The Experts below are selected from a list of 207 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Beth A Simmons - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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rules over real estate trade Territorial Conflict and international borders as institution
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2005Co-Authors: Beth A SimmonsAbstract:Territorial disputes between governments generate a significant amount of uncertainty for economic actors. Settled boundary agreements produce benefits to economic agents on both sides of the border. These qualities of borders are missed both by realists, who view Territorial Conflicts in overly zero-sum terms, and globalists, who claim borders are increasingly irrelevant. Settled borders help to secure property rights, signal much greater jurisdictional and policy certainty, and thereby reduce the transactions costs associated with international economic transactions. The plausibility of this claim is examined by showing that Territorial disputes involve significant economic opportunity costs in the form of foregone bilateral trade. Theories of Territorial politics should take into account the possibility of such joint gains in their models of state dispute behavior.
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rules over real estate trade Territorial Conflict and international borders as institutions
Social Science Research Network, 2005Co-Authors: Beth A SimmonsAbstract:Territorial disputes between governments generate a significant amount of uncertainty for economic actors.Settled boundary agreements produce benefits to economic agents on both sides of the border.These qualities of borders are missed both by realists, who view Territorial Conflicts in overly zero-sum terms, and globalists, who claim borders are increasingly irrelevant. I argue that settled borders help to secure property rights, signal much greater jurisdictional and policy certainty, and thereby reduce the costs associated with international economic transactions. The plausibility of this claim is examined by showing that Territorial disputes involve significant economic opportunity costs in the form of foregone bilateral trade. Theories of Territorial politics should take into account the possibility of such joint gains in their models of state dispute behavior.
Douglas M Gibler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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dangerous neighbours regional Territorial Conflict and the democratic peace
British Journal of Political Science, 2013Co-Authors: Douglas M Gibler, Alex BraithwaiteAbstract:The likelihood of Conflict and the observation of joint democracy tend to cluster regionally. This article tests the argument that these clusters can be explained by regional variations in the stability of international borders using a new dataset of Territorial dispute hot spots from 1960–1998. These hot spots identify spatial and temporal correlations in the Territorial dispute data and therefore serve as close proxies for regional or neighbourhood instability. The addition of these hot spots also eliminates a common form of omitted variable bias – the spatial clustering of Conflict – in international Conflict models. These results confirm that joint democracy is only statistically significant as a predictor of fatal militarized interstate disputes in more peaceful neighbourhoods once Territorial hot spots are jointly estimated. The interaction between joint democracy and regional instability confirms that the effects of regime type on continued Conflict apply mostly to dyads in peaceful regions.
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individual identity attachments and international Conflict the importance of Territorial threat
Comparative Political Studies, 2012Co-Authors: Douglas M Gibler, Marc L Hutchison, Steven V MillerAbstract:This article provides some of the first individual-level evidence for the domestic salience of Territorial issues. Using survey data from more than 80,000 individual respondents in 43 separate countries, we examine how Conflict affects the content of individual self-identification. We find that international Conflict exerts a strong influence on the likelihood and content of individual self-identification, but this effect varies with the type of Conflict. Confirming nationalist theories of Territorial salience, Territorial Conflict leads the majority of individuals in targeted countries to identify themselves as citizens of their country. However, individuals in countries that are initiating Territorial disputes are more likely to self-identify as members of a particular ethnicity, which provides support for theories connecting domestic salience to ethnic politics. That Conflict has variegated effects on identity formation suggests the relationship is not endogenous. Our within-case analysis of changes in...
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Territorial issues and international Conflict
2012Co-Authors: Douglas M GiblerAbstract:Introduction Territorial issues are incredibly Conflict-prone. These difficult-to-resolve issues account for more disputes and wars, at a higher rate of escalation, than any other type of issue. This conclusion is well documented, and I describe the empirical basis for the claim very early in this chapter. However, the purpose of this chapter actually rests with developing the ways in which previous studies have treated the domestic political implications of Territorial Conflict. As I describe, almost all explanations of Conflict rely on the salience of Territorial issues to generate a domestic political environment that makes international Conflict initiation likely. Relying mostly on the strong empirical connection between territory and war, studies search for the factor that makes the land valuable to the Conflictinitiating state. An association of ethnic lands, resources, or strategic territory, with Territorial Conflict, also offers proof of the domestic political argument. There is little development, if any, of how Territorial issues actually structure the domestic political bargaining within the state. There are two exceptions to this pattern. First, the Steps-to-War explanation, offered by Vasquez (1993, 2009), finds the relationship between Territorial Conflicts and domestic politics to be somewhat recursive. Territorial Conflicts affect the composition of the leadership by promoting the ascendance of hardliners, and these leadership changes make war more likely.Asecond exception concerns the growing number of studies that examine the ability of democratic institutions to mollify Territorial Conflict.
Todd Allee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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introduction to cmps special issue on Territorial Conflict management 1
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2006Co-Authors: Paul F Diehl, Derrick V Frazier, Todd Allee, Shannon OlearAbstract:1Most of the articles in this special issue were first presented at the Conference on Territorial Conflict Management held at the University of Illinois in October 2004. The editors would like to thank the Hewlett Foundation as well as International Programs and Studies, the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, the Center for International Business Education and Research, the Center for Global Studies, the Department of Political Science, and the Department of Geography for their support of this project.
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when are governments able to reach negotiated settlement agreements an analysis of dispute resolution in Territorial disputes 1919 1995
2006Co-Authors: Todd Allee, Paul K HuthAbstract:It has been well documented that Territorial disputes historically have been a frequent cause of international wars (e.g., Holsti 1991) and that among the various issues at stake in international disputes, the risk of armed Conflict is perhaps greatest when the issue centers on Conflicting claims to territory (e.g., Vasquez 1993, ch. 4; Hensel 2000; Senese and Vasquez 2003). Because Territorial disputes often turn violent, it is imperative to understand not only why Territorial disputes escalate to armed violence, but also when such disputes can be settled, thus averting future violence and bloodshed. Yet much of the scholarship on Territorial disputes focuses on explaining when Territorial disputes will escalate to crises and armed Conflict. In turn, there has been relatively little scholarly work on processes of Territorial Conflict resolution (see however Simmons 1999, 2002; Hensel 2001; Mitchell 2002a). In this chapter, we seek to address this gap in the literature by testing hypotheses about the international and domestic conditions that led states to reach negotiated settlement agreements to end Territorial disputes during the period 1919–1995.
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dimensions of Territorial Conflict and resolution tangible and intangible values of territory
GeoJournal, 2005Co-Authors: Shannon Olear, Paul F Diehl, Derrick V Frazier, Todd AlleeAbstract:Competitions over Territorial control serve as the cornerstones upon which many wars and rivalries have been mounted over the past two centuries and beyond. Disputes over territory form the basis of the IndiaPakistan rivalry (i.e., Kashmir) which is also true for the hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ownership of Jerusalem, rights of return for Palestinian refugees, and the legitimacy of Israeli settlements all with a strong Territorial component represent difficult barriers to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Part of the difficulty is that people on different sides of a Conflict may value the same territory differently. Indeed, even beyond the discipline of Geography, there is recognition that territory is better understood as having dynamic meaning that influences Conflict not just "on-off" features of proximity or contiguity (Starr, 2005). Territory may have tangible or "real" value as measured by population, resources or the number of people killed in a Conflict. The very same territory also may have intangible, symbolic or relational value to others who equate the land with historical claims, attach religious or cultural significance to territory, or recognize third party involvement (Goertz and Diehl, 1992; Newman, 1999; Hensel, 2000). For example, Conflicts over Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and Kurdistan fundamentally raise issues of Territorial control grafted onto broader concerns of ethnicity, religion, and historical memory. Conflict over the control of oil reserves and pipelines, freshwater sources, ocean fish stock and arable land, all of which are gaining increasing attention amidst growing global consumption and advanced technological capabilities, also imply Conflict over territory (Falk, 1971; Le Billon, 2001; Peluso and Watts, 2001). Territorial issues also dominate many ethnic and other intrastate Conflicts.
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the democratic peace and Territorial Conflict in the twentieth century
2003Co-Authors: Paul K Huth, Todd AlleeAbstract:This book presents a systematic reassessment of the theoretical and empirical foundations of the democratic peace literature. Three distinct theoretical models of how domestic political institutions shape the foreign policy choices of state leaders are developed and Huth and Allee then test hypotheses from each model against an original data set of 348 Territorial disputes from 1919–95. Each Territorial dispute is divided into three separate but related phases for empirical analysis: Challenge the Status Quo Stage, Negotiation Stage and Military Escalation Stage. Their statistical results provide strong support for the importance of democratic accountability and norms in shaping decisions to negotiate and settle disputes as well as to threaten force and escalate to war. The findings of this book address central debates and provide many insights into understanding when and why democratic leaders engage in cooperative or confrontational foreign policies.
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the democratic peace and Territorial Conflict in the twentieth century another study of democracy and international Conflict
2003Co-Authors: Paul K Huth, Todd AlleeAbstract:Introduction Over the past decade numerous books and countless articles have been published on the theoretical and empirical relationship between democracy and international Conflict. The central theoretical claim advanced by scholars is that decisions by state leaders to rely upon either peaceful diplomacy or military force as the means to resolve international disputes are influenced by the political institutions and norms of political competition and Conflict resolution within states. As a result, analysts have argued that patterns of international Conflict behavior should vary between democratic and non-democratic countries because of differences in the degree of state leaders' political accountability, or the strength of nonviolent norms of resolving political Conflict among political elites (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999; Dixon 1993, 1994, 1998; Doyle 1986; Kahl 1998/99; Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993; Owen 1994, 1997; Raymond 1994; Rummel 1983, 1985; Russett 1993; Schweller 1992; Weart 1998). In empirical research scholars have examined patterns of military Conflict between democracies and non-democracies, as well as among the two types of states. Two different conclusions have emerged from empirical findings. The first, more widely accepted, claim is that while democratic states rarely if ever go to war against each other, they do adopt more confrontational diplomatic and military policies towards non-democratic states. Thus, patterns of military Conflict between democracies and non-democracies are not very different from patterns of military Conflict among non-democracies.
Paul K Huth - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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when are governments able to reach negotiated settlement agreements an analysis of dispute resolution in Territorial disputes 1919 1995
2006Co-Authors: Todd Allee, Paul K HuthAbstract:It has been well documented that Territorial disputes historically have been a frequent cause of international wars (e.g., Holsti 1991) and that among the various issues at stake in international disputes, the risk of armed Conflict is perhaps greatest when the issue centers on Conflicting claims to territory (e.g., Vasquez 1993, ch. 4; Hensel 2000; Senese and Vasquez 2003). Because Territorial disputes often turn violent, it is imperative to understand not only why Territorial disputes escalate to armed violence, but also when such disputes can be settled, thus averting future violence and bloodshed. Yet much of the scholarship on Territorial disputes focuses on explaining when Territorial disputes will escalate to crises and armed Conflict. In turn, there has been relatively little scholarly work on processes of Territorial Conflict resolution (see however Simmons 1999, 2002; Hensel 2001; Mitchell 2002a). In this chapter, we seek to address this gap in the literature by testing hypotheses about the international and domestic conditions that led states to reach negotiated settlement agreements to end Territorial disputes during the period 1919–1995.
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the democratic peace and Territorial Conflict in the twentieth century
2003Co-Authors: Paul K Huth, Todd AlleeAbstract:This book presents a systematic reassessment of the theoretical and empirical foundations of the democratic peace literature. Three distinct theoretical models of how domestic political institutions shape the foreign policy choices of state leaders are developed and Huth and Allee then test hypotheses from each model against an original data set of 348 Territorial disputes from 1919–95. Each Territorial dispute is divided into three separate but related phases for empirical analysis: Challenge the Status Quo Stage, Negotiation Stage and Military Escalation Stage. Their statistical results provide strong support for the importance of democratic accountability and norms in shaping decisions to negotiate and settle disputes as well as to threaten force and escalate to war. The findings of this book address central debates and provide many insights into understanding when and why democratic leaders engage in cooperative or confrontational foreign policies.
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the democratic peace and Territorial Conflict in the twentieth century another study of democracy and international Conflict
2003Co-Authors: Paul K Huth, Todd AlleeAbstract:Introduction Over the past decade numerous books and countless articles have been published on the theoretical and empirical relationship between democracy and international Conflict. The central theoretical claim advanced by scholars is that decisions by state leaders to rely upon either peaceful diplomacy or military force as the means to resolve international disputes are influenced by the political institutions and norms of political competition and Conflict resolution within states. As a result, analysts have argued that patterns of international Conflict behavior should vary between democratic and non-democratic countries because of differences in the degree of state leaders' political accountability, or the strength of nonviolent norms of resolving political Conflict among political elites (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999; Dixon 1993, 1994, 1998; Doyle 1986; Kahl 1998/99; Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993; Owen 1994, 1997; Raymond 1994; Rummel 1983, 1985; Russett 1993; Schweller 1992; Weart 1998). In empirical research scholars have examined patterns of military Conflict between democracies and non-democracies, as well as among the two types of states. Two different conclusions have emerged from empirical findings. The first, more widely accepted, claim is that while democratic states rarely if ever go to war against each other, they do adopt more confrontational diplomatic and military policies towards non-democratic states. Thus, patterns of military Conflict between democracies and non-democracies are not very different from patterns of military Conflict among non-democracies.
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the democratic peace and Territorial Conflict in the twentieth century empirical results for decisions to escalate with military force
2003Co-Authors: Paul K Huth, Todd AlleeAbstract:In this final empirical chapter we analyze the decisions of leaders in challenger and target states to risk war by escalating military confrontations in Territorial disputes. The military confrontations we examine in this chapter are those initiated by the challenger either through threats of force, military movements and deployments, or the limited use of force in disputed territory (see Chapter 7). Once again, we test the hypotheses derived from our four models to determine which international politico-military and domestic political conditions influence policy choices in this Escalation Stage. Estimation of the Escalation Stage We estimate the Military Escalation Stage in a manner that parallels our estimation of the Negotiations Stage in Chapter 8. However, instead of explaining whether state leaders make concessions once they have entered into a round of talks, our focus now shifts to an examination of whether the challenger or target escalates the use of military force now that the two states are engaged in a military confrontation. We once again employ a bivariate probit model to examine the escalation decisions of both the challenger and the target. As we discussed in the previous chapter, bivariate probit models take into account many of the strategic dynamics inherent to the Military Escalation Stage, yet still allow us to test separate sets of hypotheses for each of the two states embroiled in a militarized dispute. Furthermore, we find particularly strong evidence to justify the use of a bivariate model to test the Escalation Stage hypotheses.
Alex Braithwaite - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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dangerous neighbours regional Territorial Conflict and the democratic peace
British Journal of Political Science, 2013Co-Authors: Douglas M Gibler, Alex BraithwaiteAbstract:The likelihood of Conflict and the observation of joint democracy tend to cluster regionally. This article tests the argument that these clusters can be explained by regional variations in the stability of international borders using a new dataset of Territorial dispute hot spots from 1960–1998. These hot spots identify spatial and temporal correlations in the Territorial dispute data and therefore serve as close proxies for regional or neighbourhood instability. The addition of these hot spots also eliminates a common form of omitted variable bias – the spatial clustering of Conflict – in international Conflict models. These results confirm that joint democracy is only statistically significant as a predictor of fatal militarized interstate disputes in more peaceful neighbourhoods once Territorial hot spots are jointly estimated. The interaction between joint democracy and regional instability confirms that the effects of regime type on continued Conflict apply mostly to dyads in peaceful regions.