The Experts below are selected from a list of 24402 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Xiaohang Yue - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Trade Promotion mode choice and information sharing in fashion retail supply chains
International Journal of Production Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Hisashi Kurata, Xiaohang YueAbstract:Abstract Trade Promotion has a significant impact on the retail business, particularly in the fashion sectors. Manufacturers have traditionally been concerned with the inefficiency of Trade Promotion due to the low pass-through rate of the Trade deals from retailers to customers. The scan-back (SB) Trade deal, which monitors a retailer's sales via an IT system, benefits the manufacturer, but may or may not benefit the retailer. We provide insight into when a retailer in a two-stage supply chain has incentive to accept the SB Trade deal. We show that (1) the manufacturer and the entire supply chain can always benefit from the SB Trade deal while the retailer benefits only under some conditions, and that (2) both the retailer and the manufacturer can benefit from the SB Trade deal if the SB deal is accompanied by a buyback (BB) contract. We examine the effect of a retailer's confidential pass-through rate on both the retailer's and the manufacturer's incentives to use the SB Trade deal.
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Trade Promotion Mode Choice and Information Sharing in Fashion Retail Supply Chains
Fashion Supply Chain Management, 1Co-Authors: Hisashi Kurata, Xiaohang Yue, Layth C. AlwanAbstract:Trade Promotion has a significant impact on the fashion retail business. Manufacturers have traditionally been concerned with the inefficient Trade Promotion due to the low pass-through rate of the Trade deals from retailers to customers. The scan-back (SB) Trade deal, which monitors a retailer’s sales via an IT system, benefits the manufacturer, but may or may not benefit the retailer. We provide insight into when a retailer has incentive to accept the SB Trade deal. We show that (1) the manufacturer and the entire supply chain can always benefit from the SB Trade deal while the retailer benefits only under some conditions, and that (2) both the retailer and the manufacturer can benefit from the SB Trade deal if the SB deal is accompanied by a buyback contract. We examine the effect of a retailer’s confidential pass-through rate on a firm’s incentive to use the SB Trade deal.
Hisashi Kurata - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Trade Promotion mode choice and information sharing in fashion retail supply chains
International Journal of Production Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Hisashi Kurata, Xiaohang YueAbstract:Abstract Trade Promotion has a significant impact on the retail business, particularly in the fashion sectors. Manufacturers have traditionally been concerned with the inefficiency of Trade Promotion due to the low pass-through rate of the Trade deals from retailers to customers. The scan-back (SB) Trade deal, which monitors a retailer's sales via an IT system, benefits the manufacturer, but may or may not benefit the retailer. We provide insight into when a retailer in a two-stage supply chain has incentive to accept the SB Trade deal. We show that (1) the manufacturer and the entire supply chain can always benefit from the SB Trade deal while the retailer benefits only under some conditions, and that (2) both the retailer and the manufacturer can benefit from the SB Trade deal if the SB deal is accompanied by a buyback (BB) contract. We examine the effect of a retailer's confidential pass-through rate on both the retailer's and the manufacturer's incentives to use the SB Trade deal.
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Trade Promotion Mode Choice and Information Sharing in Fashion Retail Supply Chains
Fashion Supply Chain Management, 1Co-Authors: Hisashi Kurata, Xiaohang Yue, Layth C. AlwanAbstract:Trade Promotion has a significant impact on the fashion retail business. Manufacturers have traditionally been concerned with the inefficient Trade Promotion due to the low pass-through rate of the Trade deals from retailers to customers. The scan-back (SB) Trade deal, which monitors a retailer’s sales via an IT system, benefits the manufacturer, but may or may not benefit the retailer. We provide insight into when a retailer has incentive to accept the SB Trade deal. We show that (1) the manufacturer and the entire supply chain can always benefit from the SB Trade deal while the retailer benefits only under some conditions, and that (2) both the retailer and the manufacturer can benefit from the SB Trade deal if the SB deal is accompanied by a buyback contract. We examine the effect of a retailer’s confidential pass-through rate on a firm’s incentive to use the SB Trade deal.
Murk Van Busschbach - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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reference system architecture for Trade Promotion management leveraging business intelligence technologies and decision support systems
Congress on Evolutionary Computation, 2011Co-Authors: Andra Bianca Balmus, Mariaeugenia Iacob, Marten Van Sinderen, Murk Van BusschbachAbstract:Working towards gaining competitive advantage and establishing stable relationships with their supply chain intermediaries, fast moving consumer goods companies are currently focusing their attention on intelligent, goal-based funds investment. Traditional Trade Promotion management systems (TPMS), however, fail to provide the complex, yet flexible analytical functionality required for accurate tracing of Promotional effectiveness and optimization of Trade Promotional spending. Most commonly encountered issues range from unreliable, inaccurate and inconsistent data and low user friendliness of the system to complicated, inflexible and time-consuming reporting. In this paper, we design the first reference system architecture integrating business intelligence technologies with Trade Promotion management systems, meeting the business needs and rendering high-quality reporting services to the end users. Our proposed architecture incorporates a reference Trade Promotion management process and is the first architecture model extending the in-built functionality of TPMS with BI tools. We outline the theoretical foundations and the design principles of the architecture and evaluate its validity with 19 interviews and one case study following the TOGAF ADM steps. Despite the time restriction for further validation, the architecture is based on extensive academic and industry literature and the evaluation confirmed its potential of solving common issues of current Trade Promotion management systems.
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CEC - Reference System Architecture for Trade Promotion Management: Leveraging Business Intelligence Technologies and Decision Support Systems
2011 IEEE 13th Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing, 2011Co-Authors: Andra Bianca Balmus, Mariaeugenia Iacob, Marten Van Sinderen, Murk Van BusschbachAbstract:Working towards gaining competitive advantage and establishing stable relationships with their supply chain intermediaries, fast moving consumer goods companies are currently focusing their attention on intelligent, goal-based funds investment. Traditional Trade Promotion management systems (TPMS), however, fail to provide the complex, yet flexible analytical functionality required for accurate tracing of Promotional effectiveness and optimization of Trade Promotional spending. Most commonly encountered issues range from unreliable, inaccurate and inconsistent data and low user friendliness of the system to complicated, inflexible and time-consuming reporting. In this paper, we design the first reference system architecture integrating business intelligence technologies with Trade Promotion management systems, meeting the business needs and rendering high-quality reporting services to the end users. Our proposed architecture incorporates a reference Trade Promotion management process and is the first architecture model extending the in-built functionality of TPMS with BI tools. We outline the theoretical foundations and the design principles of the architecture and evaluate its validity with 19 interviews and one case study following the TOGAF ADM steps. Despite the time restriction for further validation, the architecture is based on extensive academic and industry literature and the evaluation confirmed its potential of solving common issues of current Trade Promotion management systems.
Layth C. Alwan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Trade Promotion Mode Choice and Information Sharing in Fashion Retail Supply Chains
Fashion Supply Chain Management, 1Co-Authors: Hisashi Kurata, Xiaohang Yue, Layth C. AlwanAbstract:Trade Promotion has a significant impact on the fashion retail business. Manufacturers have traditionally been concerned with the inefficient Trade Promotion due to the low pass-through rate of the Trade deals from retailers to customers. The scan-back (SB) Trade deal, which monitors a retailer’s sales via an IT system, benefits the manufacturer, but may or may not benefit the retailer. We provide insight into when a retailer has incentive to accept the SB Trade deal. We show that (1) the manufacturer and the entire supply chain can always benefit from the SB Trade deal while the retailer benefits only under some conditions, and that (2) both the retailer and the manufacturer can benefit from the SB Trade deal if the SB deal is accompanied by a buyback contract. We examine the effect of a retailer’s confidential pass-through rate on a firm’s incentive to use the SB Trade deal.
Vithala R. Rao - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Trade Promotion Decisions Under Demand Uncertainty: A Market Experiment Approach
Management Science, 2013Co-Authors: Hong Yuan, Miguel I. Gómez, Vithala R. RaoAbstract:In this paper, we examine Trade Promotion decisions in manufacturer–retailer channels where retailers face consumer demand uncertainty. We first present the theoretical analysis for two types of markets where Trade Promotion discounts are offered either as off-invoices or as scan-backs. We derive propositions by comparing wholesale and retail prices, retailer order quantities, and profits given the same Trade Promotion discount. Next, we extend the basic model so that the amount of Trade Promotion discount influences market expansion and solve for the optimal discount level. To test our theory, we then employ market experiments where we manipulate demand uncertainty and market expansion. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that wholesale and retail prices are higher and retailer order quantities lower when the same amount of Trade Promotion discount is allocated to scan-backs versus off-invoices. In the market expansion condition, we find that manufacturers offer deeper discounts when tra...
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A Market Experiment on Trade Promotion Budget and Allocation
2009Co-Authors: Miguel I. Gómez, Vithala R. Rao, Hong YuanAbstract:We design a market experiment to examine how firm size and ability to choose Trade Promotion types influence Trade Promotion budget, its allocation and channel profits. Our experimental results show that larger manufacturers offer smaller Trade Promotion budgets. Manufacturers with ability to influence the allocation decision favor scan-backs while retailers favor off-invoices. Trade Promotion decisions affect profit sharing within the channel but not total channel profit. We validate these findings with an econometric analysis of survey data from supermarket executives. Overall, our results suggest that market experiments can shed light on Trade Promotion outcomes for which industry data are sparse.
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Market power and Trade Promotions in US supermarkets
British Food Journal, 2009Co-Authors: Miguel I. Gómez, Vithala R. RaoAbstract:Purpose – Trade Promotions are manufacturer incentives directed to retailers rather than to consumers, aiming at influencing retailer's sales, prices and merchandising practices. Although they are a growing element in the Promotional mix of food manufacturers worldwide, Trade Promotions often raise concerns about their impacts on performance and coordination in the food supply chain, which in turn affect retail food prices. This paper aims to measure the influence of market power on the outcomes of Trade Promotions negotiated between food manufacturers and supermarkets.Design/methodology/approach – The paper employs Rangan's conceptual model to develop hypotheses about the links between three dimensions of market power (size, brand and institutional power) and Trade Promotion budgets and their allocation between discount‐ and performance‐based types. The paper employs Trade Promotion data collected from 36 supermarkets in the USA to statistically test these links.Findings – The results suggest that brand,...
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Effects of Channel Power on Trade Promotion Budget and Allocation: A Market Experimental Analysis
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009Co-Authors: Vithala R. Rao, Hong Yuan, Miguel I. GómezAbstract:We design a market experiment to examine the impact of channel power on Trade Promotion budget and its allocation. Our experimental results show that a manufacturer with higher channel power offers a smaller percentage Trade Promotion budget and decreases allocation to discount-based Promotions such as off-invoices. Conversely, a retailer with higher channel power tends to receive larger Trade Promotion budgets and to increase allocation to discount-based Promotions. We validate these findings with econometric analysis of industry data. Overall, results suggest that market experiments can shed light on complex negotiations in the distribution channel for which industry data are often hard to obtain. We discuss implications of our results for managers and policy makers.
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Empirical Analysis of Budget and Allocation of Trade Promotions in the U.S. Supermarket Industry
Journal of Marketing Research, 2007Co-Authors: Miguel I. Gómez, Vithala R. Rao, Edward W. MclaughlinAbstract:Abstract Using a unique data set, the authors examine the role of manufacturer and retailer characteristics in the joint determination of Trade Promotion budgets for supermarket brands and their allocation across Trade Promotion types. They find that manufacturer variables, such as brand position in retailer product category and brand price premium, and annual retailer sales determine Trade Promotion budgets. Furthermore, retail companies with larger shares of private labels in product category sales, larger annual sales, and stronger brand positioning are able to increase the allocation of Promotional funds to off-invoices and decrease allocation to performance-based Trade Promotions, such as scanbacks/accruals and billbacks. Manufacturers with formal Trade Promotion policies tend to decrease allocation to off-invoices. The authors discuss marketing policy implications of this study and provide research directions.
