The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Steven J Briggs - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of Collective Bargaining on large police agency supplemental compensation policies 1990 2000
Police Practice and Research, 2008Co-Authors: Steven J Briggs, Steve Wilson, Jihong Solomon Zhao, Ling RenAbstract:The effect of Collective Bargaining on the economic benefits of police employees has been the interest of researchers since the 1960s. This study examines the effect of Collective Bargaining on supplemental pay benefits for police officers. Using data from the Law Enforcement Management Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey of large police agencies as well as data derived from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and US Census Bureau, we investigate the relationship between departments engaging in Collective Bargaining with officers and whether or not the department offers hazardous duty pay, shift differential pay, education incentive pay, or merit pay to its officers. Using two‐way fixed effects logistic regression analysis on four waves of panel data, we find that Collective Bargaining did increase the likelihood of the supplemental pay benefits during the 1990s.
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the influence of Collective Bargaining on large police agency salaries 1990 2000
American Journal of Criminal Justice, 2006Co-Authors: Steve Wilson, Jihong Zhao, Ling Ren, Steven J BriggsAbstract:Collective Bargaining between police management and unions is an important process that determines many aspects of police work, particularly the monetary benefits for line officers like salary and fringe benefits. Working with limited budgets, police administrators who engage in Collective Bargaining are obligated to negotiate with union representatives over wage benefits while attempting to maintain adequate financial resources toward other police operations. Though students of policing learn that police unions try very hard to increase economic reward for their members there is limited research on the effectiveness of their efforts. Since economic benefits are the primary focus of police unions, it is important; therefore, to evaluate the impact that Collective Bargaining has on salaries earned by police personnel. This study examines this issue by combining four waves of the Law Enforcement Management and Administration Statistics for the period 1990–2000. Pooled time series analyses reveal that large organizations that engaged in Collective Bargaining had higher minimum wages for officers during the period. As predicted, Collective Bargaining did not affect minimum chief’s salaries.
Ben Kriechel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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works councils Collective Bargaining and apprenticeship training evidence from german firms
Industrial Relations, 2014Co-Authors: Ben Kriechel, Samuel Muehlemann, Harald Pfeifer, Miriam SchutteAbstract:In this paper, we investigate the effects of works councils on apprenticeship training in Germany. The German law attributes works councils substantial information and co-determination rights to training-related issues. Thus, works councils may also have an impact on the cost-benefit relation of workplace training. Using detailed firm-level data containing information on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training, we find that firms with works councils make a significantly higher net investment in training compared to firms without such an institution. We also find that the fraction of former trainees still employed with the same firm 5 years after training is significantly higher in the presence of works councils, thus enabling firms to recoup training investments over a longer time horizon. Furthermore, all works council effects are much more pronounced for firms covered by Collective Bargaining agreements.
Ling Ren - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of Collective Bargaining on large police agency supplemental compensation policies 1990 2000
Police Practice and Research, 2008Co-Authors: Steven J Briggs, Steve Wilson, Jihong Solomon Zhao, Ling RenAbstract:The effect of Collective Bargaining on the economic benefits of police employees has been the interest of researchers since the 1960s. This study examines the effect of Collective Bargaining on supplemental pay benefits for police officers. Using data from the Law Enforcement Management Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey of large police agencies as well as data derived from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and US Census Bureau, we investigate the relationship between departments engaging in Collective Bargaining with officers and whether or not the department offers hazardous duty pay, shift differential pay, education incentive pay, or merit pay to its officers. Using two‐way fixed effects logistic regression analysis on four waves of panel data, we find that Collective Bargaining did increase the likelihood of the supplemental pay benefits during the 1990s.
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the influence of Collective Bargaining on large police agency salaries 1990 2000
American Journal of Criminal Justice, 2006Co-Authors: Steve Wilson, Jihong Zhao, Ling Ren, Steven J BriggsAbstract:Collective Bargaining between police management and unions is an important process that determines many aspects of police work, particularly the monetary benefits for line officers like salary and fringe benefits. Working with limited budgets, police administrators who engage in Collective Bargaining are obligated to negotiate with union representatives over wage benefits while attempting to maintain adequate financial resources toward other police operations. Though students of policing learn that police unions try very hard to increase economic reward for their members there is limited research on the effectiveness of their efforts. Since economic benefits are the primary focus of police unions, it is important; therefore, to evaluate the impact that Collective Bargaining has on salaries earned by police personnel. This study examines this issue by combining four waves of the Law Enforcement Management and Administration Statistics for the period 1990–2000. Pooled time series analyses reveal that large organizations that engaged in Collective Bargaining had higher minimum wages for officers during the period. As predicted, Collective Bargaining did not affect minimum chief’s salaries.
Daniel M Rosenthal - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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public sector Collective Bargaining majoritarianism and reform
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Daniel M RosenthalAbstract:This article explores the claim that Collective Bargaining for public employees subverts democracy, focusing in particular on public school teachers. Critics note that teacher Collective Bargaining agreements cover countless policy topics including the length of the school day, teacher personnel policies, class size, and more. Critics further argue that Bargaining supplants the ordinary democratic processes for setting policy, excluding the public and allowing teachers unions to exert disproportionate control on these issues.I question the claim that Collective Bargaining allows unions to force their preferences on the public. For example, local legislatures must approve and fund all labor agreements, and state laws have long defined a broad class of topics as “permissive” for Bargaining, meaning that the parties can bargain on the topics only if both consent. Although governments and unions often bargain over permissive topics, the permissive designation empowers governments to cease Bargaining when mutually beneficial compromise appears unlikely, thereby shifting policy questions into the normal political process.Reformers could embrace the permissive designation. Instead, many have promoted rules that prohibit Bargaining altogether on many topics. Legislators in Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee, and Idaho have recently adopted this approach. But these efforts badly miss the mark. The real issue for reformers is not how to limit unions’ involvement in policymaking but rather how to ensure that government officials use their power to advance the wishes of the public through Bargaining.I offer several recommendations in light of this new assessment of public sector Bargaining. I suggest broad use of the permissive distinction together with heightened involvement of local legislatures in Bargaining. The proposal is more majoritarian — and more supportive of public employees’ labor rights — than the Bargaining prohibitions currently in vogue.
Benjamin I Sachs - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the unbundled union politics without Collective Bargaining
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Benjamin I SachsAbstract:Public policy in the United States is disproportionately responsive to the wealthy, and the traditional response to this problem, campaign finance regulation, has failed. As students of politics have long recognized, however, political influence flows not only from wealth but also from organization, a form of political power open to all income groups. Accordingly, as this Essay argues, a promising alternative to campaign finance regulations is legal interventions designed to facilitate political organizing by the poor and middle class. To date, the most important legal intervention of this kind has been labor law, and the labor union has been the central vehicle for this type of organizing. But the labor union as a political-organizational vehicle suffers a fundamental flaw: unions bundle political organization with Collective Bargaining, a highly contested form of economic organization. As a result, opposition to Collective Bargaining impedes unions’ ability to serve as a political-organizing vehicle for lower- and middle-income groups.This Essay proposes that labor law unbundle the union, allowing employees to organize politically through the union form without also organizing economically for Collective Bargaining purposes. Doing so would have the immediate effect of liberating political-organizational efforts from the constraints of Collective Bargaining, an outcome that could mitigate representational inequality. The Essay identifies the legal reforms that would be necessary to enable such unbundled “political unions” to succeed. It concludes by looking beyond the union context and suggesting a broader regime of reforms aimed at facilitating political organizing by those income groups for whom representational inequality is now a problem.
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the unbundled union politics without Collective Bargaining
Yale Law Journal, 2013Co-Authors: Benjamin I SachsAbstract:Public policy in the United States is disproportionately responsive to the wealthy, and the traditional response to this problem, campaign finance regulation, has failed. As students of politics have long recognized, however, political influence flows not only from wealth but also from organization, a form of political power open to all income groups. Accordingly, as this Essay argues, a promising alternative to campaign finance regulations is legal interventions designed to facilitate political organizing by the poor and middle class. To date, the most important legal intervention of this kind has been labor law, and the labor union has been the central vehicle for this type of organizing. But the labor union as a political-organizational vehicle suffers a fundamental flaw: unions bundle political organization with Collective Bargaining, a highly contested form of economic organization. As a result, opposition to Collective Bargaining impedes unions’ ability to serve as a political-organizing vehicle for lowerand middle-income groups. This Essay proposes that labor law unbundle the union, allowing employees to organize politically through the union form without also organizing economically for Collective Bargaining purposes. Doing so would have the immediate effect of liberating political-organizational efforts from the constraints of Collective Bargaining, an outcome that could mitigate representational inequality. The Essay identifies the legal reforms that would be necessary to enable such unbundled “political unions” to succeed. It concludes by looking beyond the union context and suggesting a broader regime of reforms aimed at facilitating political organizing by those income groups for whom representational inequality is now a problem. author. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. The author thanks David Barron, Cynthia Estlund, Catherine Fisk, Gerald Frug, Jack Goldsmith, Daryl Levinson, and Matthew Stephenson for helpful comments and discussion. The author is also grateful to the participants in the Harvard Law School Faculty Workshop. Nikolas Bowie, William Dreher, Anna Lvovsky, Joshua Segal, and Heather Whitney provided outstanding research assistance.