The Experts below are selected from a list of 240 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Prue Burns - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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taylorism the international labour organization and the genesis and diffusion of Codetermination
Organization Studies, 2014Co-Authors: Chris Nyland, Kyle Bruce, Prue BurnsAbstract:The conventional negative understanding of the scientific management movement has been challenged in recent decades by heterodox scholars who hold that the movement supported the democratization of the management process and in so doing worked closely with unions and with progressives within and around Roosevelt’s New Deal administration. This paper seeks to strengthen this challenge to orthodoxy by documenting how the leadership of the Taylor Society, a body established by Frederick Taylor’s inner circle as a vehicle to develop and promote their mentor’s ideas, strove to internationalize the diffusion of participatory management in tandem with the International Labour Organization, a body whose core purpose was and is to promote Codetermination both in workplaces and in wider society.
Chris Nyland - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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taylorism the international labour organization and the genesis and diffusion of Codetermination
Organization Studies, 2014Co-Authors: Chris Nyland, Kyle Bruce, Prue BurnsAbstract:The conventional negative understanding of the scientific management movement has been challenged in recent decades by heterodox scholars who hold that the movement supported the democratization of the management process and in so doing worked closely with unions and with progressives within and around Roosevelt’s New Deal administration. This paper seeks to strengthen this challenge to orthodoxy by documenting how the leadership of the Taylor Society, a body established by Frederick Taylor’s inner circle as a vehicle to develop and promote their mentor’s ideas, strove to internationalize the diffusion of participatory management in tandem with the International Labour Organization, a body whose core purpose was and is to promote Codetermination both in workplaces and in wider society.
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taylorism the international labour organization and the diffusion of Codetermination
2013Co-Authors: Kyle Bruce, Chris NylandAbstract:The conventional understanding of scientific management and why it ceased to be the primary school of thought within the field of organization and management studies has been problematized in recent decades. This paper compounds this process by documenting how the scientific managers sought to build a science of management not limited by managerial opportunism and strove to diffuse their ideas by building an alliance with the International Labour Organization, a body whose core purpose was to promote pluralistic and deliberative management practices and ideas such as Codetermination.
Sigurt Vitols - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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board level Codetermination a driving force for corporate social responsibility in german companies
European Journal of Industrial Relations, 2019Co-Authors: Robert Scholz, Sigurt VitolsAbstract:We examine the relationship between board-level Codetermination and corporate social responsibility in German companies, engaging with two distinct literatures. Most quantitative studies of codeter...
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board level Codetermination a driving force for corporate social responsibility in german companies
EconStor Open Access Articles, 2019Co-Authors: Robert Scholz, Sigurt VitolsAbstract:We examine the relationship between board-level Codetermination and corporate social responsibility in German companies, engaging with two distinct literatures. Most quantitative studies of Codetermination focus on its economic impact, with little attention to other outcomes. Studies of corporate social responsibility rarely consider the role of worker representatives. Our new measure of the strength of Codetermination, the Mitbestimmungsindex (MB-ix), shows a positive relationship with ‘substantive’ policies such as the adoption of targets for reducing pollution, but not with ‘symbolic’ policies, such as membership of the UN Global Compact. We therefore shed new light on the role of Codetermination and provide a more differentiated view of the spread of what has been termed ‘explicit’ corporate social responsibility in Germany.
Kornelius Kraft - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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productivity and distribution effects of Codetermination in an efficient bargaining model
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2018Co-Authors: Kornelius KraftAbstract:Codetermination can be regarded as an extreme regulatory intervention of the legislator in the labor market which might affect the efficiency of production and the bargaining power of labor. Based on a model that covers both efficient bargaining and employment bargaining a simple equation is derived that is suited to empirical testing. The empirical test is based on German data and includes years before and after the extension of German Codetermination law in 1976. The estimates determine the productivity of labor and relative bargaining power of capital and labor. It turns out that Codetermination does not affect productivity, but leads to a significant increase in workers’ bargaining power and the distribution of rents.
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does Codetermination affect the composition of variable versus fixed parts of executive compensation
2015Co-Authors: Katharina Dyballa, Kornelius KraftAbstract:Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that interests of labor may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based compensation to avoid excessive risk taking and short-run orientated decisions. We compile unique panel data on executive compensation over the periods 2006 to 2011 for 405 listed companies and use a Hausman-Taylor approach to estimate the effect of Codetermination on the compensation design. Finally, Codetermination has a significantly positive effect on performance-based components of compensation, which supports our hypothesis.
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does Codetermination affect the composition of variable versus fixed parts of executive compensation an empirical analysis for listed companies in germany
2015Co-Authors: Katharina Dyballa, Kornelius KraftAbstract:Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that interests of labor may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based compensation to avoid excessive risk taking and short-run orientated decisions. We compile unique panel data on executive compensation over the periods 2006 to 2011 for 405 listed companies and use a Hausman-Taylor approach to estimate the effect of Codetermination on the compensation design. Finally, Codetermination has a significantly positive effect on performance-based components of compensation, which supports our hypothesis.
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Codetermination as a strategic advantage
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2001Co-Authors: Kornelius KraftAbstract:Abstract A theoretical model of Codetermination is considered, where consistent with German institutions, firm owners bargain with employees’ representatives about employment but not about wages. A duopoly and a more general oligopolistic situation are analyzed. For some range of bargaining power a prisoner’s dilemma exists. Codetermination leads to increased profits if the other firm is a traditional profit maximizer. Bargaining is the dominant strategy, although joint profits would be maximized with unrestricted profit-maximization. The theory is tested with data from 22 German firms, who operate in the same markets over 23 years. Codetermined firms actually show a different behavior than other companies.
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economic effects of Codetermination
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1993Co-Authors: Felix R Fitzroy, Kornelius KraftAbstract:The success of West German, Scandinavian and Japanese economies, particularly when compared with lagging productivity and competitiveness of the U.S. and the U.K., have focused attention on comparative institutions in labour markets and corporate control. Declining unions and increasing reliance on competitive market pressures in the AngloAmerican countries contrast with more state intervention and regulation of the European "social market economies". As noted by Henzler (1992,
Ewan Mcgaughey - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Codetermination bargains: the history of German corporate and labour law
2019Co-Authors: Ewan McgaugheyAbstract:Why does Codetermination exist in Germany? Law and economics theories have contended that if there were no legal compulsion, worker participation in corporate governance would be ‘virtually nonexistent’. This positive analysis, which flows from the ‘nexus of contracts’ conception of the corporation, supports a normative argument that Codetermination is inefficient because it is supposed it will seldom happen voluntarily. After discussing competing conceptions of the corporation, as a ‘thing in itself’, and as an ‘institution’, this article explores the development of German Codetermination from the mid-19th century to the present. It finds the inefficiency argument sits at odds with the historical evidence. In its very inception, the right of workers to vote for a company board of directors, or in work councils with a voice in dismissals, came from collective agreements. It was not compelled by law, but was collectively bargained between business and labour representatives. These ‘Codetermination bargains’ were widespread. Laws then codified these models. This was true at the foundation of the Weimar Republic from 1918 to 1922 and, after abolition in 1933, again from 1945 to 1951. The foundational Codetermination bargains were made because of two ‘Goldilocks’ conditions (conditions that were ‘just right’) which were not always seen in countries like the UK or US. First, inequality of bargaining power between workers and employers was temporarily less pronounced. Second, the trade union movement became united in the objective of seeking worker voice in corporate governance. As the practice of Codetermination has been embraced by a majority of EU countries, and continues to develop, it is important to have an accurate positive narrative of Codetermination’s economic and political foundations. (2016) 23(1) Columbia Journal of European Law 135.
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the Codetermination bargains the history of german corporate and labour law
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Ewan McgaugheyAbstract:Why does Codetermination exist in Germany? Law and economics theories have contended that if there were no legal compulsion, worker participation in corporate governance would be ‘virtually nonexistent’. This positive analysis, which flows from the ‘nexus of contracts’ conception of the corporation, supports a normative argument that Codetermination is inefficient because it is supposed that it will seldom happen voluntarily. After discussing competing conceptions of the corporation, as a ‘thing in itself’, and as an ‘institution’, this article explores the development of German Codetermination from the mid-19th century to the present. It finds the inefficiency argument sits at odds with the historical evidence. In its very inception, the right of workers to vote for a company board of directors, or in work councils with a voice in dismissals, came from collective agreements. It was not compelled by law, but was collectively bargained between business and labour representatives. These ‘Codetermination bargains’ were widespread. Laws then codified these models. This was true at the foundation of the Weimar Republic from 1918 to 1922 and, after abolition in 1933, again from 1945 to 1951. The foundational Codetermination bargains were made because of two ‘Goldilocks’ conditions (conditions that were ‘just right’) which were not always seen in countries like the UK or US. First, inequality of bargaining power between workers and employers was temporarily less pronounced. Second, the trade union movement became united in the objective of seeking worker voice in corporate governance. As the practice of Codetermination has been embraced by a majority of EU countries, and continues to spread, it is important to have an accurate positive narrative of Codetermination’s economic and political foundations.
