The Experts below are selected from a list of 24618 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Marcel Voia - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Does public debt secure Social peace? A diversionary theory of public debt management
Social Choice and Welfare, 2021Co-Authors: Maxime Menuet, Patrick Villieu, Marcel VoiaAbstract:This study analyzes the strategic use of public debt. Contrary to the classical view that politicians can use public debt to tie the hands of their successors, we show that an incumbent government can take advantage of having tied its own hands before the election with the help of public debt. By doing this, it reduces the basis for future Social Conflicts and benefits from Social peace during its term, which may enhance its chances of being re-elected. In addition, in the case of foreign or external public debt, the incumbent can strategically divert future Social Conflicts toward a common enemy (foreign creditors). Thus, by increasing public debt before the election, the incumbent can strengthen Social cohesion during his/her mandate, both by reducing the basis of internal Conflicts and by diverting citizens from internal toward external rent-seeking activities.
Maxime Menuet - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Does public debt secure Social peace? A diversionary theory of public debt management
Social Choice and Welfare, 2021Co-Authors: Maxime Menuet, Patrick Villieu, Marcel VoiaAbstract:This study analyzes the strategic use of public debt. Contrary to the classical view that politicians can use public debt to tie the hands of their successors, we show that an incumbent government can take advantage of having tied its own hands before the election with the help of public debt. By doing this, it reduces the basis for future Social Conflicts and benefits from Social peace during its term, which may enhance its chances of being re-elected. In addition, in the case of foreign or external public debt, the incumbent can strategically divert future Social Conflicts toward a common enemy (foreign creditors). Thus, by increasing public debt before the election, the incumbent can strengthen Social cohesion during his/her mandate, both by reducing the basis of internal Conflicts and by diverting citizens from internal toward external rent-seeking activities.
Patrick Villieu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Does public debt secure Social peace? A diversionary theory of public debt management
Social Choice and Welfare, 2021Co-Authors: Maxime Menuet, Patrick Villieu, Marcel VoiaAbstract:This study analyzes the strategic use of public debt. Contrary to the classical view that politicians can use public debt to tie the hands of their successors, we show that an incumbent government can take advantage of having tied its own hands before the election with the help of public debt. By doing this, it reduces the basis for future Social Conflicts and benefits from Social peace during its term, which may enhance its chances of being re-elected. In addition, in the case of foreign or external public debt, the incumbent can strategically divert future Social Conflicts toward a common enemy (foreign creditors). Thus, by increasing public debt before the election, the incumbent can strengthen Social cohesion during his/her mandate, both by reducing the basis of internal Conflicts and by diverting citizens from internal toward external rent-seeking activities.
Jing Vivian Zhan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Sharing resource wealth for peace: A Chinese strategy to cope with the resource curse
The Extractive Industries and Society, 2015Co-Authors: Ming Zeng, Jing Vivian ZhanAbstract:One symptom of the resource curse, as comparative studies suggest, is that rich mineral resources often contribute to Social Conflicts and even civil wars, especially in developing countries with weak political institutions. How can resource-rich countries deal with these Social Conflicts? This research provides some lessons from China, a country that hosts rich resources in many of its localities and faces high risk of resource-triggered Social instability. Through a case study of one coal-rich Chinese locality, we find that the local state designed various schemes to allow the local communities to share the resource wealth, which effectively alleviated popular grievance and prevented resource-triggered Social Conflicts in the region. Based on the findings, we argue that the government of resource-rich regions can play crucial roles in designing institutions and implementing policies to redistribute resource wealth as a strategy to cope with the resource curse.
Tian Tin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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research on functions of civil society organizations in solving the Social Conflicts and disputes of the urban house demolition a theoretical framework based on interests game
Urban Studies, 2010Co-Authors: Tian TinAbstract:The paper introduced society organization,and discussed its functional mechanism in solving the Social Conflicts and disputes of the urban house demolition. The conclusions are that,the interest's game and interest's conflict,including the lack of developed and mature society intermediary organization,are the reasons that some groups' events of Social conflict have occurred frequently and repeatedly in urban house demolition of China,however,civil society organization could give play to its functions such as check-and-balance supervision,expression of interest,and solution to Social contradiction by means of founding a medium of expressing interests and demands,providing a platform of information exchange,and passing on a diversity of demand of interests' distribution. In addition,independence of civil society organization could be ensured through building some sustainable systems of values,institutions and capability.
