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Gregory S. Alexander - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Pluralism and Property
    Fordham Law Review, 2011
    Co-Authors: Gregory S. Alexander
    Abstract:

    Welfarism is no longer the only game in the town of property theory. In the last several years a number of property scholars have begun developing various versions of a general vision of property and ownership that, although consistent with welfarism in some respects, purports to provide an alternative to the still-dominant welfarist account. This alternative proceeds under different labels, including “virtue theory” and “progressive,” but for convenience purposes let us call them collectively “Social Obligation” theories. For what they have in common is a desire to correct the common but mistaken notion that ownership is solely about rights. These scholars emphasize the Social Obligations that are inherent in ownership, and they seek to develop a non-welfarist theory grounding those inherent Social Obligations.These Social Obligation theories have attracted no shortage of critics. No critic, however, has raised an ambiguity that characterizes most, if not all, of the work in this vein. Although Social Obligation theorists have been clear about their commitment to the idea that ownership imposes affirmative as well as negative duties to other members of their communities, they have not always been clear about the normative basis or bases of those duties. More specifically, they have not always indicated whether their theory is value monist or value pluralist; that is, whether it rests on a commitment to a single overriding moral value or multiple moral values. Of course, this is a fundamental question not only for Social Obligation theorists but also all property scholars engaged in projects of developing general normative theories of property, including welfare theorists. Whether they believe that a single value guides, and should guide, all of property law or that no single view of the good either can or should underlie all of property law’s contextual and doctrinal diversity, property theorists must explicitly acknowledge and explain their position on this basic question.This paper has two objectives. The first is to clarify the positions on the monism-pluralism question among Social Obligation property theorists. Because so few theorists have explicitly confronted that question, I try to tease out their positions from their normative work, recognizing full well that this approach risks attributing views that the author does not hold at all. My second objective is normative. I argue, albeit briefly, in favor of value pluralism as the morally superior approach, one that is both analytically and normatively more defensible.The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief explanation of the terms monism and pluralism as they are used in modern value theory. Part II sets forth a taxonomy of various Social Obligation property theorists’ views on the monist versus pluralist approach to values. Part III then takes a normative turn, arguing in support of value pluralism generally and how my Social Obligation theory specifically conforms to such an approach. It also discusses the problem of incommensurability that arises under value pluralism. I argue that the incommensurability of competing values does not warrant the conclusion that no rational choice between them is possible. Rational choice is possible, but this does not mean that only one rational solution is always possible. An unavoidable, and perhaps tragic, consequence of pluralism is that in cases in which two or more incommensurable values are involved, there will sometimes be situations in which more than one rational choice is available. There is not always a single correct answer. But that does not mean that no rational solution is possible. Such is the human condition.The value monism versus value pluralism problem is not unique to property theory. This paper could have been written just as easily about contract or tort theory as well as other topics of legal theory. Property theory happens to be the domain that I know best. Scholars in other fields may find this paper useful for their own purposes. If so, they may wish to skip Part II, which deals specifically with property scholarship.

  • The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law
    Cornell Law Review, 2008
    Co-Authors: Gregory S. Alexander
    Abstract:

    This article seeks to provide in property legal theory an alternative to law-and-economics theory, the dominant mode of theorizing about property in contemporary legal scholarship. I call this alternative the Social Obligation theory. I argue that American property law, both on the private and public sides, includes a Social-Obligation norm but that this norm has never been explicitly recognized as such nor systemically developed. I argue that a proper understanding of the Social Obligation explains a remarkably wide array of existing legal doctrine in American property law, ranging from the power of eminent domain to the modern public trust doctrine. In some cases Social Obligation reaches the same result as law-and-economics, but in other cases it will not. Even where it reaches the same result as law and economics, Social Obligation theory provides a superior explanation. At a normative level I argue that the version of the Social-Obligation norm that I develop here is morally superior to other candidates for the Social-Obligation norm. It is so because it best promotes human flourishing, i.e., enabling individuals to live lives worthy of human dignity. Drawing on Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach (which itself is based on the Aristotelian notion that the human being is a Social and political animal, not self-sufficient alone), the Social Obligation theory holds that all individuals have an Obligation to others in their respective communities to promote the capabilities that are essential to human flourishing (e.g., freedom, practical reasoning). For property owners this has important consequences. If we accept the existence of an Obligation to foster the capabilities necessary for human flourishing, and if we understand that Obligation as extending to an Obligation to share property, at least in surplus resources, in order to enhance the abilities of others to flourish, then it follows that, in the predictable absence of adequate voluntary transfers, the state should be empowered and may even be obligated to step in to compel the wealthy to share their surplus with the poor so that the latter can develop the necessary capabilities. None of this is meant to suggest that the state's power, even as it touches on the facilitation of the capabilities we are discussing, is unbounded. But the limits to the state's proper domain are supplied by the same principles that justify its action: the demands generated by the capabilities that facilitate human flourishing - freedom, practical rationality, and Sociality, among others.

  • property as a fundamental constitutional right the german example
    Cornell Law Review, 2003
    Co-Authors: Gregory S. Alexander
    Abstract:

    INTRODUCTION 000 I. THE BASIC LAW, THE SOZIALSTAAT, AND THE “IMAGE OF MAN” .....000 II. ARTICLE 14 AND THE ROLE OF PROPERTY 000 A. Property and Self-Development 000 B. Property as Dynamic and Social: The “Social Obligation” of Ownership 000 III. THE SOURCE AND MEANING OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY ........000 A. The Basic Law as the Source of Constitutional Property: Environmental Regulation 000 B. The Substantive Meaning of Property in German Constitutional Law: Welfare Benefits 000 IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 000 A. Are Constitutional Property Clauses Inherently AntiRedistributive? 000 B. Should Property Be Treated as a Fundamental Constitutional Right Under the American Constitution? 000 CONCLUSION 000

Simon Moore - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Exploring the adoption of self-service checkouts and the associated Social Obligations of shopping practices
    Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 2018
    Co-Authors: Sandy Bulmer, Jonathan Elms, Simon Moore
    Abstract:

    Abstract While retailers and other service providers are increasingly introducing self-service checkouts into stores, these technologies do not have universal appeal for consumers. The literature offers limited understanding of how self-service checkouts influence shopping practices and consumers’ experiences of the in-store environment. Using the lens of practice theory, this paper explores adoption of self-service checkouts by consumers. Semi-structured face to face interviews were used to capture consumers’ discursive accounts of their shopping practices, and to examine their interactions with self-service checkouts. Findings illustrate that unwilling customers feel a sense of Social Obligation to use self-service checkouts at times in order to help others. This study provides a broader appreciation of how consumers engage with self-service checkout processes, and extends understanding of how consumers manage the paradoxes that surround the introduction of in-store technologies by retailers. The managerial implications of self-service checkouts for retailers are also discussed.

Wang Xiao-hu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Angela Hecimovic - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Do stakeholders or Social Obligations drive corporate Social and environmental responsibility reporting? Managerial views from a developing country
    Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management, 2015
    Co-Authors: Moazzem Hossain, Manzurul Alam, Muhammad Azizul Islam, Angela Hecimovic
    Abstract:

    Purpose - – The purpose of this study is to explore senior managers’ perception and motivations of corporate Social and environmental responsibility (CSER) reporting in the context of a developing country, Bangladesh. Design/methodology/approach - – In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with 25 senior managers of companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange. Publicly available annual reports of these companies were also analysed. Findings - – The results indicate that senior managers perceive CSER reporting as a Social Obligation. The study finds that the managers focus mostly on child labour, human resources/rights, responsible products/services, health education, sports and community engagement activities as part of the Social Obligations. Interviewees identify a lack of a regulatory framework along with socio-cultural and religious factors as contributing to the low level of disclosures. These findings suggest that CSER reporting is not merely stakeholder-driven, but rather country-specific Social and environmental issues play an important role in relation to CSER reporting practices. Research limitations/implications - – This paper contributes to engagement-based studies by focussing on CSER reporting practices in developing countries and are useful for academics, practitioners and policymakers in understanding the reasons behind CSER reporting in developing countries. Originality/value - – This paper addresses a literature “gap” in the empirical study of CSER reporting in a developing country, such as Bangladesh. This study fills a gap in the existing literature to understand managers’ motivations for CSER reporting in a developing country context. Managerial perceptions on CSER issues are largely unexplored in developing countries.

Jedediah Purdy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A Few Questions About the Social-Obligation Norm
    Cornell Law Review, 2009
    Co-Authors: Jedediah Purdy
    Abstract:

    I applaud Gregory Alexander for proposing an innovative view of property, one focused on the Obligations of ownership. His project locates what I think of as the liberal aim of personal freedom (meaning both formal autonomy and real opportunity) within a Social context of distributive choices and conceptions of mutual Obligation. That is, he is asking what counts as a free society, and he is putting property regimes at the center of the answer. I want to set out some questions about where his project goes from here. A couple of preliminary issues are worth raising at the start. One is a simple question about the scope of Professor Alexander’s Social Obligation principle: is it national, global, or something else? The legal examples come—almost inevitably—from national property regimes. Professor Alexander’s justifying argument for the SocialObligation principle, though, seems to press in a strongly cosmopolitan direction. His argument for a requirement to value in others those potential capabilities that one values in oneself, if it holds, seems most likely to hold for all humanity: its logic is universal, not national. If that is the idea, it puts the project at a considerable distance from the national regimes that furnish the article’s important examples, at least in respect of scope. The second preliminary question is about the interaction between two roles property law might play in this project. The first role is as a distribuendum of a freestanding theory of distributive justice, which should share around property rights as it does other parts of what John Rawls called primary goods and what Amartya Sen might regard as the preconditions of achieving an adequate set of human capabilities.1 The second is as a source of insight about appropriate principles of distributive justice. I get more of the first feeling from