The Experts below are selected from a list of 99 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Joel Waldfogel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Public Monopoly and economic efficiency evidence from the pennsylvania liquor control board s entry decisions
The American Economic Review, 2013Co-Authors: Katja Seim, Joel WaldfogelAbstract:While private monopolists are generally assumed to maximize profits, the goals of Public enterprises are less well known. Using the example of Pennsylvania's state liquor retailing Monopoly, we use information on store location choices, prices, wholesale costs, and sales to uncover the goals implicit in its entry decisions. Does it seek to maximize profits or welfare? We estimate a spatial model of demand for liquor that allows us to calculate counterfactual configurations of stores that maximize profit and welfare. We find that welfare maximizing networks have roughly twice as many stores as would maximize profit. Moreover, the actual network is much more similar in size and configuration to the welfare maximizing configuration. An alternative to a state Monopoly would be the common practice of regulated private entry. While such regimes can give rise to inefficient location decisions, little is known about the size of the resulting inefficiencies. Even for a given number of stores, a simple characterization of free entry with our model results in a store configuration that produces welfare losses of between 3 and 9% of revenue. This is a third to half of the overall loss from unregulated free entry.
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Public Monopoly and economic efficiency evidence from the pennsylvania liquor control board s entry decisions
The American Economic Review, 2013Co-Authors: Katja Seim, Joel WaldfogelAbstract:We estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government-controlled retailing on entry patterns. In the absence of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the state would have roughly 2.5 times the current number of stores, higher consumer surplus, and lower payments to liquor store employees. With just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare, the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing. Government operation mitigates, but does not eliminate, free entry’s bias against rural consumers. We find only limited evidence of political influence on entry. ( JEL D42, D72, L11, L12, L43, L81)
Katja Seim - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Public Monopoly and economic efficiency evidence from the pennsylvania liquor control board s entry decisions
The American Economic Review, 2013Co-Authors: Katja Seim, Joel WaldfogelAbstract:While private monopolists are generally assumed to maximize profits, the goals of Public enterprises are less well known. Using the example of Pennsylvania's state liquor retailing Monopoly, we use information on store location choices, prices, wholesale costs, and sales to uncover the goals implicit in its entry decisions. Does it seek to maximize profits or welfare? We estimate a spatial model of demand for liquor that allows us to calculate counterfactual configurations of stores that maximize profit and welfare. We find that welfare maximizing networks have roughly twice as many stores as would maximize profit. Moreover, the actual network is much more similar in size and configuration to the welfare maximizing configuration. An alternative to a state Monopoly would be the common practice of regulated private entry. While such regimes can give rise to inefficient location decisions, little is known about the size of the resulting inefficiencies. Even for a given number of stores, a simple characterization of free entry with our model results in a store configuration that produces welfare losses of between 3 and 9% of revenue. This is a third to half of the overall loss from unregulated free entry.
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Public Monopoly and economic efficiency evidence from the pennsylvania liquor control board s entry decisions
The American Economic Review, 2013Co-Authors: Katja Seim, Joel WaldfogelAbstract:We estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government-controlled retailing on entry patterns. In the absence of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the state would have roughly 2.5 times the current number of stores, higher consumer surplus, and lower payments to liquor store employees. With just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare, the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing. Government operation mitigates, but does not eliminate, free entry’s bias against rural consumers. We find only limited evidence of political influence on entry. ( JEL D42, D72, L11, L12, L43, L81)
Marian W Moszoro - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Public private Monopoly
B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2018Co-Authors: Marian W MoszoroAbstract:This paper presents comparative statics of organizational modes of natural Monopoly in Public utilities with a focus on co-ownership and co-governance. Private Monopoly lowers output and increases the price to maximize profit; Public Monopoly incurs higher costs due to the lack of know-how; and a regulated Monopoly results in regulation costs to overcome informational asymmetries. A Public-private partnership arises as an efficient organization mode when it enables the internalization of private know-how and saves regulation costs due to correspondingly sufficient private and Public residual control rights. Public-private partnerships support higher prices than marginal costs due to rent sharing, with its upper price frontier decreasing in private residual control rights.
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Public private Monopoly
Social Science Research Network, 2016Co-Authors: Marian W MoszoroAbstract:This paper presents comparative statics of organizational forms of natural Monopoly in Public utilities with a focus on co-ownership and co-governance. Private Monopoly lowers output and increases price to maximize profit. Public Monopoly incurs higher costs due to the lack of know-how. A regulated Monopoly results in regulation costs to overcome informational asymmetries. A Public-private partnership arises as an efficient organization mode when it enables the internalization of private know-how and saves regulation costs due to correspondingly sufficient private and Public ownership and control.
Mildred E Warner - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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reversing privatization rebalancing government reform markets deliberation and planning
Policy and Society, 2008Co-Authors: Mildred E WarnerAbstract:The last decades of the 20th century witnessed a profound experiment to increase the role of markets in local government service delivery. However, that experiment has failed to deliver adequately on efficiency, equity or voice criteria. This has led to reversals. But this reverse privatization process is not a return to the direct Public Monopoly delivery model of old. Instead it heralds the emergence of a new balanced position which combines use of markets, deliberation and planning to reach decisions which may be both efficient and more socially optimal.
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competition or Monopoly comparing privatization of local Public services in the us and spain
Public Administration, 2008Co-Authors: Mildred E Warner, Germa BelAbstract:Differences in national traditions of Public intervention, institutional arrangements and Public service markets make local Public services an area of great diversity. In this paper we undertake a comparative study of how local governments arrange for delivery of water and waste services in the US and Spain. We fi nd levels of privatization are higher in Spain than in the US. We review organizational reform in the two contexts and compare service delivery data using national surveys from each country. We fi nd lower and less stable privatization in the US stems in part from adherence to Public choice emphasis on the benefi ts of market competition over Public Monopoly. By contrast, Spanish municipalities refl ect an industrial organization approach, and create hybrid Public/private fi rms which benefi t from both market engagement and economies of scale available under Monopoly production. We conclude that managing Monopoly may be more important than competition in local service delivery. This paper compares how local governments in the US and Spain arrange for delivery of solid waste collection and water distribution. Although conventional wisdom suggests that privatization is higher among cities in the US, the data show contracting is actually higher among localities in many European countries. For instance, private production of solid waste collection is the form used in most municipalities (between 60 per cent and 80 per cent) in countries like Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Spain, but by less than half the municipalities in the US. In water distribution, more than 50 per cent of municipalities with population over 10,000 in the United Kingdom, France and Spain have private production ( OECD 2000a, b; Bel 2006a ), compared to less than 10 per cent of municipalities in the US ( Warner and Hefetz 2004 ).
Stephen Graham - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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constructing premium network spaces reflections on infrastructure networks and contemporary urban development
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 2000Co-Authors: Stephen GrahamAbstract:This article argues that standardized, Public or private infrastructure monopolies are receding as hegemonic forms of urban infrastructure development. We are starting to witness the uneven overlaying of new, customized, high-performance urban infrastructures onto the apparently immanent, universal and (usually) Public Monopoly networks laid down in developed cities between the 1930s and 1960s. This article seeks to develop a broad and international exploration of the construction of such premium networked spaces and to begin analysing how they are bound up within wider processes of urban change and restructuring. To this end it highlights four processes of socio-technical and political economic change that are supporting the emergence of premium networked infrastructures. These are: the 'unbundling' of urban infrastructure provision; the erosion of comprehensive urban planning and the construction of new consumption spaces; the emergence of infrastructural consumerism; and the widespread shift towards extended and automobilized cityscapes. In each case, the article explores emerging examples of premium networked spaces via brief case studies. Finally, the article reflects on the likely limits to these trends, by way of a brief conclusion. Copyright Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000.
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constructing premium network spaces reflections on infrastructure networks and contemporary urban development
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 2000Co-Authors: Stephen GrahamAbstract:This article argues that standardized, Public or private infrastructure monopolies are receding as hegemonic forms of urban infrastructure development. We are starting to witness the uneven overlaying of new, customized, high-performance urban infrastructures onto the apparently immanent, universal and (usually) Public Monopoly networks laid down in developed cities between the 1930s and 1960s. This article seeks to develop a broad and international exploration of the construction of such premium networked spaces and to begin analysing how they are bound up within wider processes of urban change and restructuring. To this end it highlights four processes of socio-technical and political economic change that are supporting the emergence of premium networked infrastructures. These are: the ‘unbundling’ of urban infrastructure provision; the erosion of comprehensive urban planning and the construction of new consumption spaces; the emergence of infrastructural consumerism; and the widespread shift towards extended and automobilized cityscapes. In each case, the article explores emerging examples of premium networked spaces via brief case studies. Finally, the article reflects on the likely limits to these trends, by way of a brief conclusion. Cet article sugg ere que les monopoles d’infrastructures uniformis´s, prives ou Publics, disparaissent en tant que formes h´gemoniques du developpement d’infrastructure urbaine. Nous commen??ons a voir la superposition inegale de nouvelles infrastructures urbaines de haut rendement, faites sur mesure, sur les r´seaux de monopole (generalement) Publics universels, apparemment immanents, mis en place dans les villes developp´es entre les annees trente et les ann´es soixante. Cet article tente de developper une perspective internationale de la construction de ces espaces de reseaux recherches, et de commencer a analyser comment ils sont relies dans le contexte du processus de changement et de restructuration urbains plus larges. Pour ce faire, il souligne quatre processus de changement politico-economique et socio-technique qui supportent l’apparition des infrastructures de reseaux recherch´es. Ce sont: le ‘d´sempaquetage’ de la provision d’infrastructure urbaine; l’erosion de la planification urbaine comprehensive et la construction de nouveaux espaces de consommation; l’apparition du consomm´risme infrastructurel; et un changement general vers des paysages de citeetendus et motorises. Dans chaque cas, l’article explore des exemples emergents d’espaces de reseaux recherches avec de brefs cas d’etude. Enfin, dans sa conclusion, l’article reflechit aux limites probables de ces tendances.
