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Conor Mchugh - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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epistemic deontology and voluntariness
Erkenntnis, 2012Co-Authors: Conor MchughAbstract:We tend to prescribe and appraise doxastic states in terms that are broadly deontic. According to a simple argument, such prescriptions and appraisals are improper, because they wrongly presuppose that our doxastic states are voluntary. One strategy for resisting this argument, recently endorsed by a number of philosophers, is to claim that our doxastic states are in fact voluntary (This strategy has been pursued by Steup 2008; Weatherson 2008). In this paper I argue that this strategy is neither successful nor necessary. Our doxastic states are not voluntary in any interesting sense. But once we see why our doxastic states are not voluntary, we can also see that there is no apparent reason to think that deontic prescriptions and appraisals—epistemic ones, at any rate—presuppose doxastic Voluntarism. Indeed, there is good reason to deny that they do so. Finally, I diagnose the misleading attraction of the idea that what I call ‘epistemic deontology’ presupposes doxastic Voluntarism.
Cunha, Vítor Souza - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A VOLUNTARIEDADE NO SISTEMA DE JUSTIÇA PENAL CONSENSUAL: UMA REFLEXÃO ANALÍTICO-COMPORTAMENTAL A PARTIR DA TEORIA DA ESCOLHA RACIONAL
'International Journal of Professional Business Review', 2021Co-Authors: Julio Cesar De ,aguiar, Cunha, Vítor SouzaAbstract:Objetivos: O artigo busca discutir a questão da voluntariedade na celebração de acordos no âmbito da justiça criminal consensual. Com base na teoria da escolha racional e na análise comportamental do direito, o artigo pretende esclarecer se a sujeição à persecução penal restringe a autonomia da vontade dos indivíduos de modo a impedi-los de optar de forma racional e deliberada pela celebração de acordos penais.Metodologia: A pesquisa, que adota uma abordagem indutiva, utiliza a técnica de pesquisa bibliográfica e documental. Seu objetivo metodológico é exploratório e propositivo.Resultados: O artigo demonstrará, com amparo nos alicerces teóricos da concepção behaviorista radical de liberdade, que os estímulos positivos instituídos para influenciar a escolha não esvaziam a voluntariedade dos acusados na justiça criminal consensual.Contribuições: O artigo apresenta um ferramental teórico inovador e ainda pouco explorado no debate acadêmico nacional para demonstrar que a voluntariedade é compatível com o sistema de justiça criminal consensual. O presente estudo, por isso, poderá ser de grande valia para orientar a aplicação dos acordos penais.Palavras-chave: Justiça Consensual; Acordos penais; Voluntariedade; Análise comportamental do direito; Teoria da escolha racional. ABSTRACTObjective: The paper aims to discuss the issue of Voluntarism in the concluding of criminal agreements in the field of the consensual criminal justice system. Based on the rational choice theory and behavioral analysis of law, the study intends to answer whether the condition of the defendant in a criminal prosecution restricts the autonomy of the individuals' will in a way that prevents them from rationally and deliberately choosing whether or not to conclude criminal agreements.Methodology: The research, adopting an inductive approach, uses a bibliographic and documental research technique. Its methodological objective is exploratory and propositional.Results: Based on the theoretical assumptions of the radical behaviorist conception of freedom, the paper will show that the positive reinforcements created to influence choice do not prevent Voluntarism in the behavior of the defendants in the field of the consensual criminal justice systemContributions: The paper presents an innovative and little explored theoretical approach to demonstrate that Voluntarism is compatible with the consensual criminal justice system. This research, therefore, may contribute to guide the implementation of criminal agreementsKeywords: Consensual criminal justice; Criminal agreements; Voluntariness; Behavioral analysis of law; Rational choice theory
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A VOLUNTARIEDADE NO SISTEMA DE JUSTIÇA PENAL CONSENSUAL: UMA REFLEXÃO ANALÍTICO-COMPORTAMENTAL A PARTIR DA TEORIA DA ESCOLHA RACIONAL
'International Journal of Professional Business Review', 2020Co-Authors: Julio Cesar De ,aguiar, Cunha, Vítor SouzaAbstract:RESUMOObjetivos: O artigo busca discutir a questão da voluntariedade na celebração de acordos no âmbito da justiça criminal consensual. Com base na teoria da escolha racional e na análise comportamental do direito, o artigo pretende esclarecer se a sujeição à persecução penal restringe a autonomia da vontade dos indivíduos de modo a impedi-los de optar de forma racional e deliberada pela celebração de acordos penais.Metodologia: A pesquisa, que adota uma abordagem indutiva, utiliza a técnica de pesquisa bibliográfica e documental. Seu objetivo metodológico é exploratório e propositivo.Resultados: O artigo demonstrará, com amparo nos alicerces teóricos da concepção behaviorista radical de liberdade, que os estímulos positivos instituídos para influenciar a escolha não esvaziam a voluntariedade dos acusados na justiça criminal consensual.Contribuições: O artigo apresenta um ferramental teórico inovador e ainda pouco explorado no debate acadêmico nacional para demonstrar que a voluntariedade é compatível com o sistema de justiça criminal consensual. O presente estudo, por isso, poderá ser de grande valia para orientar a aplicação dos acordos penais.Palavras-Chave: Justiça Consensual. Acordos penais. Voluntariedade. Análise comportamental do direito. Teoria da escolha racional. ABSTRACTObjective: The paper aims to discuss the issue of Voluntarism in the concluding of criminal agreements in the field of the consensual criminal justice system. Based on the rational choice theory and behavioral analysis of law, the study intends to answer whether the condition of the defendant in a criminal prosecution restricts the autonomy of the individuals' will in a way that prevents them from rationally and deliberately choosing whether or not to conclude criminal agreements.Methodology: The research, adopting an inductive approach, uses a bibliographic and documental research technique. Its methodological objective is exploratory and propositional.Results: Based on the theoretical assumptions of the radical behaviorist conception of freedom, the paper will show that the positive reinforcements created to influence choice do not prevent Voluntarism in the behavior of the defendants in the field of the consensual criminal justice systemContributions: The paper presents an innovative and little explored theoretical approach to demonstrate that Voluntarism is compatible with the consensual criminal justice system. This research, therefore, may contribute to guide the implementation of criminal agreementsKeywords: Consensual criminal justice. Criminal agreements. Voluntariness. Behavioral analysis of law. Rational choice theor
Julio Cesar De ,aguiar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A VOLUNTARIEDADE NO SISTEMA DE JUSTIÇA PENAL CONSENSUAL: UMA REFLEXÃO ANALÍTICO-COMPORTAMENTAL A PARTIR DA TEORIA DA ESCOLHA RACIONAL
'International Journal of Professional Business Review', 2021Co-Authors: Julio Cesar De ,aguiar, Cunha, Vítor SouzaAbstract:Objetivos: O artigo busca discutir a questão da voluntariedade na celebração de acordos no âmbito da justiça criminal consensual. Com base na teoria da escolha racional e na análise comportamental do direito, o artigo pretende esclarecer se a sujeição à persecução penal restringe a autonomia da vontade dos indivíduos de modo a impedi-los de optar de forma racional e deliberada pela celebração de acordos penais.Metodologia: A pesquisa, que adota uma abordagem indutiva, utiliza a técnica de pesquisa bibliográfica e documental. Seu objetivo metodológico é exploratório e propositivo.Resultados: O artigo demonstrará, com amparo nos alicerces teóricos da concepção behaviorista radical de liberdade, que os estímulos positivos instituídos para influenciar a escolha não esvaziam a voluntariedade dos acusados na justiça criminal consensual.Contribuições: O artigo apresenta um ferramental teórico inovador e ainda pouco explorado no debate acadêmico nacional para demonstrar que a voluntariedade é compatível com o sistema de justiça criminal consensual. O presente estudo, por isso, poderá ser de grande valia para orientar a aplicação dos acordos penais.Palavras-chave: Justiça Consensual; Acordos penais; Voluntariedade; Análise comportamental do direito; Teoria da escolha racional. ABSTRACTObjective: The paper aims to discuss the issue of Voluntarism in the concluding of criminal agreements in the field of the consensual criminal justice system. Based on the rational choice theory and behavioral analysis of law, the study intends to answer whether the condition of the defendant in a criminal prosecution restricts the autonomy of the individuals' will in a way that prevents them from rationally and deliberately choosing whether or not to conclude criminal agreements.Methodology: The research, adopting an inductive approach, uses a bibliographic and documental research technique. Its methodological objective is exploratory and propositional.Results: Based on the theoretical assumptions of the radical behaviorist conception of freedom, the paper will show that the positive reinforcements created to influence choice do not prevent Voluntarism in the behavior of the defendants in the field of the consensual criminal justice systemContributions: The paper presents an innovative and little explored theoretical approach to demonstrate that Voluntarism is compatible with the consensual criminal justice system. This research, therefore, may contribute to guide the implementation of criminal agreementsKeywords: Consensual criminal justice; Criminal agreements; Voluntariness; Behavioral analysis of law; Rational choice theory
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A VOLUNTARIEDADE NO SISTEMA DE JUSTIÇA PENAL CONSENSUAL: UMA REFLEXÃO ANALÍTICO-COMPORTAMENTAL A PARTIR DA TEORIA DA ESCOLHA RACIONAL
'International Journal of Professional Business Review', 2020Co-Authors: Julio Cesar De ,aguiar, Cunha, Vítor SouzaAbstract:RESUMOObjetivos: O artigo busca discutir a questão da voluntariedade na celebração de acordos no âmbito da justiça criminal consensual. Com base na teoria da escolha racional e na análise comportamental do direito, o artigo pretende esclarecer se a sujeição à persecução penal restringe a autonomia da vontade dos indivíduos de modo a impedi-los de optar de forma racional e deliberada pela celebração de acordos penais.Metodologia: A pesquisa, que adota uma abordagem indutiva, utiliza a técnica de pesquisa bibliográfica e documental. Seu objetivo metodológico é exploratório e propositivo.Resultados: O artigo demonstrará, com amparo nos alicerces teóricos da concepção behaviorista radical de liberdade, que os estímulos positivos instituídos para influenciar a escolha não esvaziam a voluntariedade dos acusados na justiça criminal consensual.Contribuições: O artigo apresenta um ferramental teórico inovador e ainda pouco explorado no debate acadêmico nacional para demonstrar que a voluntariedade é compatível com o sistema de justiça criminal consensual. O presente estudo, por isso, poderá ser de grande valia para orientar a aplicação dos acordos penais.Palavras-Chave: Justiça Consensual. Acordos penais. Voluntariedade. Análise comportamental do direito. Teoria da escolha racional. ABSTRACTObjective: The paper aims to discuss the issue of Voluntarism in the concluding of criminal agreements in the field of the consensual criminal justice system. Based on the rational choice theory and behavioral analysis of law, the study intends to answer whether the condition of the defendant in a criminal prosecution restricts the autonomy of the individuals' will in a way that prevents them from rationally and deliberately choosing whether or not to conclude criminal agreements.Methodology: The research, adopting an inductive approach, uses a bibliographic and documental research technique. Its methodological objective is exploratory and propositional.Results: Based on the theoretical assumptions of the radical behaviorist conception of freedom, the paper will show that the positive reinforcements created to influence choice do not prevent Voluntarism in the behavior of the defendants in the field of the consensual criminal justice systemContributions: The paper presents an innovative and little explored theoretical approach to demonstrate that Voluntarism is compatible with the consensual criminal justice system. This research, therefore, may contribute to guide the implementation of criminal agreementsKeywords: Consensual criminal justice. Criminal agreements. Voluntariness. Behavioral analysis of law. Rational choice theor
Tattay Szilárd - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Suárez mint a modern racionalista természetjogtanok előfutára?
Doctoral School of Philosophy University of Szeged (Hungary) and Fondation Pro Philosophia Szegediensi, 2020Co-Authors: Tattay SzilárdAbstract:Francisco Suárez természetjogtana mindig is radikálisan eltérő interpretációk tárgya volt. Főszabályként azt lehet mondani, hogy azok a neotomista és más kommentátorok, akik azért kárhoztatják, vagy éppenséggel dicsérik Suárezt, mert bizonyos kérdésekben eltért Aquinói Szent Tamás álláspontjától, és nominalista nézeteket fogadott el, többnyire voluntaristának tartják a doctor eximiust; míg elméletének azon elemzői, akik egy kreatív újítót látnak benne a tomista táboron belül, hajlanak rá (bár nem minden fenntartás nélkül), hogy racionalistának tekintsék, aki egyértelműen elutasította Ockham és Scotus voluntarizmusát. Létezik azonban Suárez természetjogtanának egy harmadik bevett, sőt egyre inkább elterjedt olvasata is, amely szerint a jezsuita teológus az ellenkező irányban tért el a tomista gondolkodási hagyománytól: a modern racionalizmus és a szekularizált természetjogi felfogás útját készítette elő. Ez utóbbi értelmezés kiindulópontját az az álláspont képezi, mely szerint Suárez a lényeget illetően elfogadta Gabriel Vázquez intellektualista pozícióját (Jean-François Courtine), vagy legalábbis nagyon közel került hozzá (John Finnis, Thomas Pink). Így „az isteni akarat alapvetően Suáreznél is kötve marad a dolgok racionális természetéhez. […] Az isteni akarat az önmagában létező jóhoz vagy rosszhoz csupán a speciális, isteni jogi kötelességet fűzi hozzá” (Hans Welzel). E nézetet pedig már csak egy hajszál választja el Grotius híres „etiamsi daremus”-hipotézisétől. Előadásomban elsősorban ez utóbbi interpretációval fogok foglalkozni. Amellett fogok érvelni, hogy a suárezi szintézis voluntarista elemei – a doctor eximius jól ismert voluntarista törvényfogalma általában és viszonylag ritkán elemzett „örök törvény”-koncepciója különösen – teljes mértékben kizárják ezt az értelmezést. Francisco Suárez’ theory of natural law has always been the object of radically divergent interpretations. As a general rule, those commentators who blame or praise Suárez for departing from Aquinas and adopting nominalist philosophical principles generally regard him as a voluntarist, while scholars seeing in him a creative innovator inside the Thomist camp are inclined to consider him as a kind of rationalist who clearly rejected the Voluntarism of Ockham and Scotus. A third type of interpretation suggests that Suárez deviated from the Thomistic natural law tradition in the opposite direction, so that he prepared the way for modern rationalism and secularized natural law theory. The starting point of this latter reading of Suárez is that he “concedes the essence” (Jean-François Courtine), or “comes close to conceding the substance” (Thomas Pink) of Gabriel Vázquez’ intellectualist position, or „is brought to the brink of” accepting it (John Finnis). Thus, “fundamentally, the divine will remains also in Suárez bound to the rational nature of things. […] To the self-existing good or evil God’s will only appends the special obligation of divine law” (Hans Welzel), which view is only one step from Grotius’ famous “etiamsi daremus” hypothesis. This paper is mainly intended to refute this line of argumentation. I will argue that the voluntarist elements of the Suárezian synthesis absolutely preclude such an interpretation – not only his well-known general concept of law but also his often neglected notion of ‘lex aeterna’ to which I attribute a key role in this respect
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Francisco Suárez as the forerunner of modern rationalist natural law theories?
Universidad de Extremadura, 2017Co-Authors: Tattay SzilárdAbstract:La teoría de la ley natural de Francisco Suárez ha sido objeto de interpretaciones radicalmente divergentes. Como norma general, los comentaristas que acusan o alaban a Suárez por apartarse de Tomás de Aquino y por adoptar principios filosóficos nominalistas, generalmente lo consideran un voluntarista, mientras que los estudiosos que ven en él un innovador creativo dentro del ala tomista, se inclinan por considerarlo como una especie de racionalista que rechaza claramente el Voluntarismo de Ockham y Escoto. Un tercer tipo de interpretación sugiere que Suárez se apartó de la tradición tomista de la ley natural en una dirección opuesta, de modo tal que preparó el camino para el racionalismo moderno y la teoría secularizada de la ley natural. El punto de partida de esta última lectura reside en que él "concede lo esencial" (Jean-François Courtine), o “está cerca de conceder la substancia” (Thomas Pink) de la posición intelectualista de Gabriel Vázquez, o "es llevado al umbral de” su aceptación (John Finnis). Por tanto, “fundamentalmente, la voluntad divina sigue estando también en Suárez ligada a la naturaleza racional de las cosas. […] Al bien o mal existente en sí mismo, la voluntad de Dios solo añade la obligación especial de la ley divina” (Hans Welzel), visión que está a solo un paso de la famosa hipótesis del “etiamsi daremus” de Grocio. Este artículo intenta principalmente refutar esta línea de argumentación. Defenderé que los elementos voluntaristas de la síntesis de Suárez excluyen absolutamente tal interpretación, no solo su bien conocido concepto general de ley, sino también su habitualmente descuidada noción de 'ley eterna', a la que atribuyo un papel clave a este respecto.Francisco Suárez’ theory of natural law has always been the object of radically divergent interpretations. As a general rule, those commentators who blame or praise Suárez for departing from Aquinas and adopting nominalist philosophical principles generally regard him as a voluntarist, while scholars seeing in him a creative innovator inside the Thomist camp are inclined to consider him as a kind of rationalist who clearly rejected the Voluntarism of Ockham and Scotus. A third type of interpretation suggests that Suárez deviated from the Thomistic natural law tradition in the opposite direction, so that he prepared the way for modern rationalism and secularized natural law theory. The starting point of this latter reading of Suárez is that he “concedes the essence” (Jean- François Courtine), or “comes close to conceding the substance” (Thomas Pink) of Gabriel Vázquez’ intellectualist position, or „is brought to the brink of” accepting it (John Finnis). Thus, “fundamentally, the divine will remains also in Suárez bound to the rational nature of things. […] To the self-existing good or evil God’s will only appends the special obligation of divine law” (Hans Welzel), which view is only one step from Grotius’ famous “etiamsi daremus” hypothesis. This paper is mainly intended to refute this line of argumentation. I will argue that the voluntarist elements of the Suárezian synthesis absolutely preclude such an interpretation – not only his well-known general concept of law but also his often neglected notion of ‘lex aeterna’ to which I attribute a key role in this respect.peerReviewe
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¿Francisco Suárez como precursor de la ley natural del racionalismo moderno?
2017Co-Authors: Tattay SzilárdAbstract:Francisco Suárez’ theory of natural law has always been the object of radically divergent interpretations. As a general rule, those commentators who blame or praise Suárez for departing from Aquinas and adopting nominalist philosophical principles generally regard him as a voluntarist, while scholars seeing in him a creative innovator inside the Thomist camp are inclined to consider him as a kind of rationalist who clearly rejected the Voluntarism of Ockham and Scotus. A third type of interpretation suggests that Suárez deviated from the Thomistic natural law tradition in the opposite direction, so that he prepared the way for modern rationalism and secularized natural law theory. The starting point of this latter reading of Suárez is that he “concedes the essence” (Jean- François Courtine), or “comes close to conceding the substance” (Thomas Pink) of Gabriel Vázquez’ intellectualist position, or „is brought to the brink of” accepting it (John Finnis). Thus, “fundamentally, the divine will remains also in Suárez bound to the rational nature of things. […] To the self-existing good or evil God’s will only appends the special obligation of divine law” (Hans Welzel), which view is only one step from Grotius’ famous “etiamsi daremus” hypothesis. This paper is mainly intended to refute this line of argumentation. I will argue that the voluntarist elements of the Suárezian synthesis absolutely preclude such an interpretation– not only his well-known general concept of law but also his often neglected notion of ‘lex aeterna’ to which I attribute a key role in this respect.La teoría de la ley natural de Francisco Suárez ha sido objeto de interpretaciones radicalmente divergentes. Como norma general, los comentaristas que acusan o alaban a Suárez por apartarse de Tomás de Aquino y por adoptar principios filosóficos ominalistas,generalmente lo consideran un voluntarista, mientras que los estudiosos que ven en él un innovador creativo dentro del ala tomista, se inclinan por considerarlo como una especie de racionalista que rechaza claramente el Voluntarismo de Ockham y Escoto. Un tercer tipo de interpretación sugiere que Suárez se apartó de la tradición tomista de la ley natural en una dirección opuesta, de modo tal que preparó el camino para el racionalismo moderno y la teoría secularizada de la ley natural. El punto de partida de esta última lectura reside en que él "concede lo esencial" (Jean-François Courtine), o “está cerca de conceder la substancia” (Thomas Pink) de la posición intelectualista de Gabriel Vázquez, o "es llevado al umbral de” su aceptación (John Finnis). Por tanto, “fundamentalmente, la voluntad divina sigue estando también en Suárez ligada a la naturaleza racional de las cosas. […] Al bien o mal existente en sí mismo, la voluntad de Dios solo añade la obligación especial de la ley divina” (Hans Welzel), visión que está a solo un paso de la famosa hipótesis del “etiamsi daremus” de Grocio. Este artículo intenta principalmente refutar esta línea de argumentación. Defenderé que los elementos voluntaristas de la síntesis de Suárez excluyen absolutamente tal interpretación, no solo su bien conocido concepto general de ley, sino también su habitualmente descuidada noción de 'ley eterna', a la que atribuyo un papel clave a este respecto
Segovia, Juan Fernando - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Sul contrattualismo : conseguenze politiche e legali (II)
'Fundacion Universidad Catolica Argentina', 2021Co-Authors: Segovia, Juan FernandoAbstract:Resumen: El presente trabajo pretende esclarecer algunas de las consecuencias que el contractualismo trae al Derecho y la política (virtualidad, Voluntarismo, anarquía, positivismo, estatismo, etc.), valiéndose de un examen del estado de naturaleza y del significado del contrato social. Se ha elaborado en base a fuentes y consultando la bibliografía especial.Abstract: This work aims to clarify some legal and political aftermaths of contractualism (virtuality, Voluntarism, anarchy, positivism, statism, etc.), appealing to an examen of the state of nature and the meaning of the social contract. It has been prepared based on sources and consulting the special literature.Sommario: Il presente lavoro si propone di chiarire alcuni strascichi giuridici e politici del contrattualismo (virtualità, volontarismo, anarchia, positivismo, statalismo, ecc.), facendo appello all’esame dello stato di natura e del significato del contratto sociale. È stato preparato sulla base delle fonti e consultando la letteratura speciale
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Sul contrattualismo : Conseguenze politiche e legali (I)
'Fundacion Universidad Catolica Argentina', 2021Co-Authors: Segovia, Juan FernandoAbstract:Resumen: El presente trabajo pretende esclarecer algunas de las consecuencias que el contractualismo trae al Derecho y la política (virtualidad, Voluntarismo, anarquía, positivismo, estatismo, etc.), valiéndose de un examen del estado de naturaleza y del significado del contrato social. Se ha elaborado en base a fuentes y consultando la bibliografía especial.Abstract: This work aims to clarify some legal and political aftermaths of contractualism (virtuality, Voluntarism, anarchy, positivism, statism, etc.), appealing to an examen of the state of nature and the meaning of the social contract. It has been prepared based on sources and consulting the special literature.Sommario: Questo lavoro si propone di chiarire alcune conseguenze legali e politiche del contrattualismo (virtualità, volontarismo, anarchia, positivismo, statalismo, ecc.), Facendo appello a un esame dello stato di natura e del significato del contratto sociale. È stato preparato sulla base di fonti e consultando la letteratura speciale
