The Experts below are selected from a list of 321 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Kazuhiro Ohnishi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • managerial incentives in price setting mixed duopoly model with Complementary Goods
    The International Journal of Management, 2021
    Co-Authors: Kazuhiro Ohnishi
    Abstract:

    This paper examines a price-setting mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned public firm and a private firm produce Complementary Goods. There is no possibility of entry or exit. Each firm has one owner and can hire one manager to make its production decisions. The paper first analyzes the following four possible cases: neither firm hires a manager, only the private firm hires a manager, only the state-owned public firm hires a manager and both firms hire managers. It is shown that economic welfare is identical in all the four cases. Next, this paper presents the equilibrium of the model. The paper shows that there exist two equilibrium outcomes: only the public firm hires a manager and neither firm hires a manager. As a result, it is found that the equilibrium of the paper is contrast with that obtained under price-setting mixed duopoly competition with substitute Goods, where both the public firm and the private firm hire managers.

  • price setting mixed duopoly subsidization and the order of firms moves substitutive independent and Complementary Goods
    2020
    Co-Authors: Kazuhiro Ohnishi
    Abstract:

    This study examines a price-setting mixed duopoly with production subsidies and demonstrates that under the optimal production subsidy of each of substitutive, independent and Complementary Goods, profits and economic welfare are respectively identical in the three regimes of (i) a public firm and a private firm simultaneously set prices, (ii) the public firm acts as a leader, and (iii) both firms act simultaneously as profit-maximizers.

  • Wage-Rise Contract and Labour-Managed Cournot Oligopoly with Complementary Goods
    2018
    Co-Authors: Kazuhiro Ohnishi
    Abstract:

    This paper considers a quantity-setting oligopoly model with Complementary Goods where labour-managed firms are allowed to offer wage-rise contracts as a strategic commitment. The following two stages are considered. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to adopt a wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment device. In the second stage, each firm independently chooses and sells its actual output. The paper analyses the equilibrium of the labour-managed oligopoly model.

  • quantity precommitment and cournot and bertrand models with Complementary Goods
    The International Journal of Management, 2017
    Co-Authors: Kazuhiro Ohnishi
    Abstract:

    This paper investigates Cournot and Bertrand duopoly models with Complementary Goods, where firms can enter into lifetime employment contracts with their respective workers as a strategic device. The paper treats the following four cases: ‘Cournot competition with strategic complements’, ‘Cournot competition with strategic substitutes’, ‘Bertrand competition with strategic substitutes’ and ‘Bertrand competition with strategic complements’. The paper presents the equilibrium outcomes of the four cases. In addition, it is shown that lifetime employment is beneficial for firms in the cases with strategic complements.

  • capacity precommitment and three stage duopoly with Complementary Goods
    2012
    Co-Authors: Kazuhiro Ohnishi, Masamichi Kawano
    Abstract:

    This paper considers a three-stage quantity-setting duopoly model with Complementary Goods. First, the first-mover firm decides whether or not to make a commitment to capacity. Second, the second-mover firm decides whether or not to make a commitment to capacity. Third, both firms choose their outputs simultaneously and independently. The paper demonstrates that there exist two opposite equilibria, and that at each equilibrium capacity investment is beneficial for both the firms. Keywords-Quantity-setting Model; Complementary Goods; Capacity Investment

Tobias Kretschmer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • when less can be more setting technology levels in Complementary Goods markets
    Research Policy, 2015
    Co-Authors: Jorg Claussen, Christian Essling, Tobias Kretschmer
    Abstract:

    Higher technological quality often translates directly into higher consumer utility. However, many new products require a Complementary product to operate. In such markets, releasing a technologically sophisticated product involves a trade-off as it excludes consumers whose Complementary products no longer function with the core product. Firms therefore have to balance product quality against market size. Technological change brings a dynamic perspective to this trade-off as it renders existing technology obsolete but also increases performance of the Complementary products, therefore increasing market potential. We study these mechanisms in the empirical context of computer games. In line with our expectations, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between closeness to the technological frontier and sales revenues as well as differential effects of technological change depending on initial technological quality.

  • when less can be more setting technology levels in Complementary Goods markets
    Social Science Research Network, 2014
    Co-Authors: Jorg Claussen, Christian Essling, Tobias Kretschmer
    Abstract:

    Higher technological quality often directly translates into higher consumer utility. However, many new products require the availability of a Complementary product. In such markets, releasing a technologically sophisticated product involves a tradeoff as it excludes consumers whose Complementary products no longer function with the core product. Firms therefore have to balance product quality against market size. Technological change brings a dynamic perspective to this tradeoff as it renders existing technology obsolete but also increases performance of the Complementary products, therefore increasing market potential. We study these mechanisms in the empirical context of computer games. In line with our expectations, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between closeness to the frontier and sales revenues as well as differential effects of technological change depending on initial technological quality.

Jorg Claussen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • when less can be more setting technology levels in Complementary Goods markets
    Research Policy, 2015
    Co-Authors: Jorg Claussen, Christian Essling, Tobias Kretschmer
    Abstract:

    Higher technological quality often translates directly into higher consumer utility. However, many new products require a Complementary product to operate. In such markets, releasing a technologically sophisticated product involves a trade-off as it excludes consumers whose Complementary products no longer function with the core product. Firms therefore have to balance product quality against market size. Technological change brings a dynamic perspective to this trade-off as it renders existing technology obsolete but also increases performance of the Complementary products, therefore increasing market potential. We study these mechanisms in the empirical context of computer games. In line with our expectations, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between closeness to the technological frontier and sales revenues as well as differential effects of technological change depending on initial technological quality.

  • when less can be more setting technology levels in Complementary Goods markets
    Social Science Research Network, 2014
    Co-Authors: Jorg Claussen, Christian Essling, Tobias Kretschmer
    Abstract:

    Higher technological quality often directly translates into higher consumer utility. However, many new products require the availability of a Complementary product. In such markets, releasing a technologically sophisticated product involves a tradeoff as it excludes consumers whose Complementary products no longer function with the core product. Firms therefore have to balance product quality against market size. Technological change brings a dynamic perspective to this tradeoff as it renders existing technology obsolete but also increases performance of the Complementary products, therefore increasing market potential. We study these mechanisms in the empirical context of computer games. In line with our expectations, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between closeness to the frontier and sales revenues as well as differential effects of technological change depending on initial technological quality.

Samar K Mukhopadhyay - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a stackelberg model of pricing of Complementary Goods under information asymmetry
    International Journal of Production Economics, 2011
    Co-Authors: Samar K Mukhopadhyay
    Abstract:

    We consider a duopoly market where two separate firms offer Complementary Goods in a leaderâfollower type move. Each firm has private forecast information about the uncertain market demand and decides whether to share it with the other firm. We show that information sharing would benefit the leader firm but hurt the follower firm as well as the total system if the follower firm shares information unconditionally. We then devise a âsimple to implementâ information sharing scheme under which both firms and the total system are better off. We also provide several interesting managerial insights and establish the robustness of the model in managing a supply chain through our analytical and simulation results.

  • a bertrand model of pricing of Complementary Goods under information asymmetry
    Journal of Business Research, 2006
    Co-Authors: Xiaohang Yue, Samar K Mukhopadhyay, Xiaowei Zhu
    Abstract:

    Parties in a supply chain, being independent firms, have private information about various aspects of the business not normally available to other parties. We consider a market where customers need to buy two Complementary Goods as mixed bundle, offered by two separate firms. The demand for each firm is dependent on the pricing strategy of both firms, which, in turn, depends on the quantities offered as per their own forecasts. We present a profit maximization model to obtain optimal strategies for a firm making decisions under information asymmetry. The model follows a simultaneously played Bertrand type game. We contrast and compare three scenarios: (1) when forecast information is asymmetric between the firms; (2) when forecast information is shared between the firms; and (3) when the firms form a strategic alliance.

Caroline B Ncube - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.