Beneficence

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Richard M Ryan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • correction to distinguishing between basic psychological needs and basic wellness enhancers the case of Beneficence as a candidate psychological need
    Motivation and Emotion, 2020
    Co-Authors: Frank Martela, Richard M Ryan
    Abstract:

    The authors would like to correct the following error in the publication of the original article: The appendix 1 was missing and will hereby be added. The appendix contains the four items for the Beneficence frustration scale to assess antisocial impact.

  • Distinguishing between basic psychological needs and basic wellness enhancers: the case of Beneficence as a candidate psychological need
    Motivation and Emotion, 2019
    Co-Authors: Frank Martela, Richard M Ryan
    Abstract:

    In order to be considered a basic psychological need, a candidate need should fulfill several criteria, including need satisfaction having a unique positive effect on well-being, and need frustration having a unique effect on ill-being, properties demonstrated by autonomy, competence and relatedness. Previous research has demonstrated that Beneficence satisfaction—the sense of having a positive impact on other people—can have a unique positive effect on well-being. In the present study, we examined whether Beneficence frustration—the sense of having a negative impact on other people—would be uniquely connected to ill-being. In the first study (N = 332; Mage  = 38) we developed a scale to assess Beneficence frustration. Then, in two subsequent cross-sectional studies (N = 444 and N = 426; Mage  = 38/36) Beneficence frustration is correlated with indicators of ill-being (negative affect, depression, anxiety, physical symptoms), but this connection disappears when controlling for the effects of autonomy, competence and relatedness need frustrations. The three needs fully mediate relations between Beneficence frustration and all assessed well-being and ill-being indicators in both studies. This leads us to suggest a distinction between basic psychological needs and basic wellness enhancers, the satisfaction of which may improve well-being, but the neglect or frustration of which might not uniquely impact ill-being.

  • meaningfulness as satisfaction of autonomy competence relatedness and Beneficence comparing the four satisfactions and positive affect as predictors of meaning in life
    Journal of Happiness Studies, 2018
    Co-Authors: Frank Martela, Richard M Ryan, Michael F Steger
    Abstract:

    Positive affect (PA) has consistently been shown to predict meaning in life (MIL). In one of the first investigations to examine multiple predictors of MIL simultaneously, we tested in three studies the hypothesis that satisfactions associated with being benevolent and fulfilling psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness are more central predictors of MIL, and could explain the correlation between PA and MIL. Study 1, a cross-sectional survey, regressed the four suggested factors and PA simultaneously on MIL, showing that all four emerged as independent predictors, whereas PA and MIL were no longer connected. Study 2 looked at recollections of meaningful situations, showing that all four satisfactions and PA emerged as independent predictors of situational meaning. Study 3 used a diary method to show that daily fluctuations in autonomy, competence, relatedness, Beneficence, and PA all simultaneously and independently predicted daily sense of meaning. However, a brief longitudinal study showed that whereas combined satisfaction of autonomy, competence, relatedness, and Beneficence at T1 predicted general sense of MIL at T2, PA did not. Together, these studies show that the four satisfactions consistently emerge as independent predictors of both general and short-term meaning, in some situations even accounting for the relation between PA and general MIL.

  • the benefits of benevolence basic psychological needs Beneficence and the enhancement of well being
    Journal of Personality, 2016
    Co-Authors: Frank Martela, Richard M Ryan
    Abstract:

    Pro-social behaviors have been associated with enhanced well-being, but what psychological mechanisms explain this connection? Some theories suggest that Beneficence—the sense of being able to give—inherently improves well-being, whereas evidence from self-determination theory (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010) shows that increases in well-being are mediated by satisfaction of innate psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Here we simultaneously assess these two explanations. Study 1 (N = 335) used a cross-sectional survey with an Internet sample to develop a measure to assess Beneficence satisfaction. The next two cross-sectional Internet-sample studies tested mediators between pro-social behavior and general well-being (Study 2, N = 332) and situational peak moment well-being (Study 3, N = 180). A fourth study (N = 85) used a diary method with university students to assess daily fluctuations in well-being associated with needs and Beneficence. It was shown across all studies that both the three psychological needs and Beneficence satisfaction mediate the relations between pro-social actions and well-being, with all four factors emerging as independent predictors. Together, these studies underscore the role of autonomy, competence, and relatedness in explaining the well-being benefits of benevolence, and they also point to the independent role of Beneficence as a source of human wellness.

Ben Saunders - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • procreative Beneficence intelligence and the optimization problem
    Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 2015
    Co-Authors: Ben Saunders
    Abstract:

    According to the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, reproducers should choose the child, of those available to them, expected to have the best life. Savulescu argues reproducers are therefore morally obligated to select for nondisease traits, such as intelligence. Carter and Gordon recently challenged this implication, arguing that Savulescu fails to establish that intelligence promotes well-being. This paper develops two responses. First, I argue that higher intelligence is likely to contribute to well-being on most plausible accounts. Second, I argue that, even if it does not, one can only resist the conclusion that reproducers should select on the basis of intelligence if its expected net effect is neutral. If intelligence reduces expected well-being, then reproducers should select offspring of low intelligence. More likely, the effect of increased intelligence on expected well-being varies at different levels, which makes identifying an optimum for well-being more complex than hitherto appreciated.

  • Is procreative Beneficence obligatory
    Journal of Medical Ethics, 2014
    Co-Authors: Ben Saunders
    Abstract:

    Julian Savulescu defends the principle of procreative Beneficence, according to which parents have a prima facie moral obligation to choose the child with the best expected life. In this paper, I argue that Savulescu fails to show that procreative Beneficence is genuinely obligatory, because of his equivocation between moral reason and moral obligation. Savulescu assumes that morality requires us to do what we have most (moral) reason to do, but many deny this, for instance because they believe we have reasons (but no obligation) to perform supererogatory actions. Even if parents have moral reasons to choose the child with the best expected life, they may not be under any obligation to do so.

Johan Christiaan Bester - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Samuel Mansell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • shareholder theory and kant s duty of Beneficence
    Journal of Business Ethics, 2013
    Co-Authors: Samuel Mansell
    Abstract:

    This article draws on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant to explore whether a corporate ‘duty of Beneficence’ to non-shareholders is consistent with the orthodox ‘shareholder theory’ of the firm. It examines the ethical framework of Milton Friedman’s argument and asks whether it necessarily rules out the well-being of non-shareholders as a corporate objective. The article examines Kant’s distinction between ‘duties of right’ and ‘duties of virtue’ (the latter including the duty of Beneficence) and investigates their consistency with the shareholder theory. The article concludes that it is possible within the ethical framework of shareholder theory for managers to pursue directly the happiness of non-shareholders. Furthermore, shareholders have a duty to hold management to account for the moral consequences of the firm’s activities on non-shareholding stakeholders.

  • Shareholder Theory and Kant’s ‘Duty of Beneficence
    Journal of Business Ethics, 2012
    Co-Authors: Samuel Mansell
    Abstract:

    This article draws on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant to explore whether a corporate ‘duty of Beneficence’ to non-shareholders is consistent with the orthodox ‘shareholder theory’ of the firm. It examines the ethical framework of Milton Friedman’s argument and asks whether it necessarily rules out the well-being of non-shareholders as a corporate objective. The article examines Kant’s distinction between ‘duties of right’ and ‘duties of virtue’ (the latter including the duty of Beneficence) and investigates their consistency with the shareholder theory. The article concludes that it is possible within the ethical framework of shareholder theory for managers to pursue directly the happiness of non-shareholders. Furthermore, shareholders have a duty to hold management to account for the moral consequences of the firm’s activities on non-shareholding stakeholders.

Julian Savulescu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the costs of being consequentialist social inference from instrumental harm and impartial Beneficence
    Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2018
    Co-Authors: Jim A C Everett, Julian Savulescu, Nadira S Faber, Molly J Crockett
    Abstract:

    Abstract Previous work has demonstrated that people are more likely to trust “deontological” agents who reject harming one person to save many others than “consequentialist” agents who endorse such instrumental harms, which could explain the higher prevalence of non-consequentialist moral intuitions. Yet consequentialism involves endorsing not just instrumental harm, but also impartial Beneficence, treating the well-being of every individual as equally important. In four studies (total N = 2086), we investigated preferences for consequentialist vs. non-consequentialist social partners endorsing instrumental harm or impartial Beneficence and examined how such preferences varied across different types of social relationships. Our results demonstrate robust preferences for non-consequentialist over consequentialist agents in the domain of instrumental harm, and weaker – but still evident – preferences in the domain of impartial Beneficence. In the domain of instrumental harm, non-consequentialist agents were consistently viewed as more moral and trustworthy, preferred for a range of social roles, and entrusted with more money in economic exchanges. In the domain of impartial Beneficence, preferences for non-consequentialist agents were observed for close interpersonal relationships requiring direct interaction (friend, spouse) but not for more distant roles with little-to-no personal interaction (political leader). Collectively our findings demonstrate that preferences for non-consequentialist agents are sensitive to the different dimensions of consequentialist thinking and the relational context.

  • Understanding Procreative Beneficence
    Oxford Handbooks Online, 2016
    Co-Authors: Julian Savulescu, Guy Kahane
    Abstract:

    Procreative Beneficence (PB) prescribes that reproducers should select the child (or children) they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information. Much criticized, this claim is also misunderstood: it is not an absolute obligation but similar in force to claims such as “you should give your child the best education.” This chapter clarifies the PB principle and explores competing reasons to it such as normative uncertainty, distributive justice, or reproductive liberty. It concludes that the two best objections to PB are that it requires a conception of human well-being and is committed to the existence of impersonal reasons. However, that person-affecting reasons are stronger than impersonal reasons lessens the force of some objections to PB such as that it involves sacrifices on the part of procreators.

  • procreative Beneficence and in vitro gametogenesis
    Monash bioethics review, 2012
    Co-Authors: Hannah Bourne, Thomas Douglas, Julian Savulescu
    Abstract:

    The Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB) holds that when a couple plans to have a child, they have significant moral reason to select, of the possible children they could have, the child who is most likely to experience the greatest wellbeing – that is, the most advantaged child, the child with the best chance at the best life.1 PB captures the common sense intuitions of many about reproductive decisions. For example, many couples defer conceiving until they are in a better financial or social situation in an attempt to give their child a better life. Or a woman who is currently suffering from rubella may defer conception until she has recovered to prevent giving birth to a severely impaired child. In both of these cases, parents are choosing to have one child, who can expect a better life, over another, who could expect a worse life. Most people believe that such choices are morally permissible, if not morally required. PB extrapolates from our intuitions about such cases to cases involving selection using technological means, such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. PB does not posit an absolute moral obligation – it does not dictate what people must do. Instead it holds that there is a significant moral reason to select the best child, but one that must be weighed against other reasons. Many objections have been raised to PB. For example, it has been held that adopting the principle would exacerbate inequalities, since the wealthy would have better access to selection technologies than the poor;2 would reinforce objectionable societal preferences (such as preferences for children of a certain sex or sexual orientation);3 would impose unacceptable burdens on women4 and on parents in general;5 would result in a generation of disillusioned children, unable to achieve what is expected of them;6 and would generate an ‘arms-race’ as parents iteratively attempt to prevent their own children from being placed at a competitive disadvantage.7 The principle has also been criticised for failing to give parents all-things-considered guidance on what to do;8 failing to bridge the gap between what is best, and what parents think is best;9 ignoring the complexity and context-dependence of the good life;10 and being excessively individualistic.11 Savulescu and collaborators have responded to some of these objections elsewhere.12 In this paper we wish address a different and more practical objection: the objection that parents will be heavily restricted in the number of traits that they can select, since they will have to choose among a very limited number of embryos. Recent advances in stem cell research may provide a solution to this problem.

  • in defence of procreative Beneficence
    Journal of Medical Ethics, 2007
    Co-Authors: Julian Savulescu
    Abstract:

    Why potential parents should select the best child of possible children, and the necessity of a dialogue about the context of a reproductive decision. The principle of Procreative Beneficence is the principle of selecting the best child of the possible children one could have. This principle is elaborated on and defended against a range of objections. In particular, focus is laid on four objections that Michael Parker raises: that it is underdetermining, that it is insensitive to the complex nature of the good, that it is self-defeating and that it is overly individualistic. Procreative Beneficence is a useful principle in reproductive decision-making. It is necessary to be more active in making selection decisions about what kind of child to have. Parker1 raises four objections to the principle of Procreative Beneficence (see page 279) . I will address these in turn. (1) Procreative Beneficence is underdetermining Parker claims that Procreative Beneficence is underdetermining. By “underdetermining”, he means that the principle will not give clear and determinate answers as to which lives are better or best. Parker argues that “ranking possible lives as “better” or “worse” is “highly problematic”. Ranking lives is a very complex matter. Let us distinguish between: We should also distinguish between valuation ex ante (prediction of the value of a whole life or feature) and ex post (retrospective evaluation of a whole life or feature). In Procreative Beneficence, I likened genetic testing to playing the wheel of fortune.2 Just because we have a weak chance of winning, does not mean we should not play the game. The only reason not to play a game that …