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Dale Jacquette - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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philosophy psychology and Psychologism critical and historical readings on the psychological turn in philosophy
2010Co-Authors: Dale JacquetteAbstract:Preface. Acknowledgments. Introduction: Psychologism The Philosophical Shibboleth D. Jacquette. Psychologism In Logic: Bacon To Bolzano R. George. Between Leibniz And Mill: Kant's Logic And The Rhetoric Of Psychologism C. Posy. Psychologism And Non-Classical Approaches In Traditional Logic W. Stelzner. The Concept Of 'Psychologism' In Frege And Husserl J.N. Mohanty. Psychologism And Sociologism In Early Twentieth Century German-Speaking Philosophy M. Kusch. The Space Of Signs: C.S. Peirce's Critique Of Psychologism V. Colapietro. Quinean Dreams Or, Prospects For A Scientific Epistemology M. Bradie. Late Forms Of Psychologism And AntiPsychologism J. Margolis. Propositions And The Objects Of Thought M. Jubien. The Concepts Of Truth And Knowledge In Psychologism J.H. Dreher. Psychologism Revisited In Logic, Metaphysics, And Epistemology D. Jacquette. Why There Is Nothing Rather Than Something: Quine On Behaviorism, Meaning, And Indeterminacy P.A. Roth. Cognitive Illusions And The Welcome Psychologism Of Logicist Artificial Intelligence S. Bringsjord, Yingrui Yang. Index.
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Psychologism revisited in logic metaphysics and epistemology
Metaphilosophy, 2008Co-Authors: Dale JacquetteAbstract:Psychologism is a philosophical ideology that seeks to explain the principles of logic, metaphysics, and epistemology as psychological phenomena. Psychologism has been the storm center of concerted criticisms since the nineteenth century, and is thought by many to have been refuted once and for all by Kant, Frege, Husserl, and others. The project of accounting for objective philosophical or mathematical truths in terms of subjective psychological states has been largely discredited in mainstream analytic thought. Ironically, Psychologism has resurfaced in unexpected guises in the form of intuitionistic logic and mathematics, cognitivism, and naturalized epistemology. I examine some of the principal objections to Psychologism - distinguishing roughly between good and bad or philosophically acceptable versus unacceptable Psychologism - and consider the extent to which a new wave of Psychologism may be gaining prominence in contemporary philosophy, and the light its successes and failures may shed on the original concept and underlying perspective of classical Psychologism.
Eric Wiland - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Oxford Handbooks Online - Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism about Motivating Reasons
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2018Co-Authors: Eric WilandAbstract:People do things for various reasons. Are these motivating reasons psychological? This question is the focus of this chapter. I argue here that such reasons are typically not purely psychological. Yet there is an important psychological element or aspect of these reasons. I proceed by first reviewing some arguments for and against Psychologism about (motivating) reasons. Next, I do the same for the view that reasons are typically non-psychological facts. I then explore some additional alternatives: (a) disjunctivist views, (b) the appositional account, and finally (c) naïve action theory, which I favour. Naïve action theory transcends and preserves the best features of both standard Psychologism and standard anti-Psychologism.
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Psychologism, Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2003Co-Authors: Eric WilandAbstract:Psychologism is the view that practical reasons are psychological states. It is widely thought that Psychologism is supported by the following principle governing explanation: TF. The difference between false and true beliefs on A's part cannot alter the form of the explanation which will be appropriate to A's actions. (TF) seems to imply that we always need to cite agents’ beliefs when explaining their actions, no matter whether those beliefs are true or false. And this seems to vindicate Psychologism. I argue, however, that the standard argument for Psychologism which includes (TF) as a premise in fact fails to establish its intended conclusion. As a result, the overall case for Psychologism is not as strong as it may initially seem.
Martin Kusch - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Philosophy and the Historical Perspective - The Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge Revisited: Relativism, Scepticism, Reductionism
Philosophy and the Historical Perspective, 2018Co-Authors: Martin KuschAbstract:This chapter revisits the author’s 1995 book Psychologism: A Sociology of Philosophical Knowlege in a critical, constructive and comparative spirit. It begins with a brief summary of Psychologism. Subsequently, it identifies two key influences and discusses two recent studies that might be seen as sociological alternatives to what the author tried to do in the 1990s. It offers critical comments on these alternatives. Finally, the author formulates two objections to his previous work before turning to the question where the philosophical relevance of the SPK might lie.
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Psychologism history of
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2001Co-Authors: Martin KuschAbstract:The history of Psychologism is the history of an accusation and of a threat. To label authors as advocates of Psychologism is to claim that they use psychological concepts and ideas in the wrong place. The accusation first became popular in the German-speaking world with the rise of experimental psychology in the second half of the nineteenth century. The most famous episode in the history of the accusation is the ‘Psychologism controversy’ in the German-speaking world at the beginning of the twentieth century. Frege and Husserl were among the leading critics of Psychologism in logic, mathematics, and epistemology. The German debate over Psychologism influenced subsequent philosophical thinking in most Western countries.
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Psychologism. A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. London: Routledge 1995
Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle, 1999Co-Authors: Martin Kusch, Nicole D. SchmidtAbstract:In his book Martin Kusch tells an old story, namely the episode of Psychologism and its refutation. Every philosopher knows it and novices have to learn: in the last century “Psychologism” was a result of philosophical confusions. And the typical explanation emphasizes the crisis of philosophy after the “decline of the idealism” beginning with Hegel’s death.
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the criticism of husserl s arguments against Psychologism in german philosophy 1901 1920
1994Co-Authors: Martin KuschAbstract:In recent years, a number of philosophers have re-examined Frege’s and Husserl’s arguments against Psychologism in logic and epistemology. Surprisingly enough, this renewed interest in Psychologism and its ‘refutation’ has not to date led to any historical work on the reception of Frege’s and Husserl’s arguments in German academic philosophy at the time. In this paper, I shall take a first step towards filling this lacuna by giving an overview of critical reactions to Husserl’s arguments (as presented in his Prolegomena to the Logische Untersuchungen) between 1901 and 1920.
Wayne A. Davis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Psychologism and Humeanism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2003Co-Authors: Wayne A. DavisAbstract:In Practical Reality (Oxford 2000), Jonathan Dancy argues that our reasons for action are not psychological states, but things we take to be facts about the world, and shows that the reasons themselves are not causes. Dancy concludes that intentional actions are not explained by beliefs and desires, and that explanations of action in terms of reasons are not causal explanations. I show that these further conclusions are unwarranted by sketching an alternative theory of reasons according to which what it is for an action to be done for a reason is for certain beliefs and desires to cause the action. Our reasons for action are the contents of those beliefs and desires. This theory is not only compatible with the facts about reasons Dancy has established, but explains many things that Dancy's theory does not account for. I make no claim here about the precise adequacy of the simplified theoretical definitions I present. My goal is to show that a systematic theory along these lines is a promising approach to understanding an important aspect of human nature.
Rolf George - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Bolzano and the Problem of Psychologism
Contributions to Phenomenology, 2003Co-Authors: Rolf GeorgeAbstract:Husserl’s discussion of Psychologism in his Logical Investigations led to a heated debate in German academic philosophy. While he, and earlier Frege, had been concerned only with Psychologism in logic (and this variety will be my only concern in this essay), it was discovered that many other philosophical and humanist disciplines had been infected as well. It was found that there was metaphysical, ontological, epistemological, logical, ethical, aesthetic, sociological, religious, historical, mathematical, pedagogical and linguistic Psychologism. Psychologisms were sub-classified into empiricist, a prioristic, sensualist, rationalist, critical, theological, evolutionary, pragmatist, transcendental. They could be old, new, false, genuine, objective, subjective, extreme or moderate, to cite from the lists in Martin Kusch’s excellent account of Psychologism (1995, p. 108). In almost all cases it ranged from regrettable to abject. Philosophers accused each other of this transgression. It must have been satisfying to find residual Psychologism even in those who explicitly denounced it. Even Husserl was fingered, and accused in turn of “logicism” by Wilhelm Wundt, which term here meant that Husserl intended to reduce psychology to logic, and turn it into a “psychology without psychology” (Wundt p. 580, cited from Kusch, 1995, p. 180.). The term “psychological logicism”, in contrast to “logical Psychologism,” had come to refer to the practice, as old as philosophy itself, of beginning with the logical analysis of thought, and postulating mental faculties or functions, like understanding, reason etc., that would account for the various logical accomplishments and capacities (cf. Kreiser, p. 237).
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Psychologism in logic bacon to bolzano
Philosophy and Rhetoric, 2003Co-Authors: Rolf GeorgeAbstract:Etude de l'histoire des intrusions du Psychologisme dans le domaine de la logique, depuis la fin du XVII e siecle, caracterise par une sociologie et une politique de la logique representee par Locke, Hume et Bacon, d'une part, jusqu'au XIX e siecle marque par la conception de la logique hors de la psychologie chez Herbart et Frege, d'autre part. Examinant le rejet de l'idee de logique naturelle chez Kant et ses successeurs (Kiesewetter, Esser), ainsi que l'opposition a Kant representee par Beneke et Fries, l'A. etablit, en guise de conclusion, une typologie des differents Psychologismes (eliminatif, inintentionnel, scientifique) qui ont marque son evolution depuis la reception de la logique de Port-Royal