The Experts below are selected from a list of 300 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Jacques Bughin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
to be unionized or not to be a case for cost raising strategies under cournot Oligopoly
European Economic Review, 2000Co-Authors: Stefano Vannini, Jacques BughinAbstract:Abstract This paper analyses the decision by firms under Cournot Oligopoly as to recognize unions in order to gain market power despite higher costs. Considering classical models of union–firm bargaining, namely right-to-manage (RTM) and efficient bargaining (EB), we show that, for a sufficiently low level of union power EB firms might adopt cost-raising strategies. This theoretical prediction is compatible with some empirical evidence in favour of EB, and adds to the theoretical finding that EB might dominate RTM under unionized Cournot–Nash Oligopoly. It also suggests closer antitrust scrutiny as whether unions can provide cartel-like services to Oligopoly firms, allowing them to distort product market competition at the expense of consumers.
-
To be (unionized) or not to be? A case for cost-raising strategies under Cournot Oligopoly
European Economic Review, 2000Co-Authors: Stefano Vannini, Jacques BughinAbstract:Abstract This paper analyses the decision by firms under Cournot Oligopoly as to recognize unions in order to gain market power despite higher costs. Considering classical models of union–firm bargaining, namely right-to-manage (RTM) and efficient bargaining (EB), we show that, for a sufficiently low level of union power EB firms might adopt cost-raising strategies. This theoretical prediction is compatible with some empirical evidence in favour of EB, and adds to the theoretical finding that EB might dominate RTM under unionized Cournot–Nash Oligopoly. It also suggests closer antitrust scrutiny as whether unions can provide cartel-like services to Oligopoly firms, allowing them to distort product market competition at the expense of consumers.
-
Market Power, Profit-Sharing Contracts and Systematic Risk
1998Co-Authors: Jacques BughinAbstract:This paper examines the properties of wage and profit-sharing contracts in a model of Oligopoly with capital market equilibrium. Results show that, while profit-sharing contracts dominate market wage contracts under Cournot-Nash Oligopoly, profit-sharing contracts also reduce the firm cost of equity capital by enforcing lower variable costs in exchange of a pre-determined share of cash-flows to workers.
Attila Tasnadi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
A Bertrand–Edgeworth Oligopoly with a public firm
Journal of Economics, 2016Co-Authors: Zoltán Rácz, Attila TasnadiAbstract:We determine conditions under which a pure-strategy equilibrium of a mixed Bertrand–Edgeworth Oligopoly exists. In addition, we determine its pure-strategy equilibrium whenever it exists and compare the equilibrium outcome with that of the standard Bertrand–Edgeworth Oligopoly with only private firms.
-
A Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly with a public firm
2015Co-Authors: Zoltán Rácz, Attila TasnadiAbstract:We determine conditions under which a pure-strategy equilibrium of a mixed Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly exists. In addition, we determine its pure-strategy equilibrium whenever it exists and compare the equilibrium outcome with that of the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly with only private firms.
-
price vs quantity in Oligopoly games
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2006Co-Authors: Attila TasnadiAbstract:Abstract Price-setting and quantity-setting Oligopoly games lead to extremely different outcomes in the market. One natural way to address this problem is to formulate a model in which some firms use price while the remaining firms use quantity as their decision variable. We introduce a mixed Oligopoly game of this type and determine its equilibria. In addition, we consider an extension of this mixed Oligopoly game through which the choice of the decision variables can be endogenized. We prove the emergence of the Cournot game.
Koji Okuguchi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Existence of Unique Equilibrium in Cournot Mixed Oligopoly
International Game Theory Review, 2018Co-Authors: Koji Okuguchi, Takeshi YamazakiAbstract:The properties of Cournot mixed Oligopoly consisting of one public firm and one or more than one private firms have mostly been analyzed for simple cases on the basis of numerical calculations of the equilibrium values for a linear market demand function and linear or quadratic cost functions. In this paper, after proving the existence of a unique equilibrium in Cournot mixed Oligopoly under general conditions on the market demand and each firm’s cost function, we derive conditions ensuring the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for the mixed Oligopoly where one public firm and at least one of the private firms are active in a general model of Cournot mixed Oligopoly with one public firm and several private firms.
-
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Labor-Managed Cournot Oligopoly
Firms’ Objectives and Internal Organisation in a Global Economy, 2009Co-Authors: Koji Okuguchi, Ferenc SzidarovszkyAbstract:Ward (1958) has first shown perverse behavior of a competitive labor-managed firm whose objective is maximization of dividends per unit of labor in the firm. Hill and Waterson (1983) and Neary (1984) have analyzed labor-managed Cournot Oligopoly without product differentiation. Okuguchi (1986) and Sertel (1991, 1993) have introduced product differentiation into labor-managed Oligopoly. Okuguchi (1986) has proved that under a set of conditions, the price-adjusting Bertrand Oligopoly equilibrium prices are not higher than the quantity-adjusting Cournot Oligopoly equilibrium prices in labor-managed Oligopoly with product differentiation. Okuguchi (1992) has also provided existence and stability proof of equilibrium in labor-managed quantity-adjusting Cournot Oligopoly based on the contraction mapping theorem.
-
Optimal Pollution Tax in Cournot Oligopsonistic Oligopoly
2004Co-Authors: Koji OkuguchiAbstract:Cournot Oligopoly has been studied almost exclusively under the implicit assumption of perfectly competitive factor markets. However,oligopolistic firms procure often factors of production from imperfectly competitive markets. Okuguchi(1998,2000) has analyzed Cournot Oligopoly under the condition of imperfectly competitive factor markets,i.e.Cournot oligopsonistic Oligopoly. Some economists have analyzed the optimal pollution tax rate which maximizes the net total social surplus for Cournot Oligopoly(see Barnett(1980),Baumol and Oates(1980),Levin(1985),Okuguchi and Yamazaki(1994),Simpson(1995) and Okuguchi(2003)). A general finding is that the optimal pollution tax rate may be higher,lower or equal to the marginal value of the environmental damage. In this paper I will derive a general formula for the optimal pollution tax within Cournot oligopsonistic Oligopoly where both product and factor markets are imperfectly competitive. In Section 2,I will prove that there exists a unique Cournot equilibrium for oligopsonistic Oligopoly,given the level of the pollution tax rate. In Section 3,I will derive the optimal pollution tax rate capitalizing on the existence result in Section 2. I will clarify economic implications of the optimal pollution tax formula for some special cases. The final Section concludes
-
Oligopoly Games and Their Extensions
1999Co-Authors: Koji Okuguchi, Ferenc SzidarovszkyAbstract:In this chapter several versions of the Oligopoly game are introduced. The most simple model, the classical Oligopoly game, will be first described and then its extensions will be analyzed.
-
Comparative statics for profit‐maximizing and labor‐managed cournot oligopolies
Managerial and Decision Economics, 1993Co-Authors: Koji OkuguchiAbstract:Comparative static results are derived for two types of Oligopoly: profit-maximizing and labor-managed Cournot oligopolies. After establishing a general principle for comparative statics for Oligopoly, we will examine how a shift in the demand function, changes in the wage rate, indirect tax rates and fixed costs, and technical change affect the equilibrium Cournot industry and firms‘ outputs, firms’ profits and dividends per unit of labor. We will also analyze the effects of entry. Our analysis makes an extensive use of the relationship existing between an individual firm's and industry outputs. We will derive two kinds of stability conditions: one behavioristic and the other computational. Finally, we will conduct comparative static analysis for mixed Oligopoly where several profit-maximizing and labor-managed firms co-exist.
Aymeric Lardon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
On the Coalitional Stability of Monopoly Power in Differentiated Bertrand and Cournot Oligopolies
Theory and Decision, 2019Co-Authors: Aymeric LardonAbstract:In this article we revisit the classic comparison between Bertrand and Cournot competition in the presence of a cartel of firms that faces outsiders acting individually. This competition setting enables to deal with both non-cooperative and cooperative Oligopoly games. We concentrate on industries consisting of symmetrically differentiated products where firms operate at a constant and identical marginal cost. First, while the standard Bertrand-Cournot rankings still hold for Nash equilibrium prices, we show that the results may be altered for Nash equilibrium quantities and profits.Second, we define cooperative Bertrand and Cournot Oligopoly games with transferable utility on the basis of their non-cooperative foundation. We establish that the core of a cooperative Cournot Oligopoly game is strictly included in the core of a cooperative Bertrand Oligopoly game when the number of firms is lower or equal to 25. Otherwise the cores cannot be compared. Moreover, we focus on the aggregate-monotonic core, a subset of the core, that has the advantage to select point solutions satisfying both core selection and aggregate monotonicity properties. We succeed in comparing the aggregate-monotonic cores between Bertrand and Cournot competition regardless of the number of firms.
-
Convexity of Bertrand Oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products
2018Co-Authors: Aymeric LardonAbstract:We consider Bertrand Oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products. We assume that the demand system is Shubik’s and that firms operate at a constant and identical marginal and average cost. Our main results state that Bertrand Oligopoly TU-games in alpha, beta and gamma-characteristic function form satisfy the convexity property, meaning that there exist strong incentives for large-scale cooperation between firms on prices.
-
Convexity and the Shapley value in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-games with Shubik's demand functions
2011Co-Authors: Dongshuang Hou, Theo Driessen, Aymeric LardonAbstract:The Bertrand Oligopoly situation with Shubik's demand functions is modelled as a cooperative TU game. For that purpose two optimization problems are solved to arrive at the description of the worth of any coalition in the so-called Bertrand Oligopoly Game. Under certain circumstances, this Bertrand Oligopoly game has clear affinities with the well-known notion in statistics called variance with respect to the distinct marginal costs. This Bertrand Oligopoly Game is shown to be totally balanced, but fails to be convex unless all the firms have the same marginal costs. Under the complementary circumstances, the Bertrand Oligopoly Game is shown to be convex and in addition, its Shapley value is fully determined on the basis of linearity applied to an appealing decomposition of the Bertrand Oligopoly Game into the difference between two convex games, besides two nonessential games. One of these two essential games concerns the square of one non- essential game.
-
Cournot Oligopoly interval games
2010Co-Authors: Aymeric LardonAbstract:In this paper we consider cooperative Cournot Oligopoly games. Following Chander and Tulkens (1997) we assume that firms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. Lardon (2009) shows that if the inverse demand function is not dierentiable, it is not always possible to define a Cournot Oligopoly TU(Transferable Utility)-game. In this paper, we prove that we can always specify a Cournot Oligopoly interval game. Furthermore, we deal with the problem of the non-emptiness of two induced cores: the interval -core and the standard -core. To this end, we use a decision theory criterion, the Hurwicz criterion (Hurwicz 1951), that consists in combining, for any coalition, the worst and the better worths that it can obtain in its worth interval. The first result states that the interval -core is non-empty if and only if the Oligopoly TU-game associated with the better worth of every coalition in its worth interval admits a non-empty -core. However, we show that even for a very simple Oligopoly situation, this condition fails to be satisfied. The second result states that the standard -core is non-empty if and only if the Oligopoly TU-game associated with the worst worth of every coalition in its worth interval admits a nonempty -core. Moreover, we give some properties on every individual profit function and every cost function under which this condition always holds, what substantially extends the -core existence results in Lardon (2009).
Stef Tijs - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2002Co-Authors: Henk Norde, Kim Hang Pham, Stef TijsAbstract:Abstract In this paper, standard oligopolies are interpreted in two ways, namely as oligopolies without transferable technologies and as oligopolies with transferable technologies. From a cooperative point of view this leads to two different classes of cooperative games. We show that cooperative Oligopoly games without transferable technologies are convex games and that cooperative Oligopoly games with transferable technologies are totally balanced, but not necessarily convex.
-
Oligopoly Games With and Without Transferable Technologies
2000Co-Authors: Henk Norde, Kim Hang Pham, Stef TijsAbstract:In this paper standard oligopolies are interpreted in two ways, namely as oligopolies without transferable technologies and as oligopolies with transferable technologies.From a cooperative point of view this leads to two different classes of cooperative games.We show that cooperative Oligopoly games without transferable technologies are convex games and that cooperative Oligopoly games with transferable are totally balanced, but not necessarily convex.
