Rules of Origin

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Kala Krishna - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • firm heterogeneity and costly trade a new estimation strategy and policy experiments
    Social Science Research Network, 2015
    Co-Authors: Ivan Cherkashin, Kala Krishna, Svetlana Demidova, Hiau Looi Kee
    Abstract:

    This paper builds a tractable partial equilibrium model in the spirit of Melitz (2003), which incorporates two dimensions of heterogeneity: firms specific productivity shocks and firm-market specific demand shocks. The structural parameters of interest are estimated using only cross-sectional data, and counterfactual experiments regarding the effects of reducing costs, both fixed and marginal, or of trade preferences (with distortionary Rules of Origin) offered by an importing country are performed. Our counterfactuals make a case for "trade as aid" as such policies can create a ""win-win-win" scenario and are less subject to the usual worries regarding the efficacy of direct foreign aid. They also suggest that reducing fixed costs at various levels can be quite effective as export promotion devices, with the exports induced per dollar spent ranging from .4 to 25.

  • firm behaviour and market access in a free trade area with Rules of Origin
    Canadian Journal of Economics, 2005
    Co-Authors: Kala Krishna
    Abstract:

    We study a Free Trade Area with Rules of Origin and show that there are two distinct regimes. Comparative statics results for the two regimes are exact opposites and a regime switch occurs when ROO become restrictive enough. Consequently, imports into the FTA of the intermediate good first fall and then rise while the opposite pattern occurs for imports of the final good and for the price of the domestic input. We also show that tighter ROO have opposite effects on the well-being of final versus intermediate

  • firm behaviour and market access in a free trade area with Rules of Origin
    Canadian Journal of Economics, 2005
    Co-Authors: Jiandong Ju, Kala Krishna
    Abstract:

    We study a Free Trade Area with Rules of Origin and show that there are two distinct regimes. Comparative statics results for the two regimes are exact opposites and a regime switch occurs when become restrictive enough. Consequently, imports into the of the intermediate good first fall and then rise while the opposite pattern occurs for imports of the final good and for the price of the domestic input. We also show that tighter have opposite effects on the well-being of final versus intermediate good producers and producers inside versus outside the FTA.

  • firm behavior and market access in a free trade area with Rules of Origin
    Social Science Research Network, 1998
    Co-Authors: Kala Krishna
    Abstract:

    While it is tempting to think of Free Trade Areas (FTAs) as liberalizing, they need not be. One reason for this is a relatively less studied feature of FTAs, namely Rules of Origin (ROOs) which determine when products are eligible for preferential treatment. We develop a model to study the behavior of firms in a Free Trade Area with Rules of Origin and the consequences of this behavior on the market equilibrium and outcome. We have a number of interesting and counter intuitive results to offer. First, we show that firms will choose to specialize: some firms will choose to meet Rules of Origin, and thereby obtain zero tariffs, while others will choose to ignore the possibility of obtaining preferential treatment. Second, we look at the effects of an FTA on market access. We show that an FTA with strict ROOs on the intermediate good raises imports and hence improves market access in the final good market, but reduces imports and hence harms market access in the intermediate good market. Third we look at the effect of more restrictive ROOs in the final good market. A consequence of our specialization result is that more restrictive ROOs on the final good first raise and then lower imports of the final good, but first lower then raise imports of the intermediate good. Their turning point is common so that imports of the final good are maximized and imports of the intermediate good are minimized at a common level of restrictiveness of the Rules of Origin. Lastly, we show that our model can be reinterpreted to show that more restrictive ROOs on the final good first improves and then harms the fortunes of labor, and to cast light on a particular policy to improve market access. Other problems with a similar structure could also be analyzed using our techniques with, we expect similar results.

  • firm behavior and market access in a free trade area with Rules of Origin
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998
    Co-Authors: Jiandong Ju, Kala Krishna
    Abstract:

    We develop a model to study the behavior of firms in a Free Trade Area with Rules of Origin and the consequences of this behavior on the market equilibrium and outcome. We show that firms will choose to specialize, and that an FTA with strict ROOs on the intermediate good raises imports and hence improves market access in the final good market reduces imports and hence harms market access in the intermediate good market. More restrictive ROOs on the final good first raise and then lower imports of the final good lower than raise imports of the intermediate good. Their turning point is common so that imports of the final good are maximized and imports of the intermediate good are minimized at a common level of restrictiveness of the Rules of Origin. We show that our model can be reinterpreted to show that more restrictive ROOs on the final good first improves and then harms the fortunes of labor, and to cast light on a particular policy to improve market access. Other problems with a similar structure could also be analyzed using our techniques; we expect similar results.

Jaime De Melo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • market access and welfare under free trade agreements textiles under nafta
    World Scientific Book Chapters, 2015
    Co-Authors: Olivie Cado, Celine Carrere, Jaime De Melo, Alberto Portugalperez
    Abstract:

    The effective market access granted to textiles and apparel under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is estimated, taking into account the presence of Rules of Origin. First, estimates are provided of the effect of tariff preferences combined with Rules of Origin on the border prices of Mexican final goods exported to the United States and of U.S. intermediate goods exported to Mexico, based on eight-digit Harmonized System tariff-line data. A third of the estimated rise in the border price of Mexican apparel products is found to compensate for the cost of complying with NAFTA's Rules of Origin, and NAFTA is found to have raised the price of U.S. intermediate goods exported to Mexico by around 12 percent, with downstream Rules of Origin accounting for a third of that increase. Second, simulations are used to estimate welfare gains for Mexican exporters from preferential market access under NAFTA. The presence of Rules of Origin is found to approximately halve these gains.

  • are different Rules of Origin equally costly estimates from nafta
    World Scientific Book Chapters, 2015
    Co-Authors: Celine Carrere, Jaime De Melo
    Abstract:

    The following sections are included:IntroductionNAFTA RoO map, and non-parametric cost estimatesA simple modelCost estimates by type of RoO and category of activitiesEvaluating Estevadeordal's synthetic indexValue content restrictionsConclusionsAppendix: The model

  • disentangling market access effects of preferential trading arrangements with an application for asean members under an asean eu fta
    The World Economy, 2010
    Co-Authors: Celine Carrere, Jaime De Melo, Bolormaa Tumurchudur
    Abstract:

    The paper develops two synthetic measures at the HS-10 level to depict effective market access for a country receiving preferential access and applies these to the market access ASEAN members would receive following the implementation of an FTA with the EU. First, the measures show that current effective market access for ASEAN EBA members is cut in half by the preferences granted by the EU to countries that compete with these countries in the EU markets. Second, the measures show that about one-quarter of the preferential margin under the proposed FTA for EBA members would be lost as a result of preferential access granted to ASEAN GSP members. Third, disaggregated estimates of the restrictiveness of Rules of Origin confirm that Rules are more restrictive for products with higher preferential margins and that ASEAN countries usually face tougher Rules of Origin in the EU because of the composition of their exports.

  • disentangling market access effects of preferential trading arrangements with an application for asean members under an asean eu fta
    Post-Print, 2010
    Co-Authors: Celine Carrere, Jaime De Melo, Bolormaa Tumurchudur
    Abstract:

    The paper develops two synthetic measures at the HS‐10 level to depict effective market access for a country receiving preferential access and applies these to the market access ASEAN members would receive following the implementation of an FTA with the EU. First, the measures show that current effective market access for ASEAN EBA members is cut in half by the preferences granted by the EU to countries that compete with these countries in the EU markets. Second, the measures show that about one‐quarter of the preferential margin under the proposed FTA for EBA members would be lost as a result of preferential access granted to ASEAN GSP members. Third, disaggregated estimates of the restrictiveness of Rules of Origin confirm that Rules are more restrictive for products with higher preferential margins and that ASEAN countries usually face tougher Rules of Origin in the EU because of the composition of their exports. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

  • Rules of Origin for preferential trading arrangements implications for the asean free trade area of eu and u s experience
    Journal of Economic Integration, 2006
    Co-Authors: Jaime De Melo, Olivier Cadot, Alberto Portugalperez
    Abstract:

    With free trade areas (FTAs) under negotiation between Japan and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) members and between the Republic of Korea and AFTA members, preferential market access will become more important in Asian regionalism. Protectionist pressures will likely increase through Rules of Origin, the natural outlet for these pressures. Based on the experience of the European Union and the United States with Rules of Origin, the authors argue that, should these FTAs follow in the footsteps of the EU and the U.S. and adopt similar Rules of Origin, trading partners in the region would incur unnecessary costs. Using EU trade under the Generalized System of Preferences with Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific partners, the authors estimate how the use of preferences would likely change if AFTA were to veer away from its current uniform Rules of Origin requiring a 40 percent local content rate. Depending on the sample used, a 10 percentage point reduction in the local value content requirement is estimated to increase the utilization rate of preferences by between 2.5 and 8.2 percentage points.

Celine Carrere - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • market access and welfare under free trade agreements textiles under nafta
    World Scientific Book Chapters, 2015
    Co-Authors: Olivie Cado, Celine Carrere, Jaime De Melo, Alberto Portugalperez
    Abstract:

    The effective market access granted to textiles and apparel under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is estimated, taking into account the presence of Rules of Origin. First, estimates are provided of the effect of tariff preferences combined with Rules of Origin on the border prices of Mexican final goods exported to the United States and of U.S. intermediate goods exported to Mexico, based on eight-digit Harmonized System tariff-line data. A third of the estimated rise in the border price of Mexican apparel products is found to compensate for the cost of complying with NAFTA's Rules of Origin, and NAFTA is found to have raised the price of U.S. intermediate goods exported to Mexico by around 12 percent, with downstream Rules of Origin accounting for a third of that increase. Second, simulations are used to estimate welfare gains for Mexican exporters from preferential market access under NAFTA. The presence of Rules of Origin is found to approximately halve these gains.

  • are different Rules of Origin equally costly estimates from nafta
    World Scientific Book Chapters, 2015
    Co-Authors: Celine Carrere, Jaime De Melo
    Abstract:

    The following sections are included:IntroductionNAFTA RoO map, and non-parametric cost estimatesA simple modelCost estimates by type of RoO and category of activitiesEvaluating Estevadeordal's synthetic indexValue content restrictionsConclusionsAppendix: The model

  • disentangling market access effects of preferential trading arrangements with an application for asean members under an asean eu fta
    The World Economy, 2010
    Co-Authors: Celine Carrere, Jaime De Melo, Bolormaa Tumurchudur
    Abstract:

    The paper develops two synthetic measures at the HS-10 level to depict effective market access for a country receiving preferential access and applies these to the market access ASEAN members would receive following the implementation of an FTA with the EU. First, the measures show that current effective market access for ASEAN EBA members is cut in half by the preferences granted by the EU to countries that compete with these countries in the EU markets. Second, the measures show that about one-quarter of the preferential margin under the proposed FTA for EBA members would be lost as a result of preferential access granted to ASEAN GSP members. Third, disaggregated estimates of the restrictiveness of Rules of Origin confirm that Rules are more restrictive for products with higher preferential margins and that ASEAN countries usually face tougher Rules of Origin in the EU because of the composition of their exports.

  • disentangling market access effects of preferential trading arrangements with an application for asean members under an asean eu fta
    Post-Print, 2010
    Co-Authors: Celine Carrere, Jaime De Melo, Bolormaa Tumurchudur
    Abstract:

    The paper develops two synthetic measures at the HS‐10 level to depict effective market access for a country receiving preferential access and applies these to the market access ASEAN members would receive following the implementation of an FTA with the EU. First, the measures show that current effective market access for ASEAN EBA members is cut in half by the preferences granted by the EU to countries that compete with these countries in the EU markets. Second, the measures show that about one‐quarter of the preferential margin under the proposed FTA for EBA members would be lost as a result of preferential access granted to ASEAN GSP members. Third, disaggregated estimates of the restrictiveness of Rules of Origin confirm that Rules are more restrictive for products with higher preferential margins and that ASEAN countries usually face tougher Rules of Origin in the EU because of the composition of their exports. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

  • are different Rules of Origin equally costly estimates from nafta
    Research Papers in Economics, 2006
    Co-Authors: Celine Carrere, Jaime De Melo
    Abstract:

    Using data on the preference and utilization rates of NAFTA for Mexican exports to the United States in 2001, this chapter proposes a method to estimate the likely costs of different Rules of Origin (ROO) for final and intermediate goods, and compares these results with those obtained using the synthetic index proposed by Estevadeordal (2000). Econometric results indicate that changes in tariff classification are more costly for final goods than for intermediate ones, and that technical requirements are the most constraining. For activities subject to regional value content minima, illustrative simulations are carried out to indicate what tariff preference margin would be necessary to compensate for the import content minima. Cost estimates suggest that, at least in the case of NAFTA, preferential market access is quite small, leading to speculations that these conclusions may carry over to other North-South preferential schemes.

Martin Molinuevo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • east asian free trade agreements in services key architectural elements
    Social Science Research Network, 2008
    Co-Authors: Carsten Fink, Martin Molinuevo
    Abstract:

    Since the mid-1990s East Asian countries have negotiated 25 free trade agreements (FTAs) with a services component. There are important architectural differences in these agreements, which ultimately affect their value in promoting transparency, fostering the credibility of trade policies, and advancing market opening in services. This article reviews key architectural choices, focusing on the approach towards scheduling commitments, the treatment of investment and the movement of natural persons, Rules of Origin, provisions for the settlement of trade dispute, and selected deeper integration issues. In doing so, it assesses the advantages and drawbacks of different architectural approaches and discusses a number of lessons learned.

  • east asian free trade agreements in services key architectural elements
    Journal of International Economic Law, 2008
    Co-Authors: Carsten Fink, Martin Molinuevo
    Abstract:

    Since the mid-1990s East Asian countries have negotiated 25 free trade agreements (FTAs) with a services component. There are important architectural differences in these agreements, which ultimately affect their value in promoting transparency, fostering the credibility of trade policies, and advancing market opening in services. This article reviews key architectural choices, focusing on the approach towards scheduling commitments, the treatment of investment and the movement of natural persons, Rules of Origin, provisions for the settlement of trade dispute, and selected deeper integration issues. In doing so, it assesses the advantages and drawbacks of different architectural approaches and discusses a number of lessons learned. , Oxford University Press.

Bolormaa Tumurchudur - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • disentangling market access effects of preferential trading arrangements with an application for asean members under an asean eu fta
    The World Economy, 2010
    Co-Authors: Celine Carrere, Jaime De Melo, Bolormaa Tumurchudur
    Abstract:

    The paper develops two synthetic measures at the HS-10 level to depict effective market access for a country receiving preferential access and applies these to the market access ASEAN members would receive following the implementation of an FTA with the EU. First, the measures show that current effective market access for ASEAN EBA members is cut in half by the preferences granted by the EU to countries that compete with these countries in the EU markets. Second, the measures show that about one-quarter of the preferential margin under the proposed FTA for EBA members would be lost as a result of preferential access granted to ASEAN GSP members. Third, disaggregated estimates of the restrictiveness of Rules of Origin confirm that Rules are more restrictive for products with higher preferential margins and that ASEAN countries usually face tougher Rules of Origin in the EU because of the composition of their exports.

  • disentangling market access effects of preferential trading arrangements with an application for asean members under an asean eu fta
    Post-Print, 2010
    Co-Authors: Celine Carrere, Jaime De Melo, Bolormaa Tumurchudur
    Abstract:

    The paper develops two synthetic measures at the HS‐10 level to depict effective market access for a country receiving preferential access and applies these to the market access ASEAN members would receive following the implementation of an FTA with the EU. First, the measures show that current effective market access for ASEAN EBA members is cut in half by the preferences granted by the EU to countries that compete with these countries in the EU markets. Second, the measures show that about one‐quarter of the preferential margin under the proposed FTA for EBA members would be lost as a result of preferential access granted to ASEAN GSP members. Third, disaggregated estimates of the restrictiveness of Rules of Origin confirm that Rules are more restrictive for products with higher preferential margins and that ASEAN countries usually face tougher Rules of Origin in the EU because of the composition of their exports. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

  • Rules of Origin in North-South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA
    Review of International Economics, 2005
    Co-Authors: Anton Anson, Jaime De Melo, Olivier Cadot, Antoni Estevadeordal, Akiko Suwa-eisenmann, Bolormaa Tumurchudur
    Abstract:

    All preferential trading agreements (PTAs) short of a customs union use Rules of Origin (ROO) to prevent trade deflection. ROO raise production costs and create administrative costs. This paper argues that in the case of the recent wave of North-South PTAs, the presence of ROO virtually limits the market access that these PTAs confer to the Southern partners. In the case of NAFTA, we find average compliance costs around 6% in ad valorem equivalent, undoing the tariff preference (4% on average) for a large number of tariff lines. Administrative costs amount to 47% of the preference margin. These findings are coherent with the view that North-South PTAs could well be viewed like a principal-agent problem in which the Southern partners are just about left on their participation constraint.

  • Rules of Origin in north south preferential trading arrangements with an application to nafta
    Research Papers in Economics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Jose Anson, Jaime De Melo, Olivier Cadot, Antoni Estevadeordal, Akiko Suwaeisenmann, Bolormaa Tumurchudur
    Abstract:

    All preferential trading agreements (PTAs) short of a customs union use Rules of Origin (RoO) to prevent trade deflection. RoO raise production costs and create administrative costs. This Paper argues that in the case of the recent wave of North-South PTAs, the presence of RoO virtually limits the market access that these PTAs confer to the Southern partners. In the case of NAFTA, it is estimated that up to 40% of Mexico’s preferential access to the US market in 2000 (estimated at 5%) was absorbed by RoO-related administrative costs with non-administrative costs for Mexican firms of about 3% US of import value. These findings are coherent with the view that North-South PTAs could well be viewed like a principal-agent problem in which the Southern partners are just about left on their participation constraint.

  • assessing the effect of nafta s Rules of Origin
    Research Papers in Economics, 2002
    Co-Authors: Olivier Cadot, Jaime De Melo, Antoni Estevadeordal, Akiko Suwaeisenmann, Bolormaa Tumurchudur
    Abstract:

    In the last decade or so, a voluminous literature (see e.g. de Melo and Panagarya, 1992; Bhagwati and Panagaryia, 1996; Frankel, 1997; or Bhagwati, Krishna and Panagariya, 1999, and references therein) has attempted to assess the implications of Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA) for trade patterns, global welfare, and the multilateral trading system. If this literature has yet to converge to an unambiguous answer as to whether PTAs are, in a second-best world, good or bad for world welfare, the theoretical arguments are by now fairly clear (see e.g. Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1999). By contrast, the empirical evidence is still scant. In particular, one basic question remains largely unanswered: to what extent do PTAs really improve market access for member countries, in particular for smaller ones in asymmetric blocs? The answer is less obvious than it looks. Notwithstanding the fact that GATT Article XXIV, para. 8 (b) requires the removal of tariff barriers on “substantially all trade” inside Free-Trade Areas, non-tariff measures can create significant barriers to intrabloc trade.