The Experts below are selected from a list of 158505 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Dani Rodrik - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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green Industrial Policy
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2014Co-Authors: Dani RodrikAbstract:Green growth requires green technologies: production techniques that economize on exhaustible resources and emit fewer greenhouse gases. The availability of green technologies both lowers social costs in the transition to a green growth path and helps achieve a satisfactory rate of material progress under that path. The theoretical case in favour of using Industrial Policy to facilitate green growth is quite strong. Economists’ traditional scepticism on Industrial Policy is grounded instead on pragmatic considerations having to do with the difficulty of achieving well-targeted and effective interventions in practice. While these objections deserve serious attention, I argue that they are not insurmountable. A key objective of this paper is to show how the practice of Industrial Policy can be improved by designing institutional frameworks that counter both informational and political risks.
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Industrial Policy don t ask why ask how
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: Dani RodrikAbstract:The theoretical case for Industrial Policy is a strong one. The market failures which Industrial policies target - in markets for credit, labor, products, and knowledge - have long been at the core of what development economists study. The conventional case against Industrial Policy rests on practical difficulties with its implementation. Even though the issues could in principle be settled by empirical evidence, the evidence to date remains uninformative. But the traditional informational and bureaucratic constraints on the exercise of Industrial Policy are not givens; they can be molded and rendered less binding through appropriate institutional design. Three key design attributes that Industrial Policy must possess are embeddedness, carrots-and-sticks, and accountability. A review of Industrial Policy in three non-Asian settings - El Salvador, Uruguay, and South Africa - highlights the extensive amount of Industrial Policy that is already being carried out and frames the need for Industrial Policy in the specific circumstances of individual countries. Some implications for the Middle East are discussed.
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Industrial Policy don t ask why ask how
Middle East Development Journal, 2009Co-Authors: Dani RodrikAbstract:The theoretical case for Industrial Policy is a strong one. The market failures which Industrial policies target — in markets for credit, labor, products, and knowledge — have long been at the core...
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reconfiguring Industrial Policy a framework with an application to south africa
Research Papers in Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik, Charles F SabelAbstract:he main purpose of Industrial Policy is to speed up the process of structural change towards higher productivity activities. This paper builds on our earlier writings to present an overall design for the conduct of Industrial Policy in a low- to middle-income country. It is stimulated by the specific problems faced by South Africa and by our discussions with business and government officials in that country. We present specific recommendations for the South African government in the penultimate section of the paper.
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normalizing Industrial Policy
World Bank Publications, 2008Co-Authors: Dani RodrikAbstract:The theoretical case for Industrial Policy is a strong one. The market failures that Industrial policies target in markets for credit, labor, products, and knowledge have long been at the core of what development economists study. The conventional case against Industrial Policy rests on practical difficulties with its implementation. Even though the issues could in principle be settled by empirical evidence, the evidence to date remains uninformative. Moreover, the conceptual difficulties involved in statistical inference in this area are so great that it is hard to see how statistical evidence could ever yield a convincing verdict. A review of Industrial Policy in three non-Asian settings El Salvador, Uruguay, and South Africa highlights the extensive amount of Industrial Policy that is already being carried out and frames the need for Industrial Policy in the specific circumstances of individual countries. The traditional informational and bureaucratic constraints on the exercise of Industrial Policy are not givens; they can be molded and rendered less binding through appropriate institutional design. Three key design attributes that Industrial Policy must possess are embeddedness, carrots-and-sticks, and accountability.
Jonas Meckling - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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making Industrial Policy work for decarbonization
Social Science Research Network, 2021Co-Authors: Jonas MecklingAbstract:Industrial Policy has moved into the center of debates on climate Policy, as the EU’s Green Deal, China’s green Industrial strategy, President Biden’s climate agenda, and green stimulus packages such as South Korea’s reflect. This represents a shift away from climate Policy as we know it—as classic environmental Policy. Industrial Policy and environmental Policy differ in their Policy goals, Policy instruments, and distributional effects. One primarily concerned with economic development, the other with cutting greenhouse gas emissions. This raises questions about Policy interactions between Industrial and environmental Policy in broader climate Policy mixes, and how these effect global decarbonization. This paper identifies complementary and conflictual dynamics between Industrial Policy and environmental Policy in both domestic and international climate politics. It shows how green Industrial Policy can advance climate goals and cooperation, but can also present challenges to deepening climate cooperation and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Developing an understanding of Policy interactions is central to leveraging the potential of Industrial Policy to accelerate global decarbonization.
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the politics of technology bans Industrial Policy competition and green goals for the auto industry
Energy Policy, 2019Co-Authors: Jonas Meckling, Jonas NahmAbstract:After decades of failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the transport sector, several jurisdictions have in rapid succession announced future goals to phase out sales of internal combustion engine vehicles. This article argues that these announcements are predominantly a form of political signaling in a green Industrial Policy competition for alternative transport technologies, notably electric vehicles. We show that such signaling games in green Industrial Policy are likely to emerge when market growth for alternative technologies initiates Industrial Policy competition, which explains the clustered timing of political signals. A country’s position in the global auto industry, however, shapes the domestic political economy for announcing a phaseout goal. Countries with aspirations to develop export-oriented EV industries seek Industrial upgrading; countries with existing export-oriented auto industries promote Industrial renewal to maintain international competitiveness; and importing countries pursue phaseout goals primarily for environmental reasons. Our findings suggest that Industrial upgraders can induce incumbent producer countries to participate in green Industrial Policy competition, leading to the “trading up” of energy technology Policy goals. This contrasts with classic patterns of environmental Policy competition, in which advanced Industrialized nations are the pacesetters.
Dermot Leahy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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strategic trade and Industrial Policy towards dynamic oligopolies
The Economic Journal, 2000Co-Authors: Peter J Neary, Dermot LeahyAbstract:We characterise optimal trade and Industrial Policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's "animal spirits" taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future Policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and also extensions to constrained second-best policies.
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strategic trade and Industrial Policy towards dynamic oligopolies
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 1998Co-Authors: Peter J Neary, Dermot LeahyAbstract:In this paper characterise optimal trade and Industrial Policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole''s "fat cats and top dogs" taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future Policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and extensions to second-best, revenue-constrained and entry-promotion policies.
Peter J Neary - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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strategic trade and Industrial Policy towards dynamic oligopolies
The Economic Journal, 2000Co-Authors: Peter J Neary, Dermot LeahyAbstract:We characterise optimal trade and Industrial Policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's "animal spirits" taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future Policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and also extensions to constrained second-best policies.
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strategic trade and Industrial Policy towards dynamic oligopolies
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 1998Co-Authors: Peter J Neary, Dermot LeahyAbstract:In this paper characterise optimal trade and Industrial Policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole''s "fat cats and top dogs" taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future Policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and extensions to second-best, revenue-constrained and entry-promotion policies.
Carolyn Fischer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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environmental protection for sale strategic green Industrial Policy and climate finance
2016Co-Authors: Carolyn FischerAbstract:Industrial Policy has long been criticized as subject to protectionist interests; accordingly, subsidies to domestic producers face disciplines under World Trade Organization agreements, without exceptions for environmental purposes. Now green Industrial Policy is gaining popularity as governments search for low-carbon solutions that also provide jobs at home. The strategic trade literature has largely ignored the issue of market failures related to green goods. I consider the market for a new environmental good (such as low-carbon technology) whose downstream consumption provides external benefits (such as reduced emissions). Governments may have some preference for supporting domestic production, such as by interest-group lobbying, introducing a political distortion in their objective function. I examine the national incentives and global rationales for offering production (upstream) and deployment (downstream) subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries. Restraints on upstream subsidies erode global welfare when environmental externalities are large enough relative to political distortions. Climate finance is an effective alternative if political distortions are large and governments do not undervalue carbon costs. Numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy indicate that a modest social cost of carbon can imply benefits from allowing upstream subsidies.
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environmental protection for sale strategic green Industrial Policy and climate finance
MITP: Mitigation Innovation and Transformation Pathways, 2016Co-Authors: Carolyn FischerAbstract:Industrial Policy has long been criticized as subject to protectionist interests; accordingly, subsidies to domestic producers face disciplines under World Trade Organization agreements, without exceptions for environmental purposes. Now green Industrial Policy is gaining popularity as governments search for low-carbon solutions that also provide jobs at home. The strategic trade literature has largely ignored the issue of market failures related to green goods. I consider the market for a new environmental good (like low-carbon technology) whose downstream consumption provides external benefits (like reduced emissions). Governments may have some preference for supporting domestic production, such as by interest-group lobbying, introducing a political distortion in their objective function. I examine the national incentives and global rationales for offering production (upstream) and deployment (downstream) subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries. Restraints on upstream subsidies erode global welfare when environmental externalities are large enough relative to political distortions. Climate finance is an effective alternative if political distortions are large and governments do not undervalue carbon costs. Numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy indicate that a modest social cost of carbon can imply benefits from allowing upstream subsidies.
