The Experts below are selected from a list of 9 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Yifan Dou - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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when to sell premium digital contents through the Rival Platform
International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management, 2014Co-Authors: Yifan DouAbstract:Digital contents, such as applications, ebooks, and video stream, etc., are playing an increasingly significant role in the electronic commerce nowadays. System providers who sell both hardware Platform and digital contents may strategically choose the the provisioning strategy for their digital contents in the competition of hardware market. This paper discusses the effectiveness of a novel strategy under which the system provider grants the access to her premium digital contents through the Rival Platform. I employ a stylized game-theoretical model by considering two competing systems providers who are vertically-differentiated in hardware market while one of them has advantages in the digital content offerings (i.e., premium contents). The results suggest that superior and inferior Platforms largely differ in controls of premium contents: 1) It is always optimal for the inferior Platform to sell the digital content through superior Platform. Specifically, the inferior Platform should target superior Platform's market for content sales rather than extending the low-end market with premium contents; however, 2) the superior Platform should consider a pure bundling strategy to further differentiate her Platform when the premium is low. These implications are consistent with the practice of Amazon.com and Microsoft, while providing useful guidelines for decision-making process of system providers.
Venkataraman Vijayaraghavan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Essays on Platform Ecosystems
Georgia Institute of Technology, 2020Co-Authors: Venkataraman VijayaraghavanAbstract:Essays on Platform Ecosystems Vijayaraghavan Venkataraman 151 pages Directed by Dr. Marco Ceccagnoli and Dr. Chris Forman There has been a tremendous increase in the number and variety of ecosystems. Extant literature has paid more attention to Platform owners within ecosystems. In this dissertation, I focus on complementors and try to understand their capabilities and strategies. First, I review the literature and summarize existing research that spans across the three phases of the ecosystem namely nascent, growth and technological change. I highlight some of the gaps in existing research, especially those concerning the nature and role of complementors within the ecosystem. I use empirical studies based on the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Platform Ecosystem to address some of these gaps. More specifically, in one study, I look at the complementor strategy of multihoming and explore the role played by complementor capabilities in terms of their human capital and ecosystem learning facilitated by the complementor’s prior Platform partnership in multihoming. In another study, I examine the relationship between Platform level competition and complementor performance. When an incumbent Platform faces competition from an entrant Platform, it tends to engage in steering activities that are aimed at supporting its complementors and dissuading them from joining the Rival Platform. I analyze the potential role of steering in complementor performance and its differential impact based on the complementors’s human capital profile.Ph.D
Keltto Jaakko - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Two-Sided Markets, Competition and Exclusionary Practices
2019Co-Authors: Keltto JaakkoAbstract:Markets, where two, or more, groups of agents encounter via intermediary Platform and there are network externalities between those groups, can be called two-sided markets. Functioning and key characteristics of two-sided markets are described in this bachelor thesis by presenting three models of initial settings of two-sided markets provided by Armstrong (2006). As Armstrong (2006) suggests the role of i) relative size of cross-group externalities, ii) charging format and iii) agents homing decisions, whether they choose to join a single Platform (single-homing) or to join multiple Platforms (multi-home) turn out to be crucial in determining market outcomes. There are some limitations in models. Some modifications to account those limitations can be done more easily than others. Right format of charges and costs for Platform are clearly case specific. In addition, nonnegativity constraint of prices, fixed costs and agents’ investment cost of joining Platform may be considered to be included case by case. More complex questions arise, when source of agents’ decisions about single-homing and multi-homing and source of Platforms’ differentiation decisions are considered. Unambiguous answers to these questions may not be reached just by some little modification of parameters. One complex issue is related to feasibility of crucial assumption in competitive bottleneck model, where agents are ‘atomistic’ and do not have market power to affect other group’s decisions by their own decisions. Most importantly it turns out that the format used for determining utility and agent heterogeneity within model are crucial factors in two-sided market models having implications also for endogeneity of agents’ decisions about joining single or multiple Platforms. From competition policy point of view, it is useful to pay attention to exclusionary practices, which Platforms may have incentive to use to reach dominant position. Existing literature suggests a bit different approaches for assessment of dominance in the context of two-sided markets. Predatory pricing seems even more complicated to detect than in one-sided markets because in two-sided markets price on one side do not reflect only costs incurred from that side but also relative cross-group externalities between groups. Exclusive contracts set by Platforms to persuade agents to abandon Rival Platform may turn around the way, in which total surplus is shared between groups of agents and Platform
