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Bank Managers

The Experts below are selected from a list of 6042 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Gunnar Wahlstrom – 1st expert on this subject based on the ideXlab platform

  • the relevance of valuation principles in a financial crisis senior Bank Managers evaluations of other Banks on the interBank market
    International Journal of Critical Accounting, 2018
    Co-Authors: Roy Liff, Gunnar Wahlstrom

    Abstract:

    This article examines senior Bank Managers‘ evaluations of other Banks in the interBank market during times of financial crisis. We conclude that the fair value principle demands greater awareness of the need for reputational monitoring, evaluation by thick trust and scepticism towards numbers. Monitoring during crisis includes neither historical cost nor fair value numbers, because numbers are distrusted. Consequently, valuation principles may not explain contagion effects during crisis.

  • risk in practice senior Bank Managers at work
    International Journal of Critical Accounting, 2009
    Co-Authors: Gunnar Wahlstrom

    Abstract:

    This article advances this critique of risk measurement by providing evidence on the risks senior Bank Managers perceive as the greatest threats to their organisations. The data is collected through semi-structured interviews with senior Bank Managers from all the listed Banks in Sweden. The perceived risks relate to the interviewees’ positions in the Banks. Risks also emerge unexpectedly and are difficult to measure. This situation is due to the working conditions of senior Bank Managers who work in a challenging, unstable and unplanned context; when one problem is solved, attention is immediately channelled to the next. Under stable conditions, measured risks are regarded as manageable and controllable. However, based on the criticism of risk measurement explored in the literature, it is plausible that risk measurement information provides senior Bank Managers with a false sense of security. Thus, when the operational contexts are altered, such as during financial crises, risk measurement emerges as a problem requiring the attention of senior Bank Managers.

  • Risk in practice – senior Bank Managers at work
    International Journal of Critical Accounting, 2009
    Co-Authors: Gunnar Wahlstrom

    Abstract:

    This article advances this critique of risk measurement by providing evidence on the risks senior Bank Managers perceive as the greatest threats to their organisations. The data is collected through semi-structured interviews with senior Bank Managers from all the listed Banks in Sweden. The perceived risks relate to the interviewees’ positions in the Banks. Risks also emerge unexpectedly and are difficult to measure. This situation is due to the working conditions of senior Bank Managers who work in a challenging, unstable and unplanned context; when one problem is solved, attention is immediately channelled to the next. Under stable conditions, measured risks are regarded as manageable and controllable. However, based on the criticism of risk measurement explored in the literature, it is plausible that risk measurement information provides senior Bank Managers with a false sense of security. Thus, when the operational contexts are altered, such as during financial crises, risk measurement emerges as a problem requiring the attention of senior Bank Managers.

Rosli Mahmood – 2nd expert on this subject based on the ideXlab platform

  • how Bank Managers assess small business borrowers
    , 2007
    Co-Authors: Rosli Mahmood, Ghazali Abd Rahman

    Abstract:

    The purpose of this study is to develop an understanding of the decision making process which Bankers follow in granting loans to the small business borrowers. A mail survey
    technique was employed, and questionnaires were administered on Bank branch, Managers of domestic Banks.A total of 138 useable questionnaires were received, representing a 13.8 percent return rate.The findings reveal that intended purpose of loan, repayment of previous loan and loan activity at other Banks were ranked as the top, criteria in the credit assessment of small business borrowers.On the hand, government guarantee of loan, CVs of clients and charge on assets were given lowest ranks in terms of importance.The salient factors identified in this study also indicate that the Bank Managers focused on risk when dealing with the small business borrowers.

  • Bank Managers perception of the characteristics of successful entrepreneurs
    , 2003
    Co-Authors: Rosli Mahmood, Mohmad Amin Mad Idris

    Abstract:

    The literature on the characteristics needed for entrepreneurial success has been widely discussed. Successful entrepreneurs have been found to possess a set of skills and attributes that include an ability to inspire others, autonomy and a high level of endurance. Entrepreneurs demonstrate a propensity to take risks and are ready for change.They also possess social skills such as persuasiveness, low need for support, low conformity and lack of emotionalism.The objective of this paper is to
    understand how successful entrepreneurial.characteristics are perceived from the perspectives of Bankers.The finding may prove beneficial in the entrepreneurs’ preparation of loan applications from Banks.

  • Influence of heuristics in Bank Managers‘ lending decisions to small businesses
    , 1995
    Co-Authors: Rosli Mahmood

    Abstract:

    Traditionally, Banks are the major source of external finance for small businesses.The Bank funds are needed to finance the day-to-day operations, purchase of capital equipment, and building needs.The small businesses do
    have access to the capital market, especially where equity finance is concerned,and thus rely heavily on Bank loans for both short- and long-term needs.When granting loans to small businesses, Bankers make decisions under conditions of uncertainty and asymmetry of information (Binks et al, 1992) Under these conditions, one party has certain pieces of information that have a material effect on a contract, but not the other party, and such a situation can give rise to a twin problem of moral hazard and adverse selection.In the former situation, the issue arises where the action of a small business borrower is not directly observable by the Banker once he or she obtains the loan.This borrower may use
    the funds for other purposes which are personally profitable, but may be detrimental to the Banker.In an adverse selection situation, a Banker cannot distinguish between the good risk and the bad risk borrowers.A small business owner when approaching the Bank for a loan has always an informational advantage over the Banker, which leads him (the business owner) to overstate the soundness of his business proposition in relation to the funding sought.This problem sometimes affects the willingness of Banks to enter into contracts to supply the needed funds to small businesses.The problem of adverse selection often lead Bankers to commit errors in their decisions on lending to small businesses. Deakins and Hussain (1994) categorise
    the adverse selection as Type I and Type II errors. Type I error is where a Banker turns down a good business proposition which turns out to be a success, while Type II error is where a Banker accepts a proposition which turns out to be a business failure.Bankers may be concerned only with avoiding Type II error and not Type I, as the latter will not affect them unless the Banks fail to achieve their targets.This partly explains why some small business propositions which have high potential for growth and profitability are turned away by the Banks.At the branch level, Bank Managers often make their decisions on small business applications against a background of rules and instructions from their head offices (Fletcher, 1995). There are many variables which influence the rules and
    the work environment, and affect the lending decision.The decision on lending to small businesses is thus a process of interaction between the rules and a manager’s experience.The extent of variability is affected by the interpretation of the rules and accountability in interpreting these rules.One extreme is the strict interpretation of the rules, which is a product of their rigour and detail. Where they lack detail or are imprecise, then the decision will depend on the interpretation, accountability and level of ambiguity.At the other extreme, the decision is made on the complete use of one’s own experience and attitude and depends on the conviction of the value of the Bank manager’s own experience-Furthermore, because of the asymmetry of information in lending to small businesses.some elements of qualitative and intuitive analysis are required In decision-making.This paper attempts to discuss the influence of heuristics or intuition in the Bank Managers‘ lending decisions on small businesses, and its implication on the availability of funds to the small business sector in Malaysia.

Monika Marcinkowska – 3rd expert on this subject based on the ideXlab platform

  • Remuneration of Bank Managers – problems and potential solutions. Argumenta Oeconomica, 2014, Nr 1 (32), s. 41-74
    , 2020
    Co-Authors: Monika Marcinkowska

    Abstract:

    The issue of the remuneration of Bank Managers is indicated as one of the fundamental problems of corporate governance and is pointed out as one of irregularities that led to the financial crisis. Based on the literature review, the paper summarizes the identified inadequacies of management compensation systems in Banks: overcompensation, short-termism and the related incentive for excessive risk-taking, manipulation by Managers, poor disclosure and the lack of proper oversight from the supervisory boards. Another problem is that – although as a rule the management compensation system should be used as a tool to motivate Managers (agents) to act in a way to achieve the objectives of the owners (and other legitimate stakeholders) – the literature shows the unequivocal results of the pay-performance research. As the described problems in the Banking industry have grown enormously, the recommendations and regulations concerning the management remuneration policies and practices are being enacted. The paper shows however that their implementation raises many problems and challenges. Therefore there is a need to further analyze the issue of designing a proper Bank Managers’ compensation model. The postulates concerning performance evaluation process, linkage with risk, instruments and disclosure are presented.

  • remuneration of Bank Managers problems and potential solutions
    Argumenta Oeconomica, 2014
    Co-Authors: Monika Marcinkowska

    Abstract:

    * The issue of the remuneration of Bank Managers is indicated as one of the fundamental problems of corporate governance and is pointed out as one of irregularities that led to the financial crisis. Based on the literature review, the paper summarizes the identified inadequacies of management compensation systems in Banks: overcompensation, short-termism and the related incentive for excessive risk-taking, manipulation by Managers, poor disclosure and the lack of proper oversight from the supervisory boards. Another problem is that – although as a rule the management compensation system should be used as a tool to motivate Managers (agents) to act in a way to achieve the objectives of the owners (and other legitimate stakeholders) – the literature shows the unequivocal results of the pay-performance research. As the described problems in the Banking industry have grown enormously, the recommendations and regulations concerning the management remuneration policies and practices are being enacted. The paper shows however that their implementation raises many problems and challenges. Therefore there is a need to further analyze the issue of designing a proper Bank Managers’ compensation model. The postulates concerning performance evaluation process, linkage with risk, instruments and disclosure are presented.

  • remuneration of Bank Managers problems and potential solutions argumenta oeconomica 2014 nr 1 32 s 41 74
    , 2014
    Co-Authors: Monika Marcinkowska

    Abstract:

    The issue of the remuneration of Bank Managers is indicated as one of the fundamental problems of corporate governance and is pointed out as one of irregularities that led to the financial crisis. Based on the literature review, the paper summarizes the identified inadequacies of management compensation systems in Banks: overcompensation, short-termism and the related incentive for excessive risk-taking, manipulation by Managers, poor disclosure and the lack of proper oversight from the supervisory boards. Another problem is that – although as a rule the management compensation system should be used as a tool to motivate Managers (agents) to act in a way to achieve the objectives of the owners (and other legitimate stakeholders) – the literature shows the unequivocal results of the pay-performance research. As the described problems in the Banking industry have grown enormously, the recommendations and regulations concerning the management remuneration policies and practices are being enacted. The paper shows however that their implementation raises many problems and challenges. Therefore there is a need to further analyze the issue of designing a proper Bank Managers’ compensation model. The postulates concerning performance evaluation process, linkage with risk, instruments and disclosure are presented.