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Toshio Yamagishi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Response time in Economic Games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2017Co-Authors: Toshio Yamagishi, Yoshie Matsumoto, Toko Kiyonari, Haruto Takagishi, Ryota Kanai, Masamichi SakagamiAbstract:Behavioral and neuroscientific studies explore two pathways through which internalized social norms promote prosocial behavior. One pathway involves internal control of impulsive selfishness, and the other involves emotion-based prosocial preferences that are translated into behavior when they evade cognitive control for pursuing self-interest. We measured 443 participants’ overall prosocial behavior in four Economic Games. Participants’ predispositions [social value orientation (SVO)] were more strongly reflected in their overall game behavior when they made decisions quickly than when they spent a longer time. Prosocially (or selfishly) predisposed participants behaved less prosocially (or less selfishly) when they spent more time in decision making, such that their SVO prosociality yielded limited effects in actual behavior in their slow decisions. The increase (or decrease) in slower decision makers was prominent among consistent prosocials (or proselfs) whose strong preference for prosocial (or proself) goals would make it less likely to experience conflict between prosocial and proself goals. The strong effect of RT on behavior in consistent prosocials (or proselfs) suggests that conflict between prosocial and selfish goals alone is not responsible for slow decisions. Specifically, we found that contemplation of the risk of being exploited by others (social risk aversion) was partly responsible for making consistent prosocials (but not consistent proselfs) spend longer time in decision making and behave less prosocially. Conflict between means rather than between goals (immediate versus strategic pursuit of self-interest) was suggested to be responsible for the time-related increase in consistent proselfs’ prosocial behavior. The findings of this study are generally in favor of the intuitive cooperation model of prosocial behavior.
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Life history strategy and human cooperation in Economic Games
Evolution and Human Behavior, 2017Co-Authors: Daniel Balliet, Joshua M. Tybur, Sakura Arai, Paul A. M. Van Lange, Toshio YamagishiAbstract:Abstract Across five studies using samples from both Japan and United States ( N =2345), we take a multi-method approach to test the prediction from life history theory that a slow, compared to fast, life history strategy promotes investment in cooperative relationships. Studies 1 and 2 examined how different measures as proxies for life history strategy (i.e., Mini-K and High-K Strategy Scale) relate to cooperation in various Economic Games. Studies 3 to 5 measured early childhood environments (i.e., childhood harshness and unpredictability), manipulated resource scarcity using previously validated methods, and then measured cooperation. Across our studies, we also examined four hypothesized psychological mechanisms that could explain the relation between life history strategy and cooperation: temporal discounting, concern for reputation, social value orientation, and trust in others. Overall, we found no support for the hypothesis that life history strategy predicts cooperation or that early childhood environments interact with current resource scarcity to predict cooperation. Thus, our initial findings imply that life history theory may not account for individual variation in cooperation with unknown others.
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prosocial behavior increases with age across five Economic Games
PLOS ONE, 2016Co-Authors: Yoshie Matsumoto, Toshio Yamagishi, Toko KiyonariAbstract:Ontogenic studies of human prosociality generally agree on that human prosociality increases from early childhood through early adulthood; however, it has not been established if prosociality increases beyond early adulthood. We examined a sample of 408 non-student residents from Tokyo, Japan, who were evenly distributed across age (20–59) and sex. Participants played five Economic Games each separated by a few months. We demonstrated that prosocial behavior increased with age beyond early adulthood and this effect was shown across all five Economic Games. A similar, but weaker, age-related trend was found in one of three social value orientation measures of prosocial preferences. We measured participants’ belief that manipulating others is a wise strategy for social success, and found that this belief declined with age. Participants’ satisfaction with the unilateral exploitation outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma Games also declined with age. These two factors—satisfaction with the DC outcome in the prisoner’s dilemma Games and belief in manipulation—mediated the age effect on both attitudinal and behavioral prosociality. Participants’ age-related socio-demographic traits such as marriage, having children, and owning a house weakly mediated the age effect on prosociality through their relationships with satisfaction with the DC outcome and belief in manipulation.
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Moral Bargain Hunters Purchase Moral Righteousness When it is Cheap: Within-Individual Effect of Stake Size in Economic Games
Scientific reports, 2016Co-Authors: Toshio Yamagishi, Yoshie Matsumoto, Toko KiyonariAbstract:Despite the repeatedly raised criticism that findings in Economic Games are specific to situations involving trivial incentives, most studies that have examined the stake-size effect have failed to find a strong effect. Using three prisoner’s dilemma experiments, involving 479 non-student residents of suburban Tokyo and 162 students, we show here that stake size strongly affects a player’s cooperation choices in prisoner’s dilemma Games when stake size is manipulated within each individual such that each player faces different stake sizes. Participants cooperated at a higher rate when stakes were lower than when they were higher, regardless of the absolute stake size. These findings suggest that participants were ‘moral bargain hunters’ who purchased moral righteousness at a low price when they were provided with a ‘price list’ of prosocial behaviours. In addition, the moral bargain hunters who cooperated at a lower stake but not at a higher stake did not cooperate in a single-stake one-shot game.
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Cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex predicts strategic choices in Economic Games
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2016Co-Authors: Toshio Yamagishi, Haruto Takagishi, Alan S. R. Fermin, Ryota Kanai, Yoshie MatsumotoAbstract:Human prosociality has been traditionally explained in the social sciences in terms of internalized social norms. Recent neuroscientific studies extended this traditional view of human prosociality by providing evidence that prosocial choices in Economic Games require cognitive control of the impulsive pursuit of self-interest. However, this view is challenged by an intuitive prosociality view emphasizing the spontaneous and heuristic basis of prosocial choices in Economic Games. We assessed the brain structure of 411 players of an ultimatum game (UG) and a dictator game (DG) and measured the strategic reasoning ability of 386. According to the reflective norm-enforcement view of prosociality, only those capable of strategically controlling their selfish impulses give a fair share in the UG, but cognitive control capability should not affect behavior in the DG. Conversely, we support the intuitive prosociality view by showing for the first time, to our knowledge, that strategic reasoning and cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were not related to giving in the UG but were negatively related to giving in the DG. This implies that the uncontrolled choice in the DG is prosocial rather than selfish, and those who have a thicker dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and are capable of strategic reasoning (goal-directed use of the theory of mind) control this intuitive drive for prosociality as a means to maximize reward when there are no future implications of choices.
Yoshie Matsumoto - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Response time in Economic Games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2017Co-Authors: Toshio Yamagishi, Yoshie Matsumoto, Toko Kiyonari, Haruto Takagishi, Ryota Kanai, Masamichi SakagamiAbstract:Behavioral and neuroscientific studies explore two pathways through which internalized social norms promote prosocial behavior. One pathway involves internal control of impulsive selfishness, and the other involves emotion-based prosocial preferences that are translated into behavior when they evade cognitive control for pursuing self-interest. We measured 443 participants’ overall prosocial behavior in four Economic Games. Participants’ predispositions [social value orientation (SVO)] were more strongly reflected in their overall game behavior when they made decisions quickly than when they spent a longer time. Prosocially (or selfishly) predisposed participants behaved less prosocially (or less selfishly) when they spent more time in decision making, such that their SVO prosociality yielded limited effects in actual behavior in their slow decisions. The increase (or decrease) in slower decision makers was prominent among consistent prosocials (or proselfs) whose strong preference for prosocial (or proself) goals would make it less likely to experience conflict between prosocial and proself goals. The strong effect of RT on behavior in consistent prosocials (or proselfs) suggests that conflict between prosocial and selfish goals alone is not responsible for slow decisions. Specifically, we found that contemplation of the risk of being exploited by others (social risk aversion) was partly responsible for making consistent prosocials (but not consistent proselfs) spend longer time in decision making and behave less prosocially. Conflict between means rather than between goals (immediate versus strategic pursuit of self-interest) was suggested to be responsible for the time-related increase in consistent proselfs’ prosocial behavior. The findings of this study are generally in favor of the intuitive cooperation model of prosocial behavior.
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prosocial behavior increases with age across five Economic Games
PLOS ONE, 2016Co-Authors: Yoshie Matsumoto, Toshio Yamagishi, Toko KiyonariAbstract:Ontogenic studies of human prosociality generally agree on that human prosociality increases from early childhood through early adulthood; however, it has not been established if prosociality increases beyond early adulthood. We examined a sample of 408 non-student residents from Tokyo, Japan, who were evenly distributed across age (20–59) and sex. Participants played five Economic Games each separated by a few months. We demonstrated that prosocial behavior increased with age beyond early adulthood and this effect was shown across all five Economic Games. A similar, but weaker, age-related trend was found in one of three social value orientation measures of prosocial preferences. We measured participants’ belief that manipulating others is a wise strategy for social success, and found that this belief declined with age. Participants’ satisfaction with the unilateral exploitation outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma Games also declined with age. These two factors—satisfaction with the DC outcome in the prisoner’s dilemma Games and belief in manipulation—mediated the age effect on both attitudinal and behavioral prosociality. Participants’ age-related socio-demographic traits such as marriage, having children, and owning a house weakly mediated the age effect on prosociality through their relationships with satisfaction with the DC outcome and belief in manipulation.
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Moral Bargain Hunters Purchase Moral Righteousness When it is Cheap: Within-Individual Effect of Stake Size in Economic Games
Scientific reports, 2016Co-Authors: Toshio Yamagishi, Yoshie Matsumoto, Toko KiyonariAbstract:Despite the repeatedly raised criticism that findings in Economic Games are specific to situations involving trivial incentives, most studies that have examined the stake-size effect have failed to find a strong effect. Using three prisoner’s dilemma experiments, involving 479 non-student residents of suburban Tokyo and 162 students, we show here that stake size strongly affects a player’s cooperation choices in prisoner’s dilemma Games when stake size is manipulated within each individual such that each player faces different stake sizes. Participants cooperated at a higher rate when stakes were lower than when they were higher, regardless of the absolute stake size. These findings suggest that participants were ‘moral bargain hunters’ who purchased moral righteousness at a low price when they were provided with a ‘price list’ of prosocial behaviours. In addition, the moral bargain hunters who cooperated at a lower stake but not at a higher stake did not cooperate in a single-stake one-shot game.
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Cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex predicts strategic choices in Economic Games
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2016Co-Authors: Toshio Yamagishi, Haruto Takagishi, Alan S. R. Fermin, Ryota Kanai, Yoshie MatsumotoAbstract:Human prosociality has been traditionally explained in the social sciences in terms of internalized social norms. Recent neuroscientific studies extended this traditional view of human prosociality by providing evidence that prosocial choices in Economic Games require cognitive control of the impulsive pursuit of self-interest. However, this view is challenged by an intuitive prosociality view emphasizing the spontaneous and heuristic basis of prosocial choices in Economic Games. We assessed the brain structure of 411 players of an ultimatum game (UG) and a dictator game (DG) and measured the strategic reasoning ability of 386. According to the reflective norm-enforcement view of prosociality, only those capable of strategically controlling their selfish impulses give a fair share in the UG, but cognitive control capability should not affect behavior in the DG. Conversely, we support the intuitive prosociality view by showing for the first time, to our knowledge, that strategic reasoning and cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were not related to giving in the UG but were negatively related to giving in the DG. This implies that the uncontrolled choice in the DG is prosocial rather than selfish, and those who have a thicker dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and are capable of strategic reasoning (goal-directed use of the theory of mind) control this intuitive drive for prosociality as a means to maximize reward when there are no future implications of choices.
Luke D. Smillie - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Politeness and Compassion Differentially Predict Adherence to Fairness Norms and Interventions to Norm Violations in Economic Games
Scientific reports, 2017Co-Authors: Kun Zhao, Eamonn Ferguson, Luke D. SmillieAbstract:Adherence to norms and interventions to norm violations are two important forms of social behaviour modelled in Economic Games. While both appear to serve a prosocial function, they may represent separate mechanisms corresponding with distinct emotional and psychological antecedents, and thus may be predicted by different personality traits. In this study, we compared adherence to fairness norms in the dictator game with responses to violations of the same norms in third-party punishment and recompensation Games with respect to prosocial traits from the Big Five and HEXACO models of personality. The results revealed a pattern of differential relations between prosocial traits and game behaviours. While norm adherence in the dictator game was driven by traits reflecting good manners and non-aggression (the politeness aspect of Big Five agreeableness and HEXACO honesty-humility), third-party recompensation of victims—and to a lesser extent, punishment of offenders—was uniquely driven by traits reflecting emotional concern for others (the compassion aspect of Big Five agreeableness). These findings demonstrate the discriminant validity between similar prosocial constructs and highlight the different prosocial motivations underlying Economic game behaviours.
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Prosocial Personality Traits Differentially Predict Egalitarianism, Generosity, and Reciprocity in Economic Games.
Frontiers in psychology, 2016Co-Authors: Kun Zhao, Eamonn Ferguson, Luke D. SmillieAbstract:Recent research has highlighted the role of prosocial personality traits—agreeableness and honesty-humility—in egalitarian distributions of wealth in the dictator game. Expanding on these findings, we ran two studies to examine individual differences in two other forms of prosociality—generosity and reciprocity—with respect to two major models of personality, the Big Five and the HEXACO. Participants (combined N = 560) completed a series of Economic Games in which allocations in the dictator game were compared with those in the generosity game, a non-constant-sum wealth distribution task where proposers with fixed payoffs selected the size of their partner’s payoff (“generosity”). We further examined positive and negative reciprocity by manipulating a partner’s previous move (“reciprocity”). Results showed clear evidence of both generosity and positive reciprocity in social preferences, with allocations to a partner greater in the generosity game than in the dictator game, and greater still when a player had been previously assisted by their partner. There was also a consistent interaction with gender, whereby men were more generous when this was costless and women were more egalitarian overall. Furthermore, these distinct forms of prosociality were differentially predicted by personality traits, in line with the core features of these traits and the theoretical distinctions between them. HEXACO honesty-humility predicted dictator, but not generosity allocations, while traits capturing tendencies towards irritability and anger predicted lower generosity, but not dictator allocations. In contrast, the politeness—but not compassion—aspect of Big Five agreeableness was uniquely and broadly associated with prosociality across all Games. These findings support the discriminant validity between related prosocial constructs, and have important implications for understanding the motives and mechanisms taking place within Economic Games.
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The Role of Interpersonal Traits in Social Decision Making: Exploring Sources of Behavioral Heterogeneity in Economic Games
Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology Inc, 2014Co-Authors: Kun Zhao, Luke D. SmillieAbstract:Economic Games are well-established experimental paradigms for modeling social decision making. A large body of literature has pointed to the heterogeneity of behavior within many of these Games, which might be partly explained by broad interpersonal trait dispositions. Using the Big Five and HEXACO (Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience) personality frameworks, we review the role of personality in two main classes of Economic Games: social dilemmas and bargaining Games. This reveals an emerging role for Big Five agreeableness in promoting cooperative, egalitarian, and altruistic behaviors across several Games, consistent with its core characteristic of maintaining harmonious interpersonal relations. The role for extraversion is less clear, which may reflect the divergent effects of its underlying agentic and affiliative motivational components. In addition, HEXACO honesty-humility and agreeableness may capture distinct aspects of prosocial behavior outside the bounds of the Five-Factor Model. Important considerations and directions for future studies are discussed within the emerging personality-Economics interface.
Toko Kiyonari - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Response time in Economic Games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2017Co-Authors: Toshio Yamagishi, Yoshie Matsumoto, Toko Kiyonari, Haruto Takagishi, Ryota Kanai, Masamichi SakagamiAbstract:Behavioral and neuroscientific studies explore two pathways through which internalized social norms promote prosocial behavior. One pathway involves internal control of impulsive selfishness, and the other involves emotion-based prosocial preferences that are translated into behavior when they evade cognitive control for pursuing self-interest. We measured 443 participants’ overall prosocial behavior in four Economic Games. Participants’ predispositions [social value orientation (SVO)] were more strongly reflected in their overall game behavior when they made decisions quickly than when they spent a longer time. Prosocially (or selfishly) predisposed participants behaved less prosocially (or less selfishly) when they spent more time in decision making, such that their SVO prosociality yielded limited effects in actual behavior in their slow decisions. The increase (or decrease) in slower decision makers was prominent among consistent prosocials (or proselfs) whose strong preference for prosocial (or proself) goals would make it less likely to experience conflict between prosocial and proself goals. The strong effect of RT on behavior in consistent prosocials (or proselfs) suggests that conflict between prosocial and selfish goals alone is not responsible for slow decisions. Specifically, we found that contemplation of the risk of being exploited by others (social risk aversion) was partly responsible for making consistent prosocials (but not consistent proselfs) spend longer time in decision making and behave less prosocially. Conflict between means rather than between goals (immediate versus strategic pursuit of self-interest) was suggested to be responsible for the time-related increase in consistent proselfs’ prosocial behavior. The findings of this study are generally in favor of the intuitive cooperation model of prosocial behavior.
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prosocial behavior increases with age across five Economic Games
PLOS ONE, 2016Co-Authors: Yoshie Matsumoto, Toshio Yamagishi, Toko KiyonariAbstract:Ontogenic studies of human prosociality generally agree on that human prosociality increases from early childhood through early adulthood; however, it has not been established if prosociality increases beyond early adulthood. We examined a sample of 408 non-student residents from Tokyo, Japan, who were evenly distributed across age (20–59) and sex. Participants played five Economic Games each separated by a few months. We demonstrated that prosocial behavior increased with age beyond early adulthood and this effect was shown across all five Economic Games. A similar, but weaker, age-related trend was found in one of three social value orientation measures of prosocial preferences. We measured participants’ belief that manipulating others is a wise strategy for social success, and found that this belief declined with age. Participants’ satisfaction with the unilateral exploitation outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma Games also declined with age. These two factors—satisfaction with the DC outcome in the prisoner’s dilemma Games and belief in manipulation—mediated the age effect on both attitudinal and behavioral prosociality. Participants’ age-related socio-demographic traits such as marriage, having children, and owning a house weakly mediated the age effect on prosociality through their relationships with satisfaction with the DC outcome and belief in manipulation.
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Moral Bargain Hunters Purchase Moral Righteousness When it is Cheap: Within-Individual Effect of Stake Size in Economic Games
Scientific reports, 2016Co-Authors: Toshio Yamagishi, Yoshie Matsumoto, Toko KiyonariAbstract:Despite the repeatedly raised criticism that findings in Economic Games are specific to situations involving trivial incentives, most studies that have examined the stake-size effect have failed to find a strong effect. Using three prisoner’s dilemma experiments, involving 479 non-student residents of suburban Tokyo and 162 students, we show here that stake size strongly affects a player’s cooperation choices in prisoner’s dilemma Games when stake size is manipulated within each individual such that each player faces different stake sizes. Participants cooperated at a higher rate when stakes were lower than when they were higher, regardless of the absolute stake size. These findings suggest that participants were ‘moral bargain hunters’ who purchased moral righteousness at a low price when they were provided with a ‘price list’ of prosocial behaviours. In addition, the moral bargain hunters who cooperated at a lower stake but not at a higher stake did not cooperate in a single-stake one-shot game.
Haruto Takagishi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Response time in Economic Games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2017Co-Authors: Toshio Yamagishi, Yoshie Matsumoto, Toko Kiyonari, Haruto Takagishi, Ryota Kanai, Masamichi SakagamiAbstract:Behavioral and neuroscientific studies explore two pathways through which internalized social norms promote prosocial behavior. One pathway involves internal control of impulsive selfishness, and the other involves emotion-based prosocial preferences that are translated into behavior when they evade cognitive control for pursuing self-interest. We measured 443 participants’ overall prosocial behavior in four Economic Games. Participants’ predispositions [social value orientation (SVO)] were more strongly reflected in their overall game behavior when they made decisions quickly than when they spent a longer time. Prosocially (or selfishly) predisposed participants behaved less prosocially (or less selfishly) when they spent more time in decision making, such that their SVO prosociality yielded limited effects in actual behavior in their slow decisions. The increase (or decrease) in slower decision makers was prominent among consistent prosocials (or proselfs) whose strong preference for prosocial (or proself) goals would make it less likely to experience conflict between prosocial and proself goals. The strong effect of RT on behavior in consistent prosocials (or proselfs) suggests that conflict between prosocial and selfish goals alone is not responsible for slow decisions. Specifically, we found that contemplation of the risk of being exploited by others (social risk aversion) was partly responsible for making consistent prosocials (but not consistent proselfs) spend longer time in decision making and behave less prosocially. Conflict between means rather than between goals (immediate versus strategic pursuit of self-interest) was suggested to be responsible for the time-related increase in consistent proselfs’ prosocial behavior. The findings of this study are generally in favor of the intuitive cooperation model of prosocial behavior.
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Cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex predicts strategic choices in Economic Games
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2016Co-Authors: Toshio Yamagishi, Haruto Takagishi, Alan S. R. Fermin, Ryota Kanai, Yoshie MatsumotoAbstract:Human prosociality has been traditionally explained in the social sciences in terms of internalized social norms. Recent neuroscientific studies extended this traditional view of human prosociality by providing evidence that prosocial choices in Economic Games require cognitive control of the impulsive pursuit of self-interest. However, this view is challenged by an intuitive prosociality view emphasizing the spontaneous and heuristic basis of prosocial choices in Economic Games. We assessed the brain structure of 411 players of an ultimatum game (UG) and a dictator game (DG) and measured the strategic reasoning ability of 386. According to the reflective norm-enforcement view of prosociality, only those capable of strategically controlling their selfish impulses give a fair share in the UG, but cognitive control capability should not affect behavior in the DG. Conversely, we support the intuitive prosociality view by showing for the first time, to our knowledge, that strategic reasoning and cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were not related to giving in the UG but were negatively related to giving in the DG. This implies that the uncontrolled choice in the DG is prosocial rather than selfish, and those who have a thicker dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and are capable of strategic reasoning (goal-directed use of the theory of mind) control this intuitive drive for prosociality as a means to maximize reward when there are no future implications of choices.
