other mass tort actions that can involve thousands or even millions of individuals as plaintiffs. (2) The legal bases for Product Liability suits are expansive, comprising Liability for manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure to warn. (3) Product Liability cases receive significant attention from the media, especially when they concern widely sold Products that harm many consumers. (4) Moreover, Product Liability is of growing importance outside of the United States, particularly in the European Union and in Asia. (5) Perhaps surprisingly, no one to our knowledge has attempted to examine the question whether, or in what circumstances, Product Liability is socially desirable, considering its major benefits and costs. (6) We undertake this task here and come to the judgment that the case for Product Liability is problematic for a wide range of Products. The essence of our argument is that the three beneficial effects of Product Liability--inducing firms to improve Product safety, causing prices of Products to reflect their risks, and providing compensation to injured consumers--are, for many Products, likely to be outweighed by the litigation and related costs of Product Liability. (7) We discuss the influence of Product Liability on Product safety in Part II of the Article. To assess this effect, it is necessary to consider whether firms would have an incentive to make safe Products even in the absence of Product Liability. One reason that firms might have such an incentive concerns market forces, namely, that their sales may fall if their Products harm consumers or are viewed as unduly risky, or that their sales may rise if their Products are seen as particularly safe. …
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a skeptical attitude about Product Liability is justified a reply to professors goldberg and zipursky
2010Co-Authors: Mitchell A Polinsky, Steven ShavellAbstract:In The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, we maintained that the benefits of Product Liability are likely to be less than its costs for many Products, especially widely sold ones. Our article was intended to alter the dominant view held by the judiciary and commentators that Product Liability has a clear justification on grounds of public policy. We argued instead that a skeptical attitude toward Product Liability should be adopted. Professors John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky strongly criticize our article in The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell. To a significant extent, however, they attack a straw man, for they impute to us a radical thesis – that Product Liability should be eliminated for all widely sold Products – that we manifestly did not advance. In fact, we argued that whether Product Liability is undesirable depends on the particular Product. Goldberg and Zipursky also ascribe to us other opinions that exaggerate what we said in our article – notably, they state that we believe that Product Liability has no beneficial effect on Product safety for widely sold Products. It is not surprising, therefore, that they are unable to support these mischaracterizations with citations to statements in our article. The major claim that Goldberg and Zipursky develop is that our benefit-cost analysis fails to demonstrate that the case for Product Liability is uneasy. In our view, their critique is deficient on multiple accounts, including that it contains numerous distortions and errors, and hence does not alter our original conclusion.
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a skeptical attitude about Product Liability is justified a reply to professors goldberg and zipursky
Harvard Law Review, 2010Co-Authors: Mitchell A Polinsky, Steven ShavellAbstract:In The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, (1) we maintained that the benefits of Product Liability are likely to be less than its costs for many Products, especially widely sold ones. Our article was intended to alter the dominant view held by the judiciary and commentators that Product Liability has a clear justification on grounds of public policy. We argued instead that a skeptical attitude toward Product Liability should be adopted. Professors John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky strongly criticize our article in The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell. (2) To a significant extent, however, they attack a straw man, for they impute to us a radical thesis--that Product Liability should be eliminated for all widely sold Products (3)--that we manifestly did not advance. In fact, we argued that whether Product Liability is undesirable depends on the particular Product. (4) Goldberg and Zipursky also ascribe to us other opinions that exaggerate what we said in our article--notably, they state that we believe that Product Liability has no beneficial effect on Product safety for widely sold Products. (5) It is not surprising, therefore, that they are unable to support these mischaracterizations with citations to statements in our article. (6) The major claim that Goldberg and Zipursky develop is that our benefit-cost analysis fails to demonstrate that the case for Product Liability is uneasy. (7) In our view, their critique is deficient on multiple accounts, including that it contains numerous distortions and errors, and hence does not alter our original conclusion. We begin in Part I by considering the safety benefit of Product Liability, namely, that it spurs firms to reduce Product risks. A central point of our article was that this benefit is incremental in character. It consists only of the steps that Product Liability induces firms to take to reduce accident risks beyond those that they already take in response to market forces (to avoid losses in sales if their Products injure customers) and to comply with safety regulation. We argued in our article that market forces and regulation often contribute in a significant way to Product safety, particularly for widely sold Products, and thus that the safety benefit of Product Liability might not be great. Goldberg and Zipursky do not dispute our basic observation that the safety benefit of Product Liability is incremental in nature; they do not deny that market forces and regulation are often important determinants of Product safety. What they do contend, however, is that the magnitude of the safety benefit of Product Liability is large, notwithstanding that it is incremental. We explain why the various arguments that they present to support this view are problematic. In doing so, we address their criticisms of our discussion of several empirical studies--involving general aviation aircraft, motor vehicles, and childhood vaccines--that fail to find that Product Liability has a measurable effect on Product safety. We observe that their evaluation of these studies is incomplete, reflects questionable judgments about the interpretation of empirical work, and contains errors. Significantly, Goldberg and Zipursky do not cite any study demonstrating that Product Liability has led to a decrease in Product accident rates. (8) In the end, we see no reason to modify our conclusion that the safety benefit of Product Liability is incremental and that it is often small, especially for widely sold Products for which market forces and regulation are strong. In Part II we examine the second major benefit of Product Liability--that it compensates victims of Product-related accidents for their harms. As we stressed in our article, the compensation benefit also is incremental, because victims of Product-related accidents already often receive substantial compensation from private and public insurance. …
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the uneasy case for Product Liability
2009Co-Authors: Mitchell A Polinsky, Steven ShavellAbstract:In this Article we compare the benefits of Product Liability to its costs and conclude that the case for Product Liability is weak for a wide range of Products. One benefit of Product Liability is that it can induce firms to improve Product safety. Even in the absence of Product Liability, however, firms are often motivated by market forces to enhance Product safety because their sales may fall if their Products harm consumers. Moreover, Products must frequently conform to safety regulations. Consequently, Product Liability might not be expected to exert a significant additional influence on Product safety — and empirical studies of several widely sold Products fail to find an effect of Product Liability on the frequency of Product accidents. A second benefit of Product Liability is that it can improve consumer purchase decisions by causing Product prices to increase to reflect Product risks. But because of litigation costs and other factors, Product Liability may raise prices excessively and undesirably chill purchases. A third benefit of Product Liability is that it compensates victims of Product-related accidents for their losses. Yet this benefit is only partial, for accident victims are frequently compensated by insurers for some or all of their losses. Furthermore, the payment of compensation for pain and suffering actually reduces the welfare of individuals because it effectively forces them to purchase insurance for a type of loss for which they ordinarily do not wish to be covered. Offsetting the potential benefits of Product Liability are its costs, which are great. Notably, the transfer of a dollar to a victim of a Product accident via the Liability system requires more than a dollar on average in legal expenses. Given the limited benefits and the high costs of Product Liability, we come to the judgment that its use is often unwarranted. This is especially likely for Products for which market forces and regulation are relatively strong, which includes many widely sold Products. On the other hand, the use of Product Liability may be desirable for Products for which these factors are weak. Our generally skeptical assessment of Product Liability for Products for which market forces and regulation are strong is in tension with the broad social endorsement of such Liability.
Mitchell A Polinsky - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the uneasy case for Product Liability
Harvard Law Review, 2013Co-Authors: Mitchell A Polinsky, Steven ShavellAbstract:TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 1438 II. THE SAFETY BENEFIT OF Product Liability 1443 A. Incentives To Reduce Product Risk Generated by Market 1443 Forces B. Regulation of Product Risk 1450 C. Risk Reduction Accomplished by Product Liability 1453 III. THE PRICE-SIGNALING BENEFIT OF Product Liability 1459 A. Price-Signaling and Consumer Information 1459 B. Price-Signaling and First-Party Insurance 1461 IV. THE COMPENSATION BENEFIT OF Product Liability 1462 A. Compensation Accomplished by Insurance 1462 B. Compensation Accomplished by Product Liability 1463 C. The Social Desirability of the Compensation Accomplished by Product Liability 1465 V. THE COSTS OF Product Liability 1469 A. Legal Expenses 1469 B. Price Distortions 1470 VI. IS Product Liability SOCIALLY WORTHWHILE GIVEN ITS BENEFITS AND COSTS? 1472 A. Product Liability for Widely Sold Products 1472 B. Product Liability for Products That Are Not Widely 1476 Sold VII. THE PREVAILING SOCIAL ENDORSEMENT OF Product Liability 1476 A. Judicial Opinions 1476 B. Academic Writing 1483 C. Public Commentary 1487 VIII. THE CONTRAST BETWEEN Product Liability AND Liability TO STRANGERS 1490 IX. CONCLUSION 1491 I. INTRODUCTION The Liability of manufacturers of Products for harms caused to their customers--Product Liability (1)--has great prominence in the United States. Tens of thousands of Product Liability cases are filed annually in state and federal courts, including some as class or other mass tort actions that can involve thousands or even millions of individuals as plaintiffs. (2) The legal bases for Product Liability suits are expansive, comprising Liability for manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure to warn. (3) Product Liability cases receive significant attention from the media, especially when they concern widely sold Products that harm many consumers. (4) Moreover, Product Liability is of growing importance outside of the United States, particularly in the European Union and in Asia. (5) Perhaps surprisingly, no one to our knowledge has attempted to examine the question whether, or in what circumstances, Product Liability is socially desirable, considering its major benefits and costs. (6) We undertake this task here and come to the judgment that the case for Product Liability is problematic for a wide range of Products. The essence of our argument is that the three beneficial effects of Product Liability--inducing firms to improve Product safety, causing prices of Products to reflect their risks, and providing compensation to injured consumers--are, for many Products, likely to be outweighed by the litigation and related costs of Product Liability. (7) We discuss the influence of Product Liability on Product safety in Part II of the Article. To assess this effect, it is necessary to consider whether firms would have an incentive to make safe Products even in the absence of Product Liability. One reason that firms might have such an incentive concerns market forces, namely, that their sales may fall if their Products harm consumers or are viewed as unduly risky, or that their sales may rise if their Products are seen as particularly safe. …
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a skeptical attitude about Product Liability is justified a reply to professors goldberg and zipursky
2010Co-Authors: Mitchell A Polinsky, Steven ShavellAbstract:In The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, we maintained that the benefits of Product Liability are likely to be less than its costs for many Products, especially widely sold ones. Our article was intended to alter the dominant view held by the judiciary and commentators that Product Liability has a clear justification on grounds of public policy. We argued instead that a skeptical attitude toward Product Liability should be adopted. Professors John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky strongly criticize our article in The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell. To a significant extent, however, they attack a straw man, for they impute to us a radical thesis – that Product Liability should be eliminated for all widely sold Products – that we manifestly did not advance. In fact, we argued that whether Product Liability is undesirable depends on the particular Product. Goldberg and Zipursky also ascribe to us other opinions that exaggerate what we said in our article – notably, they state that we believe that Product Liability has no beneficial effect on Product safety for widely sold Products. It is not surprising, therefore, that they are unable to support these mischaracterizations with citations to statements in our article. The major claim that Goldberg and Zipursky develop is that our benefit-cost analysis fails to demonstrate that the case for Product Liability is uneasy. In our view, their critique is deficient on multiple accounts, including that it contains numerous distortions and errors, and hence does not alter our original conclusion.
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a skeptical attitude about Product Liability is justified a reply to professors goldberg and zipursky
Harvard Law Review, 2010Co-Authors: Mitchell A Polinsky, Steven ShavellAbstract:In The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, (1) we maintained that the benefits of Product Liability are likely to be less than its costs for many Products, especially widely sold ones. Our article was intended to alter the dominant view held by the judiciary and commentators that Product Liability has a clear justification on grounds of public policy. We argued instead that a skeptical attitude toward Product Liability should be adopted. Professors John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky strongly criticize our article in The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell. (2) To a significant extent, however, they attack a straw man, for they impute to us a radical thesis--that Product Liability should be eliminated for all widely sold Products (3)--that we manifestly did not advance. In fact, we argued that whether Product Liability is undesirable depends on the particular Product. (4) Goldberg and Zipursky also ascribe to us other opinions that exaggerate what we said in our article--notably, they state that we believe that Product Liability has no beneficial effect on Product safety for widely sold Products. (5) It is not surprising, therefore, that they are unable to support these mischaracterizations with citations to statements in our article. (6) The major claim that Goldberg and Zipursky develop is that our benefit-cost analysis fails to demonstrate that the case for Product Liability is uneasy. (7) In our view, their critique is deficient on multiple accounts, including that it contains numerous distortions and errors, and hence does not alter our original conclusion. We begin in Part I by considering the safety benefit of Product Liability, namely, that it spurs firms to reduce Product risks. A central point of our article was that this benefit is incremental in character. It consists only of the steps that Product Liability induces firms to take to reduce accident risks beyond those that they already take in response to market forces (to avoid losses in sales if their Products injure customers) and to comply with safety regulation. We argued in our article that market forces and regulation often contribute in a significant way to Product safety, particularly for widely sold Products, and thus that the safety benefit of Product Liability might not be great. Goldberg and Zipursky do not dispute our basic observation that the safety benefit of Product Liability is incremental in nature; they do not deny that market forces and regulation are often important determinants of Product safety. What they do contend, however, is that the magnitude of the safety benefit of Product Liability is large, notwithstanding that it is incremental. We explain why the various arguments that they present to support this view are problematic. In doing so, we address their criticisms of our discussion of several empirical studies--involving general aviation aircraft, motor vehicles, and childhood vaccines--that fail to find that Product Liability has a measurable effect on Product safety. We observe that their evaluation of these studies is incomplete, reflects questionable judgments about the interpretation of empirical work, and contains errors. Significantly, Goldberg and Zipursky do not cite any study demonstrating that Product Liability has led to a decrease in Product accident rates. (8) In the end, we see no reason to modify our conclusion that the safety benefit of Product Liability is incremental and that it is often small, especially for widely sold Products for which market forces and regulation are strong. In Part II we examine the second major benefit of Product Liability--that it compensates victims of Product-related accidents for their harms. As we stressed in our article, the compensation benefit also is incremental, because victims of Product-related accidents already often receive substantial compensation from private and public insurance. …
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the uneasy case for Product Liability
2009Co-Authors: Mitchell A Polinsky, Steven ShavellAbstract:In this Article we compare the benefits of Product Liability to its costs and conclude that the case for Product Liability is weak for a wide range of Products. One benefit of Product Liability is that it can induce firms to improve Product safety. Even in the absence of Product Liability, however, firms are often motivated by market forces to enhance Product safety because their sales may fall if their Products harm consumers. Moreover, Products must frequently conform to safety regulations. Consequently, Product Liability might not be expected to exert a significant additional influence on Product safety — and empirical studies of several widely sold Products fail to find an effect of Product Liability on the frequency of Product accidents. A second benefit of Product Liability is that it can improve consumer purchase decisions by causing Product prices to increase to reflect Product risks. But because of litigation costs and other factors, Product Liability may raise prices excessively and undesirably chill purchases. A third benefit of Product Liability is that it compensates victims of Product-related accidents for their losses. Yet this benefit is only partial, for accident victims are frequently compensated by insurers for some or all of their losses. Furthermore, the payment of compensation for pain and suffering actually reduces the welfare of individuals because it effectively forces them to purchase insurance for a type of loss for which they ordinarily do not wish to be covered. Offsetting the potential benefits of Product Liability are its costs, which are great. Notably, the transfer of a dollar to a victim of a Product accident via the Liability system requires more than a dollar on average in legal expenses. Given the limited benefits and the high costs of Product Liability, we come to the judgment that its use is often unwarranted. This is especially likely for Products for which market forces and regulation are relatively strong, which includes many widely sold Products. On the other hand, the use of Product Liability may be desirable for Products for which these factors are weak. Our generally skeptical assessment of Product Liability for Products for which market forces and regulation are strong is in tension with the broad social endorsement of such Liability.
Geraint Howells - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Product Liability and Digital Products
EU Internet Law, 2017Co-Authors: Geraint Howells, Christian Twigg-flesner, Chris WillettAbstract:This paper examines the topical question as to whether non-tangible Products such as apps and other software not supplied on a tangible medium (should) qualify as Products under EU Product Liability Directive. It addresses the relevant questions posed by the European Commission, which has recently announced an evaluation of the said Directive with the aim of its adaptation to the digital age. The article draws a crucial distinction between information (whether in tangible or non-tangible form) that should not lead to Liability and tangible or non-tangible Products which are not confined to mere information provision and whose defects may cause material harm. The latter must be considered as falling within the Product Liability Directive, which is eligible to reasonable interpretation achieving this aim.
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Is Product Liability still a global problem
Managerial Law, 2007Co-Authors: Duncan Fairgrieve, Geraint HowellsAbstract:Purpose – Almost 20 years ago one of the present authors wrote an article entitled “Product Liability: a global problem”. The brief paper seeks to provide a summation of what has happened in the meantime.Design/methodology/approach – The article is a brief discussion of the issues: the first section comments on Products Liability outside Europe and the final part concludes with an overview of what happened in the UK and Europe.Findings – The article finds that the EU Directive's approach to strict Liability has become the most common influence on law reform around the globe and that there is still much uncertainty in Europe and the USA as to what the law of Product Liability actually is.Originality/value – The paper illustrates how, for the foreseeable future, businesses may continue to be most concerned about Product Liability exposure in the USA.
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Rethinking Product Liability: A Missing Element in the European Commission's Third Review of the European Product Liability Directive
Modern Law Review, 2007Co-Authors: Duncan Fairgrieve, Geraint HowellsAbstract:The paper uses the opportunity afforded by the European Commission's Third Report of the Product Liability Directive to assess the present state of Product Liability in Europe. It notes that despite the maximal harmonisation character of the Directive there is a risk of divergence between Member States on key issues including the core concept of defectiveness. The Commission seems at times confused (for example, as regards the relationship between defect and fault Liability) and more often complacent about the risks of divergence; but this sits uneasily with the espousal of maximal harmonisation. Ultimately there may be a need for a rethinking of Product Liability to ensure greater clarity as regards the underlying rationale supporting strict Liability. This seems unlikely to materialise in the near future and so at the very least the Commission should act to clarify some core concepts that are proving difficult to interpret for the courts.
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comparative Product Liability
1993Co-Authors: Geraint HowellsAbstract:The fundamentals of Product Liability European harmonization European Product Liability directive Product Liability in the United Kingdom - contract Product Liability in the United Kingdom - negligence United Kingdom's consumer protection act 1987 France - Europe's loser in the Product Liability stakes? Germany - minimalist implementation of the directive Scandinavia - the insurance solution Product Liability in the rest of Europe - the impact of the directive harmony in Europe? United States - birthplace of the Product Liability phenomemon United States - the Product Liability reform debate Canadian Product Liability - the middle ground Australia - radical thinking - traditional reform New Zealand's accident compensation approach to Product Liability Product Liability compensation and harmonization - a personal view.
Marta Robles - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Product Liability versus reputation
Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 2016Co-Authors: Juan Jose Ganuza, Fernando Gomez, Marta RoblesAbstract:Market reputation is often perceived as a cheaper alternative to Product Liability in the provision of safety incentives. We explore the interaction between legal and reputational sanctions using the idea that inducing safety through reputation requires implementing costly "market sanctioning" mechanisms. We show that law positively affects the functioning of market reputation by reducing its costs. We also show that reputation and Product Liability are not just substitutes but also complements. We analyze the effects of different legal policies, and namely that negligence reduces reputational costs more intensely than strict Liability, and that court errors in determining Liability interfere with reputational cost reduction through law. A more general result is that any variant of an ex post Liability rule will improve the functioning of market reputation in isolation. We complicate the basic analysis with endogenous prices and observability by consumers of the outcome of court’s decisions. (JEL K13, K23, L51, H24)
Duncan Fairgrieve - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Product Liability
2020Co-Authors: Duncan Fairgrieve, Richard S. GoldbergAbstract:Product Liability is a recognised authority in the field and covers the Product Liability laws through which manufacturers, retailers, and others may be held liable to compensate persons who are injured, or who incur financial loss, when the Products which they manufacture or sell are defective or not fit for their purpose. Product defects may originate in the Production process, be one of design, or be grounded in a failure to issue an adequate warning or directions for safe use and practitioners advising business clients or claimants will find this book provides all the necessary information for practitioners to manage a Product Liability claim.This new edition has been fully updated to take account of 10 years of development in case law and regulation, and the increasing impact of cross-border and transnational sale of goods. The Court of Justice of the European Union handed down major rulings concerning the Product Liability Directive which affect the application of the Directive and national arrangements and Fairgrieve and Goldberg examines this in detail. For any legal practitioner operating in areas which require knowledge of European Product Liability law, an understanding of the impact of recent developments is essential and this work is an essential resource for practitioners working on Product Liability, sale of goods, personal injury and negligence.The work provides comprehensive coverage of the law of negligence as it applies to Product Liability, of the strict Liability provisions of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, and of the EU's Product Liability Directive on which the Act is based. Although the majority of cases involve pharmaceuticals and medical devices, in recent English cases the allegedly defective Products have been as diverse as a child's buggy, an All Terrain Vehicle, and even a coffee cup. Many cases are brought as group actions, and the book examines the rights of those who are injured by defective Products.As well as considering the perspective of the law as it has developed in the UK, this edition contains detailed discussion of case law from other jurisdictions including the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France and Germany. The coverage in the work is complemented by a full analysis of issues which arise in transnational litigation involving problems of jurisdiction and the choice of laws.
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Is Product Liability still a global problem
Managerial Law, 2007Co-Authors: Duncan Fairgrieve, Geraint HowellsAbstract:Purpose – Almost 20 years ago one of the present authors wrote an article entitled “Product Liability: a global problem”. The brief paper seeks to provide a summation of what has happened in the meantime.Design/methodology/approach – The article is a brief discussion of the issues: the first section comments on Products Liability outside Europe and the final part concludes with an overview of what happened in the UK and Europe.Findings – The article finds that the EU Directive's approach to strict Liability has become the most common influence on law reform around the globe and that there is still much uncertainty in Europe and the USA as to what the law of Product Liability actually is.Originality/value – The paper illustrates how, for the foreseeable future, businesses may continue to be most concerned about Product Liability exposure in the USA.
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Rethinking Product Liability: A Missing Element in the European Commission's Third Review of the European Product Liability Directive
Modern Law Review, 2007Co-Authors: Duncan Fairgrieve, Geraint HowellsAbstract:The paper uses the opportunity afforded by the European Commission's Third Report of the Product Liability Directive to assess the present state of Product Liability in Europe. It notes that despite the maximal harmonisation character of the Directive there is a risk of divergence between Member States on key issues including the core concept of defectiveness. The Commission seems at times confused (for example, as regards the relationship between defect and fault Liability) and more often complacent about the risks of divergence; but this sits uneasily with the espousal of maximal harmonisation. Ultimately there may be a need for a rethinking of Product Liability to ensure greater clarity as regards the underlying rationale supporting strict Liability. This seems unlikely to materialise in the near future and so at the very least the Commission should act to clarify some core concepts that are proving difficult to interpret for the courts.
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Product Liability in Comparative Perspective
2005Co-Authors: Duncan FairgrieveAbstract:Foreword Sir Michael Burton 1. Introduction Duncan Fairgrieve and Luis Gonzalez Vaque Part I. Country Reports: 2. The use of comparative law Michael Brooke, Ian Forrester, Nicholas Underhill and Sir Michael Burton 3. Spanish Product Liability today - adapting to the 'new' rules Miquel Martin-Casals 4. Interaction between the European directive on Product Liability and the former Liability regime in Italy Eleonora Rajneri 5. L'Exception Francaise? The French law of Product Liability Duncan Fairgrieve 6. German Product Liability law Stefan Lenze 7. Dutch case law on the EU Cees C. van Dam 8. Defect in English Law - lessons for the harmonisation of European Product Liability Geraint Howells Part II. European Influences: 9. Product Liability Hans Claudius Taschner 10. The development risks defence Mark Mildred 11. Approaches to Product Liability in the EU and Member States Christopher Hodges 12. Product Liability - a history Geraint Howells Part III. Comparing Systems: 13. Harmonisation or divergence? Simon Taylor 14. Product Liability law in Centre Europe and the true impact of the Product Liability directive Magdalena Sengayen 15. Bugs in Anglo-American Products Liability Jane Stapleton 16. Comparing Product safety and Liability law in Japan Luke Nottage Appendix.