Self-Judgment

14,000,000 Leading Edge Experts on the ideXlab platform

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

The Experts below are selected from a list of 6085896 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Jason P. Mitchell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Medial prefrontal cortex subserves diverse forms of self-reflection
    2011
    Co-Authors: Adrianna C. Jenkins, Jason P. Mitchell
    Abstract:

    The ability to think about oneself--to self--reflect--is one of the defining features of the human mind. Recent research has suggested that this ability may be subserved by a particular brain region: the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). However, although humans can contemplate a variety of different aspects of themselves, including their stable personality traits, current feelings, and physical attributes, no research has directly examined the extent to which these different forms of self-reflection are subserved by common mechanisms. To address this question, participants were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while making judgments about their own personality traits, current mental states, and physical attributes as well as those of another person. Whereas some brain regions responded preferentially during only one form of self-reflection, a robust region of MPFC was engaged preferentially during self-reflection across all three types of judgment. These results suggest that--although dissociable--diverse forms of self-referential thought draw on a shared cognitive process subserved by MPFC.

  • repetition suppression of ventromedial prefrontal activity during judgments of self and others
    2008
    Co-Authors: Adrianna C. Jenkins, Neil C Macrae, Jason P. Mitchell
    Abstract:

    One useful strategy for inferring others' mental states (i.e., mentalizing) may be to use one's own thoughts, feelings, and desires as a proxy for those of other people. Such self-referential accounts of social cognition are supported by recent neuroimaging observations that a single brain region, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC), is engaged both by tasks that require introspections about self and by tasks that require inferences about the minds of others perceived to be similar to self. To test whether people automatically refer to their own mental states when considering those of a similar other, we examined repetition-related suppression of vMPFC response during self-reflections that followed either an initial reflection about self or a judgment of another person. Consistent with the hypothesis that perceivers spontaneously engage in self-referential processing when mentalizing about particular individuals, vMPFC response was suppressed when self-reflections followed either an initial reflection about self or a judgment of a similar, but not a dissimilar, other. These results suggest that thinking about the mind of another person may rely importantly on reference to one's own mental characteristics.

Liang Luo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • how font size affects judgments of learning simultaneous mediating effect of item specific beliefs about fluency and moderating effect of beliefs about font size and memory
    2018
    Co-Authors: Jun Zheng, Tian Fan, Liang Luo
    Abstract:

    Numerous studies have provided experience-based or theory-based frameworks for the basis of judgment of learning (JOL). However, few studies have directly measured processing experience and beliefs related to the same cue in one experiment and examined their joint contribution to JOLs. The present study focused on font-size effects and aimed to examine the simultaneous contribution of processing fluency and beliefs to the effect of font size on JOLs. We directly measured processing fluency via self-paced study time. We also directly measured participants’ beliefs via two approaches: pre-study global differentiated predictions (GPREDs) as an indicator of preexisting beliefs about font size and memory and ease of learning judgments (EORs) as online generated item-specific beliefs about fluency. In Experiment 1, EORs partially mediated the font-size effect, whereas self-paced study time did not. In Experiments 2a and 2b, EORs mediated the font-size effect; at the same time, beliefs about font size and memory moderated the font-size effect. In summary, the present study demonstrates a major role of beliefs underlying the font-size effect.

Adrianna C. Jenkins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Medial prefrontal cortex subserves diverse forms of self-reflection
    2011
    Co-Authors: Adrianna C. Jenkins, Jason P. Mitchell
    Abstract:

    The ability to think about oneself--to self--reflect--is one of the defining features of the human mind. Recent research has suggested that this ability may be subserved by a particular brain region: the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). However, although humans can contemplate a variety of different aspects of themselves, including their stable personality traits, current feelings, and physical attributes, no research has directly examined the extent to which these different forms of self-reflection are subserved by common mechanisms. To address this question, participants were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while making judgments about their own personality traits, current mental states, and physical attributes as well as those of another person. Whereas some brain regions responded preferentially during only one form of self-reflection, a robust region of MPFC was engaged preferentially during self-reflection across all three types of judgment. These results suggest that--although dissociable--diverse forms of self-referential thought draw on a shared cognitive process subserved by MPFC.

  • repetition suppression of ventromedial prefrontal activity during judgments of self and others
    2008
    Co-Authors: Adrianna C. Jenkins, Neil C Macrae, Jason P. Mitchell
    Abstract:

    One useful strategy for inferring others' mental states (i.e., mentalizing) may be to use one's own thoughts, feelings, and desires as a proxy for those of other people. Such self-referential accounts of social cognition are supported by recent neuroimaging observations that a single brain region, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC), is engaged both by tasks that require introspections about self and by tasks that require inferences about the minds of others perceived to be similar to self. To test whether people automatically refer to their own mental states when considering those of a similar other, we examined repetition-related suppression of vMPFC response during self-reflections that followed either an initial reflection about self or a judgment of another person. Consistent with the hypothesis that perceivers spontaneously engage in self-referential processing when mentalizing about particular individuals, vMPFC response was suppressed when self-reflections followed either an initial reflection about self or a judgment of a similar, but not a dissimilar, other. These results suggest that thinking about the mind of another person may rely importantly on reference to one's own mental characteristics.

George Loewenstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • changing places a dual judgment model of empathy gaps in emotional perspective taking
    2013
    Co-Authors: Leaf Van Boven, David Dunning, George Loewenstein, Loran F Nordgren
    Abstract:

    Abstract Emotional perspective taking involves people's attempts to estimate the attitudes, preferences, and behaviors of other people who are in different emotional situations. We propose a dual judgment model in which perspective takers first predict what their own reactions would be to different emotional situations, and, second, adjust these self-predictions to accommodate perceived differences between themselves and others. Prior literature has focused on egocentric biases in the second judgment, perceived differences and similarities between the self and others. We propose that significant errors in emotional perspective taking often arise from the first judgment, people’s predictions of what their own attitudes, preferences, and behaviors would be in different emotional situations. Specifically, people exhibit “empathy gaps,” underestimating how much emotional situations influence their own attitudes, preferences, and behaviors. We review evidence that provides support for (a) the dual judgment model of emotional perspective taking, (b) the occurrence of empathy gaps in self-predictions, and (c) the occurrence of empathy gaps in social predictions that are mediated by empathy gaps in Self-Judgments. We discuss implications of empathy gaps in emotional perspective taking for social behavior, social judgment, and for other forms of perspective taking and affective forecasting.

  • the heat of the moment the effect of sexual arousal on sexual decision making
    2006
    Co-Authors: Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein
    Abstract:

    Despite the social importance of decisions taken in the “heat of the moment,” very little research has examined the effect of sexual arousal on judgment and decision making. Here we examine the effect of sexual arousal, induced by self-stimulation, on judgments and hypothetical decisions made by male college students. Students were assigned to be in either a state of sexual arousal or a neutral state and were asked to: (1) indicate how appealing they find a wide range of sexual stimuli and activities, (2) report their willingness to engage in morally questionable behavior in order to obtain sexual gratification, and (3) describe their willingness to engage in unsafe sex when sexually aroused. The results show that sexual arousal had a strong impact on all three areas of judgment and decision making, demonstrating the importance of situational forces on preferences, as well as subjects' inability to predict these influences on their own behavior. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  • self interest automaticity and the psychology of conflict of interest
    2004
    Co-Authors: Don A Moore, George Loewenstein
    Abstract:

    This paper argues that self-interest and concern for others influence behavior through different cognitive systems. Self-interest is automatic, viscerally compelling, and often unconscious. Understanding one’s ethical and professional obligations to others, in contrast, often involves a more thoughtful process. The automatic nature of self-interest gives it a primal power to influence judgment and make it difficult for people to understand its influence on their judgment, let alone eradicate its influence. This dual-process view offers new insights into how conflict of interest operate and it suggests some new avenues for addressing them or limiting some of their greatest dangers.

Jun Zheng - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • how font size affects judgments of learning simultaneous mediating effect of item specific beliefs about fluency and moderating effect of beliefs about font size and memory
    2018
    Co-Authors: Jun Zheng, Tian Fan, Liang Luo
    Abstract:

    Numerous studies have provided experience-based or theory-based frameworks for the basis of judgment of learning (JOL). However, few studies have directly measured processing experience and beliefs related to the same cue in one experiment and examined their joint contribution to JOLs. The present study focused on font-size effects and aimed to examine the simultaneous contribution of processing fluency and beliefs to the effect of font size on JOLs. We directly measured processing fluency via self-paced study time. We also directly measured participants’ beliefs via two approaches: pre-study global differentiated predictions (GPREDs) as an indicator of preexisting beliefs about font size and memory and ease of learning judgments (EORs) as online generated item-specific beliefs about fluency. In Experiment 1, EORs partially mediated the font-size effect, whereas self-paced study time did not. In Experiments 2a and 2b, EORs mediated the font-size effect; at the same time, beliefs about font size and memory moderated the font-size effect. In summary, the present study demonstrates a major role of beliefs underlying the font-size effect.