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Dirk Schoenmaker - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Trans-Tasman cooperation in Banking Supervision and resolution
Journal of Banking Regulation, 2020Co-Authors: Dirk SchoenmakerAbstract:Four major Australian banks span the Australian and New Zealand Banking system. Applying the financial trilemma model, this article investigates possible approaches for cooperation in the Supervision and resolution of these cross-border banks. The article first reviews the current arrangement in the Trans-Tasman Council of Banking Supervision, which is based on a soft law approach. Next, this article explores a trans-Tasman Banking union, which would encompass joint Supervision and joint resolution based on burden sharing. The challenge is political. Are the two countries willing to join forces in Banking policies and thus give up part of their sovereignty in this field? And can New Zealand, as the smaller one of the two, ensure an effective voice in joint arrangements?
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european Banking Supervision the first eighteen months
2016Co-Authors: Dirk Schoenmaker, Nicolas VeronAbstract:European Banking Supervision, also known as the Single Supervisory Mechanism, is the first and arguably the main component of European Banking union. In late 2014, the European Central Bank became the supervisor for the region’s largest Banking groups; the ECB also oversees the Supervision by national authorities of smaller banks. This Blueprint is the first in-depth study of how this ground-breaking reform is working in practice. It includes a euro-area overview and chapters on nine countries covering 95 percent of the area’s Banking assets, illustrating the diversity of experiences, situations and perceptions in different member states. Despite teething troubles and occasional misjudgements, this assessment finds that overall European Banking Supervision has been effective, demanding and broadly fair, at least for the banks under the ECB’s direct watch. Even so, achieving a truly single market in Banking services will require more time, further supervisory initiatives and new Europe-wide regulatory and legislative steps.
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Banking Supervision and resolution the european dimension
Law and Financial Markets Review, 2012Co-Authors: Dirk SchoenmakerAbstract:Both theory (game theory) and practice (recent financial crisis) indicate that national interests prevail in cross-border resolution. National authorities aim for the least-cost solution for domestic taxpayers. This results in an undersupply of the public good of global financial stability. International banks are increasingly run on national lines, as national supervisors force stand-alone subsidiaries to maintain separate liquidity and capital buffers in each jurisdiction.To preserve the Internal Market in Banking, this paper proposes a supranational approach to Banking Supervision and resolution in Europe. The large cross-border banks would then be supervised directly by the European Banking Authority, and in case of liquidity and solvency problems, have access to the ECB and the newly proposed European Resolution Authority. The European Resolution Authority needs a fiscal backstop and a strong legal framework to be credible. The access to government funds could be based on ex ante burden sharing between participating countries. The legal regime could be provided by a new special resolution regime embedded in a EU Regulation giving powers to liquidate or resolve ailing banks in a timely and orderly manner on a EU-wide scale.
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should the functions of monetary policy and Banking Supervision be separated
Oxford Economic Papers, 1995Co-Authors: Charles Goodhart, Dirk SchoenmakerAbstract:The paper investigates whether monetary policy and Banking Supervision should be separated. The main argument for separation is that the combination of functions might lead to a conflict of interest. An argument against is that separation is inconsistent with the central bank's concern for the systemic stability of the financial system. In a cross-country survey of 104 bank failures, we observe a trend towards using taxpayers' money for bank rescues which strengthens the case for hiving off the supervisory function to a government agency. It would, however, be difficult to have a complete division, since the central bank generally remains the only source of immediate funding. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.
Charles Goodhart - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A History of the Early Years, 1974–1997 - The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A History of the Early Years 1974–1997
2011Co-Authors: Charles GoodhartAbstract:The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) sets the guidelines for world-wide regulation of banks. It is the forum for agreeing international regulation on the conduct of Banking. Based on special access to the archives of the BCBS and interviews with many of its key players, this book tells the story of the early years of the Committee from its foundation in 1974/5 right through until 1997 – the year that marks the watershed between the Basel I Accord on Capital Adequacy and the start of work on Basel II. In addition, the book covers the Concordat, the Market Risk Amendment, the Core Principles of Banking and all other facets of the work of the BCBS. While the book is primarily a record of the history of the BCBS, it also provides an assessment of its actions and efficacy. It is a major contribution to the historical record on Banking Supervision.
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the basel committee on Banking Supervision a history of the early years 1974 1997
2011Co-Authors: Charles GoodhartAbstract:The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) sets the guidelines for world-wide regulation of banks. It is the forum for agreeing international regulation on the conduct of Banking. Based on special access to the archives of the BCBS and interviews with many of its key players, this book tells the story of the early years of the Committee from its foundation in 1974/5 right through until 1997 – the year that marks the watershed between the Basel I Accord on Capital Adequacy and the start of work on Basel II. In addition, the book covers the Concordat, the Market Risk Amendment, the Core Principles of Banking and all other facets of the work of the BCBS. While the book is primarily a record of the history of the BCBS, it also provides an assessment of its actions and efficacy. It is a major contribution to the historical record on Banking Supervision.
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the basel committee on Banking Supervision
Cambridge Books, 2011Co-Authors: Charles GoodhartAbstract:The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) sets the guidelines for world-wide regulation of banks. It is the forum for agreeing international regulation on the conduct of Banking. Based on special access to the archives of the BCBS and interviews with many of its key players, this book tells the story of the early years of the Committee from its foundation in 1974/5 right through until 1997 - the year that marks the watershed between the Basel I Accord on Capital Adequacy and the start of work on Basel II. In addition, the book covers the Concordat, the Market Risk Amendment, the Core Principles of Banking and all other facets of the work of the BCBS. While the book is primarily a record of the history of the BCBS, it also provides an assessment of its actions and efficacy. It is a major contribution to the historical record on Banking Supervision.
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the organizational structure of Banking Supervision
Economic Notes, 2002Co-Authors: Charles GoodhartAbstract:type="main" xml:lang="en"> Does it matter whether Banking Supervision is undertaken in-house in the Central Bank or in a separate specialised supervisory institution? After all, bank supervisors and the Central Bank must continue to work closely together wherever the supervisors are located. Nevertheless there has been a recent trend towards hiving off bank Supervision to a separate agency, as in the UK. The main driving forces are the rise of the universal bank, increased conglomeration, and concerns with conflicts of interest. Such separation, however, raises questions whether systemic stability might suffer. The ethos and culture of the separate supervisor might come to focus more on conduct of business, consumer protection, issues. Potentially systemic financial crises would have to be handled by a committee. These are qualitative issues, and developed countries, with differing historical, legal and institutional backgrounds, will come to differing conclusions. But in less developed countries, more weight needs to be placed on ensuring the quality of the supervisory staff, i.e. their professional skills, independence from external pressures, and adequate funding. This tells strongly towards retaining Banking Supervision under the wing of the Central Bank in such emerging countries. (J.E.L.: E5, F3, G2).
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the organisational structure of Banking Supervision
FMG Special Papers, 2000Co-Authors: Charles GoodhartAbstract:In this paper I try to address the question of whether, and why, it matters whether Banking Supervision is undertaken in-house in the Central Bank or in a separate specialised supervisory institution. After all, the bank supervisors and those in the Central Bank concerned with systemic stability must continue to work closely together wherever the supervisors are physically located. Nevertheless there has been some recent trend towards hiving off bank Supervision to a separate agency, as with the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK. The main driving forces behind this tendency are the changing, more blurred, structure of the financial system, and continuing concerns with conflicts of interest. As the dividing lines between differing kinds of financial institutions become increasingly fuzzy (e.g. universal banks), continuing bank Supervision by the Central Bank threatens both inefficient overlap between supervisory bodies and a potential creep of Central Bank safety net, and other, responsibilities into ever-widening areas. With the accompanying trend towards Central Bank operational independence in monetary policy, continued Central Bank supervisory authority enhances concerns about potential conflicts of interest, and raises issues about the limits of delegated powers to a non-elected body. On the other hand, separation of Supervision from the Central Bank raises questions whether systemic stability might suffer. The ethos, culture and concerns of the separate supervisory body might come to focus more on conduct of business, consumer protection, issues. Potentially systemic financial crises would have to be handled by a committee, not by a unified Central Bank. How much, if at all, would the collection, transmission and interpretation of information relevant to a Central Banks concerns, both on monetary and systemic stability policy issues, be lost as a consequence of separation. These are, mostly, qualitative issues, and more developed countries, with differing historical, legal and institutional backgrounds, will, and have, come to differing conclusions. But in less developed countries, more weight needs to be placed on ensuring the quality of the supervisory staff, i.e. their professional skills, independence from external pressures, and adequate funding. These latter considerations tell strongly towards retaining Banking Supervision under the wing of the Central Bank in emerging countries.
Sheng-you Yang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The game theory analysis and suggestions on post-crisis China-ASEAN Cooperation in Banking Supervision
2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information, 2011Co-Authors: Guo-ying Li, Sheng-you YangAbstract:Although China-ASEAN Cooperation in Banking Supervision has made many achievements, there are still some problems. Through establishing a game model of inter-countries cooperation in Banking Supervision and analyzing the strategy selection under different conditions. We can conclude that: countries with high financial openness in the China-ASEAN region are actively committed to Supervision cooperation; and with the acceleration of financial integration, it will help to maximize the social welfare if the countries with low financial openness join the cooperation. Hence, to strengthen the China-ASEAN cooperation in Banking Supervision, we should set up a multi-level cooperation framework, found authoritative organizations and establish uniform rules.
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The game theory analysis and suggestions on post-crisis China-ASEAN Cooperation in Banking Supervision
2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information, 2011Co-Authors: Guo-ying Li, Sheng-you YangAbstract:Although China-ASEAN Cooperation in Banking Supervision has made many achievements, there are still some problems. Through establishing a game model of inter-countries cooperation in Banking Supervision and analyzing the strategy selection under different conditions. We can conclud that: countries with high financial openness in the China-ASEAN region are actively committed to Supervision cooperation; and with the acceleration of financial integration, it will help to maximize the social welfare if the countries with low financial openness join the cooperation. Hence, to strengthen the China-ASEAN cooperation in Banking Supervision, we should set up a multi-level cooperation framework, found authoritative organizations and establish uniform rules.
Henriëtte Prast - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Banking Supervision at the Crossroads - Banking Supervision at the Crossroads
2020Co-Authors: Thea Kuppens, Henriëtte Prast, Sandra WesselingAbstract:This book charts the consequences for Banking Supervision of two stylized developments that over the last decade have characterized the global financial landscape: the integration of cross-sector and cross-border financial services. Both developments inevitably call for a supervisory response and the authors discuss what form and direction this should take. They also address a number of other important subjects including the new Capital Accord (Basel 2), the convergence of supervisory practices, procyclicality, financial conglomerates, deposit insurance and a brief history of the interplay between Banking Supervision and bank behaviour.
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A Brief History of the Institutional Design of Banking Supervision in the Netherlands
WO Research Memoranda, 2020Co-Authors: Joke Mooij, Henriëtte PrastAbstract:This paper describes how Banking Supervision in the Netherlands has evolved over time. It concentrates on how legal and institutional arrangements and the practice of Banking regulation and Supervision have responded to developments in the financial environment since the Bank Act of 1948 formally entrusted Banking Supervision to the Nederlandsche Bank. To put the developments of the last fifty years in a broader perspective, this study also contains a brief history of the Bank and the commercial Banking industry in the Netherlands up to 1952. The paper concludes that the changes in financial Supervision in the Netherlands have been inspired not by major Banking crises, but by the evolving role of banks and by changes in the structure of the financial sector.
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who pays for Banking Supervision principles and trends
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2007Co-Authors: Donato Masciandaro, Maria Jesus Nieto, Henriëtte PrastAbstract:Purpose - This paper aims to analyse the economics of financing Banking Supervision and attempts to respond to two questions: What are the most common financing practices? Can the differences in current financing practices be explained by country-specific factors, using a path-dependence approach? Design/methodology/approach - The paper performs an empirical analysis that identifies the determinants of the financing structure of banks' prudential Supervision using a sample of 90 Banking supervisors (central banks and financial authorities). Findings - The paper concludes that supervisors in central banks are more likely to be publicly funded, while financial authorities are more likely to be funded via a levy on the regulated banks. The financing rule is also explained by the structure of the financial systems. Public funding is more likely in bank-oriented structures. Finally, the geographical factor is also significant: European bank supervisors are more oriented towards the private funding regime. Practical implications - In general, the paper does not find evidence of the role of the political factor, the size of the economy, the level of development and the legal tradition. Originality/value - The paper analyses the financial governance of Banking Supervision in a sample of 90 countries world-wide. The empirical analysis focuses on the financing rules and identifies factors that explain the differences between supervisory authorities.
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financial governance of Banking Supervision
Documentos de trabajo del Banco de España, 2007Co-Authors: Donato Masciandaro, Maria Jesus Nieto, Henriëtte PrastAbstract:This article analyses the economics of financing Banking Supervision and attempts to respond to two questions: What are the most common financing practices? Can the differences in current financing practices be explained by country specific factors? We perform an empirical analysis that identifies the determinants of the financing structure of banks´ prudential Supervision using a sample of 90 Banking supervisors (central banks and financial authorities). We conclude that supervisors in central banks are more likely publicly funded, while financial authorities are more likely funded via a levy on the regulated banks. The financing rule is also explained by the structure of the financial systems. Public funding is more likely in bank oriented structures. Finally, the geographical factor is also significant: European bank supervisors are more oriented towards the private funding regime. In general, we do not find evidence of the role of the political factor, the size of the economy, the level of development and the legal tradition.
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Who pays for Banking Supervision? Principles and practices
2007Co-Authors: Donato Masciandaro, Maria Jesus Nieto, Henriëtte PrastAbstract:This paper focuses on the financing of Banking Supervision. Countries are classified according to who finances Banking Supervision the tax payer and/or the supervised industry -, and how the budget and fees are determined. We show that funding regimes differ across countries. Public funding is more often found when banks are supervised by the central bank, while Supervision funded via a levy on the regulated banks is more likely in the case of a separate financial authority. Finally, some countries apply mixed funding. In general, there is a trend toward more private funding. We also find a relation between sources of financing and accountability arrangements. Public financing is associated with accountability towards the parliament, while private financing is more likely to go hand in hand with accountability towards the government. The financing issue is important because the financing regime may affect the behaviour of the supervisor and hence the quality of Supervision. Regulatory capture, industry capture and the supervisor's self interest may affect supervisory policy. No theoretical model has been developed prescribing the optimal financing of Supervision. Our results suggest that the actual choice of financing is a casual one, not based on either considerations of incentive-compatability or on the beneficiary approach. As it is to be expected that financial regulation will become more internationally organized in the future, careful analysis of the financing issue will become even more relevant.
Guo-ying Li - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The game theory analysis and suggestions on post-crisis China-ASEAN Cooperation in Banking Supervision
2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information, 2011Co-Authors: Guo-ying Li, Sheng-you YangAbstract:Although China-ASEAN Cooperation in Banking Supervision has made many achievements, there are still some problems. Through establishing a game model of inter-countries cooperation in Banking Supervision and analyzing the strategy selection under different conditions. We can conclude that: countries with high financial openness in the China-ASEAN region are actively committed to Supervision cooperation; and with the acceleration of financial integration, it will help to maximize the social welfare if the countries with low financial openness join the cooperation. Hence, to strengthen the China-ASEAN cooperation in Banking Supervision, we should set up a multi-level cooperation framework, found authoritative organizations and establish uniform rules.
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The game theory analysis and suggestions on post-crisis China-ASEAN Cooperation in Banking Supervision
2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information, 2011Co-Authors: Guo-ying Li, Sheng-you YangAbstract:Although China-ASEAN Cooperation in Banking Supervision has made many achievements, there are still some problems. Through establishing a game model of inter-countries cooperation in Banking Supervision and analyzing the strategy selection under different conditions. We can conclud that: countries with high financial openness in the China-ASEAN region are actively committed to Supervision cooperation; and with the acceleration of financial integration, it will help to maximize the social welfare if the countries with low financial openness join the cooperation. Hence, to strengthen the China-ASEAN cooperation in Banking Supervision, we should set up a multi-level cooperation framework, found authoritative organizations and establish uniform rules.
