Works Council

14,000,000 Leading Edge Experts on the ideXlab platform

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

The Experts below are selected from a list of 3171 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Alexander Dilger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Works Councils and Personnel Turnover
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020
    Co-Authors: Alexander Dilger
    Abstract:

    According to theoretical arguments and previous empirical studies, Works Councils reduce personnel turnover. This result is confirmed by an empirical examination of the NIFA-Panel containing information on the production area of German mechanical engineering plants. Futhermore the effects of the introduction or closure of a Works Council are considered for the first time. The same is true for different types of Works Councils. In particular, cooperative relations between management and Works Council foster a lower personnel turnover. Thus, this lowered turnover has to be in the common interest of employees and employers.

  • Payment Schemes, Returns and Works Councils
    2006
    Co-Authors: Alexander Dilger
    Abstract:

    The interdependences of payment schemes, returns and the existence of a Works Council are analysed by using data collected on German firms in the sector of mechanical engineering. There is no connection between payment schemes and returns, whereas a Works Council has a negative effect on a firm's returns as has been found in former studies. Although a strong correlation between the use of different payment schemes and Works Councils exists, this in only due to firm size. Finally, a first model of the determinants of newly-founded Works Councils is estimated, validating the former results and suggesting a new direction for further research.

  • Kooperation zwischen Betriebsrat und Management / Cooperation between Works Council and Management
    Jahrbucher Fur Nationalokonomie Und Statistik, 2006
    Co-Authors: Alexander Dilger
    Abstract:

    SummaryThere are different kinds of Works Councils. They can be cooperative or antagonistic for example. There are also different kinds of management. The managers can be friendly or unfriendly to the workers and the Works Council representing them. Here the mutual relationship between Works Council and management is analysed. To this end two data sets are connected, the NIFA-Panel with information about mechanical engineering plants in Germany given by the management and the Bochumer survey of Works Councils in some of these plants. A new typology of the relationship between the Works Council and the managers of a firm is derived from these combined data. The effects of a positive, neutral or negative relationship on different turnover rates, product innovations and earnings of the firms are empirically analysed. The results are in accordance with prior studies using only separated data for Works Councils or management. Concretely, turnover and earnings are mostly lower and innovations more probable as long as any kind of Works Council exists. The kind of relationship influences the magnitudes of these effects and their statistical significance. A positive relationship reduces the departure rate most of all, a negative relationship has the strongest effect on innovations and, unexpectedly, an inconsistent relationship is best for earnings.

  • kooperation zwischen betriebsrat und management cooperation between Works Council and management die sicht beider seiten und deren folgen the view from both sides and its consequences
    Journal of Economics and Statistics, 2006
    Co-Authors: Alexander Dilger
    Abstract:

    There are different kinds of Works Councils. They can be cooperative or antagonistic for example. There are also different kinds of management. The managers can be friendly or unfriendly to the workers and the Works Council representing them. Here the mutual relationship between Works Council and management is analysed. To this end two data sets are connected, the NIFA-Panel with information about mechanical engineering plants in Germany given by the management and the Bochumer survey of Works Councils in some of these plants. A new typology of the relationship between the Works Council and the managers of a firm is derived from these combined data. The effects of a positive, neutral or negative relationship on different turnover rates, product innovations and earnings of the firms are empirically analysed. The results are in accordance with prior studies using only separated data for Works Councils or management. Concretely, turnover and earnings are mostly lower and innovations more probable as long as any kind of Works Council exists. The kind of relationship influences the magnitudes of these effects and their statistical significance. A positive relationship reduces the departure rate most of all, a negative relationship has the strongest effect on innovations and, unexpectedly, an inconsistent relationship is best for earnings.

John T Addison - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • German Works Councils and the Anatomy of Wages
    Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 2020
    Co-Authors: John T Addison, Paulino Teixeira, Thomas Zwick
    Abstract:

    Using matched employer-employee data from the German LIAB for 2001, the authors found that German Works Councils are in general associated with higher earnings, even after accounting for establishment- and worker heterogeneity. Works Council wage premia exceed those of collective bargaining and are higher, in fact, where both institutions are present in the workplace. The authors also found evidence indicating that Works Councils benefit women relative to men and appear to favor foreign, east-German, and service-sector workers as well. Separate evidence from quantile regressions suggests that the conjunction of Works Council presence and collective bargaining is important to the narrowing process. In smaller plants even the presence of a Works Council markup depends on the coexistence of the Works Council entity with the machinery of collective bargaining.

  • Works Councils in the Production Process
    Schmollers Jahrbuch, 2020
    Co-Authors: John T Addison, Claus Schnabel, Thorsten Schank, Joachim Wagner
    Abstract:

    This paper uses data from a nationally representative panel of establishments to estimate the effects of German Works Councils on firm performance, 1997-2000. We analyze the impact of this institution on sales and sales growth using OLS and fixed effect estimates of a translog production function as well as by employing a model in first differences. With cross section and pooled data, the strong pro-productivity effects of Works Councils noted in the recent literature prove sensitive to disaggregation – most notably for plants with 21 to 100 employees, where the powers of the Council are a datum – even if the coefficient estimates for the Works Council variable are often substantive. However, the fixed effects estimator yields much smaller Works Council effects that are (weakly) statistically significant in only one instance, while productivity changes do not differ between plants with and without a Works Council in the first differences specification. We conclude that reports of positive Works Council effects on productivity have been much exaggerated. That said, there is no evidence that Works Councils adversely affect firm performance, as suggested by an earlier empirical literature based on small samples of firms.

  • Do Works Councils Inhibit Investment
    Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 2020
    Co-Authors: John T Addison, Claus Schnabel, Thorsten Schank, Joachim Wagner
    Abstract:

    Theory suggests that firms confront a hold-up problem in dealing with workplace unionism: unions will appropriate a portion of the quasi rents stemming from long-lived capital. As a result, firms may be expected to limit their exposure to rent seeking by reducing investments, among other things. Although there is some empirical support for this prediction in firm-level studies for the United States, we investigate whether this is also the case in the different institutional context of Germany where the Works Council is the analogue of workplace unionism. Using parametric and nonparametric methods and establishment panel data, we find no evidence that the formation (dissolution) of a Works Council has an unfavorable (favorable) impact on investment.

  • The Impact of Works Councils on Wages
    2020
    Co-Authors: John T Addison, Paulino Teixeira, Thomas Zwick
    Abstract:

    This paper investigates for the first time the effect of Works Councils on the anatomy of wages, using matched employer-employee data from the German LIAB for 2001. We find that Works Councils are associated with higher earnings. The wage premium is roughly comparable with the combined effect of sectoral and plant collective bargaining proper. This result persists after taking account of worker and establishment heterogeneity and the endogeneity of Works Council presence. Next, using quantile regressions, we find that the Works Council premium is decreasing with the position of the worker in the wage distribution. And it is also higher for women than for men. Finally, in addition to attenuating the gender wage gap and reducing wage dispersion, Works Councils have a small but significantly positive impact on tenure after controlling for wages. This suggests that there is some rent sharing; even if, overall, the entity’s voice effects appear to dominate its monopoly effects.

  • Dissonant Works Councils and Establishment Survivability
    2019
    Co-Authors: John T Addison, Paulino Teixeira, Philipp Grunau, Lutz Bellmann
    Abstract:

    Using subjective information provided by manager respondents on the stance taken by the Works Council in company decision making, this paper investigates the association between a measure of Works Council dissonance or disaffection and plant closings in Germany, 2006-2015. The potential effects of worker representation on plant survivability have been little examined in the firm performance literature because of inadequate information on plant closings on the one hand and having to assume homogeneity of what are undoubtedly heterogeneous worker representation agencies on the other. Our use of two datasets serves to identify failed establishments, while the critical issue of heterogeneity is tackled via manager perceptions of Works Council disaffection or otherwise. The heterogeneity issue is also addressed by considering the wider collective bargaining framework within which Works Councils are embedded, and also by allowing for Works Council learning. It is reported that Works Council dissonance is positively associated with plant closings, although this association is not found for establishments that are covered by sectoral agreements. Taken in conjunction, both findings are consistent with the literature on the mitigation of rent seeking behavior. Less consistent with the recent empirical literature, however, is the association between plant closings and dissonance over time, that is, from the point at which Works Council dissonance is first observed. Although the coefficient estimate for dissonance is declining with the length of the observation window, it remains stubbornly positive and highly statistically significant. Finally, there is evidence that establishments with dissonant Works Councils are associated with a much higher probability of transitioning from no collective bargaining to sectoral bargaining coverage over the sample period than their counterparts with more consensual Works Councils.

Ellguth Peter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Friedemann W Nerdinger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • mitbestimmung und innovation aus betriebsratsperspektive ergebnisse qualitativer studien co determination and innovation from a Works Council perspective some qualitative research findings
    The German Journal of Industrial Relations, 2010
    Co-Authors: Stefan Stracke, Friedemann W Nerdinger
    Abstract:

    Innovationen werden als wichtige Erfolgsstrategie fuer Unternehmen gesehen. Dabei stellt sich die Frage, ob es auch Aufgabe fuer Betriebsraete sein kann, langfristig die Innovationsstrategie der Unternehmen zu beeinflussen und die Innovationsbereitschaft der Beschaeftigten anzuregen. In diesem Beitrag wird analysiert, (1) unter welchen Voraussetzungen Betriebsraete bereit sind, betriebliche Innovationen zu foerdern, (2) welchen Einfluss Betriebsraete aus ihrer Sicht auf Innovationen ausueben koennen und (3) welche Interessen- und Rollenkonflikte sie dabei bewaeltigen muessen. In zwei qualitativen Studien wurden Betriebsraete in 20 Unternehmen mit dem Schwerpunkt im Bereich der Metall- und Elektroindustrie interviewt. Die Untersuchung zeigt u.a., dass Betriebsraete sich haeufig einen indirekten Einfluss auf das betriebliche Innovationsgeschehen zuschreiben. Ansatzpunkte hierfuer sind z.B. Abschluesse von Vereinbarungen zur Standort- und Beschaeftigungssicherung, in denen neben einer Absicherung fuer die Beschaeftigten auch Kriterien zur Durchfuehrung beteiligungsorientierter Innovationsprozesse festgelegt werden. (Innovation is seen as an important economic strategy for a company’s management. We discuss the question how far Works Councils could positively influence a company’s innovation strategy in the long term and how far they could encourage workers to participate in innovation processes. The objective of this article is, in particular, to analyse the conditions under which Works Councils promote innovation, their potential impact on innovation, as well as the importance of role conflicts which may result from conflicting expectations or requirements of the different actors participating in the innovation process. The analysis, which is based on interviews with Works Councils in 20 companies (with a focus on the metalworking sector), shows that Works Councils perceive their influence on innovation rather as being indirect. One option considered, for example, concerns company agreements on employment that include not only safeguarding clauses for employees but also define criteria for participation-orientated innovation processes.)

Bellmann Lutz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.