The Experts below are selected from a list of 516 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Francesco Magris - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Migration outflows and optimal migration policy: Rules Versus Discretion
Portuguese Economic Journal, 2017Co-Authors: Ismael Issifou, Francesco MagrisAbstract:We study the effects of more open borders on return migration and show that migrants are more likely to return to the origin country when migration Rules are softened, because this implies that they could more easily re-migrate if return migration is unsuccessful. As a result, softening migration Rules leads to lower net inflows than is generally acknowledged. We show that if government follows Rules to shape the optimal migration policy, it will choose more open “borders” than were its behaviour to be Discretionary. However, this requires an appropriate commitment technology. We show that electoral accountability may be a solution to the commitment problem. As a matter of fact, observed softer immigration Rules in western countries suggest the effectiveness of such a mechanism.
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Migration Outflows and Optimal Migration Policy: Rules Versus Discretion
Portuguese Economic Journal, 2017Co-Authors: Ismael Issifou, Francesco MagrisAbstract:We study the effects of more open borders on return migration and show that migrants are more likely to return to the origin country when migration Rules are softer, because this implies that they could more easily re-migrate if return migration is unsuccessful. As a result, softening migration Rules leads to lower net inflows than generally acknowledged. We show that if government follows Rules to shape the optimal migration policy, it will chose more open borders than in the case its behavior is Discretionary. However, this requires an appropriate commitment technology. We show that electoral accountability may be a solution of the commitment problem. As a matter of fact, observed softer immigration Rules in western countries suggest the effectiveness of such a mechanism.
Ismael Issifou - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Migration outflows and optimal migration policy: Rules Versus Discretion
Portuguese Economic Journal, 2017Co-Authors: Ismael Issifou, Francesco MagrisAbstract:We study the effects of more open borders on return migration and show that migrants are more likely to return to the origin country when migration Rules are softened, because this implies that they could more easily re-migrate if return migration is unsuccessful. As a result, softening migration Rules leads to lower net inflows than is generally acknowledged. We show that if government follows Rules to shape the optimal migration policy, it will choose more open “borders” than were its behaviour to be Discretionary. However, this requires an appropriate commitment technology. We show that electoral accountability may be a solution to the commitment problem. As a matter of fact, observed softer immigration Rules in western countries suggest the effectiveness of such a mechanism.
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Migration Outflows and Optimal Migration Policy: Rules Versus Discretion
Portuguese Economic Journal, 2017Co-Authors: Ismael Issifou, Francesco MagrisAbstract:We study the effects of more open borders on return migration and show that migrants are more likely to return to the origin country when migration Rules are softer, because this implies that they could more easily re-migrate if return migration is unsuccessful. As a result, softening migration Rules leads to lower net inflows than generally acknowledged. We show that if government follows Rules to shape the optimal migration policy, it will chose more open borders than in the case its behavior is Discretionary. However, this requires an appropriate commitment technology. We show that electoral accountability may be a solution of the commitment problem. As a matter of fact, observed softer immigration Rules in western countries suggest the effectiveness of such a mechanism.
Elke Muchlinski - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Against rigid Rules - Keynes's economic theory
Social Science Research Network, 2003Co-Authors: Elke MuchlinskiAbstract:This paper provides textual evidence of Keynes's position on monetary policy and shaping international monetary relations. One result of my contribution is that the famous dichotomy Rules Versus Discretion is of no relevance to his economic theory, because he used the term Rules not in the meaning of a formal brilliantly designed notion.He definitely made a distinction between non-rigidly-fixed-Rules and Discretion. I give an explanation why his economic theory is not compatible with principles of constructivism, empiricism and ontological realism by referring to a key term of his economic writings, i.e., Discretionary decision.
John A. C. Conybeare - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Retaliating against Terrorism: Rational Expectations and the Optimality of Rules Versus Discretion
American Journal of Political Science, 1994Co-Authors: Bryan Brophy-baermann, John A. C. ConybeareAbstract:The application of rational expectations theory to policies of retaliation against terrorism suggests that only unexpected retaliations will be effective in causing terrorist attacks to deviate from their natural rate and that there is a time inconsistency problem in responding to terrorism. Since the optimal response rate to terrorism would never be believable to the terrorists, the first best policy may be for the government retaliating against terrorism to have its response rate constrained by an externally imposed rule. A time series intervention model of terrorist attacks against Israel supports the natural rate hypothesis and, therefore, also the desirability of a retaliatory rule over policy Discretion. Israeli retaliation for the 1972 Munich massacre was the first Israeli retaliation of unexpectedly large magnitude, and it produced a temporary deviation of terrorist attacks from the natural rate. Retaliation has no long-term deterrent or escalation effect.
Andrea Stella - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Politics of Monetary Policy
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010Co-Authors: Alberto Alesina, Andrea StellaAbstract:In this paper we critically review the literature on the political economy of monetary policy, with an eye on the questions raised by the recent financial crisis. We begin with a discussion of Rules Versus Discretion. We then examine the issue of Central Banks independence both in normal times, in times of crisis. Then we review the literature of electoral manipulation of policies. Finally we address international institutional issues concerning the feasibility, optimality and political sustainability of currency unions in which more than one country share the same currency. A brief review of the Euro experience concludes the paper.
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The Politics of Monetary Policy ∗
2009Co-Authors: Alberto Alesina, Andrea StellaAbstract:In this paper we critically review the literature on the political economy of monetary policy emphasizing the questions opened by the recent financial crisis. We begin with a discussion of the issue of Rules Versus Discretion. We then examine the independence of Central banks both in normal times and in crisis and in relation to the political cycles. Finally we address international institutional issues concerning the feasibility, optimality and political sustainabilty of currency unions in which more than one country share the same currency. A brief review of the Euro experience concludes the paper.
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The Politics of Monetary Policy
2009Co-Authors: Alberto Alesina, Andrea StellaAbstract:In this paper we critically review the literature on the political economy of monetary policy emphasizing the questions opened by the recent financial crisis. We begin with a discussion of the issue of Rules Versus Discretion. We then examine the independence of Central banks both in normal times and in crisis and in relation to the political cycles. Finally we address international institutional issues concerning the feasibility, optimality and political sustainabilty of currency unions in which more than one country share the same currency. A brief review of the Euro experience concludes the paper
