The Experts below are selected from a list of 267 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
L Rus - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
the role of independent verification and validation in maintaining a safety critical evolutionary software in a complex environment the nasa Space Shuttle Program
International Conference on Software Maintenance, 2001Co-Authors: Marvin V Zelkowitz, L RusAbstract:The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Shuttle Program is a multi-billion dollar activity scheduled to span over 40 years. Maintaining such software with requirements for high reliability and mission safety taxes current development methods. The authors present how independent verification and validation (IV&V) activities are used to support these requirements. They also show how the IV&V activities for this Program differ from those of more traditional software developments.
-
ICSM - The role of independent verification and validation in maintaining a safety critical evolutionary software in a complex environment: the NASA Space Shuttle Program
Proceedings IEEE International Conference on Software Maintenance. ICSM 2001, 1Co-Authors: Marvin V Zelkowitz, L RusAbstract:The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Shuttle Program is a multi-billion dollar activity scheduled to span over 40 years. Maintaining such software with requirements for high reliability and mission safety taxes current development methods. The authors present how independent verification and validation (IV&V) activities are used to support these requirements. They also show how the IV&V activities for this Program differ from those of more traditional software developments.
Marvin V Zelkowitz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
the role of independent verification and validation in maintaining a safety critical evolutionary software in a complex environment the nasa Space Shuttle Program
International Conference on Software Maintenance, 2001Co-Authors: Marvin V Zelkowitz, L RusAbstract:The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Shuttle Program is a multi-billion dollar activity scheduled to span over 40 years. Maintaining such software with requirements for high reliability and mission safety taxes current development methods. The authors present how independent verification and validation (IV&V) activities are used to support these requirements. They also show how the IV&V activities for this Program differ from those of more traditional software developments.
-
understanding iv v in a safety critical and complex evolutionary environment the nasa Space Shuttle Program
International Conference on Software Engineering, 2001Co-Authors: Marvin V Zelkowitz, Ioana RusAbstract:The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is an internationally recognized leader in Space science and exploration. NASA recognizes the inherent risk associated with Space exploration; however, NASA makes every reasonable effort to minimize that risk. To that end for the Space Shuttle Program NASA instituted a software independent verification and validation (IV&V) process in 1988 to ensure that the Shuttle and its crew are not exposed to any unnecessary risks. Using data provided by both the Shuttle software developer and the IV&V contractor, in this paper we describe the overall IV&V process as used on the Space Shuttle Program and provide an analysis of the use of metrics to document and control this process. Our findings reaffirm the value of IV&V and show the impact IV&V has on multiple releases of a large complex software system.
-
ICSE - Understanding IV&IV in a safety critical and complex evolutionary environment: the nasa Space Shuttle Program
Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Software Engineering. ICSE 2001, 1Co-Authors: Marvin V Zelkowitz, Ioana RusAbstract:The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is an internationally recognized leader in Space science and exploration. NASA recognizes the inherent risk associated with Space exploration; however, NASA makes every reasonable effort to minimize that risk. To that end for the Space Shuttle Program NASA instituted a software independent verification and validation (IV&V) process in 1988 to ensure that the Shuttle and its crew are not exposed to any unnecessary risks. Using data provided by both the Shuttle software developer and the IV&V contractor, in this paper we describe the overall IV&V process as used on the Space Shuttle Program and provide an analysis of the use of metrics to document and control this process. Our findings reaffirm the value of IV&V and show the impact IV&V has on multiple releases of a large complex software system.
-
ICSM - The role of independent verification and validation in maintaining a safety critical evolutionary software in a complex environment: the NASA Space Shuttle Program
Proceedings IEEE International Conference on Software Maintenance. ICSM 2001, 1Co-Authors: Marvin V Zelkowitz, L RusAbstract:The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Shuttle Program is a multi-billion dollar activity scheduled to span over 40 years. Maintaining such software with requirements for high reliability and mission safety taxes current development methods. The authors present how independent verification and validation (IV&V) activities are used to support these requirements. They also show how the IV&V activities for this Program differ from those of more traditional software developments.
Nasa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Space Shuttle Program: STS-1 Medical Report
2019Co-Authors: NasaAbstract:The necessity for developing medical standards addressing individual classes of Shuttle crew positions is discussed. For the U.S. manned Program the conclusion of the Apollo era heralded the end of water recovery operations and the introduction of land-based medical operations. This procedural change marked a significant departure from the accepted postflight medical recovery and evaluation techniques. All phases of the missions required careful re-evaluation, identification of potential impact on preexisting medical operational techniques, and development of new methodologies which were carefully evaluated and tested under simulated conditions. Significant coordination was required between the different teams involved in medical operations. Additional dimensions were added to the concepts of medical operations, by the introduction of different toxic substances utilized by the Space Transportation Systems especially during ground operations.
-
AeroSpace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report February 1996
2019Co-Authors: NasaAbstract:The AeroSpace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) presents its annual report covering February through December 1995. Findings and recommendations include the areas of the Space Shuttle Program, the International Space Station, Aeronautics, and Other. Information to support these findings is included in this report. NASA's response to last year's annual report is included as an appendix. With regards to the Space Shuttle Program, the panel addresses the potential for safety problems due to organizational changes by increasing its scrutiny of Space Shuttle operations and planning.
-
Space Shuttle Program Orbiter Approach and Landing Test
2019Co-Authors: NasaAbstract:The orbiter approach and landing test (ALT) reports are published to provide senior NASA management with timely information on ALT Program plans and accomplishments. The ALT reports will be comprised of this pre-ALT report, ALT pre-flight memoranda, and an ALT post-flight report following each flight. The purpose of this pre-ALT report is to provide an overview of the ALT Program, describing the flight vehicles involved and summarizing the planned flights.
-
Space Shuttle Program Update
2018Co-Authors: NasaAbstract:Bruce Buckingham, from NASA Public Affairs, introduces Wayne Hale, Space Shuttle Program Manager, and Mike Leinbach, NASA launch Director. Wayne Hale begins discussing the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) that has just occurred to see if they were ready to fly. He points out that the review was a debris verification review (DVR). This review was done to ascertain how well they have done to eliminate the potential for debris to come off of the External Tank (ET), or any other part of the launch vehicle. He expresses that they have made significant improvements to the ET. He gives a description of the ET that is presently on the launch pad. Mike Leinbach discusses hardware processing and the condition of the launch vehicle. Questions from the news media about possible modifications to the ice frost ramp, Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) electrical problems, ET foam loss, amount of debris loss expectation during ascent, and return to flight costs are all addressed.
-
Space Shuttle Program Update News Conference with Wayne Hale
2018Co-Authors: NasaAbstract:Jessica Rye from NASA Public Affairs introduces: Wayne Hale, Space Shuttle Deputy Program Manager; Mike Leinbach, NASA Launch Director; and Tim Wilson, from the NASA Engineering and Safety Center. Hale begins the discussion with a video showing the following processes: 1) Changing of gap fillers at Orbiter Processing Facility; 2) The Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) being loaded into Discovery payload bay; 3) Engine installation; 4) Spacecrew at Michoud Assembly observing the area where the PAL ramps were removed; 5) Test being performed to mitigate liquid air forming underneath foam; and 6) Roll out of ET119 from New Orleans. Hale also presents a slide of the ET debris Mitigation Activities and ET Ice/Frost Ramps. Mike Leinbach says that Kennedy Space Center is ready to receive the tank and that he is ready to get on with the mission. Tim Wilson heads the team to resolve foam loss issues which is his primary goal before this flight. A question and answer period follows.
Robert W. Fricke - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
STS-80 Space Shuttle Mission Report
1997Co-Authors: Robert W. FrickeAbstract:The STS-80 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload activities as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) systems performance during the eightieth flight of the Space Shuttle Program, the fifty-fifth flight since the return-to-flight, and the twenty-first flight of the Orbiter Columbia (OV-102).
-
STS-62 Space Shuttle mission report
1994Co-Authors: Robert W. FrickeAbstract:The STS-62 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload activities as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSHE) systems performance during the sixty-first flight of the Space Shuttle Program and sixteenth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Columbia (OV-102). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET designated as ET-62; three SSME's which were designated as serial numbers 2031, 2109, and 2029 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRB's which were designated BI-064. The RSRM's that were installed in each SRB were designated as 360L036A (lightweight) for the left SRB, and 36OWO36B (welterweight) for the right SRB. This STS-62 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume 8, Appendix E. That document requires that each major organizational element supporting the Program report the results of its hardware evaluation and mission performance plus identify all related in-flight anomalies. The primary objectives of the STS-62 mission were to perform the operations of the United States Microgravity Payload-2 (USMP-2) and the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology-2 (OAST-2) payload. The secondary objectives of this flight were to perform the operations of the Dexterous End Effector (DEE), the Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet/A (SSBUV/A), the Limited Duration Space Environment Candidate Material Exposure (LDCE), the Advanced Protein Crystal Growth (APCG), the Physiological Systems Experiments (PSE), the Commercial Protein Crystal Growth (CPCG), the Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus (CGBA), the Middeck Zero-Gravity Dynamics Experiment (MODE), the Bioreactor Demonstration System (BDS), the Air Force Maui Optical Site Calibration Test (AMOS), and the Auroral Photography Experiment (APE-B).
-
STS-60 Space Shuttle mission report
1994Co-Authors: Robert W. FrickeAbstract:The STS-60 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload activities as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) systems performance during the sixtieth flight of the Space Shuttle Program and eighteenth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Discovery (OV-103). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET designated at ET-61 (Block 10); three SSME's which were designated as serial numbers 2012, 2034, and 2032 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRB's which were designated BI-062. The RSRM's that were installed in each SRB were designated as 360L035A (lightweight) for the left SRB, and 360Q035B (quarterweight) for the right SRB. This STS-60 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Appendix E. That document requires that each major organizational element supporting the Program report the results of its hardware evaluation and mission performance plus identify all related in-flight anomalies. The primary objectives of the STS-60 mission were to deploy and retrieve the Wake Shield Facility-1 (WSF-1), and to activate the Spacehab-2 payload and perform on-orbit experiments. Secondary objectives of this flight were to activate and command the Capillary Pumped Loop/Orbital Debris Radar Calibration Spheres/Breman Satellite Experiment/Getaway Special (GAS) Bridge Assembly (CAPL/ODERACS/BREMSAT/GBA) payload, the Auroral Photography Experiment-B (APE-B), and the Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-II (SAREX-II).
-
STS-61 Space Shuttle mission report
1994Co-Authors: Robert W. FrickeAbstract:The STS-61 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing mission as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) systems performance during the fifty-ninth flight of the Space Shuttle Program and fifth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Endeavour (OV-105). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET designated as ET-60; three SSME's which were designated as serial numbers 2019, 2033, and 2017 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRB's which were designated BI-063. The RSRM's that were installed in each SRB were designated as 360L023A (lightweight) for the left SRB, and 360L023B (lightweight) for the right SRB. This STS-61 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume 8, Appendix E. That document requires that each major organizational element supporting the Program report the results of its hardware evaluation and mission performance plus identify all related in-flight anomalies. The primary objective of the STS-61 mission was to perform the first on-orbit servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope. The servicing tasks included the installation of new solar arrays, replacement of the Wide Field/Planetary Camera I (WF/PC I) with WF/PC II, replacement of the High Speed Photometer (HSP) with the Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR), replacement of rate sensing units (RSU's) and electronic control units (ECU's), installation of new magnetic sensing systems and fuse plugs, and the repair of the Goddard High Resolution Spectrometer (GHRS). Secondary objectives were to perform the requirements of the IMAX Cargo Bay Camera (ICBC), the IMAX Camera, and the Air Force Maui Optical Site (AMOS) Calibration Test.
-
STS-61 Space Shuttle mission report
1994Co-Authors: Robert W. FrickeAbstract:The STS-61 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing mission as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) systems performance during the fifty-ninth flight of the Space Shuttle Program and fifth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Endeavour (OV-105). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET designated as ET-60; three SSME's which were designated as serial numbers 2019, 2033, and 2017 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRB's which were designated BI-063. The RSRM's that were installed in each SRB were designated as 360L023A (lightweight) for the left SRB, and 360L023B (lightweight) for the right SRB. This STS-61 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume 8, Appendix E. That document requires that each major organizational element supporting the Program report the results of its hardware evaluation and mission performance plus identify all related in-flight anomalies. The primary objective of the STS-61 mission was to perform the first on-orbit servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope. The servicing tasks included the installation of new solar arrays, replacement of the Wide Field/Planetary Camera I (WF/PC I) with WF/PC II, replacement of the High Speed Photometer (HSP) with the Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR), replacement of rate sensing units (RSU's) and electronic control units (ECU's), installation of new magnetic sensing systems and fuse plugs, and the repair of the Goddard High Resolution Spectrometer (GHRS). Secondary objectives were to perform the requirements of the IMAX Cargo Bay Camera (ICBC), the IMAX Camera, and the Air Force Maui Optical Site (AMOS) Calibration Test.
Ioana Rus - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
understanding iv v in a safety critical and complex evolutionary environment the nasa Space Shuttle Program
International Conference on Software Engineering, 2001Co-Authors: Marvin V Zelkowitz, Ioana RusAbstract:The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is an internationally recognized leader in Space science and exploration. NASA recognizes the inherent risk associated with Space exploration; however, NASA makes every reasonable effort to minimize that risk. To that end for the Space Shuttle Program NASA instituted a software independent verification and validation (IV&V) process in 1988 to ensure that the Shuttle and its crew are not exposed to any unnecessary risks. Using data provided by both the Shuttle software developer and the IV&V contractor, in this paper we describe the overall IV&V process as used on the Space Shuttle Program and provide an analysis of the use of metrics to document and control this process. Our findings reaffirm the value of IV&V and show the impact IV&V has on multiple releases of a large complex software system.
-
ICSE - Understanding IV&IV in a safety critical and complex evolutionary environment: the nasa Space Shuttle Program
Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Software Engineering. ICSE 2001, 1Co-Authors: Marvin V Zelkowitz, Ioana RusAbstract:The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is an internationally recognized leader in Space science and exploration. NASA recognizes the inherent risk associated with Space exploration; however, NASA makes every reasonable effort to minimize that risk. To that end for the Space Shuttle Program NASA instituted a software independent verification and validation (IV&V) process in 1988 to ensure that the Shuttle and its crew are not exposed to any unnecessary risks. Using data provided by both the Shuttle software developer and the IV&V contractor, in this paper we describe the overall IV&V process as used on the Space Shuttle Program and provide an analysis of the use of metrics to document and control this process. Our findings reaffirm the value of IV&V and show the impact IV&V has on multiple releases of a large complex software system.