Workers Organization

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F Cesar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • el bajo vientre del jaguar la fiscalizacion y la ausencia de autotutela en el derecho laboral chileno the jaguar s underbelly labor inspection and Workers Organization in chile
    Social Science Research Network, 2014
    Co-Authors: Rosado Marzan, F Cesar
    Abstract:

    Spanish Abstract: Es posible que el ente administrativo de la inspeccion del trabajo, con caracter sancionatorio y autonomo de la sociedad civil, pueda compeler el cumplimiento de las leyes laborales de manera efectiva? Recientes investigaciones han demostrado que una orientacion pedagogica o asistencialista al cumplimiento de las leyes laborales puede ser mucho mas efectiva que las sanciones administrativas y/o otras medidas coercitivas en contra del empleador infractor. De igual forma tales investigaciones han demostrado la necesidad de incluir a las organizaciones de trabajadores en un plan integral de fiscalizacion para que la oficina de inspeccion del trabajo pueda contrarrestar la oposicion patronal, obtener mejor informacion sobre infracciones y desarrollar planes de cumplimiento efectivos. Estas nuevas investigaciones nos obligan a cuestionar el modelo de inspeccion del trabajo de Chile, “el jaguar latinoamericano”, toda vez que, contrario a lo que parece estar de moda en la literatura juridica y de las ciencias sociales sobre la inspeccion laboral, este resulta ser un modelo altamente punitivo y aislado de conexiones funcionales con los distintos sectores de la sociedad civil, entre ellos los sindicatos y otras organizaciones laborales. Luego de haber realizado una investigacion de campo en Chile durante siete meses, el autor argumenta que las deficiencias mas apremiantes en Chile, relativas a la fiscalizacion del trabajo son la ausencia de trabajadores o gremios laborales organizados y enraizados a la inspeccion del trabajo y la falta de derechos colectivos que sostengan al sindicalismo. En Chile existen programas pedagogicos y de asistencia al cumplimento de la normativa laboral cobijados por la sombra del sistema formalmente punitivo. No obstante lo anterior, Chile carece de sindicatos efectivos, lo que conlleva a la facilitacion de la oposicion patronal a la fiscalizacion. Dentro de este contexto politico, la inspeccion del trabajo se torna en un ente inefectivo, indistintamente de cual fuerte pueda su autoridad “en los libros” de las leyes. English Abstract: Can a labor inspectorate that is with punitive against law breakers and that is autonomous from civil society compel compliance with labor laws effectively? Recent research has shown that pedagogical compliance strategies can be much more effective than punitive ones. Similarly, other research has demonstrated the need to include Workers' Organizations in a scheme for labor law enforcement. Labor unions help to counteract employer opposition and provide better compliance information to labor inspectorates, helping inspectors to develop better plans for enforcement. This new research forces us to question the model of labor inspection in Chile, the Latin American "jaguar." The Chilean labor inspectorate is highly punitive and detached from civil society, including from trade unions and other labor Organizations. After doing field research in Chile for more than seven months, the author argues that the most pressing deficiencies in Chile concerning labor inspection are the absence of labor Organizations connected to the labor inspectorate and the lack of collective labor rights for such ends. In Chile, there are pedagogical inspection programs working in the shadow of the formal punitive system. Nevertheless, Chile lacks effective unions, facilitating employer opposition. Under such precarious political circumstances, labor inspection becomes ineffective, regardless how strong the labor inspectorate looks on the law books.

Rosado Marzan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • el bajo vientre del jaguar la fiscalizacion y la ausencia de autotutela en el derecho laboral chileno the jaguar s underbelly labor inspection and Workers Organization in chile
    Social Science Research Network, 2014
    Co-Authors: Rosado Marzan, F Cesar
    Abstract:

    Spanish Abstract: Es posible que el ente administrativo de la inspeccion del trabajo, con caracter sancionatorio y autonomo de la sociedad civil, pueda compeler el cumplimiento de las leyes laborales de manera efectiva? Recientes investigaciones han demostrado que una orientacion pedagogica o asistencialista al cumplimiento de las leyes laborales puede ser mucho mas efectiva que las sanciones administrativas y/o otras medidas coercitivas en contra del empleador infractor. De igual forma tales investigaciones han demostrado la necesidad de incluir a las organizaciones de trabajadores en un plan integral de fiscalizacion para que la oficina de inspeccion del trabajo pueda contrarrestar la oposicion patronal, obtener mejor informacion sobre infracciones y desarrollar planes de cumplimiento efectivos. Estas nuevas investigaciones nos obligan a cuestionar el modelo de inspeccion del trabajo de Chile, “el jaguar latinoamericano”, toda vez que, contrario a lo que parece estar de moda en la literatura juridica y de las ciencias sociales sobre la inspeccion laboral, este resulta ser un modelo altamente punitivo y aislado de conexiones funcionales con los distintos sectores de la sociedad civil, entre ellos los sindicatos y otras organizaciones laborales. Luego de haber realizado una investigacion de campo en Chile durante siete meses, el autor argumenta que las deficiencias mas apremiantes en Chile, relativas a la fiscalizacion del trabajo son la ausencia de trabajadores o gremios laborales organizados y enraizados a la inspeccion del trabajo y la falta de derechos colectivos que sostengan al sindicalismo. En Chile existen programas pedagogicos y de asistencia al cumplimento de la normativa laboral cobijados por la sombra del sistema formalmente punitivo. No obstante lo anterior, Chile carece de sindicatos efectivos, lo que conlleva a la facilitacion de la oposicion patronal a la fiscalizacion. Dentro de este contexto politico, la inspeccion del trabajo se torna en un ente inefectivo, indistintamente de cual fuerte pueda su autoridad “en los libros” de las leyes. English Abstract: Can a labor inspectorate that is with punitive against law breakers and that is autonomous from civil society compel compliance with labor laws effectively? Recent research has shown that pedagogical compliance strategies can be much more effective than punitive ones. Similarly, other research has demonstrated the need to include Workers' Organizations in a scheme for labor law enforcement. Labor unions help to counteract employer opposition and provide better compliance information to labor inspectorates, helping inspectors to develop better plans for enforcement. This new research forces us to question the model of labor inspection in Chile, the Latin American "jaguar." The Chilean labor inspectorate is highly punitive and detached from civil society, including from trade unions and other labor Organizations. After doing field research in Chile for more than seven months, the author argues that the most pressing deficiencies in Chile concerning labor inspection are the absence of labor Organizations connected to the labor inspectorate and the lack of collective labor rights for such ends. In Chile, there are pedagogical inspection programs working in the shadow of the formal punitive system. Nevertheless, Chile lacks effective unions, facilitating employer opposition. Under such precarious political circumstances, labor inspection becomes ineffective, regardless how strong the labor inspectorate looks on the law books.

Ugo Pagano - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • politics business co evolution paths Workers Organization and capitalist concentration
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2013
    Co-Authors: Marianna Belloc, Ugo Pagano
    Abstract:

    Abstract Most pre-crisis explanations of the various corporate governance systems have considered the separation between ownership and control to be an advantage of the Anglo-American economies. They have also attributed the failure of other countries to achieve these efficient arrangements to their different legal and/or electoral systems. In this paper we compare this view with a different approach based on the hypothesis that politics and corporate governance co-evolve, generating complex interactions of financial and labour market institutions. Countries cluster along different complementary politics–business interaction paths and there is no reason to expect, or to device policies for, their convergence to a single model of corporate governance. We argue that this hypothesis provides a more convincing explanation of the past histories of major capitalist economies and can suggest some useful possible scenarios of their future institutional development. Bayesian model comparison suggests that the co-evolution approach turns out at least as influential as the competing theories in explaining shareholder and worker protection determination.

Marco Aurelio Santana - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • vw s modular system and Workers Organization in resende brazil
    International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 2002
    Co-Authors: Jose Ricardo Ramalho, Marco Aurelio Santana
    Abstract:

    This article analyses the changes taking place in the Brazilian vehicle assembly industryof the 1990s with particular reference to the state of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It focusesupon a case study of Volkswagen’s bus and truck plant and its Workers at Resende. Theplant opened in 1996 on a greenfield site and was presented as a major development invehicle assembly. The unique feature of the plant’s production system rests on therelationship between the assembler (VW) and its component suppliers. At Resende thesewere involved in a joint enterprise to establish a ‘modular system’ of production. In thissystem, the component suppliers finance a part of the factory and organize the assemblyof their components on site. As such, few of the production Workers are employed by theassembler, whose main role in the process is to coordinate production and to market thevehicle.The restructuring of production and new ways of managing the workforce in Brazilhave been accelerated since the beginning of the 1990s by the increase in foreigninvestment in industrial activities and the need for firms to compete in the world market.The car industry has represented an important part of this movement. New locations andnew management and Organizational strategies have been introduced and experienced inthe country.Despite many difficulties, labour unions linked to the automobile industry have alsobeen working closely together in order to keep pace with changes in the negotiatingprocess for new forms of management and their consequences, such as risingunemployment, putting jobs right on the firing line. However, labour unions appear tobe facing an additional difficulty. Moving into a new investment phase, the auto-assemblers were a source of much political and economic competition between states andmunicipalities through a range of fiscal incentives to attract them (Rodriguez-Pose andArbix, 2001). However, the establishment of new assembly plants also reflects a shift instrategy with regard to the workforce, with a clear-cut trend towards seeking alternativesoutside the city of Sa˜o Paulo’s industrial belt (usually known as ‘the ABC region’), whichhas been for decades the most highly unionized area of Brazil and the militant centre ofthe metal Workers’ union and the socialist confederation, CUT (Seidman, 1994). The

Melo, Filipe Augusto Freitas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Representing the Workers: Organization in the workplace in the ABC Paulista
    'Universidade de Sao Paulo Agencia USP de Gestao da Informacao Academica (AGUIA)', 2019
    Co-Authors: Melo, Filipe Augusto Freitas
    Abstract:

    Esta dissertação de mestrado trata a respeito da organização no local de trabalho, por meio de um estudo do caso da Comissão de Fábrica dos Trabalhadores na planta da Ford de São Bernardo do Campo. Com base em entrevistas com dirigentes e ex-dirigentes da Comissão e em documentos produzidos pelo sindicato da categoria e a própria representação no local de trabalho, procura-se recuperar as transformações institucionais e no padrão de ação dessa instância representativa desde a sua fundação. Levando-se em conta as mudanças no mundo do trabalho nas últimas décadas, a discussão se encaminha para as estratégias laborais para lidar com os novos desafios impostos pela globalização. Ao final, discorre-se a respeito da nova lei trabalhista, que obriga a criação de comissões de empresa em todos os locais de trabalho com mais de 200 funcionários. Conclui-se que a nova lei, por alijar os sindicatos do processo eleitoral dessas novas comissões, representa uma derrota para as pretensões de alastramento do modelo construído no ABC, podendo levar a um modelo paternalista de representação dos trabalhadores.This masters theses delas with the Organization in the workplace, through a case study of the Works Council at the Fords factory in São Bernardo do Campo. Based on interviews with unionists and former unionists as well as on documents produced by the MetalWorkers Union and the Works Council itself, the aim is to deal with institutional transformations and the pattern of action of this representative body since its foundation. Taking into account the changes in the world of work in the last decades, it is discussed the labour strategies to deal with the new challenges imposed by globalization. At the end, the new labour law, which requires the creation of Works Councils in all workplaces with more than 200 employees, is discussed. It is concluded that the new law, by eliminating the unions from the electoral process of these new councils, represents a defeat for the pretensions of spreading the model built in the ABC, and can lead to a paternalistic model of Workers representation