Tax Compliance

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Benno Torgler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • trust and power as determinants of Tax Compliance across 44 nations
    Journal of Economic Psychology, 2019
    Co-Authors: Larissa Batrancea, Benno Torgler, Erich Kirchler, Jerome Olsen, Erik Hoelzl, Anca Nichita, Christoph Kogler, Avi Weiss, Jonas Fooken
    Abstract:

    The slippery slope framework of Tax Compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of Tax Compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase Tax Compliance intentions and mitigate intended Tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster Compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary Compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced Compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of Tax Compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for Tax collection.

  • Tax Compliance and psychic costs behavioral experimental evidence using a physiological marker
    Journal of Public Economics, 2016
    Co-Authors: Uwe Dulleck, Jonas Fooken, Cameron J Newton, Andrea Ristl, Markus Schaffner, Benno Torgler
    Abstract:

    Although paying Taxes is a key element of a well-functioning society, there is still limited understanding as to why people actually pay their Taxes. Models emphasizing that Taxpayers make strategic, financially motivated Compliance decisions seemingly assume an overly restrictive view of human nature. Law abidance may be more accurately explained by social norms, a concept that has gained growing importance as research attempts to understand the Tax Compliance puzzle. This study analyzes the influence of psychic stress generated by the possibility of breaking social norms in the Tax Compliance context. We measure psychic stress using heart rate variability (HRV), which captures the psychobiological or neural equivalents of psychic stress that may arise from the contemplation of real or imagined actions, producing immediate physiologic discomfort. The results of our laboratory experiments provide empirical evidence of a positive correlation between psychic stress and Tax Compliance, thus underscoring the importance of moral sentiments for Tax Compliance. We also identify three distinct types of individuals who differ in their levels of psychic stress, Tax morale, and Tax Compliance.

  • Tax Compliance and psychic costs behavioral experimental evidence using a physiological marker
    Research Papers in Economics, 2012
    Co-Authors: Uwe Dulleck, Jonas Fooken, Andrea Ristl, Markus Schaffner, Cameron Newton, Benno Torgler
    Abstract:

    Although paying Taxes is a key element in a well-functioning civilized society, the understanding of why people pay Taxes is still limited. What current evidence shows is that, given relatively low audit probabilities and penalties in case of Tax evasion, Compliance levels are higher than would be predicted by traditional economics-of-crime models. Models emphasizing that Taxpayers make strategic, financially motivated Compliance decisions, seemingly assume an overly restrictive view of human nature. Law abidance may be more accurately explained by social norms, a concept that has gained growing importance as a facet in better understanding the Tax Compliance puzzle. This study analyzes the relation between psychic cost arising from breaking social norms and Tax Compliance using a heart rate variability (HRV) measure that captures the psychobiological or neural equivalents of psychic costs (e.g., feelings of guilt or shame) that may arise from the contemplation of real or imagined actions and produce immediate consequential physiologic discomfort. Specifically, this nonintrusive HRV measurement method obtains information on activity in two branches of the autonomous nervous system (ANS), the excitatory sympathetic nervous system and the inhibitory parasympathetic system. Using time-frequency analysis of the (interpolated) heart rate signal, it identifies the level of activity (power) at different velocities of change (frequencies), whose LF (low frequency) to HF (high frequency band) ratio can be used as an index of sympathovagal balance or psychic stress. Our results, based on a large set of observations in a laboratory setting, provide empirical evidence of a positive correlation between psychic stress and Tax Compliance and thus underscore the importance of moral sentiment in the Tax Compliance context.

  • Tax morale affects Tax Compliance evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment
    Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2009
    Co-Authors: Ronald G Cummings, Jorge Martinezvazquez, Michael Mckee, Benno Torgler
    Abstract:

    Our working hypothesis is that cross-cultural differences in Tax Compliance behavior have foundations in the institutions of Tax administration and citizen assessment of the quality of governance. Tax Compliance being a complex behavioral issue, its investigation requires use of a variety of methods and data sources. Results from artefactual field experiments conducted in countries with substantially different political histories and records of governance quality demonstrate that observed differences in Tax Compliance levels persist over alternative levels of enforcement. The experimental results are shown to be robust by replicating them for the same countries using survey response measures of Tax Compliance.

  • Tax Compliance and Tax morale
    2007
    Co-Authors: Benno Torgler
    Abstract:

    The question of why citizens pay their Taxes has attracted increased attention in the Tax Compliance literature of late. In this book, Benno Torgler considers the evidence that suggests that enforcement efforts cannot fully explain the high degree of Tax Compliance within society. To attempt to resolve this puzzle, numerous researchers have argued that citizens’ attitudes towards paying Taxes (defined as Tax morale) help to explain the high degree of Compliance. Yet most have treated Tax morale itself as a black box, failing to discuss the issues influencing it. This unique volume provides important new insights into the factors that shape the emergence and maintenance of citizens’ willingness to cooperate with Tax legislations in different societies.

Erich Kirchler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Tax Compliance is not fundamentally influenced by incidental emotions an experiment
    Economics of Governance, 2021
    Co-Authors: Janina Enachescu, žiga Puklavec, Jerome Olsen, Erich Kirchler
    Abstract:

    The present study investigates the impact of incidental emotions on Tax Compliance behavior in an experimental setting. Different theories are divided about how experiencing incidental emotions should influence Tax decisions and the few existing studies yield inconsistent results. Our aim was to investigate differences between three specific emotions, namely anger, fear, and happiness. This allowed a comparison in Compliance behavior as a function of differences in emotional valence as well as in specific emotional qualities. For this purpose, a sample of 264 individuals participated in a Tax experiment. After a baseline treatment, one of the three emotions was induced using video-clips with background music. Moreover, emotional arousal was assessed by measuring electrodermal activity. Manipulation check items as well as elevated arousal levels after the emotion induction provided support for a successful emotion induction. Nevertheless, we did not observe any Tax Compliance differences between the anger, fear, and happiness conditions. Our results speak against a fundamental role of incidental emotions for Tax Compliance decisions. Keywords: Tax Compliance, incidental emotions, experiment, emotion induction, electrodermal activity, arousal

  • trust and power as determinants of Tax Compliance across 44 nations
    Journal of Economic Psychology, 2019
    Co-Authors: Larissa Batrancea, Benno Torgler, Erich Kirchler, Jerome Olsen, Erik Hoelzl, Anca Nichita, Christoph Kogler, Avi Weiss, Jonas Fooken
    Abstract:

    The slippery slope framework of Tax Compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of Tax Compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase Tax Compliance intentions and mitigate intended Tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster Compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary Compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced Compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of Tax Compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for Tax collection.

  • cooperative Tax Compliance from deterrence to deference
    Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2014
    Co-Authors: Erich Kirchler, Christoph Kogler, Stephan Muehlbacher
    Abstract:

    The prevailing neoclassical economic view in Tax-behavior research is that trust is good, but control is better. The advice for combating Tax evasion is to deter illegal behavior with rigid audits and harsh fines. But control and punishment may have unintended side effects; therefore, psychological variables (e.g., attitudes toward Taxation, social norms, and perceived fairness) are receiving increased attention. The slippery-slope framework integrates both economic and psychological perspectives on Tax Compliance. It assumes that Taxpayers abide by the law either because they fear detection and fines (enforced Compliance) or because they feel an obligation to honestly contribute their share (voluntary cooperation). Whereas enforced Compliance depends on the power of authorities, voluntary cooperation originates from Taxpayers’ trust in the authorities. A growing body of empirical research supports this framework’s assumptions. The psychological approach to Tax behavior has led to a change in Tax authorit...

  • the slippery slope framework on Tax Compliance an attempt to formalization
    Journal of Economic Psychology, 2014
    Co-Authors: Aloys Prinz, Stephan Muehlbacher, Erich Kirchler
    Abstract:

    Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008) presented with the so-called ‘slippery slope’ framework a new approach to understand Tax Compliance. The slippery slope approach supposes two routes to Tax Compliance: deterrence of Tax evasion by audits and fines on the one hand, and building a trusting relationship with Taxpayers by services and support on the other hand. In this paper, the slippery slope framework is formalized by assuming two groups of Taxpayers: Compliance-minded and evasion-minded persons. Defining reaction functions for persons of both groups with respect to coercive and persuasive power instruments of Tax authorities, the typical slippery slope picture emerges that characterises the authorities’ work. As a consequence, both groups of policy tools are considered necessary to generate Tax Compliance. In addition to that, it is shown that coercive and persuasive power may be substitutes or complements to each other, depending of the parameters of the Taxpayers’ reaction functions. As a further crucial determinant of Tax Compliance, the behaviour of the fellow citizens with respect to Taxpaying is identified.

  • powerful authorities and trusting citizens the slippery slope framework and Tax Compliance in italy
    Journal of Economic Psychology, 2013
    Co-Authors: Barbara Kastlunger, Erich Kirchler, Edoardo Lozza, Alfred Schabmann
    Abstract:

    Abstract The Slippery Slope Framework of Tax Compliance postulates that citizens’ Compliance depends on the power of the authorities to enforce Compliance and/or trust in the authorities and voluntary cooperation. While trust is widely recognized as a strong determinant of cooperation, empirical evidence is less clear on power: severe fines may lead towards Compliance or even have the opposite effect. We propose a thorough investigation of the nature of power (coercive versus legitimate) within the theoretical framework of Tax Compliance to shed light on the ambiguous results and to clarify the complex relation between power and trust. We use structural equation modeling to test the assumptions of the Slippery Slope Framework by taking into account coercive power and legitimate power on a sample of N  =  389 self-employed Italian Taxpayers and entrepreneurs. We found evidence that trust is positively related to voluntary Tax Compliance. Trust was found to be negatively related to coercive power and positively related to legitimate power. Both coercive power and legitimate power were correlated with enforced Compliance. However, the effect of enforced Compliance leads to increased evasion. The results evidence the multifaceted nature of power and trust and their relation with Tax Compliance, and the importance of power and trust in political regulatory strategies.

Ivo Vlaev - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the behavioralist as Tax collector using natural field experiments to enhance Tax Compliance
    Journal of Public Economics, 2017
    Co-Authors: Michael Hallsworth, John A List, Robert Metcalfe, Ivo Vlaev
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper presents results from two large-scale natural field experiments that tested the effect of social norm messages on Tax Compliance. Using administrative data from > 200,000 individuals in the United Kingdom, we show that including social norm messages in standard reminder letters increases payment rates for overdue Tax. This result offers a rare example of social norm messages affecting Tax Compliance behavior in a real world setting. We find no evidence that loss framing is more effective than gain framing. Descriptive norms appear to be more effective than injunctive norms. Messages referring to public services or financial information also significantly increased payment rates. The field experiments accelerated the collection of Tax revenue at little cost.

  • the behavioralist as Tax collector using natural field experiments to enhance Tax Compliance
    Research Papers in Economics, 2014
    Co-Authors: Michael Hallsworth, John A List, Robert Metcalfe, Ivo Vlaev
    Abstract:

    Tax collection problems date back to the earliest recorded history of mankind. This paper begins with a simple theoretical construct of paying (rather than declaring) Taxes, which we argue has been an overlooked aspect of Tax Compliance. This construct is then tested in two large natural field experiments. Using administrative data from more than 200,000 individuals in the UK, we show that including social norms and public goods messages in standard Tax payment reminder letters considerably enhances Tax Compliance. The field experiments increased Taxes collected by the Government in the sample period and were cost-free to implement, demonstrating the potential importance of such interventions in increasing Tax Compliance.

  • the behavioralist as Tax collector using natural field experiments to enhance Tax Compliance
    Social Science Research Network, 2014
    Co-Authors: Michael Hallsworth, John A List, Robert Metcalfe, Ivo Vlaev
    Abstract:

    Tax collection problems date back to the earliest recorded history of mankind. This paper begins with a simple theoretical construct of paying (rather than declaring) Taxes, which we argue has been an overlooked aspect of Tax Compliance. This construct is then tested in two large natural field experiments. Using administrative data from more than 200,000 individuals in the UK, we show that including social norms and public goods messages in standard Tax payment reminder letters considerably enhances Tax Compliance. The field experiments increased Taxes collected by the Government in the sample period and were cost-free to implement, demonstrating the potential importance of such interventions in increasing Tax Compliance.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

John A List - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the behavioralist as Tax collector using natural field experiments to enhance Tax Compliance
    Journal of Public Economics, 2017
    Co-Authors: Michael Hallsworth, John A List, Robert Metcalfe, Ivo Vlaev
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper presents results from two large-scale natural field experiments that tested the effect of social norm messages on Tax Compliance. Using administrative data from > 200,000 individuals in the United Kingdom, we show that including social norm messages in standard reminder letters increases payment rates for overdue Tax. This result offers a rare example of social norm messages affecting Tax Compliance behavior in a real world setting. We find no evidence that loss framing is more effective than gain framing. Descriptive norms appear to be more effective than injunctive norms. Messages referring to public services or financial information also significantly increased payment rates. The field experiments accelerated the collection of Tax revenue at little cost.

  • the behavioralist as Tax collector using natural field experiments to enhance Tax Compliance
    Research Papers in Economics, 2014
    Co-Authors: Michael Hallsworth, John A List, Robert Metcalfe, Ivo Vlaev
    Abstract:

    Tax collection problems date back to the earliest recorded history of mankind. This paper begins with a simple theoretical construct of paying (rather than declaring) Taxes, which we argue has been an overlooked aspect of Tax Compliance. This construct is then tested in two large natural field experiments. Using administrative data from more than 200,000 individuals in the UK, we show that including social norms and public goods messages in standard Tax payment reminder letters considerably enhances Tax Compliance. The field experiments increased Taxes collected by the Government in the sample period and were cost-free to implement, demonstrating the potential importance of such interventions in increasing Tax Compliance.

  • the behavioralist as Tax collector using natural field experiments to enhance Tax Compliance
    Social Science Research Network, 2014
    Co-Authors: Michael Hallsworth, John A List, Robert Metcalfe, Ivo Vlaev
    Abstract:

    Tax collection problems date back to the earliest recorded history of mankind. This paper begins with a simple theoretical construct of paying (rather than declaring) Taxes, which we argue has been an overlooked aspect of Tax Compliance. This construct is then tested in two large natural field experiments. Using administrative data from more than 200,000 individuals in the UK, we show that including social norms and public goods messages in standard Tax payment reminder letters considerably enhances Tax Compliance. The field experiments increased Taxes collected by the Government in the sample period and were cost-free to implement, demonstrating the potential importance of such interventions in increasing Tax Compliance.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Michael Hallsworth - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the behavioralist as Tax collector using natural field experiments to enhance Tax Compliance
    Journal of Public Economics, 2017
    Co-Authors: Michael Hallsworth, John A List, Robert Metcalfe, Ivo Vlaev
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper presents results from two large-scale natural field experiments that tested the effect of social norm messages on Tax Compliance. Using administrative data from > 200,000 individuals in the United Kingdom, we show that including social norm messages in standard reminder letters increases payment rates for overdue Tax. This result offers a rare example of social norm messages affecting Tax Compliance behavior in a real world setting. We find no evidence that loss framing is more effective than gain framing. Descriptive norms appear to be more effective than injunctive norms. Messages referring to public services or financial information also significantly increased payment rates. The field experiments accelerated the collection of Tax revenue at little cost.

  • the behavioralist as Tax collector using natural field experiments to enhance Tax Compliance
    Research Papers in Economics, 2014
    Co-Authors: Michael Hallsworth, John A List, Robert Metcalfe, Ivo Vlaev
    Abstract:

    Tax collection problems date back to the earliest recorded history of mankind. This paper begins with a simple theoretical construct of paying (rather than declaring) Taxes, which we argue has been an overlooked aspect of Tax Compliance. This construct is then tested in two large natural field experiments. Using administrative data from more than 200,000 individuals in the UK, we show that including social norms and public goods messages in standard Tax payment reminder letters considerably enhances Tax Compliance. The field experiments increased Taxes collected by the Government in the sample period and were cost-free to implement, demonstrating the potential importance of such interventions in increasing Tax Compliance.

  • the behavioralist as Tax collector using natural field experiments to enhance Tax Compliance
    Social Science Research Network, 2014
    Co-Authors: Michael Hallsworth, John A List, Robert Metcalfe, Ivo Vlaev
    Abstract:

    Tax collection problems date back to the earliest recorded history of mankind. This paper begins with a simple theoretical construct of paying (rather than declaring) Taxes, which we argue has been an overlooked aspect of Tax Compliance. This construct is then tested in two large natural field experiments. Using administrative data from more than 200,000 individuals in the UK, we show that including social norms and public goods messages in standard Tax payment reminder letters considerably enhances Tax Compliance. The field experiments increased Taxes collected by the Government in the sample period and were cost-free to implement, demonstrating the potential importance of such interventions in increasing Tax Compliance.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.