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Regina T Riphahn - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the Effect of Employment protection on worker effort absenteeism during and after probation
    Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Regina T Riphahn
    Abstract:

    Employment protection systems are widely believed to generate distortions in firms' hiring and firing decisions. However, much less is known about the impact of these regulations on workers' behavior. In this paper we provide evidence on the latter question using data from a large Italian bank. Our analysis is based on weekly observations for 545 men and 313 females hired as white-collar workers between January 1993 and February 1995. These workers begin to be protected against firing only after the 12th week of tenure, and we observe them for one year. We show that—particularly for men—the number of days of absence per week increases significantly once Employment protection is granted at the end of probation. This suggests that the provision of Employment protection causes the increase in absenteeism. Alternative explanations based on career concerns or on learning about social norms would predict a smooth relationship between absenteeism and tenure instead of the observed discrete jump. This consequence of Employment protection seems to have been neglected in European policy debates so far. (JEL: J2, D2, D8, M5)

  • the Effect of Employment protection on worker effort absenteeism during and after probation
    Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Regina T Riphahn
    Abstract:

    Employment protection systems are widely believed to generate distortions in firms' hiring and firing decisions. However, much less is known about the impact of these regulations on workers' behavior. In this paper we provide evidence on the latter question using data from a large Italian bank. Our analysis is based on weekly observations for 545 men and 313 females hired as white-collar workers between January 1993 and February 1995. These workers begin to be protected against firing only after the 12th week of tenure, and we observe them for one year. We show that-particularly for men-the number of days of absence per week increases significantly once Employment protection is granted at the end of probation. This suggests that the provision of Employment protection causes the increase in absenteeism. Alternative explanations based on career concerns or on learning about social norms would predict a smooth relationship between absenteeism and tenure instead of the observed discrete jump. This consequence of Employment protection seems to have been neglected in European policy debates so far. (JEL: J2, D2, D8, M5) Copyright (c) 2005 by the European Economic Association.

  • the Effect of Employment protection on worker effort a comparison of absenteeism during and after probation
    Journal of the European Economic Association, 2001
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Regina T Riphahn
    Abstract:

    Employment protection systems are known to generate significant distortions in firms’ hiring and firing decisions. We know much less about the impact of these regulations on worker effort. The goal of this paper is to fill in this gap and in particular to assess whether the provision of Employment protection induces less effort among workers in the form of absenteeism. Our analysis is based on weekly observations for the 858 white collar workers hired by a large Italian bank between January 1993 and February 1995. These workers begin to be protected against firing only after the twelfth week of tenure and we observe them for one year. We show that the number of days of absence per week more than doubles once Employment protection is granted, thus confirming what is suggested by our theoretical model and what is typically assumed in the literature. We also discuss how this evidence can be used to estimate what the absenteeism rate would be in Italy if Employment protection were eliminated.

  • the Effect of Employment protection on worker effort a comparison of absenteeism during and after probation
    2001
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Regina T Riphahn
    Abstract:

    Employment protection systems are known to generate significant distortions in firms' hiring and firing decisions. We know much less about the impact of these regulations on workers behaviour. The goal of this Paper is to fill in this gap and in particular to assess whether the provision of Employment protection induces more absenteeism among workers. Our analysis is based on weekly observations for the 858 white-collar workers hired by a large Italian bank between January 1993 and February 1995. These workers begin to be protected against firing only after the twelfth week of tenure and we observe them for one year. We show that the number of day's absence per week more than doubles once Employment protection is granted. This result offers a preliminary but robust piece of evidence to evaluate a consequence of Employment protection systems that has been relatively neglected in the policy debate in Europe.

Andrea Ichino - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the Effect of Employment protection on worker effort absenteeism during and after probation
    Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Regina T Riphahn
    Abstract:

    Employment protection systems are widely believed to generate distortions in firms' hiring and firing decisions. However, much less is known about the impact of these regulations on workers' behavior. In this paper we provide evidence on the latter question using data from a large Italian bank. Our analysis is based on weekly observations for 545 men and 313 females hired as white-collar workers between January 1993 and February 1995. These workers begin to be protected against firing only after the 12th week of tenure, and we observe them for one year. We show that—particularly for men—the number of days of absence per week increases significantly once Employment protection is granted at the end of probation. This suggests that the provision of Employment protection causes the increase in absenteeism. Alternative explanations based on career concerns or on learning about social norms would predict a smooth relationship between absenteeism and tenure instead of the observed discrete jump. This consequence of Employment protection seems to have been neglected in European policy debates so far. (JEL: J2, D2, D8, M5)

  • the Effect of Employment protection on worker effort absenteeism during and after probation
    Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Regina T Riphahn
    Abstract:

    Employment protection systems are widely believed to generate distortions in firms' hiring and firing decisions. However, much less is known about the impact of these regulations on workers' behavior. In this paper we provide evidence on the latter question using data from a large Italian bank. Our analysis is based on weekly observations for 545 men and 313 females hired as white-collar workers between January 1993 and February 1995. These workers begin to be protected against firing only after the 12th week of tenure, and we observe them for one year. We show that-particularly for men-the number of days of absence per week increases significantly once Employment protection is granted at the end of probation. This suggests that the provision of Employment protection causes the increase in absenteeism. Alternative explanations based on career concerns or on learning about social norms would predict a smooth relationship between absenteeism and tenure instead of the observed discrete jump. This consequence of Employment protection seems to have been neglected in European policy debates so far. (JEL: J2, D2, D8, M5) Copyright (c) 2005 by the European Economic Association.

  • the Effect of Employment protection on worker effort a comparison of absenteeism during and after probation
    Journal of the European Economic Association, 2001
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Regina T Riphahn
    Abstract:

    Employment protection systems are known to generate significant distortions in firms’ hiring and firing decisions. We know much less about the impact of these regulations on worker effort. The goal of this paper is to fill in this gap and in particular to assess whether the provision of Employment protection induces less effort among workers in the form of absenteeism. Our analysis is based on weekly observations for the 858 white collar workers hired by a large Italian bank between January 1993 and February 1995. These workers begin to be protected against firing only after the twelfth week of tenure and we observe them for one year. We show that the number of days of absence per week more than doubles once Employment protection is granted, thus confirming what is suggested by our theoretical model and what is typically assumed in the literature. We also discuss how this evidence can be used to estimate what the absenteeism rate would be in Italy if Employment protection were eliminated.

  • the Effect of Employment protection on worker effort a comparison of absenteeism during and after probation
    2001
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Regina T Riphahn
    Abstract:

    Employment protection systems are known to generate significant distortions in firms' hiring and firing decisions. We know much less about the impact of these regulations on workers behaviour. The goal of this Paper is to fill in this gap and in particular to assess whether the provision of Employment protection induces more absenteeism among workers. Our analysis is based on weekly observations for the 858 white-collar workers hired by a large Italian bank between January 1993 and February 1995. These workers begin to be protected against firing only after the twelfth week of tenure and we observe them for one year. We show that the number of day's absence per week more than doubles once Employment protection is granted. This result offers a preliminary but robust piece of evidence to evaluate a consequence of Employment protection systems that has been relatively neglected in the policy debate in Europe.

Kusum Singh - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • part time Employment in high school and its Effect on academic achievement
    Journal of Educational Research, 1998
    Co-Authors: Kusum Singh
    Abstract:

    Abstract Part-time Employment during high school has grown dramatically. High school students are twice as likely to be working part-time as they were in 1950. Despite the fact that many adolescents work between the ages of 12 and 17, little empirical evidence exists about the impact of part-time Employment on academic performance. In the present research, the nationally representative sample of 10th graders, the First Follow-Up of the National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS-88), was used to examine the Effects of part-time work during the school year on academic achievement, as measured by the standardized achievement scores and high school grades earned in 4 subject areas: English, mathematics, science, and social studies. The findings of the study point to a small negative Effect of Employment on both measures of achievement when socioeconomic status, gender, and previous achievement were controlled. The study helps to illuminate an important question and has implications for parents, edu...

Giovanni Pica - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • who pays for it the heterogeneous wage Effects of Employment protection legislation
    The Economic Journal, 2013
    Co-Authors: Marco Leonardi, Giovanni Pica
    Abstract:

    This study estimates the Effect of Employment protection legislation on wages, exploiting the 1990 Italian reform that introduced unjust dismissal costs for firms below 15 employees. We find that the slight average wage reduction induced by the reform hides highly heterogeneous Effects. Workers who change firm during the reform period suffer a drop in the entry wage, while incumbent workers are left unaffected. Also, the negative Effect of the reform is stronger for young blue collars, low-wage workers and workers in low-Employment regions. This pattern suggests that the ability of employers to shift firing costs onto wages depends on workers’ relative bargaining power.

  • who pays for it the heterogeneous wage Effects of Employment protection legislation
    2010
    Co-Authors: Marco Leonardi, Giovanni Pica
    Abstract:

    Theory predicts that the wage Effects of government-mandated severance payments depend on workers' and firms' relative bargaining power. This paper estimates the Effect of Employment protection legislation (EPL) on workers' individual wages in a quasi-experimental setting, exploiting a reform that introduced unjust-dismissal costs in Italy for firms below 15 employees and left firing costs unchanged for bigger firms. Accounting for the endogeneity of the treatment status, we find that high-bargaining power workers (stayers, white collar and workers above 45) are almost left unaffected by the increase in EPL, while low-bargaining power workers (movers, blue collar and young workers) suffer a drop both in the wage level and its growth rate.

  • the Effect of Employment protection legislation and financial market imperfections on investment evidence from a firm level panel of eu countries
    Economic Policy, 2010
    Co-Authors: Federico Cingano, Marco Leonardi, Julian Messina, Giovanni Pica
    Abstract:

    This paper analyzes the joint Effect of EPL and financial market imperfections on investment, capital-labour substitution, labour productivity and job reallocation in a cross-country framework. In the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006), we exploit variation in the need for reallocation at the sectoral and aggregate level to assess the average Effect of EPL on firms’ policies. Then, exploiting firm-level information we study if the Effect of EPL is stronger in firms with lower levels of internal resources. We find that, on average, EPL reduces investment per worker, capital per worker and value added per worker in high reallocation sectors relative to low reallocation sectors. The reduction in the capital-labour ratio is less pronounced in firms with higher internal resources, suggesting that financial constraints exacerbate the negative Effects of EPL on capital deepening.

Robert A Moffitt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the Effect of Employment and training programs on entry and exit from the welfare caseload
    Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1996
    Co-Authors: Robert A Moffitt
    Abstract:

    To policymakers, the major attraction of Employment and training programs for welfare recipients is that they hold out the prospect that recipients can be moved off the rolls and to self-sufficiency in the private labor market, thereby decreasing welfare costs and caseloads. This article considers the possibility that such programs may also affect the attractiveness of welfare in the first place, either by making welfare less desirable because the work-training program is viewed by recipients as a burden, or by making it more desirable because the program is viewed favorably by potential applicants. Such responses are termed here “entry rate Effects.” Some empirical estimates are presented which suggest that the magnitude of such entry rate Effects on the caseload, where positive or negative, may be quite large.