The Experts below are selected from a list of 321 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Lynn A Stout - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a team Production Theory of corporate law
The Journal of Corporation Law, 1999Co-Authors: Margaret M Blair, Lynn A StoutAbstract:A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law^ INTRODUCTION Who owns a corporation? Most economists and legal scholars today seem inclined to answer: Its shareholders do. Contemporary discussions of corporate governance have come to be dominated by the view that public corporations are little more than bundles of assets collectively owned by shareholders (principals) who hire directors and officers (agents) to manage those assets on their behalf.1 This principal-agent model, in turn, has given rise to two recurring themes in the literature: First, that the central economic problem addressed by corporation law is reducing "agency costs" by keeping directors and managers faithful to shareholders' interests; and second, that the primary goal of the public corporation is-or ought to be-maximizing shareholders' wealth. In this Article we take issue with both the prevailing principal-agent model of the public corporation and the shareholder wealth maximization goal that underlies it. Because corporations are fictional entities that can only act through human agents, problems of agent fealty are frequently encountered by those who study and practice corporate law. Yet the public corporation is hardly unique in its use of agents. Other organizational forms, including partnerships, proprietorships, privately-held corporations, and limited liability companies, also routinely do business through hired managers and employees. Thus, while the principal-agent problem may be important in understanding the business firm, we question whether it necessarily provides special insight into the Theory of the public corporation. We explore an alternative approach that we believe may go much further in explaining both the distinctive legal doctrines that apply to public corporations and the unique role these business entities have come to play in American economic life: the team Production approach. In the economic literature, team Production problems are said to arise in situations where a productive activity requires the combined investment and coordinated effort of two or more individuals or groups.2 If the team members' investments are firm-specific (that is, difficult to recover once committed to the project), and if output from the enterprise is nonseparable (meaning that it is difficult to attribute any particular portion of the joint output to any particular member's contribution), serious problems can arise in determining how any economic surpluses generated by team Production-any "rents"should be divided. Ex ante sharing rules invite shirking,3 while ex post attempts to divvy up rewards create incentives for opportunistic rent-seeking4 that can erode and even destroy the economic gains that flow from team Production. Yet trying to prevent shirking and rent-seeking by defining individual team members' duties and rewards through explicit contracts can be impossibly difficult, especially when the team Production process is complex, continuous, or uncertain. While team Production problems are less well studied than principal-agent problems, we believe the former may represent a more appropriate basis for understanding the unique economic and legal functions served by the public corporation. Our analysis rests on the observation-generally accepted even by corporate scholars who adhere to the principal-agent model-that shareholders are not the only group that may provide specialized inputs into corporate Production.5 Executives, rank-and-file employees, and even creditors or the local community may also make essential contributions and have an interest in an enterprise's success. And in circumstances where it is impossible to draft explicit contracts that deter shirking and rent-seeking among these various corporate "team members" by preallocating rewards and responsibilities, we suggest that the problem may be better left to an institutional substitute for explicit contracts: the law of public corporations. …
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a team Production Theory of corporate law
Virginia Law Review, 1999Co-Authors: Margaret M Blair, Lynn A StoutAbstract:Contemporary corporate scholarship generally assumes that the central economic problem addressed by corporation law is getting managers and directors to act as loyal agents for shareholders. We take issue with this approach and argue that the unique legal rules governing publicly-held corporations are instead designed primarily to address a different problem - the "team Production" problem - that arises when a number of individuals must invest firm-specific resources to produce a nonseparable output. In such situations team members may find it difficult or impossible to draft explicit contracts distributing the output of their joint efforts, and, as an alternative, might prefer to give up control over their enterprise to an independent third party charged with representing the team's interests and allocating rewards among team members. Thus we argue that the essential economic function of the public corporation is not to address principal-agent problems, but to provide a vehicle through which shareholders, creditors, executives, rank-and-file employees, and other potential corporate "stakeholders" who may invest firm-specific resources can, for their own benefit, jointly relinquish control over those resources to a board of directors. This alternative to the principal-agent approach offers to explain a variety of pivotal doctrines in corporate law that have proven difficult to explain using agency Theory, including: the requirement that a public corporation be managed by a board of directors rather than by shareholders directly; the meaning and function of a corporation's "legal personality" and the rules of derivative suit procedure; the substantive structure of directors' fiduciary duties, including the application of the business judgment rule in the takeover context; and the highly-limited nature of shareholders' voting rights. The team Production model also carries important normative implications for legal and popular debates over corporate governance, because it suggests that maximizing shareholder wealth should not be the principal goal of corporate law. Rather, directors of public corporations should seek to maximize the joint welfare of all the firm's stakeholders - including shareholders, managers, employees, and possibly other groups such as creditors or the local community - who contribute firm-specific resources to corporate Production.
Patrick C. Hallenbeck - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Metabolic engineering in dark fermentative hydrogen Production; Theory and practice
Bioresource Technology, 2011Co-Authors: Mona Abo-hashesh, Ruofan Wang, Patrick C. HallenbeckAbstract:Dark fermentation is an attractive option for hydrogen Production since it could use already existing reactor technology and readily available substrates without requiring a direct input of solar energy. However, a number of improvements are required before the rates and yields of such a process approach those required for a practical process. Among the options for achieving the required advances, metabolic engineering offers some powerful tools for remodeling microbes to increase product Production rates and molar yields. Here we review the current metabolic engineering tool box that is available, discuss the current status of engineering efforts as applied to dark hydrogen Production, and suggest areas for future improvements. © 2011 Elsevier Ltd.
Michael Schmidt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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How Production-Theory can support the analysis of recycling systems in the electronic waste sector
Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Symposium on Electronics and the Environment 2006., 2006Co-Authors: Lise Laurin, Andrew Moeller, Martina Prox, Michael SchmidtAbstract:The question surrounding "greener" products has always been, "at what cost?" Several decades ago, it was assumed that the product that was easier on the environment would cost more to produce, yet would not command a higher price. Regulations, such as the European WEEE directive, and emissions trading are ways in which governments have changed the market paradigm, rewarding lower polluting manufacturers. With complex issues at stake within a Production system, it becomes more difficult to measure the trade-offs between environmental benefit and economics. A modern approach in Production Theory of business and management economics enables this complex calculation by valuing everything in the system. This approach proposes that objects (e.g. materials) are defined as good, bad, or neutral. In transformation processes in Production or recycling systems this makes it possible to distinguish stringently between the economic revenue of a process and the economic and ecological expenditures for it. Materials and energy classified as good are considered as an expense if they are used by the system and a product or revenue, if they are created by the system. This approach can be transferred to entire systems of processes in order to determine the system revenue and the system expenditure. The process can be more easily understood using material flow networks or graphs. In complex material flow systems, it becomes possible to calculate not only the costs, but also the direct and indirect environmental impacts of an individual process or system revenue (for example a product or the elimination of waste) consistently. The approach permits a stringent analysis as well as different analysis perspectives of a material and energy flow system. It is particularly suitable for closed-loop economic systems in which material backflows occur. This paper outlines how this approach can be employed in the field of e-waste management
Mario Schmidt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a Production Theory based framework for analysing recycling systems in the e waste sector
Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 2005Co-Authors: Mario SchmidtAbstract:Abstract Modern approaches in the Production Theory of business and management economics propose that objects (e.g. materials) be divided into good, bad or neutral. In transformation processes such as occur in Production or recycling this makes it possible to distinguish stringently between the economic revenue of a process and the economic and ecological expenditures for it. This approach can be transferred to entire systems of processes in order to determine the system revenue and the system expenditure. Material flow nets or graphs are used for this purpose. In complex material flow systems it becomes possible to calculate not only the costs, but also the direct and indirect environmental impacts of an individual process or a system revenue (for example a product or the elimination of waste) consistently. The approach permits a stringent analysis as well as different analysis perspectives of a material flow system. It is particularly suitable for closed-loop economic systems in which material backflows occur. With the aid of an example developed jointly with Hewlett Packard Europe, the paper outlines how this approach can be employed in the field of e-waste management.
Margaret M Blair - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a team Production Theory of corporate law
The Journal of Corporation Law, 1999Co-Authors: Margaret M Blair, Lynn A StoutAbstract:A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law^ INTRODUCTION Who owns a corporation? Most economists and legal scholars today seem inclined to answer: Its shareholders do. Contemporary discussions of corporate governance have come to be dominated by the view that public corporations are little more than bundles of assets collectively owned by shareholders (principals) who hire directors and officers (agents) to manage those assets on their behalf.1 This principal-agent model, in turn, has given rise to two recurring themes in the literature: First, that the central economic problem addressed by corporation law is reducing "agency costs" by keeping directors and managers faithful to shareholders' interests; and second, that the primary goal of the public corporation is-or ought to be-maximizing shareholders' wealth. In this Article we take issue with both the prevailing principal-agent model of the public corporation and the shareholder wealth maximization goal that underlies it. Because corporations are fictional entities that can only act through human agents, problems of agent fealty are frequently encountered by those who study and practice corporate law. Yet the public corporation is hardly unique in its use of agents. Other organizational forms, including partnerships, proprietorships, privately-held corporations, and limited liability companies, also routinely do business through hired managers and employees. Thus, while the principal-agent problem may be important in understanding the business firm, we question whether it necessarily provides special insight into the Theory of the public corporation. We explore an alternative approach that we believe may go much further in explaining both the distinctive legal doctrines that apply to public corporations and the unique role these business entities have come to play in American economic life: the team Production approach. In the economic literature, team Production problems are said to arise in situations where a productive activity requires the combined investment and coordinated effort of two or more individuals or groups.2 If the team members' investments are firm-specific (that is, difficult to recover once committed to the project), and if output from the enterprise is nonseparable (meaning that it is difficult to attribute any particular portion of the joint output to any particular member's contribution), serious problems can arise in determining how any economic surpluses generated by team Production-any "rents"should be divided. Ex ante sharing rules invite shirking,3 while ex post attempts to divvy up rewards create incentives for opportunistic rent-seeking4 that can erode and even destroy the economic gains that flow from team Production. Yet trying to prevent shirking and rent-seeking by defining individual team members' duties and rewards through explicit contracts can be impossibly difficult, especially when the team Production process is complex, continuous, or uncertain. While team Production problems are less well studied than principal-agent problems, we believe the former may represent a more appropriate basis for understanding the unique economic and legal functions served by the public corporation. Our analysis rests on the observation-generally accepted even by corporate scholars who adhere to the principal-agent model-that shareholders are not the only group that may provide specialized inputs into corporate Production.5 Executives, rank-and-file employees, and even creditors or the local community may also make essential contributions and have an interest in an enterprise's success. And in circumstances where it is impossible to draft explicit contracts that deter shirking and rent-seeking among these various corporate "team members" by preallocating rewards and responsibilities, we suggest that the problem may be better left to an institutional substitute for explicit contracts: the law of public corporations. …
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a team Production Theory of corporate law
Virginia Law Review, 1999Co-Authors: Margaret M Blair, Lynn A StoutAbstract:Contemporary corporate scholarship generally assumes that the central economic problem addressed by corporation law is getting managers and directors to act as loyal agents for shareholders. We take issue with this approach and argue that the unique legal rules governing publicly-held corporations are instead designed primarily to address a different problem - the "team Production" problem - that arises when a number of individuals must invest firm-specific resources to produce a nonseparable output. In such situations team members may find it difficult or impossible to draft explicit contracts distributing the output of their joint efforts, and, as an alternative, might prefer to give up control over their enterprise to an independent third party charged with representing the team's interests and allocating rewards among team members. Thus we argue that the essential economic function of the public corporation is not to address principal-agent problems, but to provide a vehicle through which shareholders, creditors, executives, rank-and-file employees, and other potential corporate "stakeholders" who may invest firm-specific resources can, for their own benefit, jointly relinquish control over those resources to a board of directors. This alternative to the principal-agent approach offers to explain a variety of pivotal doctrines in corporate law that have proven difficult to explain using agency Theory, including: the requirement that a public corporation be managed by a board of directors rather than by shareholders directly; the meaning and function of a corporation's "legal personality" and the rules of derivative suit procedure; the substantive structure of directors' fiduciary duties, including the application of the business judgment rule in the takeover context; and the highly-limited nature of shareholders' voting rights. The team Production model also carries important normative implications for legal and popular debates over corporate governance, because it suggests that maximizing shareholder wealth should not be the principal goal of corporate law. Rather, directors of public corporations should seek to maximize the joint welfare of all the firm's stakeholders - including shareholders, managers, employees, and possibly other groups such as creditors or the local community - who contribute firm-specific resources to corporate Production.
