The Experts below are selected from a list of 60 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Audun Botterud - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Analysis of generation investment under different market designs
2008 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting - Conversion and Delivery of Electrical Energy in the 21st Century, 2008Co-Authors: Gerard L. Doorman, Audun BotterudAbstract:Summary form only given. In this paper a stochastic dynamic optimization model is used to analyze the effect of different market designs on generation investment in restructured power systems. The expansion decisions of profit-maximizing investors are simulated under four different market designs: Energy only, Capacity payment, Capacity Obligation, and Capacity subscription. The results show that the overall social welfare is reduced compared to a centralized social welfare optimization for the first three policies. In particular, an energy only market with a low price cap leads to insufficient generation investments. Capacity payments and Obligations give additional investment incentives and more generating Capacity, but also result in a considerable transfer of wealth from consumers to producers due to the Capacity payments. In contrast, the Capacity subscription policy increases the social welfare, and both producers and consumers benefit. This is possible because Capacity subscription explicitly utilizes differences in consumers' preferences for uninterrupted supply. This advantage must be weighed against the cost of implementation, which is not included in the model.
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Analysis of Generation Investment Under Different Market Designs
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2008Co-Authors: Gerard L. Doorman, Audun BotterudAbstract:In this paper a stochastic dynamic optimization model is used to analyze the effect of different market designs on generation investment and demand. The expansion decisions of profit-maximizing investors are simulated under four different market designs: energy only, Capacity payment, Capacity Obligation, and Capacity subscription. The results show that the overall social welfare is reduced compared to a centralized social welfare optimization for the first three policies. In particular, an energy only market with a low price cap leads to insufficient generation investments. Capacity payments and Obligations give additional investment incentives and more generating Capacity, but also result in a considerable transfer of wealth from consumers to producers due to the Capacity payments. In contrast, the Capacity subscription policy increases the social welfare, and both producers and consumers benefit. This is possible because Capacity subscription explicitly utilizes differences in consumers' preferences for uninterrupted supply. This advantage must be weighed against the cost of implementation, which is not included in the model.
Laura Merla - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A macro perspective on transnational families and care circulation: situating Capacity, Obligation, and family commitments
2014Co-Authors: Laura MerlaAbstract:This chapter discusses the usefulness of situating the care circulation framework in a migratory context by discussing the interconnectedness between institutional contexts and Capacity, Obligation and negotiated commitments. The author shows that care arrangements that result from a dialectical relationship between these three elements are influenced by migrants and their kin's respective positioning in the migration, gendered care, welfare and working-time regimes of their societies of origin and destination. The chapter also highlights the tensions that arise between various moral orders within transnational family networks, and within host societies.
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Transnational Families, Migration and the Circulation of Care : Understanding Mobility and Absence in Family Life
2013Co-Authors: Loretta Baldassar, Laura MerlaAbstract:Part A: Conceptualising Care Circulation Introduction: Transnational Family Caregiving Through the Lens of Circulation Loretta Baldassar and Laura Merla 1. Locating Transnational Care Circulation in Migration and Family Studies Loretta Baldassar and Laura Merla Part B: Care Circulation: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations 2. Mapping the New Plurality of Transnational Families: A Life Course Perspective Karin Wall and Claudio Bolzman 3. Care (and) Circulation Revisited: A Conceptual Map of Diversity in Transnational Parenting Paola Bonizzoni and Paolo Boccagni 4. Care Circulation, Absence and Affect in Transnational Families Marina Ariza 5. A Macro Perspective on Transnational Families and Care Circulation: Situating Capacity, Obligation and Family Commitments Laura Merla Part C: Gendered Care Circuits: Exploring Absence Beyond Mother-Child Dyads 6. Migration and Care: Intimately Related Aspects of Caribbean Family and Kinship Karen Fog Olwig 7. Ghanaian Children in Transnational Families: Understanding the Experiences of Left-Behind Children Through Local Parenting Norms Miranda Poeze and Valentina Mazzucato 8. Men's Caregiving Practices in Filipino Transnational Families: A Case Study of Left-Behind Fathers and Sons Asuncion Fresnoza-Flot 9. Polish Male Migrants in London: The Circulation of Fatherly Care Majella Kilkey Part D: The Mobilities of Care as a Resource Within and Beyond Transnational Families 10. Care Circulation in Transnational Families: Social and Cultural Capitals in Italian and Caribbean Migrant Communities in Britain Tracey Reynolds and Elisabetta Zontini 11. "Boomerang Remittances" and Circular Care: A Study of Indian Transnational Families in Australia Supriya Singh and Anuja Cabraal 12. Middle Class Transnational Caregiving: The Circulation of Care Between Family and Extended Kin Networks in the Global North Loretta Baldassar and Raelene Wilding
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Transnational family caregiving and emotions: a reassessment of the dialectical relationship between Capacity, Obligation and negotiated commitments
2008Co-Authors: Loretta Baldassar, Laura MerlaAbstract:Transnational family caregiving and emotions: a reassessment of the dialectical relationship between Capacity, Obligation and negotiated commitments
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Capabilities, well-being and social class: a comparison of transnational exchanges between Australia, EU and Latin America
2008Co-Authors: Laura Merla, Loretta BaldassarAbstract:The ability to maintain contact with elderly parents living in a distant country and to be involved in their caring seems to play a major role in migrants and their elderly parents sense of well-being. This ability is influenced by a wide range of elements, such as resources, time, technologies, mobility, mental and physical health. It is also influenced and constrained by cultural values and expectations about who should take care of elderly people (the family versus the State, women versus men, the eldest son or daughter versus the youngest etc.) and by perceptions about available care services in the home country. This paper will employ both Yeates (2005) concept of Global Care Chain Analysis (which focuses on the power differentials that result from state legislation, transnational agreements between states and access to resources) and the framework for analyzing Transnational family Caregiving developed by Baldassar, Baldock & Wilding (2007), (which highlights the dialectical relationship between Capacity, Obligation and negotiated commitments) to compare and contrast the experiences of well being (in transnational care contexts) among working class and professional migrants in Australia and their kin in Europe and South America. Data are drawn in particular from a sample of Italian professional 'lifestyle' migrants who arrived in Perth, Western Australia since 1980 and a sample of working class El Salvadorian 'political' migrants who arrived there since 1990. A key objective of the paper is to interrogate the impact of social class on transnational caregiving relationship.
Susan Tierney - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Political Economy of Long-Term Generation Adequacy: Why an ICAP Mechanism is Needed as Part of Standard Market Design
The Electricity Journal, 2002Co-Authors: Janet Gail Besser, John G. Farr, Susan TierneyAbstract:Abstract In theory, energy and ancillary services markets alone can provide incentives for investment in electricity supplies. However, they can only do this by subjecting consumers to price volatility, price levels, supply shortages, and a level of risk to reliability that customers and policymakers would find unacceptable. If, given the political realities of the electricity market, prices lack the ability to move up and down as necessary to induce investment when Capacity tightens, then an explicit Capacity Obligation is needed to signal Capacity shortages (and surpluses) and induce investment when appropriate.
Gerard L. Doorman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Analysis of generation investment under different market designs
2008 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting - Conversion and Delivery of Electrical Energy in the 21st Century, 2008Co-Authors: Gerard L. Doorman, Audun BotterudAbstract:Summary form only given. In this paper a stochastic dynamic optimization model is used to analyze the effect of different market designs on generation investment in restructured power systems. The expansion decisions of profit-maximizing investors are simulated under four different market designs: Energy only, Capacity payment, Capacity Obligation, and Capacity subscription. The results show that the overall social welfare is reduced compared to a centralized social welfare optimization for the first three policies. In particular, an energy only market with a low price cap leads to insufficient generation investments. Capacity payments and Obligations give additional investment incentives and more generating Capacity, but also result in a considerable transfer of wealth from consumers to producers due to the Capacity payments. In contrast, the Capacity subscription policy increases the social welfare, and both producers and consumers benefit. This is possible because Capacity subscription explicitly utilizes differences in consumers' preferences for uninterrupted supply. This advantage must be weighed against the cost of implementation, which is not included in the model.
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Analysis of Generation Investment Under Different Market Designs
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2008Co-Authors: Gerard L. Doorman, Audun BotterudAbstract:In this paper a stochastic dynamic optimization model is used to analyze the effect of different market designs on generation investment and demand. The expansion decisions of profit-maximizing investors are simulated under four different market designs: energy only, Capacity payment, Capacity Obligation, and Capacity subscription. The results show that the overall social welfare is reduced compared to a centralized social welfare optimization for the first three policies. In particular, an energy only market with a low price cap leads to insufficient generation investments. Capacity payments and Obligations give additional investment incentives and more generating Capacity, but also result in a considerable transfer of wealth from consumers to producers due to the Capacity payments. In contrast, the Capacity subscription policy increases the social welfare, and both producers and consumers benefit. This is possible because Capacity subscription explicitly utilizes differences in consumers' preferences for uninterrupted supply. This advantage must be weighed against the cost of implementation, which is not included in the model.
Janet Gail Besser - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Political Economy of Long-Term Generation Adequacy: Why an ICAP Mechanism is Needed as Part of Standard Market Design
The Electricity Journal, 2002Co-Authors: Janet Gail Besser, John G. Farr, Susan TierneyAbstract:Abstract In theory, energy and ancillary services markets alone can provide incentives for investment in electricity supplies. However, they can only do this by subjecting consumers to price volatility, price levels, supply shortages, and a level of risk to reliability that customers and policymakers would find unacceptable. If, given the political realities of the electricity market, prices lack the ability to move up and down as necessary to induce investment when Capacity tightens, then an explicit Capacity Obligation is needed to signal Capacity shortages (and surpluses) and induce investment when appropriate.
