The Experts below are selected from a list of 4521 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Michael P. Mcdonald - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Public Mapping Project - Public Mapping and Redistricting Reform
The Public Mapping Project, 2018Co-Authors: Michael P. Mcdonald, Micah AltmanAbstract:This concluding chapter looks at the benefits of public mapping. The public approaches Redistricting from a perspective fundamentally different from that of politicians. Redistricting plans produced by the public, compared to plans adopted by Redistricting authorities, are generally more politically fair, have more competitive districts, have at least the same number or more voting rights districts, are more compact, and adhere more closely to existing political boundaries. Indeed, when politicians gerrymander, they are not particularly interested in achieving any goal other than political advantage. The chapter then argues that public mapping should be a component of Redistricting reform. Redistricting is an astoundingly complex problem that benefits from having more maps to help inform the range of possible policy choices. Thus, Redistricting authorities should accept, consider, and be responsive to Redistricting plans created by the public. Public mapping can also help inform the courts about the intent of a Redistricting authority.
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the effects of automated Redistricting and partisan strategic interaction on representation the case of mexico
2014Co-Authors: Micah Altman, Michael P. Mcdonald, Eric Magar, Alejandro TrellesAbstract:In the U.S. Redistricting is deeply politicized and often synonymous with gerrymandering -- the manipulation of boundaries to promote the goals of parties, incumbents, and racial groups. In contrast, Mexico’s federal Redistricting has been implemented nationwide since 1996 through automated algorithms devised by the electoral management body (EMB) in consultation with political parties. In this setting, parties interact strategically and generate counterproposals to the algorithmically generated plans in a closed-door process that is not revealed outside the bureaucracy. Applying geospatial statistics and large-scale optimization to a novel dataset that has never been available outside of the EMB, we analyze the effects of automated Redistricting and partisan strategic interaction on representation. Our dataset comprises the entire set of plans generated by the automated algorithm, as well as all the counterproposals made by each political party during the 2013 Redistricting process. Additionally, we inspect the 2006 map with new data and two proposals to replace it towards 2015 in search for partisan effects and political distortions. Our analysis offers a unique insight into the internal workings of a purportedly autonomous EMB and the partisan effects of automated Redistricting on representation.
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HICSS - Public Participation GIS: The Case of Redistricting
2014 47th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2014Co-Authors: Micah Altman, Michael P. McdonaldAbstract:Recent technological advances have enabled greater public participation and transparency in the United States Redistricting process. We review these advances, with particular attention to activities involving open-source Redistricting software.
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public participation gis the case of Redistricting
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2014Co-Authors: Micah Altman, Michael P. McdonaldAbstract:Recent technological advances have enabled greater public participation and transparency in the United States Redistricting process. We review these advances, with particular attention to activities involving open-source Redistricting software.
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BARD: Better Automated Redistricting
Journal of Statistical Software, 2011Co-Authors: Micah Altman, Michael P. McdonaldAbstract:BARD is the first (and at time of writing, only) open source software package for general Redistricting and Redistricting analysis. BARD provides methods to create, display, compare, edit, automatically refine, evaluate, and profile political districting plans. BARD aims to provide a framework for scientific analysis of Redistricting plans and to facilitate wider public participation in the creation of new plans. BARD facilitates map creation and refinement through command-line, graphical user interface, and automatic methods. Since Redistricting is a computationally complex partitioning problem not amenable to an exact optimization solution, BARD implements a variety of selectable metaheuristics that can be used to refine existing or randomly-generated Redistricting plans based on user-determined criteria. Furthermore, BARD supports automated generation of Redistricting plans and profiling of plans by assigning different weights to various criteria, such as district compactness or equality of population. This functionality permits exploration of trade-offs among criteria. The intent of a Redistricting authority may be explored by examining these trade-offs and inferring which reasonably observable plans were not adopted. Redistricting is a computationally-intensive problem for even modest-sized states. Performance is thus an important consideration in BARD's design and implementation. The program implements performance enhancements such as evaluation caching, explicit memory management, and distributed computing across snow clusters.
Micah Altman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Public Mapping Project - Public Mapping and Redistricting Reform
The Public Mapping Project, 2018Co-Authors: Michael P. Mcdonald, Micah AltmanAbstract:This concluding chapter looks at the benefits of public mapping. The public approaches Redistricting from a perspective fundamentally different from that of politicians. Redistricting plans produced by the public, compared to plans adopted by Redistricting authorities, are generally more politically fair, have more competitive districts, have at least the same number or more voting rights districts, are more compact, and adhere more closely to existing political boundaries. Indeed, when politicians gerrymander, they are not particularly interested in achieving any goal other than political advantage. The chapter then argues that public mapping should be a component of Redistricting reform. Redistricting is an astoundingly complex problem that benefits from having more maps to help inform the range of possible policy choices. Thus, Redistricting authorities should accept, consider, and be responsive to Redistricting plans created by the public. Public mapping can also help inform the courts about the intent of a Redistricting authority.
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the effects of automated Redistricting and partisan strategic interaction on representation the case of mexico
2014Co-Authors: Micah Altman, Michael P. Mcdonald, Eric Magar, Alejandro TrellesAbstract:In the U.S. Redistricting is deeply politicized and often synonymous with gerrymandering -- the manipulation of boundaries to promote the goals of parties, incumbents, and racial groups. In contrast, Mexico’s federal Redistricting has been implemented nationwide since 1996 through automated algorithms devised by the electoral management body (EMB) in consultation with political parties. In this setting, parties interact strategically and generate counterproposals to the algorithmically generated plans in a closed-door process that is not revealed outside the bureaucracy. Applying geospatial statistics and large-scale optimization to a novel dataset that has never been available outside of the EMB, we analyze the effects of automated Redistricting and partisan strategic interaction on representation. Our dataset comprises the entire set of plans generated by the automated algorithm, as well as all the counterproposals made by each political party during the 2013 Redistricting process. Additionally, we inspect the 2006 map with new data and two proposals to replace it towards 2015 in search for partisan effects and political distortions. Our analysis offers a unique insight into the internal workings of a purportedly autonomous EMB and the partisan effects of automated Redistricting on representation.
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HICSS - Public Participation GIS: The Case of Redistricting
2014 47th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2014Co-Authors: Micah Altman, Michael P. McdonaldAbstract:Recent technological advances have enabled greater public participation and transparency in the United States Redistricting process. We review these advances, with particular attention to activities involving open-source Redistricting software.
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public participation gis the case of Redistricting
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2014Co-Authors: Micah Altman, Michael P. McdonaldAbstract:Recent technological advances have enabled greater public participation and transparency in the United States Redistricting process. We review these advances, with particular attention to activities involving open-source Redistricting software.
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BARD: Better Automated Redistricting
Journal of Statistical Software, 2011Co-Authors: Micah Altman, Michael P. McdonaldAbstract:BARD is the first (and at time of writing, only) open source software package for general Redistricting and Redistricting analysis. BARD provides methods to create, display, compare, edit, automatically refine, evaluate, and profile political districting plans. BARD aims to provide a framework for scientific analysis of Redistricting plans and to facilitate wider public participation in the creation of new plans. BARD facilitates map creation and refinement through command-line, graphical user interface, and automatic methods. Since Redistricting is a computationally complex partitioning problem not amenable to an exact optimization solution, BARD implements a variety of selectable metaheuristics that can be used to refine existing or randomly-generated Redistricting plans based on user-determined criteria. Furthermore, BARD supports automated generation of Redistricting plans and profiling of plans by assigning different weights to various criteria, such as district compactness or equality of population. This functionality permits exploration of trade-offs among criteria. The intent of a Redistricting authority may be explored by examining these trade-offs and inferring which reasonably observable plans were not adopted. Redistricting is a computationally-intensive problem for even modest-sized states. Performance is thus an important consideration in BARD's design and implementation. The program implements performance enhancements such as evaluation caching, explicit memory management, and distributed computing across snow clusters.
Justin Levitt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Race, Redistricting, and the Manufactured Conundrum
Loyola of Los Angeles law review, 2018Co-Authors: Justin LevittAbstract:Race and Redistricting each lie at the core of recurring contests over American political identity. It is therefore perhaps no surprise that cases concerning the role of race in Redistricting have offered the Supreme Court a steady diet. In 2017, for the fourth time in four decades, the Court struck North Carolina districts based on the legislature’s misuse of race. And the North Carolina legislature, proclaiming the whole business too complicated, simply threw up its hands. This petulance is likely performance. The law of race and Redistricting is resistant to shortcuts and stereotypes, but that does not render it intractable, particularly for those actually drawing the lines. For legislators, confronting race in the Redistricting process is most difficult if you’re not actually trying. This piece traces the law of race and Redistricting from the perspective of a Redistricting body, distilling the present state of the doctrine to a few core elements. It then places the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements within this doctrinal framework, and interrogates the portent of the latest developments as a trail marker of developments to come. As the next Redistricting cycle approaches, the most vexing issue is likely not that the Court’s statements on the law are unclear, but that some Redistricting bodies may not yet be ready to listen.
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Essay: Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting
Loyola of Los Angeles law review, 2011Co-Authors: Justin LevittAbstract:As they do every ten years, this year state legislatures across the country are redrawing legislative district lines to reflect population shifts and ensure equal representation for each district. In 2010, California voters passed a proposition granting the California Citizens Redistricting Commission control over the drawing of congressional lines. This Symposium Essay examines the potential for Redistricting by an independent group of citizens such as the Citizens Redistricting Commission. First, it explores the nature of the Redistricting process, a process often explained as fundamentally political, and argues, instead, that the process is both political and pre-political. This Essay then examines incumbent legislators’ roles in the Redistricting process in light of this insight, and challenges the presumption that incumbents are more accountable to members of their districts because of Redistricting. Finally, this Essay reviews various alternatives to incumbent control of the Redistricting process, and both the positive and negative potential of citizen Redistricting.
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The Legal Context for Scientific Redistricting Analysis
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011Co-Authors: Justin LevittAbstract:2011 marks another decennial Redistricting cycle, with much attention focused on new tools or techniques that might facilitate attempts of professional and amateur political scientists to influence the Redistricting process. New software packages and quantitative methodologies have generated particular buzz, leading to renewed discussions about the role of technology in the Redistricting struggle. This introductory chapter of a forthcoming book on the impact of technology on the Redistricting process briefly reviews the history and impact of the Redistricting process, and describes the federal and state legal environment for Redistricting decisions, including an accessible description of the basic legal requirements and considerations in play. It then seeks to situate the productive opportunities for quantitative input within this legal context. The chapter suggests that a quest to "solve" or automate Redistricting wholesale is misguided, but recognizes the profound value of scientific analysis in better informing the nuanced human debate over the political priorities that Redistricting should accomplish.
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Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting
2010Co-Authors: Justin LevittAbstract:Redistricting - the act of drawing and redrawing legislative districts as population shifts, to ensure roughly equal representation for each district - is once again upon the nation. In 2011, jurisdictions across the country will again redraw the lines that determine the representation they will receive. And with each new Redistricting cycle, the debate arises anew about whether the procedures used are well suited to effectuate the public’s interest in the process. The 2010 California elections offer a particularly salient opportunity to reflect on the manner in which Redistricting is conducted. In 2008, Californians narrowly passed Proposition 11, which removed the state legislature’s control over the lines of its members’ own districts, and delivered that control instead to a commission of citizens without direct ties to officials likely to keep or lose their jobs based on the way the lines are drawn. Two years later, two new Propositions appeared on the general election ballot. One measure granted the new citizens’ commission control over drawing congressional lines as well. The other would have eliminated the commission entirely. This Symposium Essay takes California’s choice as inspiration to examine more generally the potential for Redistricting by an independent group of citizens. In Part I, it explores the nature of the Redistricting process. Often, this process is explained as fundamentally political, and therefore particularly suited to execution by politicians. I argue, instead, that the process is both political and pre-political; it not only flows from, but also defines, the jurisdiction’s relevant political cleavages. Part II then examines incumbent legislators’ role in the Redistricting process in light of this insight, including a normative assessment of skills and predilections that incumbents may bring to bear, and a challenge to the presumption of incumbents’ accountability with respect to Redistricting. Part III follows with a brief review of various alternatives to incumbent control of the Redistricting process, capped by a more thorough review of the potential - both positive and negative - for citizen Redistricting.
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A Citizen's Guide to Redistricting
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008Co-Authors: Justin LevittAbstract:A Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting provides engaged citizens with an accessible overview of Redistricting for state and federal office. The guide is intended as an introduction for students of the Redistricting process, and as a reference tool for practitioners, experts, policymakers, and academics. It offers a description of the procedural and substantive rules governing Redistricting today, for state legislative and congressional districts in all 50 states, and reviews components of proposals for reform in the future. Replete with tables, illustrations, and maps, the Citizen’s Guide presents an enormous amount of information in accessible form, and provides a robust background for discussion as the next Redistricting cycle approaches.(Written at Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law.)
Kosuke Imai - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Sequential Monte Carlo for Sampling Balanced and Compact Redistricting Plans.
arXiv: Applications, 2020Co-Authors: Cory Mccartan, Kosuke ImaiAbstract:Random sampling of graph partitions under constraints has become a popular tool for evaluating legislative Redistricting plans. Analysts detect partisan gerrymandering by comparing a proposed Redistricting plan with an ensemble of sampled alternative plans. For successful application, sampling methods must scale to large maps with many districts, incorporate realistic legal constraints, and accurately sample from a selected target distribution. Unfortunately, most existing methods struggle in at least one of these three areas. We present a new Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) algorithm that draws representative Redistricting plans from a realistic target distribution of choice. Because it yields nearly independent samples, the SMC algorithm can efficiently explore the relevant space of Redistricting plans than the existing Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithms that yield dependent samples. Our algorithm can simultaneously incorporate several constraints commonly imposed in real-world Redistricting problems, including equal population, compactness, and preservation of administrative boundaries. We validate the accuracy of the proposed algorithm by using a small map where all Redistricting plans can be enumerated. We then apply the SMC algorithm to evaluate the partisan implications of several maps submitted by relevant parties in a recent high-profile Redistricting case in the state of Pennsylvania. Open-source software is available for implementing the proposed methodology.
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the essential role of empirical validation in legislative Redistricting simulation
Statistics and Public Policy, 2020Co-Authors: Benjamin Fifield, Kosuke Imai, Jun Kawahara, Christopher T. KennyAbstract:As granular data about elections and voters become available, Redistricting simulation methods are playing an increasingly important role when legislatures adopt Redistricting plans and courts dete...
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The Essential Role of Empirical Validation in Legislative Redistricting Simulation
arXiv: Applications, 2020Co-Authors: Benjamin Fifield, Kosuke Imai, Jun Kawahara, Christopher T. KennyAbstract:As granular data about elections and voters become available, Redistricting simulation methods are playing an increasingly important role when legislatures adopt Redistricting plans and courts determine their legality. These simulation methods are designed to yield a representative sample of all Redistricting plans that satisfy statutory guidelines and requirements such as contiguity, population parity, and compactness. A proposed Redistricting plan can be considered gerrymandered if it constitutes an outlier relative to this sample according to partisan fairness metrics. Despite their growing use, an insufficient effort has been made to empirically validate the accuracy of the simulation methods. We apply a recently developed computational method that can efficiently enumerate all possible Redistricting plans and yield an independent uniform sample from this population. We show that this algorithm scales to a state with a couple of hundred geographical units. Finally, we empirically examine how existing simulation methods perform on realistic validation data sets.
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Automated Redistricting Simulation Using Markov Chain Monte Carlo
Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics, 2020Co-Authors: Benjamin Fifield, Kosuke Imai, Michael J. Higgins, Alexander TarrAbstract:Legislative Redistricting is a critical element of representative democracy. A number of political scientists have used simulation methods to sample Redistricting plans under various constraints to...
Justin Buchler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Inevitability of Gerrymandering: Winners and Losers Under Alternative Approaches to Redistricting
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy, 2012Co-Authors: Justin BuchlerAbstract:Apolitical Redistricting is an impossibility. To refer to a process or institution as “political” is merely to use an empty epithet. A Redistricting process can be criticized as “political” on one of two bases—the individuals to whom authority is delegated, or the geographical algorithms used by those who have Redistricting authority. Given that elections in the United States are based around the winner-take-all principle, any Redistricting plan will create winners and losers. Therefore, the choice between any set of Redistricting algorithms is a choice about who will be winners and who will be losers. Furthermore, because the delegation of responsibility for Redistricting is only relevant inasmuch as it affects the choice of Redistricting algorithms, the choice of delegation is also a determination of who will win and who will lose. By definition, that choice cannot be apolitical. Moreover, any attempt to evaluate Redistricting processes independently of such outcomes devolves the process into a trivial exercise in Nomic.
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The Aftermath of Redistricting Reform in California
California Journal of Politics and Policy, 2011Co-Authors: Justin BuchlerAbstract:THE CALIFORNIA Journal of Politics & Policy Volume 3, Issue 3 The Aftermath of Redistricting Reform in California Justin Buchler Case Western Reserve University Abstract In 2009, Matthew Jarvis and I offered differing opinions in this journal about the potential effects of Redistricting reform on California’s budgetary process. Jarvis suggested Redistricting reform could help the process by either reducing legislative polarization, or giving Democrats the supermajority necessary to pass their budget without partisan gridlock. I argued the best approach would be to eliminate super- majority requirements for fiscal policy. Now that the new district lines have been released under the process created by Proposition 11, we revisit our arguments. I expect California’s legislature to remain polarized. While a two-thirds Democratic supermajority is possible, it is not probable, and legislative dysfunction will likely remain. Keywords: Redistricting, Redistricting reform, California politics, political polar- ization Copyright © 2011 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved. www.bepress.com/cjpp
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Redistricting Reform Will Not Solve California's Budget Crisis
California Journal of Politics and Policy, 2009Co-Authors: Justin BuchlerAbstract:THE CALIFORNIA Journal of Politics & Policy Volume 1, Issue 1 Redistricting Reform Will Not Solve California’s Budget Crisis Justin Buchler Case Western Reserve University Abstract Jarvis (2009) argues that ideological polarization in California’s state legislature creates unique problems for the state because of the interaction between polar- ization and the requirement that the budget pass with a two-thirds supermajority. Thus, Jarvis argues that California should adopt a system of Redistricting that pro- duces more competitive elections in order to reduce polarization. However, that is the wrong solution. Increasing the number of competitive districts would have a minimal effect on polarization because polarization has other causes. Instead, the solution is to abandon the two-thirds budget requirement since polarization cannot be solved through Redistricting, and increasing the number of competitive districts simply reduces representation. KEYWORDS: competition, Redistricting, polarization, budget www.bepress.com/cjpp