The Experts below are selected from a list of 132 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Brent Mccusker - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Land Use and Cover Change as an Indicator of Transformation on Recently Redistributed Farms in Limpopo Province, South Africa
Human Ecology, 2004Co-Authors: Brent MccuskerAbstract:This paper assesses the impact of South Africa's land reform program on land use change in rural areas of Limpopo Province. Land use change was examined on five Communal Property Associations using remotely sensed images and quantitative and qualitative survey techniques. Land was abandoned or used less productively after Redistribution. The primary reason for the lack of land use change to more productive states was that the land Redistribution Policy was not sufficiently sensitive to the diversity of rural livelihoods. Other reasons include farm-level general disorganization, lack of capital and labor, gender inequities, and age distribution. Regional political diseconomies also hindered change, namely poor tenure relations and a persistent urban bias.
Matti Tuomala - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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On the optimal lifetime Redistribution and social objectives: a multidimensional approach
International Tax and Public Finance, 2018Co-Authors: Terhi Ravaska, Sanna Tenhunen, Matti TuomalaAbstract:We characterize optimal Redistribution Policy when there are differences not only in individuals’ productivities but also in their tastes towards the timing of consumption, i.e. some are patient and others impatient in consumption over the life cycle and this preference together with productivity is non-observable to government. We consider different social objectives and incorporate a novel approach taken in the spirit of Roemer (Equality of opportunity, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1998 ) and Van de Gaer (Equality of opportunity and investments in human capital, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1993 ). This approach applies a compromise between the principle of compensation and the principle of responsibility. We derive analytical expressions which describe the optimal distortion (upward or downward) in saving. As the multidimensional problems become very complicated, to gain a better understanding, we also numerically examine the properties of an optimal lifetime Redistribution Policy. We find support for a nonlinear tax/pension program in which impatient types are taxed at the margin, and patient low ability types are subsidized in their retirement consumption. Numerical simulations show quite big differences in terms of the levels of marginal tax rates between different social objectives, indicating that the optimal income taxation results are sensitive to the choice of the social planner’s goals.
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on optimal lifetime Redistribution Policy
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2010Co-Authors: Sanna Tenhunen, Matti TuomalaAbstract:In this paper we examine various aspects of the optimal lifetime Redistribution Policy within a cohort. We characterise optimal Redistribution Policy when society consists of individuals who do not differ only in productivity, but also in time preference or myopia. We extend Diamond’s (2003) analysis on nonlinear taxation of savings into the three and four type models. Our results provide a rationale for distortions (upward and downward) in savings behaviour in a simple two period model where high skilled and low skilled individuals have different non-observable time preferences beyond their earning capacity. If we interpret our model so that there is no private savings, but public provision of pension in period 2, then in different versions (and different parameterization) of three type model we find the U-shaped pattern of the replacement rates. Our numerical results suggest that the retirement consumption is less dispersed than the first period consumption in a paternalistic case, whereas in a welfarist case the ordering is reversed. Our numerical simulations also show that consumption when old should be less dispersed than consumption when young when some individuals are myopic. Moreover our numerical results suggest that when there are myopic individuals in the economy, a paternalistic government Policy increases saving and makes saving larger than with paternalist government Policy where there are no myopic individuals.
Ryo Arawatari - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a political economy model of earnings mobility and Redistribution Policy
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2015Co-Authors: Ryo ArawatariAbstract:This paper presents a politico-economic model that includes a mutual link between life cycle earnings mobility and redistributive politics. The model demonstrates that when an economy features a high opportunity of upward mobility and high risk of downward mobility, it attains a unique equilibrium where unskilled, low-income agents support a low Redistribution because of the hope of upward mobility in future. In contrast, the economy attains multiple equilibria when mobility opportunity and risk are low: one is an unskilled-majority equilibrium defined by low mobility and the other is a skilled-majority equilibrium defined by high mobility. The paper gives a comparison between the political equilibrium and the social planner's allocation in terms of mobility, and shows that the skilled-majority equilibrium realizes mobility close to the optimal one.
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The Political Economy of Earnings Mobility and Redistribution Policy
2009Co-Authors: Ryo ArawatariAbstract:This paper presents a politico-economic model including a mutual link between earnings mobility and Redistribution Policy affected by human capital risk. A lowrisk economy produces multiple equilibria: a poor-majority equilibrium with lower mobility and higher Redistribution and a rich-majority equilibrium with higher mobility and lower Redistribution. In contrast, a high-risk economy produces a unique, poor-majority equilibrium with high mobility and low Redistribution, which supports the POUM (prospect of upward mobility) hypothesis. In the latter economy, a further increase in risk may improve the expected utility of agents.
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the political economy of occupational mobility and Redistribution Policy
2008Co-Authors: Ryo ArawatariAbstract:In this study, we ask why countries with similar labor market characteristics experience different occupational mobility levels and Redistribution policies. We develop a politico-economic model that integrates occupational mobility affected by individual educational investments with voting on Redistribution policies. It is shown that a rigid labor market will tend to produce multiple equilibria: a poor-majority equilibrium with lower mobility and higher Redistribution and a rich-majority equilibrium with higher mobility and lower Redistribution. However, a flexible labor market will tend to produce a unique, poor-majority equilibrium with high mobility and low Redistribution, which supports the POUM (prospect of upward mobility) hypothesis. Deregulation in the labor market enhances mobility but may degrade social welfare.
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dynamic political economy of Redistribution Policy the role of education costs
Economics Bulletin, 2007Co-Authors: Ryo ArawatariAbstract:This paper focuses on how education costs affect the political determination of Redistribution Policy via individual decision making on education. For cases of high costs, there are multiple equilibria: the poor-majority equilibrium featured by the minority of highly educated individuals and a high level of Redistribution, and the rich-majority equilibrium featured by the majority of highly educated individuals and a low level of Redistribution. For cases of low costs, there is a unique rich-majority equilibrium featured by the majority of highly educated individuals and a high level of Redistribution.
Joseph Devine - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ethnography of a Policy process a case study of land Redistribution in bangladesh
Public Administration and Development, 2002Co-Authors: Joseph DevineAbstract:Throughout the developing world, Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are involved in various aspects of an increasing number of Policy interventions. The donor community has lent considerable support to this strategy. One of the key assumptions behind the strategy is that the greater involvement of NGOs in Policy processes will result in more resources being distributed to the poor, and will also facilitate the establishment of a Policy process which is more inclusive and egalitarian. Here the involvement of NGOs in an important land Redistribution Policy initiative is used to examine both these assumptions. While there is strong evidence that more land was redistributed to the poor as a result of NGO involvement, the actual mechanism or process for deciding the distribution of land was not found to be all inclusive or completely egalitarian. This ambivalence serves as a timely critique to the naive optimism and simplified assumptions underpinning development thinking and practice. Copyright (C) 2002 John Wiley Sons, Ltd.
Heinrich W Ursprung - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the political economy of Redistribution Policy
2016Co-Authors: Luna Bellani, Heinrich W UrsprungAbstract:We review the literature on the public choice approach to explaining Redistribution policies. The focus is on policies that are pursued with the sole reason to redistribute initial endowments. Moreover, we restrict ourselves to Redistribution in democracies. In democratic settings, generic Redistribution games lack equilibria. Structure-inducing rules that give rise to realistic Redistribution patterns may concern the underlying economic model, political institutions, and firmly established preferences, beliefs, and attitudes of the voters. We present the respective lines of argument in turn and then present the related empirical evidence.