The Experts below are selected from a list of 147 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Gary Hatfield - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

W. Sharrock - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Can organisations afford knowledge?
    Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), 1992
    Co-Authors: R. Anderson, W. Sharrock
    Abstract:

    “Affordance Theory” has been widely discussed as a potential resource for the design of interfaces for CSCW and other systems. In this paper, we discuss the extension and adaption of this concept beyond the Psychology of Perception to the social distribution of a common stock of knowledge. We suggest that a working division of labour as that is known, oriented to, and rendered visible by the management of space and artifacts within a working environment can “afford” knowledge of organisational routines and practices. Learning to see the working division of labour is coming to understand the organisation. The grounds for extending the concept in this way are derived from consideration of an actual example taken from fieldwork. Some implications for the design of CSCW systems are reviewed.

Helge Malmgren - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Rorschach’s Idea of a “Movement” Response in the Light of Recent Philosophy and Psychology of Perception
    Rorschachiana, 2020
    Co-Authors: Helge Malmgren
    Abstract:

    The proper definition of the kinesthetic or movement (M) category has been the subject of many controversies within the Rorschach community; see, for example, the discussion between Kramer and Exner (Kramer, 1991; Exner, 1991). The present paper elucidates the nature of movement responses by means of a theoretical analysis of some of the key concepts involved. This analysis in part is of a philosophical character, but I also bring in several recent results from the Psychology and neurophysiology of Perception which in my opinion are crucial to a correct understanding of the movement responses. The first two parts of the essay describe the basic controversy between those Rorschach theorists who – like Hermann Rorschach himself and Ewald Bohm – hold that kinesthetic identification is a necessary ingredient in any movement response, and those – like John Exner – who want to drop this condition from the definition. This controversy is shown to involve another fundamental issue, namely: In what sense is movement a determinant, and what should be meant by a determinant? The third section also discusses a main objection against keeping Rorschach’s original definition: its reliance on introspective criteria. The fourth part takes a historical perspective, describing the philosophical and psychological tradition called associationism, discussing certain ideas concerning kinesthetic sensibility brought forward within that tradition, and finally analyzing the nature and extent of Hermann Rorschach’s commitment to associationism, especially as manifested in his doctoral dissertation. Some main elements of the 20th-century psychological and philosophical critique of associationism are outlined in Sections 5–6, and the relevance of this critique for the definition of a movement response is explained. Converging evidence from different sources, such as child Psychology and clinical and primate neuroPsychology, is then brought together in Section 7 to show that recent work on Perception supports Hermann Rorschach’s basic intuition about the M category. In Section 8, a new definition of movement responses is given in terms of practical Perception and immediate visuo-motor couplings. Finally, in Section 9, the possible use of Rorschach data in the experimental analysis of motion-from-form Perception is pointed out.

  • rorschach s idea of a movement response in the light of recent philosophy and Psychology of Perception
    Rorschachiana. Yearbook of the International Rorschach Society, 2000
    Co-Authors: Helge Malmgren
    Abstract:

    The proper definition of the kinesthetic or movement (M) category has been the subject of many controversies within the Rorschach community; see, for example, the discussion between Kramer and Exner (Kramer, 1991; Exner, 1991). The present paper elucidates the nature of movement responses by means of a theoretical analysis of some of the key concepts involved. This analysis in part is of a philosophical character, but I also bring in several recent results from the Psychology and neurophysiology of Perception which in my opinion are crucial to a correct understanding of the movement responses. The first two parts of the essay describe the basic controversy between those Rorschach theorists who – like Hermann Rorschach himself and Ewald Bohm – hold that kinesthetic identification is a necessary ingredient in any movement response, and those – like John Exner – who want to drop this condition from the definition. This controversy is shown to involve another fundamental issue, namely: In what sense is movement a determinant, and what should be meant by a determinant? The third section also discusses a main objection against keeping Rorschach’s original definition: its reliance on introspective criteria. The fourth part takes a historical perspective, describing the philosophical and psychological tradition called associationism, discussing certain ideas concerning kinesthetic sensibility brought forward within that tradition, and finally analyzing the nature and extent of Hermann Rorschach’s commitment to associationism, especially as manifested in his doctoral dissertation. Some main elements of the 20th-century psychological and philosophical critique of associationism are outlined in Sections 5–6, and the relevance of this critique for the definition of a movement response is explained. Converging evidence from different sources, such as child Psychology and clinical and primate neuroPsychology, is then brought together in Section 7 to show that recent work on Perception supports Hermann Rorschach’s basic intuition about the M category. In Section 8, a new definition of movement responses is given in terms of practical Perception and immediate visuo-motor couplings. Finally, in Section 9, the possible use of Rorschach data in the experimental analysis of motion-from-form Perception is pointed out.

Klaus Robering - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Otto Selz’s phenomenology of natural space
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2020
    Co-Authors: Klaus Robering
    Abstract:

    In the 1930s Otto Selz developed a novel approach to the Psychology of Perception which he called “synthetic Psychology of wholes”. This “synthetic Psychology” is based on a phenomenological description of the structural relationships between elementary items (tones, colors, smells, etc.) building up integral wholes. The present article deals with Selz’s account of spatial cognition within this general framework. Selz Zeitschrift für Psychologie , 114, 351–362 ( 1930a ) argues that his approach to spatial cognition delivers answers to the long-discussed question of the epistemological status of the laws of geometry. More specifically he tries to derive (a subset of) the Euclidean axioms from the structural laws valid for phenomenal space. After a brief description of the discussion of the status of geometry in the 1920s/1930 (section 2 ), the present article explains Selz’s understanding of “phenomenology” (section 3 ). Section 4 then deals with Selz’s attempt to derive the Euclidean laws from the structural phenomenological laws of space. Selz’s attempted derivation suffers from some formal shortcomings, which however can be repaired. The question arises, though, whether the necessary improvements do not rely upon more intricate geometric intuitions and thus render Selz’s attempt to base geometry upon the phenomenology of spatial cognition circular.

Morgan Williams - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the social Psychology of Perception experiments hills backpacks glucose and the problem of generalizability
    Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 2012
    Co-Authors: Frank H Durgin, Brennan Klein, Ariana Spiegel, Cassandra J Strawser, Morgan Williams
    Abstract:

    Experiments take place in a physical environment but also a social environment. Generalizability from experimental manipulations to more typical contexts may be limited by violations of ecological validity with respect to either the physical or the social environment. A replication and extension of a recent study (a blood glucose manipulation) was conducted to investigate the effects of experimental demand (a social artifact) on participant behaviors judging the geographical slant of a large-scale outdoor hill. Three different assessments of experimental demand indicate that even when the physical environment is naturalistic, and the goal of the main experimental manipulation was primarily concealed, artificial aspects of the social environment (such as an explicit requirement to wear a heavy backpack while estimating the slant of a hill) may still be primarily responsible for altered judgments of hill orientation.