The Experts below are selected from a list of 7932 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Matthew Paterson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the politics of Carbon Markets an introduction
Environmental Politics, 2012Co-Authors: Benjamin Stephan, Matthew PatersonAbstract:This overview of the existing political analysis of Carbon Markets identifies three broad strands in the literature. The first is concerned with the processes by which particular Carbon market schemes are established. The second focuses on the role of particular actors in the creation of Carbon Markets. The third strand assesses Carbon Markets on efficiency, legitimacy or justice grounds. This existing literature is contrasted with the framework developed by the contributions to this volume. Broadly drawing on constructivist and poststructuralist approaches, the Carbon economy is deconstructed, its history scrutinised and the practices and technologies that have been used to bring these Markets into being are highlighted. Thus it is demonstrated that politics is not limited to the policy process leading up to the decision to implement an emissions trading scheme or offset mechanism, but is also present in the forms of knowledge claims that underpin these Markets, as well as the various daily practices tha...
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who and what are Carbon Markets for politics and the development of climate policy
Climate Policy, 2012Co-Authors: Matthew PatersonAbstract:Why have Carbon Markets been rapidly adopted as policy solutions to climate change in the last decade? Perhaps surprisingly, this question has attracted virtually no attention in the large literature on such Markets. The standard arguments given for why Carbon Markets are good ways to respond to climate change do not explain why such Markets have flourished as governance mechanisms in relation to climate. Carbon Markets have spread and become taken-for-granted because of the potential they give to certain powerful actors (financiers, specifically) to create new cycles of investment, profits and growth. As a consequence, they make possible a political coalition combining financiers with environmentalists. This coalition has considerable potential to legitimize substantial cuts in Carbon emissions in the face of continued opposition from other interests. It is the combination of these two elements - the promotion of specific growth sectors and the construction of a political coalition - that constitutes the principal political virtue of Carbon Markets. In order to demonstrate this claim, the history of emissions trading is traced and the implication of this analysis is explored for the further building of climate governance centred on Carbon Markets.
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between desire and routine assembling environment and finance in Carbon Markets
Antipode, 2011Co-Authors: Philippe Descheneau, Matthew PatersonAbstract:: This article contributes to emerging research on the social construction of Carbon Markets by focusing on the mobilisation of desire amongst Carbon market actors, and on the routinisation of financial practices within such Markets. We examine specifically the Markets that have emerged around the Clean Development Mechanism. First, we look at the stories market actors tell each other in advertising and at Carbon Expo. Second, we look at the routinisation of Carbon finance through the borrowing of ideas and tools from traditional financial Markets. We suggest that the former animates the Markets while the latter enables the Markets to become “normalised” for financiers. We also suggest that the two aspects however also work in tension with each other, and that the character of this tension is one way of understanding the distinctiveness of Carbon Markets.
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a tale of two copenhagens Carbon Markets and climate governance
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2010Co-Authors: Steven Bernstein, Michele M Betsill, Matthew J Hoffmann, Matthew PatersonAbstract:Assessments of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 have tended to see it as a ‘return to realism’ — as the triumph of hard interstate bargaining over institutional or normative development about climate change. This article contests that interpretation by showing how it focuses too closely on the interstate negotiations and neglects the ongoing development of Carbon Markets as governance practices and systems to deal with climate change. It shows that there remains a strong normative consensus about such Markets, and a deepening set of transnational governance practices. These governance practices only partly depend on the interstate negotiations. Thinking about the future of global climate governance needs to start with the complexity of interactions between these transnational governance systems and the interstate negotiations.
Cameron Hepburn - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Designing Carbon Markets. Part I: Carbon Markets in time
Energy Policy, 2020Co-Authors: Samuel Fankhauser, Cameron HepburnAbstract:This paper analyses the design of Carbon Markets in time (i.e., intertemporally). It is part of a twin set of papers that ask, starting from first principles, what an optimal global Carbon market would look like by around 2030. Our focus is on firm-level cap-and-trade systems, although much of what we say would also apply to government-level trading and Carbon offset schemes. We examine the "first principles" of temporal design that would help to maximise flexibility and to minimise costs, including banking and borrowing and other mechanisms to provide greater Carbon price predictability and credibility over time
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Designing Carbon Markets, part II: Carbon Markets in space
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 2020Co-Authors: Cameron Hepburn, Samuel FankhauserAbstract:This paper analyses the design of Carbon Markets in time (i.e., intertemporally). It is part of a twin set of papers that ask, starting from first principles, what an optimal global Carbon market would look like by around 2030. Our focus is on firm-level cap-and-trade systems, although much of what we say would also apply to government-level trading and Carbon offset schemes. We examine the "first principles" of temporal design that would help to maximise flexibility and to minimise costs, including banking and borrowing and other mechanisms to provide greater Carbon price predictability and credibility over time.
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designing Carbon Markets part ii Carbon Markets in space
Energy Policy, 2010Co-Authors: Samuel Fankhauser, Cameron HepburnAbstract:This paper analyses the design of Carbon Markets in space (i.e., geographically). It is part of a twin set of papers that, starting from first principles, ask what an optimal global Carbon market would look like by around 2030. Our focus is on firm-level cap-and-trade systems, although much of what we say would also apply to government-level trading and Carbon offset schemes. We examine the "first principles" of spatial design to maximise flexibility and to minimise costs, including key design issues in linking national and regional Carbon Markets together to create a global Carbon market.
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Carbon Markets in space and time
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Samuel Fankhauser, Cameron HepburnAbstract:This paper analyses the design of Carbon Markets in time (intertemporally) and space (geographically) from first principles, starting initially with a relatively clean slate and asking what an optimal global Carbon market would look like by around 2030. Our focus is on firmlevel trading systems, although much of what we say would also apply to government-level trading (e.g., AAU trading under the Kyoto Protocol). We examine the “first principles” of design to maximise flexibility and to minimise costs, consider temporal design including banking and borrowing and other mechanisms to provide greater Carbon price predictability and credibility over time, and consider spatial elements, examining the key design issues in linking national and regional Carbon Markets together to create a global Carbon market.
Daniel Raimi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Carbon Markets past present and future
Annual Review of Resource Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Richard G Newell, William A Pizer, Daniel RaimiAbstract:Carbon Markets are substantial and expanding. There are many lessons from experience over the past 9 years: fewer free allowances, careful moderation of low and high prices, and a recognition that trading systems require adjustments that have consequences for market participants and market confidence. Moreover, the emerging international architecture features separate emissions trading systems serving distinct jurisdictions. These programs are complemented by a variety of other types of policies alongside the Carbon Markets. This architecture sits in sharp contrast to the integrated global trading architecture envisioned 15 years ago by the designers of the Kyoto Protocol and raises a suite of new questions. In this new architecture, jurisdictions with emissions trading have to decide how, whether, and when to link with one another, and policy makers must confront how to measure both the comparability of efforts among Markets and the comparability between Markets and a variety of other policy approaches.
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Carbon Markets effective policy response
Science, 2014Co-Authors: Richard G Newell, William A Pizer, Daniel RaimiAbstract:Cullenward and Wara raise two main issues: (i) Are Carbon Markets delivering the reductions they were designed to deliver? (ii) Can we use economic theory to calculate the extent to which Carbon Markets are reducing emissions? They then highlight two problems—leakage and offsets—that suggest Carbon Markets are not performing as designed. Emission targets and programs are often designed with some understanding of potential problems. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was fully aware of the potential for leakage to neighboring regions, and intentionally designed their program to operate with low prices that limit leakage ([ 1 ][1]). California may have believed that it could successfully address leakage, but it also implemented a price floor that largely protects the rest of the program if it occurs ([ 2 ][2]). The European Union placed strict limits on the use of offsets, in turn limiting the potential for their abuse ([ 3 ][3]). Similarly, the Bonn and Marrakech conferences after the Kyoto Protocol largely renegotiated the original targets through limits on credits for Carbon sinks, highlighting how even credit provisions that are widely acknowledged to influence environmental effectiveness can be part of an intentional program design ([ 4 ][4]). We believe that although leakage and problematic offsets are never desirable, they are often occurring in a way that was anticipated at the time the program was designed. To answer Cullenward and Wara's second question, we do not think that leakage and offsets negate the mitigation effects of the observed Carbon price. We argue that Carbon Markets—even if flawed—are working and are reducing emissions. Leakage and certain offsets can yield reduction credit where it has not actually occurred in aggregate. Such reductions, however, are in addition to all of the real abatement activities that will occur at a given market price. We can certainly imagine subtleties that caution us from being too precise about our rough calculations, but our review suggests these issues are not problematic. 1. [↵][5]RGGI Emission Leakage Multi-State Staff Working Group, “Potential emissions leakage and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI): Evaluating market dynamics, monitoring options, and possible mitigation mechanisms” (2007); [www.rggi.org/docs/il\_report\_final\_3\_14_07.pdf][6]. 2. [↵][7]1. H. G. Fell, 2. D. Burtraw, 3. R. D. Morgenstern, 4. K. L. Palmer, 5. L. Preonas , Soft and hard price collars in a cap-and-trade system: A comparative analysis (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 10-27-REV, 2010). 3. [↵][8]1. D. A. Ellerman, 2. F. J. Convery, 3. C. de Perthius , Pricing Carbon (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2010). 4. [↵][9]1. C. Bohringer , Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol. 19, 451 (2003). [OpenUrl][10][Abstract][11] [1]: #ref-1 [2]: #ref-2 [3]: #ref-3 [4]: #ref-4 [5]: #xref-ref-1-1 "View reference 1 in text" [6]: http://www.rggi.org/docs/il_report_final_3_14_07.pdf [7]: #xref-ref-2-1 "View reference 2 in text" [8]: #xref-ref-3-1 "View reference 3 in text" [9]: #xref-ref-4-1 "View reference 4 in text" [10]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DOxford%2BReview%2Bof%2BEconomic%2BPolicy%26rft.stitle%253DOXF%2BREV%2BECON%2BPOLICY%26rft.aulast%253DBohringer%26rft.auinit1%253DC.%26rft.volume%253D19%26rft.issue%253D3%26rft.spage%253D451%26rft.epage%253D466%26rft.atitle%253DThe%2BKyoto%2BProtocol%253A%2BA%2BReview%2Band%2BPerspectives%26rft_id%253Dinfo%253Adoi%252F10.1093%252Foxrep%252F19.3.451%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [11]: /lookup/ijlink/YTozOntzOjQ6InBhdGgiO3M6MTQ6Ii9sb29rdXAvaWpsaW5rIjtzOjU6InF1ZXJ5IjthOjQ6e3M6ODoibGlua1R5cGUiO3M6NDoiQUJTVCI7czoxMToiam91cm5hbENvZGUiO3M6NToib3hyZXAiO3M6NToicmVzaWQiO3M6ODoiMTkvMy80NTEiO3M6NDoiYXRvbSI7czoyNToiL3NjaS8zNDQvNjE5MS8xNDYwLjMuYXRvbSI7fXM6ODoiZnJhZ21lbnQiO3M6MDoiIjt9
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Carbon Market Lessons and Global Policy Outlook
Science, 2014Co-Authors: Richard G Newell, William A Pizer, Daniel RaimiAbstract:Prices in the European Union's (EU) Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) spent 2013 at historic lows. Elected officials have promised to repeal the Australian Carbon market. Yet five new regional Carbon Markets recently began in China, which nearly doubled the volume of emissions covered by trading programs. This follows California's successful launch of its cap-and-trade program in 2013 and its 2014 link to Quebec's market. Are Carbon Markets seriously challenged or succeeding and on the rise?
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Carbon Markets 15 years after kyoto lessons learned new challenges
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2013Co-Authors: Richard G Newell, William A Pizer, Daniel RaimiAbstract:Carbon Markets are substantial and they are expanding. There are many lessons from market experiences over the past eight years: there should be fewer free allowances, better management of market-sensitive information, and a recognition that trading systems require adjustments that have consequences for market participants and market confidence. Moreover, the emerging market architecture features separate emissions trading systems serving distinct jurisdictions and a variety of other types of policies exist alongside the Carbon Markets.This situation is in sharp contrast to the top-down, integrated global trading architecture envisioned 15 years ago by the designers of the Kyoto Protocol and raises a suite of new questions. In this new architecture, jurisdictions with emissions trading have to decide how, whether, and when to link with one another. Stakeholders and policymakers must confront how to measure the comparability of efforts among Markets as well as relative to a variety of other policy approaches. International negotiators must in turn work out a global agreement that can accommodate and support increasingly bottom-up approaches to Carbon Markets and climate change mitigation.
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Carbon Markets past present and future
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012Co-Authors: Richard G Newell, William A Pizer, Daniel RaimiAbstract:Carbon Markets are substantial and they are expanding. There are many lessons from experiences over the past eight years: fewer free allowances, better management of market-sensitive information, and a recognition that trading systems require adjustments that have consequences for market participants and market confidence. Moreover, the emerging international architecture features separate emissions trading systems serving distinct jurisdictions. These programs are complemented by a variety of other types of policies alongside the Carbon Markets. This sits in sharp contrast to the integrated global trading architecture envisioned 15 years ago by the designers of the Kyoto Protocol and raises a suite of new questions. In this new architecture, jurisdictions with emissions trading have to decide how, whether, and when to link with one another, and policymakers overseeing Carbon Markets must confront how to measure the comparability of efforts among Markets and relative to a variety of other policy approaches.
Samuel Fankhauser - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Designing Carbon Markets. Part I: Carbon Markets in time
Energy Policy, 2020Co-Authors: Samuel Fankhauser, Cameron HepburnAbstract:This paper analyses the design of Carbon Markets in time (i.e., intertemporally). It is part of a twin set of papers that ask, starting from first principles, what an optimal global Carbon market would look like by around 2030. Our focus is on firm-level cap-and-trade systems, although much of what we say would also apply to government-level trading and Carbon offset schemes. We examine the "first principles" of temporal design that would help to maximise flexibility and to minimise costs, including banking and borrowing and other mechanisms to provide greater Carbon price predictability and credibility over time
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Designing Carbon Markets, part II: Carbon Markets in space
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 2020Co-Authors: Cameron Hepburn, Samuel FankhauserAbstract:This paper analyses the design of Carbon Markets in time (i.e., intertemporally). It is part of a twin set of papers that ask, starting from first principles, what an optimal global Carbon market would look like by around 2030. Our focus is on firm-level cap-and-trade systems, although much of what we say would also apply to government-level trading and Carbon offset schemes. We examine the "first principles" of temporal design that would help to maximise flexibility and to minimise costs, including banking and borrowing and other mechanisms to provide greater Carbon price predictability and credibility over time.
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designing Carbon Markets part ii Carbon Markets in space
Energy Policy, 2010Co-Authors: Samuel Fankhauser, Cameron HepburnAbstract:This paper analyses the design of Carbon Markets in space (i.e., geographically). It is part of a twin set of papers that, starting from first principles, ask what an optimal global Carbon market would look like by around 2030. Our focus is on firm-level cap-and-trade systems, although much of what we say would also apply to government-level trading and Carbon offset schemes. We examine the "first principles" of spatial design to maximise flexibility and to minimise costs, including key design issues in linking national and regional Carbon Markets together to create a global Carbon market.
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Carbon Markets in space and time
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Samuel Fankhauser, Cameron HepburnAbstract:This paper analyses the design of Carbon Markets in time (intertemporally) and space (geographically) from first principles, starting initially with a relatively clean slate and asking what an optimal global Carbon market would look like by around 2030. Our focus is on firmlevel trading systems, although much of what we say would also apply to government-level trading (e.g., AAU trading under the Kyoto Protocol). We examine the “first principles” of design to maximise flexibility and to minimise costs, consider temporal design including banking and borrowing and other mechanisms to provide greater Carbon price predictability and credibility over time, and consider spatial elements, examining the key design issues in linking national and regional Carbon Markets together to create a global Carbon market.
Richard G Newell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Carbon Markets past present and future
Annual Review of Resource Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Richard G Newell, William A Pizer, Daniel RaimiAbstract:Carbon Markets are substantial and expanding. There are many lessons from experience over the past 9 years: fewer free allowances, careful moderation of low and high prices, and a recognition that trading systems require adjustments that have consequences for market participants and market confidence. Moreover, the emerging international architecture features separate emissions trading systems serving distinct jurisdictions. These programs are complemented by a variety of other types of policies alongside the Carbon Markets. This architecture sits in sharp contrast to the integrated global trading architecture envisioned 15 years ago by the designers of the Kyoto Protocol and raises a suite of new questions. In this new architecture, jurisdictions with emissions trading have to decide how, whether, and when to link with one another, and policy makers must confront how to measure both the comparability of efforts among Markets and the comparability between Markets and a variety of other policy approaches.
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Carbon Markets effective policy response
Science, 2014Co-Authors: Richard G Newell, William A Pizer, Daniel RaimiAbstract:Cullenward and Wara raise two main issues: (i) Are Carbon Markets delivering the reductions they were designed to deliver? (ii) Can we use economic theory to calculate the extent to which Carbon Markets are reducing emissions? They then highlight two problems—leakage and offsets—that suggest Carbon Markets are not performing as designed. Emission targets and programs are often designed with some understanding of potential problems. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was fully aware of the potential for leakage to neighboring regions, and intentionally designed their program to operate with low prices that limit leakage ([ 1 ][1]). California may have believed that it could successfully address leakage, but it also implemented a price floor that largely protects the rest of the program if it occurs ([ 2 ][2]). The European Union placed strict limits on the use of offsets, in turn limiting the potential for their abuse ([ 3 ][3]). Similarly, the Bonn and Marrakech conferences after the Kyoto Protocol largely renegotiated the original targets through limits on credits for Carbon sinks, highlighting how even credit provisions that are widely acknowledged to influence environmental effectiveness can be part of an intentional program design ([ 4 ][4]). We believe that although leakage and problematic offsets are never desirable, they are often occurring in a way that was anticipated at the time the program was designed. To answer Cullenward and Wara's second question, we do not think that leakage and offsets negate the mitigation effects of the observed Carbon price. We argue that Carbon Markets—even if flawed—are working and are reducing emissions. Leakage and certain offsets can yield reduction credit where it has not actually occurred in aggregate. Such reductions, however, are in addition to all of the real abatement activities that will occur at a given market price. We can certainly imagine subtleties that caution us from being too precise about our rough calculations, but our review suggests these issues are not problematic. 1. [↵][5]RGGI Emission Leakage Multi-State Staff Working Group, “Potential emissions leakage and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI): Evaluating market dynamics, monitoring options, and possible mitigation mechanisms” (2007); [www.rggi.org/docs/il\_report\_final\_3\_14_07.pdf][6]. 2. [↵][7]1. H. G. Fell, 2. D. Burtraw, 3. R. D. Morgenstern, 4. K. L. Palmer, 5. L. Preonas , Soft and hard price collars in a cap-and-trade system: A comparative analysis (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 10-27-REV, 2010). 3. [↵][8]1. D. A. Ellerman, 2. F. J. Convery, 3. C. de Perthius , Pricing Carbon (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2010). 4. [↵][9]1. C. Bohringer , Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol. 19, 451 (2003). [OpenUrl][10][Abstract][11] [1]: #ref-1 [2]: #ref-2 [3]: #ref-3 [4]: #ref-4 [5]: #xref-ref-1-1 "View reference 1 in text" [6]: http://www.rggi.org/docs/il_report_final_3_14_07.pdf [7]: #xref-ref-2-1 "View reference 2 in text" [8]: #xref-ref-3-1 "View reference 3 in text" [9]: #xref-ref-4-1 "View reference 4 in text" [10]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DOxford%2BReview%2Bof%2BEconomic%2BPolicy%26rft.stitle%253DOXF%2BREV%2BECON%2BPOLICY%26rft.aulast%253DBohringer%26rft.auinit1%253DC.%26rft.volume%253D19%26rft.issue%253D3%26rft.spage%253D451%26rft.epage%253D466%26rft.atitle%253DThe%2BKyoto%2BProtocol%253A%2BA%2BReview%2Band%2BPerspectives%26rft_id%253Dinfo%253Adoi%252F10.1093%252Foxrep%252F19.3.451%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [11]: /lookup/ijlink/YTozOntzOjQ6InBhdGgiO3M6MTQ6Ii9sb29rdXAvaWpsaW5rIjtzOjU6InF1ZXJ5IjthOjQ6e3M6ODoibGlua1R5cGUiO3M6NDoiQUJTVCI7czoxMToiam91cm5hbENvZGUiO3M6NToib3hyZXAiO3M6NToicmVzaWQiO3M6ODoiMTkvMy80NTEiO3M6NDoiYXRvbSI7czoyNToiL3NjaS8zNDQvNjE5MS8xNDYwLjMuYXRvbSI7fXM6ODoiZnJhZ21lbnQiO3M6MDoiIjt9
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Carbon Market Lessons and Global Policy Outlook
Science, 2014Co-Authors: Richard G Newell, William A Pizer, Daniel RaimiAbstract:Prices in the European Union's (EU) Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) spent 2013 at historic lows. Elected officials have promised to repeal the Australian Carbon market. Yet five new regional Carbon Markets recently began in China, which nearly doubled the volume of emissions covered by trading programs. This follows California's successful launch of its cap-and-trade program in 2013 and its 2014 link to Quebec's market. Are Carbon Markets seriously challenged or succeeding and on the rise?
-
Carbon Markets 15 years after kyoto lessons learned new challenges
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2013Co-Authors: Richard G Newell, William A Pizer, Daniel RaimiAbstract:Carbon Markets are substantial and they are expanding. There are many lessons from market experiences over the past eight years: there should be fewer free allowances, better management of market-sensitive information, and a recognition that trading systems require adjustments that have consequences for market participants and market confidence. Moreover, the emerging market architecture features separate emissions trading systems serving distinct jurisdictions and a variety of other types of policies exist alongside the Carbon Markets.This situation is in sharp contrast to the top-down, integrated global trading architecture envisioned 15 years ago by the designers of the Kyoto Protocol and raises a suite of new questions. In this new architecture, jurisdictions with emissions trading have to decide how, whether, and when to link with one another. Stakeholders and policymakers must confront how to measure the comparability of efforts among Markets as well as relative to a variety of other policy approaches. International negotiators must in turn work out a global agreement that can accommodate and support increasingly bottom-up approaches to Carbon Markets and climate change mitigation.
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Carbon Markets past present and future
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012Co-Authors: Richard G Newell, William A Pizer, Daniel RaimiAbstract:Carbon Markets are substantial and they are expanding. There are many lessons from experiences over the past eight years: fewer free allowances, better management of market-sensitive information, and a recognition that trading systems require adjustments that have consequences for market participants and market confidence. Moreover, the emerging international architecture features separate emissions trading systems serving distinct jurisdictions. These programs are complemented by a variety of other types of policies alongside the Carbon Markets. This sits in sharp contrast to the integrated global trading architecture envisioned 15 years ago by the designers of the Kyoto Protocol and raises a suite of new questions. In this new architecture, jurisdictions with emissions trading have to decide how, whether, and when to link with one another, and policymakers overseeing Carbon Markets must confront how to measure the comparability of efforts among Markets and relative to a variety of other policy approaches.