The Experts below are selected from a list of 918 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Zoltan Dienes - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Evaluative conditioning of artificial grammars: Evidence that subjectively-unConscious structures bias affective evaluations of novel stimuli.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2020Co-Authors: Răzvan Jurchiș, Zoltan Dienes, Andrei Costea, Mircea Miclea, Adrian OpreAbstract:: Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to the acquisition of emotional valence by an initially neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus [CS]) after being paired with an emotional stimulus (unconditioned stimulus [US]). An important issue regards whether, when participants are unaware of the CS-US contingency, the affective valence can generalize to new stimuli that share similarities with the CS. Previous studies have shown that generalization of EC effects appears only when participants are aware of the contingencies, but we suggest that this is because (a) the contingencies typically used in these studies are salient and easy to detect Consciously, and (b) the performance-based measures of awareness (so-called "objective measures"), typically used in these studies, tend to overestimate the amount of available Conscious Knowledge. We report a preregistered study in which participants (N = 217) were exposed to letter strings generated from two complex artificial grammars that are difficult to decipher Consciously. Stimuli from one grammar were paired with positive USs, whereas those from the other grammar were paired with negative USs. Subsequently, participants evaluated new, previously unseen, stimuli from the positively conditioned grammar more positively than new stimuli from the negatively conditioned grammar. Importantly, this effect appeared even when trial-by-trial subjective measures indicated lack of relevant Conscious Knowledge. We provide evidence for the generalization of EC effects even without subjective awareness of the structures that enable those generalizations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
-
Evaluative conditioning of artificial grammars: Evidence that subjectively-unConscious structures bias affective evaluations of novel stimuli
2018Co-Authors: Răzvan Jurchiș, Zoltan Dienes, Andrei Costea, Mircea Miclea, Adrian OpreAbstract:Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to the acquisition of emotional valence by an initially-neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus; CS), after being paired with an emotional stimulus (unconditioned stimulus; US). An important issue regards whether, when participants are unaware of the CS-US contingency, the affective valence can generalize to new stimuli that share similarities with the CS. Previous studies have shown that generalization of EC effects appears only when participants are aware of the contingencies, but we suggest that this is because (a) the contingencies typically used in these studies are salient and easy to detect Consciously, and (b) the performance-based measures of awareness (so-called “objective measures”), typically used in these studies, tend to overestimate the amount of available Conscious Knowledge. We report a preregistered study in which participants (N = 217) were exposed to letter strings generated from two complex artificial grammars that are difficult to decipher Consciously. Stimuli from one grammar were paired with positive USs, while those from the other grammar were paired with negative USs. Subsequently, participants evaluated new, previously-unseen, stimuli from the positively-conditioned grammar more positively than new stimuli from the negatively-conditioned grammar. Importantly, this effect appeared even when trial-by-trial subjective measures indicated lack of relevant Conscious Knowledge. We provide evidence for the generalization of EC effects even without subjective awareness of the structures that enable those generalizations.
-
Explicit feedback maintains implicit Knowledge
Consciousness and Cognition, 2013Co-Authors: Andy D. Mealor, Zoltan DienesAbstract:Abstract The role of feedback was investigated with respect to Conscious and unConscious Knowledge acquired during artificial grammar learning (AGL). After incidental learning of training sequences, participants classified further sequences in terms of grammaticality and reported their decision strategy with or without explicit veridical feedback. Sequences that disobeyed the learning structure conformed to an alternative structure. Feedback led to an increase in the amount of reported Conscious Knowledge of structure (derived rules and recollections) but did not increase its accuracy. Conversely, feedback maintained the accuracy of unConscious Knowledge of structure (intuition or familiarity-based responses) which otherwise degraded. Results support a dual-process account of AGL. They suggest that implicit learning of the to-be-rejected structure at test contaminates familiarity-based classifications whereas feedback allows competing familiarity signals to be contextualised, which is incompatible with theories that consider familiarity context-insensitive.
-
No-loss gambling shows the speed of the unConscious.
Consciousness and Cognition, 2011Co-Authors: Andy D. Mealor, Zoltan DienesAbstract:This paper investigates the time it takes unConscious vs. Conscious Knowledge to form by using an improved “no-loss gambling” method to measure awareness of knowing. Subjects could either bet on a transparently random process or on their grammaticality judgment in an artificial grammar learning task. A conflict in the literature is resolved concerning whether unConscious rather than Conscious Knowledge is especially fast or slow to form. When guessing (betting on a random process), accuracy was above chance and RTs were longer than when feeling confident (betting on the grammaticality decision). In a second experiment, short response deadlines only interfered with the quality of confident decisions (betting on grammaticality). When people are unaware of their Knowledge, externally enforced decisions can be made rapidly with little decline in quality; but if given ample time, they await a metacognitive process to complete. The dissociation validates no-loss gambling as a measure of Conscious awareness.
-
acquisition of Conscious and unConscious Knowledge of semantic prosody
Consciousness and Cognition, 2011Co-Authors: Li Zheng, Zhiliang Yang, Chao Chen, Lei Zhang, Zoltan DienesAbstract:An experiment explored the acquisition of Conscious and unConscious Knowledge of semantic prosody in a second language under incidental and intentional learning conditions. Semantic prosody is the conotational coloring of the semantics of a word, largely uncaptured by dictionary definitions. Contrary to some claims in the literature, we revealed that both Conscious and unConscious Knowledge were involved in the acquisition of semantic prosody. Intentional learning resulted in similar unConscious but more Conscious Knowledge than incidental learning. The results are discussed in terms of second language learning and the nature of unConscious Knowledge
Ryan B Scott - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
the metacognitive role of familiarity in artificial grammar learning transitions from unConscious to Conscious Knowledge
2010Co-Authors: Ryan B Scott, Zoltan DienesAbstract:We present two methods by which people could learn (e.g., artificial grammars): learning by a single updating model that has the function to reflect how reality is (e.g., the standard types of connectionist models in the implicit learning literature), and learning by the use of considering hypotheticals (hypothesis testing). The first method results in unConscious Knowledge of the structure of a domain. Such unConscious structural Knowledge can lead to Conscious Knowledge that new items do (or do not) have that structure (“judgment Knowledge”). When unConscious structural Knowledge produces Conscious judgment Knowledge, the phenomenology is of intuition, a common phenomenology in implicit learning experiments. We propose a mechanism by which one becomes aware of judgment Knowledge, turning feelings of guessing into those of intuition: feedback in calibrating the accuracy of one’s Knowledge of the distribution of familiarity of the test strings. Accurate predictions lead to awareness of knowing, that is, to Conscious Knowledge. Contrary to some popular beliefs, we argue fluency plays little role in either the expression of unConscious structural Knowledge or in the formation of Conscious judgment Knowledge. The individual difference variable Faith in Intuition was not associated with better implicit learning but it was associated with sensitivity to familiarity and the metacognitive processes by which judgment Knowledge can be made Conscious: that is, by which feelings of intuition are formed.
-
measuring unConscious Knowledge distinguishing structural Knowledge and judgment Knowledge
Psychological Research-psychologische Forschung, 2005Co-Authors: Zoltan Dienes, Ryan B ScottAbstract:This paper investigates the dissociation between Conscious and unConscious Knowledge in an implicit learning paradigm. Two experiments employing the artificial grammar learning task explored the acquisition of unConscious and Conscious Knowledge of structure (structural Knowledge). Structural Knowledge was contrasted to Knowledge of whether an item has that structure (judgment Knowledge). For both structural and judgment Knowledge, Conscious awareness was assessed using subjective measures. It was found that unConscious structural Knowledge could lead to both Conscious and unConscious judgment Knowledge. When structural Knowledge was unConscious, there was no tendency for judgment Knowledge to become more Conscious over time. Furthermore, Conscious rather than unConscious structural Knowledge produced more consistent errors in judgments, was facilitated by instructions to search for rules, and after such instructions was harmed by a secondary task. The dissociations validate the use of these subjective measures of Conscious awareness.
Patrick Lincoln - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Neuroscience meets cryptography: crypto primitives secure against rubber hose attacks
Communications of The ACM, 2014Co-Authors: Hristo Bojinov, Daniel J. Sanchez, Paul J. Reber, Dan Boneh, Patrick LincolnAbstract:Cryptographic systems often rely on the secrecy of cryptographic keys given to users. Many schemes, however, cannot resist coercion attacks where the user is forcibly asked by an attacker to reveal the key. These attacks, known as rubber hose cryptanalysis, are often the easiest way to defeat cryptography. We present a defense against coercion attacks using the concept of implicit learning from cognitive psychology. Implicit learning refers to learning of patterns without any Conscious Knowledge of the learned pattern. We use a carefully crafted computer game to allow a user to implicitly learn a secret password without them having any explicit or Conscious Knowledge of the trained password. While the trained secret can be used for authentication, participants cannot be coerced into revealing it since they have no Conscious Knowledge of it. We performed a number of user studies using Amazon's Mechanical Turk to verify that participants can successfully re-authenticate over time and that they are unable to reconstruct or even robustly recognize the trained secret.
-
USENIX Security Symposium - Neuroscience meets cryptography: designing crypto primitives secure against rubber hose attacks
2012Co-Authors: Hristo Bojinov, Daniel J. Sanchez, Paul J. Reber, Dan Boneh, Patrick LincolnAbstract:Cryptographic systems often rely on the secrecy of cryptographic keys given to users. Many schemes, however, cannot resist coercion attacks where the user is forcibly asked by an attacker to reveal the key. These attacks, known as rubber hose cryptanalysis, are often the easiest way to defeat cryptography. We present a defense against coercion attacks using the concept of implicit learning from cognitive psychology. Implicit learning refers to learning of patterns without any Conscious Knowledge of the learned pattern. We use a carefully crafted computer game to plant a secret password in the participant's brain without the participant having any Conscious Knowledge of the trained password. While the planted secret can be used for authentication, the participant cannot be coerced into revealing it since he or she has no Conscious Knowledge of it. We performed a number of user studies using Amazon's Mechanical Turk to verify that participants can successfully re-authenticate over time and that they are unable to reconstruct or even recognize short fragments of the planted secret.
Li Zheng - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
acquisition of Conscious and unConscious Knowledge of semantic prosody
Consciousness and Cognition, 2011Co-Authors: Li Zheng, Zhiliang Yang, Chao Chen, Lei Zhang, Zoltan DienesAbstract:An experiment explored the acquisition of Conscious and unConscious Knowledge of semantic prosody in a second language under incidental and intentional learning conditions. Semantic prosody is the conotational coloring of the semantics of a word, largely uncaptured by dictionary definitions. Contrary to some claims in the literature, we revealed that both Conscious and unConscious Knowledge were involved in the acquisition of semantic prosody. Intentional learning resulted in similar unConscious but more Conscious Knowledge than incidental learning. The results are discussed in terms of second language learning and the nature of unConscious Knowledge
Brian A Nosek - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
evaluative conditioning and Conscious Knowledge of contingencies a correlational investigation with large samples
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2010Co-Authors: Yoav Baranan, Jan De Houwer, Brian A NosekAbstract:Evaluative conditioning (EC) is a change in the valence of a stimulus that results from pairing the stimulus with an affective stimulus. Two high-powered studies (total N = 1,161) investigated the nature of the relationship between EC and contingency awareness measured as contingency memory. Stronger EC occurred among people with more accurate and more confident memory of the pairings. Awareness was a necessary condition for EC, but EC was not necessary for awareness. Supporting a propositional account of EC, we found evidence for intentional reliance on the contingency for the evaluation of stimuli. We also found evidence that contingency memory was based both on the actual contingency and on preexisting attitudes.
