The Experts below are selected from a list of 13470 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Joseph F Brodley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Antitrust Law and innovation cooperation
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1990Co-Authors: Joseph F BrodleyAbstract:The issue posed by the Jorde-Teece paper and by several bills proposed in Congress is whether the Antitrust Laws should be modified to promote collaboration in innovation between business firms, especially in high technology industries. Jorde and Teece and other proponents of such legislation argue that in the arena of world competition, the United States cannot afford to have Antitrust Laws that are more restrictive of innovation collaboration than the Laws of Europe and Japan. They argue that since there is very little risk of cartelization in rapidly evolving high technology industries, the benefits from permissive Antitrust can be achieved at virtually no cost. My own analysis will conclude that innovation collaboration, particularly when it encompasses production and marketing, can create anticompetitive risks, and should be subject to the Antitrust Laws. It appears unlikely that actual Antitrust enforcement inhibits technological collaboration in any direct way because government enforcement is extremely permissive and no successful private cases have been brought in recent years. To the extent that misguided perceptions of Antitrust risk may have discouraged some types of innovation collaboration, a few narrowly targeted reforms are sufficient to correct the problem.
Howard Shelanski - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Antitrust Law and mass media regulation can merger standards protect the public interest
California Law Review, 2006Co-Authors: Howard ShelanskiAbstract:Two distinct views of the public interest objectives of American communications policy underlie the debate over deregulation of media ownership in the United States. Advocates of deregulation typically view the public interest through an efficiency-oriented model. In that model the policy goal is to promote competition that will lead media companies to better satisfy consumers' preferences. Opponents of deregulation typically view the public interest through a democracy model. In that model the policy goal is to preserve media access opportunities for diverse voices and to promote informed public discussion of important issues. These distinct formulations of the public interest lead to divergent opinions about the need for ownership rules and the consequences should the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Congress, and the courts leave media concentration to be controlled by general Antitrust Law. This Article discusses the competing models of the public interest and examines the FCC's ownership rules in light of those models. The paper then assesses the likelihood that Antitrust enforcement would achieve the FCC's public interest objectives in a deregulated environment. The analysis concludes that in media markets Antitrust is unlikely to further the FCC's democracy objectives and also faces serious obstacles to protecting even the economic, efficiency-oriented public interest objectives that are much closer to Antitrust Law's core purpose. Those challenges of protecting the public interest in media markets through Antitrust should spark a forthright debate about what the objectives for mass media policy will be in a deregulated environment and cause policy officials to consider improving Antitrust or developing other ways to achieve those objectives.
Gregory T. Gundlach - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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competition policy and Antitrust Law implications of developments in supply chain management
Journal of Supply Chain Management, 2019Co-Authors: Gregory T. Gundlach, Robert Frankel, Riley T KrotzAbstract:Building on research in supply chain management (SCM) that aids in the workings of society, the authors illustrate how SCM research can advance public policy and Law. Using competition policy and Antitrust Law as an example, they consider how developments in SCM thought and practice augment economic understanding of vertical restraints involving minimum resale price maintenance (RPM). Developments affecting the organization of supply chains, firm‐level strategies for the management of retail distribution, and the interactions of supply chain participants are investigated. The findings advance knowledge of the primary procompetitive and anticompetitive theories of RPM found in competition policy and Antitrust Law. They also illustrate the potential of SCM to expand its reach and impact through studies that address the interplay of SCM and public policy and Law.
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The Role of Efficiencies in Antitrust Law: Introduction and Overview
The Antitrust bulletin, 2015Co-Authors: Gregory T. Gundlach, Diana L. MossAbstract:An increasing number of Antitrust stakeholders have advanced the opinion that enhancing economic efficiency is the most appropriate way to maximize consumer welfare. However, continuing and important questions surround the conclusion that efficiency should be the primary objective and central criterion of competition policy and Antitrust Law. This two-part special issue of the Antitrust Bulletin examines this debate by focusing on cutting-edge, multidisciplinary thinking, and recent developments concerning economic efficiency and its primacy as an important goal for competition policy and Antitrust Law.
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Competition Policy and Antitrust Law: Introduction to the Special Issue
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 2001Co-Authors: Gregory T. GundlachAbstract:Today, few marketers are unaware of the implications of competition for reaching consumers. Indeed, to win in today’s marketplace, marketers must be adept not only in providing value to their customers but also in providing this value in ways that exceed the value offered by their competitors (Kotler and Armstrong 2000). Public policy toward competition and the Law of Antitrust are intended to ensure that such activities are conducted in ways that enhance competition and increase the welfare of consumers (Hovenkamp 1994). The special issue brings together a collection of articles that addresses various aspects of competition policy and Antitrust Law. Included in the special issue are contributions that examine the regulatory origins of Antitrust Law, its foundations in competition theory, marketing-based research helpful to informing its development, explanations of current enforcement agency activities, insights as to the application of Antitrust Law to emerging forms of commerce, comparative perspectives on the international application of competition policy, and the special challenges of Antitrust Law in certain industries. Together, the collection of articles contributes to the further understanding of this important area of public policy.
Einer Elhauge - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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how horizontal shareholding harms our economy and why Antitrust Law can fix it
2020Co-Authors: Einer ElhaugeAbstract:Empirical evidence that horizontal shareholding has created anticompetitive effects in airline and banking markets have produced calls for Antitrust enforcement. In response, others have critiqued the airline and banking studies and argued that Antitrust Law cannot tackle any anticompetitive effects from horizontal shareholding. I show that new economic proofs and empirical evidence, ranging far beyond the airline and banking studies, show that horizontal shareholding in concentrated markets often has anticompetitive effects. I also provide new analysis demonstrating that critiques of the airline and banking market-level studies either conflict with the evidence or, when taken into account, increase the estimated adverse price effects from horizontal shareholding. Finally, I provide new legal theories for tackling the problem of horizontal shareholding. I show that when horizontal shareholding has anticompetitive effects, it is illegal not only under Clayton Act §7, but also under Sherman Act §1. In fact, the historic trusts that were the core target of Antitrust Law were horizontal shareholders. I further show that anticompetitive horizontal shareholding also constitutes an illegal agreement or concerted practice under EU Treaty Article 101, as well as an abuse of collective dominance under Article 102. I conclude by showing that horizontal shareholding not only lessens the market concentration that traditional merger Law can tolerate, but also means that what otherwise seem like non-horizontal mergers should often be treated as horizontal. Those implications for traditional merger analysis become even stronger if we fail to tackle horizontal shareholding directly.
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research handbook on the economics of Antitrust Law
2012Co-Authors: Einer ElhaugeAbstract:One might mistakenly think that the long tradition of economic analysis in Antitrust Law would mean there is little new to say. Yet the field is surprisingly dynamic and changing. The specially commissioned chapters in this landmark volume offer a rigorous analysis of the field’s most current and contentious issues.
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united states Antitrust Law and economics
2011Co-Authors: Einer ElhaugeAbstract:The book presents a modern approach to understanding U.S. Antitrust Law, illuminating the economic analysis that dominates modern Antitrust analysis in a straightforward way that minimizes technical jargon and makes the underlying economic concepts accessible to a broad audience. The cases are carefully edited to present the facts and issues clearly and succinctly, with the focus on extensive questions that probe those issues and show how to apply modern Antitrust economic analysis to them. The result is a book that is quite compact, fewer than 800 pages, but covers the full waterfront of Antitrust issues and generates plenty of multi-layered points and ideas to fill a class. Throughout the book incorporates important Supreme Court Antitrust cases and agency guidelines. The merger section focuses on modern agency practices and merger theories, and selected cases that illustrate them, rather than on outdated Supreme Court cases that no longer describe current merger enforcement. A
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Antitrust Law an analysis of Antitrust principles and their application
1994Co-Authors: Phillip Areeda, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Donald F Turner, John L Solow, Einer ElhaugeAbstract:Recognized by Antitrust practitioners and the courts as the most authoritative and comprehensive treatise on Antitrust principles and practice, Antitrust Law explains the interplay of judicial, statutory, public policy, and economic forces that shape the world of Antitrust. Its thorough analysis and criticism of U.S. Supreme Court, appellate court and major lower court Antitrust decisions will help you truly understand the underpinnings of the Law and frame successful arguments in litigation. The most recently revised volumes contain greatly expanded coverage of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine; state action, implied, and statutory immunity; and the international and extraterritorial application of U.S. Antitrust Laws. Author Herbert Hovenkamp is recognized as one of the foremost experts on Antitrust Law in the country and has consulted extensively for both the government and the private sector.
Nicola Giocoli - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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competition vs property rights american Antitrust Law the freiburg school and the early years of european competition policy
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Nicola GiocoliAbstract:This paper investigates the influence of the American Antitrust tradition on the foundation and early years of European competition policy. Four main propositions summarize my argument made in this paper. First, when one takes the competition versus property rights dichotomy into account, it becomes evident that the economists' contribution to the historical evolution of U.S. Antitrust Law has been smaller than usually believed. Second, the American Antitrust tradition has had less influence than is commonly claimed over the foundations of European Economic Community (EEC) competition policy. Third, a Law and economics argument based on the constitutional standing of competition rules, an argument initially put forward by the highly influential Freiburg School of Ordoliberalism, played a crucial role in the birth of EEC Antitrust policy. Fourth, the ordoliberal origin of EEC competition rules, when combined with the Community's integration goal, helps explain why the impact of the competition versus property rights dichotomy on European Antitrust Law has been limited and, contrary to the U.S. example, solved more favorably to competition than to property rights.
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competition vs property rights american Antitrust Law the freiburg school and the early years of european competition policy
MPRA Paper, 2008Co-Authors: Nicola GiocoliAbstract:The goal of the paper is to investigate the extent of the influence of American Antitrust tradition on the foundation and early years of European competition policy. This as part of a wider research program aiming at assessing the role of economic theory in the development of Antitrust Law and policy. My argument may be summarized in four propositions. First, by taking into account what I call the “competition versus property rights” dichotomy, it turns out that the economists’ contribution to the historical evolution of US Antitrust Law has been smaller than usually believed. Second, as far as the foundation of EEC competition policy is concerned, the influence of the American Antitrust tradition has, again, been less than what is commonly claimed. Third, a crucial role on the birth of EEC Antitrust has been played by a Law and economics argument based on the constitutional standing of competition rules, an argument put forward by the highly influential Freiburg School of Ordoliberalism. Fourth, the ordoliberal origin of EEC competition rules, when combined with the Community’s integration goal, helps explain why the impact of the “competition versus property rights” dichotomy on European Antitrust Law has been limited and, contrary to the US, always solved more favorably to the “competition” pole than to the “property rights” one.
