The Experts below are selected from a list of 3381 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Wang Li-ping - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Study on the Influence Mechanism of Trade Protection Measures on Chinese Textiles
Ecological Economy, 2020Co-Authors: Wang Li-pingAbstract:Because Trade Protection emphasizes more particularly on intervening import and export quantity from the aspect of market access in the new period, this paper analyzed the quantity control mechanism and market access mechanism of Trade Protection measures under the background of Chinese textiles Trade, which makes us more clearly recognize the essence of Trade Protection and is helpful to take corresponding measure for the enterprises.
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The History Vicissitudes of Trade Protection Theory and its Inspiration on China
Future and Development, 2020Co-Authors: Wang Li-pingAbstract:Through reviewing the research achievements of Trade Protection theory, the paper reveals and demonstrates the interaction and intergrowth characteristics of Trade Protection theory and free Trade theory. Based on these analyses and China as a great development country, the paper puts forward some inspiration on our foreign Trade development in the new period.
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The Impact of Trade Protection Events on Chinese Textile Exports
East China Economic Management, 2020Co-Authors: Wang Li-pingAbstract:This paper firstly summarized and reviewed "event analysis" that widely used in the financial sector and analyzed its rationality and scientificalness in the study of economic events,which provided a theoretical analysis tool and idea for the study of specific Trade Protection events.Secondly,the paper quantitatively analyzed the short-term impact of Trade Protection event on China’s textile exports.Finally,combining with China’s basic national conditions and the actual situation of textile Trade,the paper comprehensively and objectively analyzed the findings of the event evaluation.
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The Study of Trade Protection on the Production Factors and Industry Structure of Chinese Textile Industry
Future and Development, 2020Co-Authors: Wang Li-pingAbstract:The present literature mainly expounded the necessity and pressure of China actively facing Trade Protection from the effect of Trade Protection on the export growth speed of Chinese textiles and industry technology. In fact,the distortion effect of Trade Protection measures on Chinese textiles price and Trade market will inevitably feedback the factors market and capital market,further affecting the structure adjustment of Chinese textile industry. In conclusion,the effect of Trade Protection on Chinese textile industry is multiplex and profound
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Empirical study on Trade Protection on textiles based on event analysis
2009 Chinese Control and Decision Conference, 2009Co-Authors: Wang Li-pingAbstract:This paper firstly summarized and commented on the ldquoevent analysisrdquo that is extensively used in the field of financial application, analyzed the reasonable and scientific applications of ldquoevent analysisrdquo on economic events, which provided the theoretical analysis tools and research ideas for studies on specific Trade Protection events. Secondly, it analyzed the event of the international Protection against China's textile Trade in detail, and qualitatively analyzed its short-term impact. Finally, it made a comprehensive and objective analysis on the results of the event analysis in light of China's basic national conditions and the actual situation of the textile Trade.
Dani Rodrik - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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labor market shocks and the demand for Trade Protection evidence from online surveys
The Economic Journal, 2020Co-Authors: Rafael Di Tella, Dani RodrikAbstract:We study preferences for government action in response to layoffs resulting from different types of labour-market shocks. We consider: technological change, a demand shift, bad management, and three kinds of international outsourcing. Support for government intervention rises sharply in response to shocks and is heavily biased towards Trade Protection. Trade shocks generate more demand for Protectionism, and among Trade shocks, outsourcing to a developing country elicits greater demand for Protectionism. The 'bad management' shock is the only scenario that induces a desired increase in compensatory transfers. Trump supporters are more Protectionist than Clinton supporters, but preferences seem easy to manipulate: Clinton supporters primed with Trade shocks are as Protectionist as baseline Trump voters. Highlighting labour abuses in the exporting country increases the demand for Trade Protection by Clinton supporters but not Trump supporters.
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labor market shocks and the demand for Trade Protection evidence from online surveys
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019Co-Authors: Rafael Di Tella, Dani RodrikAbstract:We study preferences for government action in response to layoffs resulting from different types of labor-market shocks. We consider the following shocks: technological change, a demand shift, bad management, and three kinds of international outsourcing. Respondents are given a choice among no government action, compensatory transfers, and Trade Protection. In response to these shocks, support for government intervention generally rises sharply and is heavily biased towards Trade Protection. Demand for import Protection increases significantly in all cases, except for the “bad management” shock. Trade shocks generate more demand for Protectionism, and among Trade shocks, outsourcing to a developing country elicits greater demand for Protectionism than outsourcing to a developed country. The “bad management” shock is the only scenario that induces a desired increase in compensatory transfers. Effects appear to be heterogeneous across subgroups with different political preferences and education. Trump supporters are more Protectionist than Clinton supporters, but preferences seem easy to manipulate: Clinton supporters primed with Trade shocks are as Protectionist as baseline Trump voters. Highlighting labor abuses in the exporting country increases the demand for Trade Protection by Clinton supporters but not Trump supporters.
Daniel Trefler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Trade liberalization and the theory of endogenous Protection an econometric study of u s import policy
Journal of Political Economy, 1993Co-Authors: Daniel TreflerAbstract:Trade theorists continue to puzzle over their surprisingly small estimates of the impact of Trade liberalization o n imports. All explanations of the puzzle treat Trade liberalization as a given but the level of Trade Protection is not exogenous. The theo ry of endogenous Protection predicts that higher levels of import penetration will lead to greater Protection. This paper finds that, when Trade Protection is modeled endogenously, its restrictive impact on imports is large--ten times the size obtained from treating Protection exogenously. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.
Puja Vasudeva Dutta - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Trade Protection and industry wages in india
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 2007Co-Authors: Puja Vasudeva DuttaAbstract:This paper examines the link between Trade Protection and industry wage premia in India using a unique dataset combining employment survey data with industry-level data for various years between 1983 and 2000. The author finds that India's Trade reforms were not distributionally neutral. The impact of Protection on industry wage premia was positive and statistically significant, though modest in magnitude: workers employed in industries with high tariffs received higher wages than apparently identical workers in low-tariff industries. Because industries with high initial levels of Protection were also those with the largest tariff reductions during this period and had the highest share of unskilled workers, the positive tariff-wage effect implies that the Trade reforms were likely to have increased wage inequality as the relative wages of the (predominantly unskilled) workers in these manufacturing industries fell.
Nina Pavcnik - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Trade wages and the political economy of Trade Protection evidence from the colombian Trade reforms
Journal of International Economics, 2005Co-Authors: Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, Nina PavcnikAbstract:Worker industry affiliation plays a crucial role in how Trade policy affects wages in many Trade models. Yet, most research has focused on how Trade policy affects wages by altering the economy-wide returns to a specific worker characteristic (i.e. skill or education) rather than through worker-industry affiliation. This Paper exploits drastic Trade liberalizations in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s to investigate the relationship between Protection and industry wages. Using the Colombian National Household Survey we first compute industry wage premiums, adjusting for a series of worker, job, and firm characteristics. We find that Colombian industry wage premiums exhibit remarkably less persistence over time than US wage premiums. Similarly, tariffs are less correlated over time than in the US data, indicating that Trade liberalization has changed the structure of Protection. We next relate wage premiums to Trade policy in a framework that accounts for the political economy of Trade Protection. Accounting for time-invariant political economy factors is critical. When we do not control for unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics, we find that workers in protected sectors earn less than workers with similar observable characteristics in unprotected sectors. Allowing for industry fixed effects reverses the result: Trade Protection increases relative wages. This positive relationship persists when we instrument for tariff changes. Our results are in line with short- and medium-run models of Trade where labour is immobile across sectors, or, alternatively, with the existence of industry rents that are reduced by Trade liberalization. In the context of the current debate on the rising income inequality in developing countries, our findings point to a source of disparity beyond the well-documented rise in the economy-wide skill premium: because tariff reductions were proportionately larger in sectors employing a high fraction of less-skilled workers, the decrease in the wage premiums in these sectors affected such workers disproportionately.
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Trade Protection and wages evidence from the colombian Trade reforms
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001Co-Authors: Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, Nina PavcnikAbstract:Starting in 1985, Colombia experienced gradual Trade liberalization that culminated in the drastic tariff reductions of 1990-91. This paper exploits these Trade reforms to investigate the relationship between Protection and wages. The focus of the analysis is on relative wages, defined as industry wage premiums relative to the economy-wide average wage. Using the June waves of the Colombian National Household Survey, we first compute wage premiums for the period 1984-98, adjusting for a series of worker characteristics, job and firm attributes, and informality. We find that industry wage premiums in Colombia exhibit remarkably less persistence over time than U.S. wage premiums. Similarly, measures of Trade Protection are less correlated over time than in the U.S. data, indicating that as a result of Trade liberalization the structure of Protection has changed. Regressions of wage premiums on tariffs, without industry fixed effects, produce a negative relationship between Protection and wages; workers in protected sectors earn less than workers with similar observable characteristics in unprotected sectors. With fixed effects the results are reversed: Trade Protection is found to increase relative wages. The effect is economically significant: Elimination of tariffs in an industry with an average level of Protection in 1984 would lead to a 4% wage decline in this industry. For the most protected industries the effect increases to 7.3%. We also find that - in contrast to the U.S. - sectors with high import penetration in Colombia pay higher wages; nevertheless, regressions with industry fixed effects indicate that an increase of imports in a particular sector is associated with lower wages. The differences between the results with and without fixed effects are indicative of the importance of (time-invariant) political economy factors as determinants of Protection. Further issues concerning the effects of Trade liberalization, such as the relevance of time-variant political economy factors, the importance of employment guarantees, liberalization induced productivity changes, and the interplay of Trade and labor reforms, will be investigated in a sequel paper.
