Scan Science and Technology
Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies
The Experts below are selected from a list of 13470 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Joseph F Brodley – 1st expert on this subject based on the ideXlab platform
Antitrust Law and innovation cooperationJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1990Co-Authors: Joseph F BrodleyAbstract:
The issue posed by the Jorde-Teece paper and by several bills proposed in Congress is whether the Antitrust Laws should be modified to promote collaboration in innovation between business firms, especially in high technology industries. Jorde and Teece and other proponents of such legislation argue that in the arena of world competition, the United States cannot afford to have Antitrust Laws that are more restrictive of innovation collaboration than the Laws of Europe and Japan. They argue that since there is very little risk of cartelization in rapidly evolving high technology industries, the benefits from permissive Antitrust can be achieved at virtually no cost. My own analysis will conclude that innovation collaboration, particularly when it encompasses production and marketing, can create anticompetitive risks, and should be subject to the Antitrust Laws. It appears unlikely that actual Antitrust enforcement inhibits technological collaboration in any direct way because government enforcement is extremely permissive and no successful private cases have been brought in recent years. To the extent that misguided perceptions of Antitrust risk may have discouraged some types of innovation collaboration, a few narrowly targeted reforms are sufficient to correct the problem.
Howard Shelanski – 2nd expert on this subject based on the ideXlab platform
Antitrust Law and mass media regulation can merger standards protect the public interestCalifornia Law Review, 2006Co-Authors: Howard ShelanskiAbstract:
Two distinct views of the public interest objectives of American communications policy underlie the debate over deregulation of media ownership in the United States. Advocates of deregulation typically view the public interest through an efficiency-oriented model. In that model the policy goal is to promote competition that will lead media companies to better satisfy consumers’ preferences. Opponents of deregulation typically view the public interest through a democracy model. In that model the policy goal is to preserve media access opportunities for diverse voices and to promote informed public discussion of important issues. These distinct formulations of the public interest lead to divergent opinions about the need for ownership rules and the consequences should the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Congress, and the courts leave media concentration to be controlled by general Antitrust Law. This Article discusses the competing models of the public interest and examines the FCC’s ownership rules in light of those models. The paper then assesses the likelihood that Antitrust enforcement would achieve the FCC’s public interest objectives in a deregulated environment. The analysis concludes that in media markets Antitrust is unlikely to further the FCC’s democracy objectives and also faces serious obstacles to protecting even the economic, efficiency-oriented public interest objectives that are much closer to Antitrust Law‘s core purpose. Those challenges of protecting the public interest in media markets through Antitrust should spark a forthright debate about what the objectives for mass media policy will be in a deregulated environment and cause policy officials to consider improving Antitrust or developing other ways to achieve those objectives.
Gregory T. Gundlach – 3rd expert on this subject based on the ideXlab platform
competition policy and Antitrust Law implications of developments in supply chain managementJournal of Supply Chain Management, 2019Co-Authors: Gregory T. Gundlach, Robert Frankel, Riley T KrotzAbstract:
Building on research in supply chain management (SCM) that aids in the workings of society, the authors illustrate how SCM research can advance public policy and Law. Using competition policy and Antitrust Law as an example, they consider how developments in SCM thought and practice augment economic understanding of vertical restraints involving minimum resale price maintenance (RPM). Developments affecting the organization of supply chains, firm‐level strategies for the management of retail distribution, and the interactions of supply chain participants are investigated. The findings advance knowledge of the primary procompetitive and anticompetitive theories of RPM found in competition policy and Antitrust Law. They also illustrate the potential of SCM to expand its reach and impact through studies that address the interplay of SCM and public policy and Law.
The Role of Efficiencies in Antitrust Law: Introduction and OverviewThe Antitrust bulletin, 2015Co-Authors: Gregory T. Gundlach, Diana L. MossAbstract:
An increasing number of Antitrust stakeholders have advanced the opinion that enhancing economic efficiency is the most appropriate way to maximize consumer welfare. However, continuing and important questions surround the conclusion that efficiency should be the primary objective and central criterion of competition policy and Antitrust Law. This two-part special issue of the Antitrust Bulletin examines this debate by focusing on cutting-edge, multidisciplinary thinking, and recent developments concerning economic efficiency and its primacy as an important goal for competition policy and Antitrust Law.
Competition Policy and Antitrust Law: Introduction to the Special IssueJournal of Public Policy & Marketing, 2001Co-Authors: Gregory T. GundlachAbstract:
Today, few marketers are unaware of the implications of competition for reaching consumers. Indeed, to win in today’s marketplace, marketers must be adept not only in providing value to their customers but also in providing this value in ways that exceed the value offered by their competitors (Kotler and Armstrong 2000). Public policy toward competition and the Law of Antitrust are intended to ensure that such activities are conducted in ways that enhance competition and increase the welfare of consumers (Hovenkamp 1994). The special issue brings together a collection of articles that addresses various aspects of competition policy and Antitrust Law. Included in the special issue are contributions that examine the regulatory origins of Antitrust Law, its foundations in competition theory, marketing-based research helpful to informing its development, explanations of current enforcement agency activities, insights as to the application of Antitrust Law to emerging forms of commerce, comparative perspectives on the international application of competition policy, and the special challenges of Antitrust Law in certain industries. Together, the collection of articles contributes to the further understanding of this important area of public policy.